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Xianfeng 1851-1861
Tongzhi (regent and de facto ruler:
Empress Dowager Cixi) 1862-1874
Guangxu (regent and de facto ruler:
Empress Dowager Cixi) 1875-1908
Xuantong (Child emperor Puyi, regent: Zaifeng) 1909-1911
Weights and volume1
1 ge 合 0.1035 l in the Qing, 0.0987 l in the Ming, 0.0836 l in 
the Yuan, 0.0585 l in the Song
1 sheng 升 (peck) 10 ge合, 1.035 l (Qing), 0.987 l (Ming), 0.836 l (Yuan), 
0.585 l (Song)
1 dou 斗 (pint) 10 sheng 升, 10.35 l (Qing), 9.87 l (Ming), 8.36 l (Yuan), 
5,85 l (Song)
1 qian 錢 (mace) 3.73 g
1 liang 兩 (ounce) 10 qian, 37.3 g
1 jin 斤 (catty) 16 liang (in most, not all regions), 596.8 g (Qing), 590 g 
(Ming), 633 g (Yuan and Song)
shi 石as a measure of volume
1 shi of rice = 138.75 catties (jin 斤) = 82.8 kg
shi 石 as a measure of weight
1 shi = 120 catties = 157.896 pounds = 71.5 kg [1 pound = 0.453 kg]
1 catty = 1.3158 pounds (kuping 庫平 or imperial standard)
1 ton = 2240 pounds = 1702.3863 catties
shi 石as a measure for ship capacity, according to its quality as measure 
of weight
250 shi = 30,000 catties = 17.5 tons
500 shi = 60,000 catties = 35 tons
1,000 shi = 120,000 catties = 70 tons
1,500 shi = 180,000 catties = 105 tons
2,000 shi = 240,000 catties = 140 tons
3,000 shi = 360,000 catties = 210 tons
4,000 shi = 480,000 catties = 280 tons
5,000 shi = 600,000 catties = 350 tons
6,000 shi = 720,000 catties = 420 tons
7,000 shi = 840,000 catties = 490 tons
8,000 shi = 960,000 catties = 560 tons
1 Endymion Wilkinson, Chinese History, p. 238.
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Currencies
tael: liang兩 (ounce) of unminted silver, 100 percent purity (unless otherwise 
stated): 10 qian (mace)
Kuping liang 庫平兩: 37.31 grams, imperial standard set by the Board of 
Revenue, used for off icial accounts. Many other regional liang weights exist, 
such as the Customs ounce (haiguan liang 海關兩): 37.68 grams, adopted 
after the Maritime Customs was established in 1858, used for tariff.
Canton weight ounce (Guangping liang 廣平兩): 37.57 grams
Transport weight ounce (caoping liang 漕平兩): 36.54 grams, the standard 
for commuting tax in rice
cash: wen 文, brass coin, copper-lead-zinc-tin alloy, with standard exchange 
rate 1000 cash to one tael of silver. Many regional and local variances of 
conversion rates existed legally and illegally. The cash was bound in ten 
strings of hundred and is sometimes accounted in strings of thousands (吊).
yuan 圓 (Chinese dollar): 10 mao. Exchange rate 0.75 yuan to one tael of silver.
British pound: Before 1871, f ixed at 1 ₤ per 3 tael haiguan liang, or 6 shillings 
7 pence per haiguan liang.2




This book has been developed over a span of time and at several academic 
institutions where I had the opportunity to pursue my research. The idea 
originated from a DFG (German Research Council) project that I coordinated 
under the direction of Professor Hans Ulrich Vogel at the Institute of Chinese 
and Korean Studies of Tübingen University between 2000 and 2003. Our 
research focused on handicraft regulations ( jiangzuo zeli 匠作則例), a type 
of source def ined by the art historian and connoisseur Wang Shixiang 王
世襄 (1914-2009). These regulations are made up of texts and lists of the 
parts of buildings and the products for off icial use, often with specif ications 
and prices, sometimes with norms on the working times for objects or 
services. The project ended in a large workshop and the publication of a 
collected volume of articles that explored handicraft regulations for the 
issues of technical, monetary, administrative, and f inancial history, with 
comparative perspectives on the history of European craft production.1 
Personally, this was a most inspiring initiation into the world of technical 
administration from the seventeenth through the early twentieth centuries 
and into the scholarly company of technical and craft historians within 
China and abroad. In the course of that project, I was lucky enough to 
be introduced to the important Beijing groups of the Qinghua University 
Institute for Ancient Technical Texts (Qinghua daxue Kejishi ji gu wenxian 
yanjiusuo 清华大学科技史暨古文献研究所, ‘Kegusuo’) and to the Institute 
for the History of Natural Sciences of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, 
the (Zhongguo kexueyuan Ziran kexueshi yanjiusuo 中国科学院自然科学
史研究所 ‘Keshisuo’). I learned a lot from the members of these groups of 
scholars, who also attended the Tübingen workshop in 2003.
Yet, as instructive as the explorations of handicraft regulations were, 
these sources require great effort to draw out a historical narrative. As 
tools for contemporary Qing administrators and technical supervisors of 
building or production projects, they were more often lists of ingredients 
rather than recipes, intended to serve the purposes of informed people and 
therefore rarely opening up a wider frame of knowledge on the objects they 
describe. What was their purpose? Who constructed or produced them, 
and under what conditions? Together with Song Jianze and Liu Qiang from 
the Qinghua University Kegusuo, and on the basis of Wang Shixiang’s f irst 
1 Moll-Murata, Song Jianze, Hans Ulrich Vogel (eds.), Chinese Handicraft Regulations of the 
Qing Dynasty.
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survey, I collected the titles of some two hundred handicraft regulations.2 I 
used some of them for my research on imperial building projects and became 
curious about the larger frameworks, the institutions that employed the 
craftspeople, and about the craftspeople themselves.
My next research appointment led me to Utrecht University in the 
Netherlands, where Jan Luiten van Zanden and members of the Research 
Group Economic and Social History within the History Department are 
conducting global comparative research on issues of economic and social 
history. This unfolded a new academic f ield for me and enabled me to place 
Chinese craft history in a wider context. Not only were the regulations 
and precedents put to good use, since information on wage levels and the 
cost of transportation and materials could be gleaned from them, but I 
also had the chance to explore the f ield of private craft production from 
the perspective of the Chinese guilds in comparison to their European 
counterparts. My stay at Utrecht consisted of two years full of intellectual 
stimulation and challenges which initiated my turn towards comparative 
Eurasian history. Together with Jan Luiten van Zanden, I visited the eminent 
economic historian Li Bozhong 李伯重 at Qinghua University and the 
Department of Economics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 中国
社会科学院经济研究所, where I had the chance to meet Xu Jianqing 徐
建青, to whose research on Chinese crafts in the Qing dynasty this study 
owes much inspiration and insight.
This study was thereafter accepted as a habilitation thesis by the Faculty of 
Cultural Studies at the Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen. Meanwhile, a 
further engagement in the Netherlands had opened the doors of the Interna-
tional Institute of Social History (IISH) for me, where I coordinated its newly 
founded research group known as the Global Collaboratory on the History 
of Labour Relations, 1500-2000 (the ‘Collab’) for one year. The then research 
director of the IISH, Marcel van der Linden, kindly suggested including this 
thesis in one of the Institute’s series, Social Histories of Work in Asia, and I 
found a sharp-sighted and circumspect editor in Ulbe Bosma, who patiently 
steered me through the rewriting process. Harriet Zurndorfer from Leiden 
University read the entire manuscript and gave valuable advice on how to 
polish the arguments and restructure the presentation. My research at the 
IISH, in the framework of the methodical approach of the Collab, made me 
recalibrate and take a wider perspective on work and labour in the Ming and 
Qing, the Republic, and the People’s Republic of China. From the Collab’s 
steering group ‒ which consists of Jan Lucassen, Marcel van der Linden, 
2 ‘Union List of Handicraft Regulations of the Qing Dynasty’.
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and Karin Hofmeester ‒ and from its many participants, I learned much 
about the world of labour in space and time.3
Heiner Roetz gave me the opportunity to take up the position of Academic 
Reader at the Faculty of East Asian Studies at Ruhr-Universität Bochum. A 
period of intensive teaching ensued, with an interruption of a three-month 
respite for research in the summer of 2016 which enabled me to work on the 
manuscript in a concentrated manner. For this opportunity, I am grateful 
to the IISH’s present research director, Leo Lucassen, and the vice research 
director, Karin Hofmeester, and for the support in Bochum by Jörn-Carsten 
Gottwald and Andrea Halbmeyer. At last, this book can be presented to the 
general public, edited under the guidance of Saskia Gieling from Amsterdam 
University Press.
I would like to thank the mentors who created the intellectual, institutional, 
and economic framework that made work on this study possible: Hans Ulrich 
Vogel (Tübingen), Jan Luiten van Zanden (Utrecht), Jan Lucassen and Marcel 
van der Linden (Amsterdam), and Heiner Roetz (Bochum). Furthermore, I am 
indebted to the habilitation committee, Hans Ulrich Vogel, Achim Mittag, 
and Robert Horres from Tübingen University, Jan Lucassen (Vrije Universiteit 
and IISH, Amsterdam), and Iwo Amelung (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt) for 
their critical reading and their encouragement to publish this manuscript.
I am deeply grateful to my friends and colleagues who read and discussed 
with me longer and shorter parts of the manuscript before the habilitation: 
Jessica Dijkman (Utrecht), who commented on the economic historical per-
spectives, and Monique Nagel-Angermann (Münster), who looked into the 
sinological issues. My colleagues in Utrecht, Erika Kuijpers and Tine De Moor, 
whose office I shared (together with Jessica Dijkman), gave me important advice 
on the chapter entitled ‘The Artisan’s Place’, and I enjoyed De Moor and Maarten 
Prak’s manifold suggestions for research perspectives on guilds in China.
The Chinese colleagues to whom I could turn for questions and issues 
about Qing craft and technical history were, most importantly, Song Jianze 
宋建昃 as well as Liu Qiang 刘蔷, You Zhanhong 游战洪 and Dai Wusan 戴
吾三 from Qinghua University, and the directors of Kegusuo, Gao Xuan 高
瑄 and Feng Lisheng 冯立昇. Moreover, I profited from conversations with 
the eminent architectural historian at Qinghua University, Guo Daiheng 
郭黛姮. At the Institute for the History of Natural Sciences of the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences, my partners for scholarly exchange were Su Rongyu 
苏荣誉 and Chen Chaoyong 陈朝勇. I am particularly grateful to Su Rongyu 
3 See the list of participants, as of 2012: https://collab.iisg.nl/c/document_library/get_f ile?p_l_id
=273223&folderId=277142&name=DLFE-144108.pdf
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for introducing me to Wang Shixiang and his wife Yuan Quanyou 袁荃猷 
(1920-2003) in their Beijing home. I greatly cherish the discussions with 
these f ine scholars, both in Beijing and in Germany.
Among the several occasions I had for presenting aspects of my research, 
I would like to point out in particular the 2010 workshop at the Max Planck 
Institute for the History of Science in Berlin conducted by Dagmar Schäfer 
in her Workshop Discussion Series ‘Technological Cultures: Themes and 
Methods in the History of Technology’. In a more intimate setting, I had a 
long and enlightening conversation with the technical and social historians 
of Japan, Erich Pauer and Regine Mathias, about the Japanese government 
shipyards at Yokosuka in the Meiji period and the feasibility and usefulness 
of China-Japan comparisons. Moreover, Wolfgang Behr’s erudite explana-
tions about the etymology of terms relating to crafts and craftspeople were 
extremely useful to me.
During the editorial process, Harriet Zurndorfer generously provided 
me with treasures from her storehouse of knowledge to structure, amend, 
and prune the text. Ulbe Bosma was a formidable editorial helmsman who 
helped me stay the course. Aad Blok gave good advice about the reproduction 
of tables and illustrations.
Moreover, I benefitted from the administrative support of Ilse Wiech and 
the research assistance provided by Juliane Kiefner in Tübingen, and I greatly 
appreciated the help offered by the librarians Thomas Gaiser (Tübingen) 
and Ilse Dilger (Bochum), and by the Bochum student assistants Huang 
Gufeng and Anja Bemnarek. I am obliged to Bettina Dilger (Gelsenkirchen), 
who accurately designed the maps. Stephen Thomas, a graduate from the 
University of Kansas, faithfully and continuously helped me to polish my 
expression of English in this book. Thanks also to Saskia Gieling and her 
team of able editors at Amsterdam University Press for their professional 
processing of the text: Jaap Wagenaar and Gioia Marini.
My family provided a safe haven of emotional, moral, and organizational 
support. Unforgettable are my mother’s childminding and housekeeping 
missions during the Tübingen workshop and while I f inished the habilitation 
manuscript. In addition, my sister Gertrud proofread the entire text in its 
f irst version for the habilitation committee. My husband Masato and son Leo 
tolerated the many weekends and holidays I spent in front of the computer, 
and Masato proofread the Chinese characters in the text. I am grateful for 
their kindness, patience, and encouragement.
Cheers and praise to all my companions in research and in life who saw the 
growth of this study and accompanied me for parts ‒ or the entire process ‒ of 











































Since the People’s Republic of China joined the World Trade Organization in 
2001, its exports of manufactured goods have soared to a degree that earned 
it the label of the ‘workbench of the world’.1 This study offers a retrospec-
tive view from the early modern situation of handicraft manufacturing in 
China to the beginnings of industrialization, spanning the period from the 
seventeenth through the early twentieth centuries when China was ruled 
by the Qing dynasty. The perspective is on the interior organization and 
the eff iciency of the state administration relevant to the sector of craft 
production.
Regarding internal social, political, and economic processes, some 
scholars argue that until about 1800, China stood on an equal level with 
those overseas powers that came to rise in the era of industrialization and 
imperialism. However, forty years later, the Chinese state was forced to cede 
absolute legal power over import and export decisions in subsequent warfare 
and treaties. Thus, the centuries between 1700 and 1900, when the Manchu 
Qing dynasty ruled China, witnessed decisive changes and turning points. 
This concerns the state economic policies as well as economic activities in 
the private sector. How did the government accomplish craft production, 
and what were the reactions of the private producers and distributors? How 
did industrialization set in, and how did it change government decisions 
and household strategies?
The author f irst studied the impact of the Qing state on handicrafts, 
with a special focus on public construction, in a research project on ‘Staat, 
Handwerk und Gewerbe in Peking, 1700-1900’.2 The main source materials for 
this project consisted of the so-called jiangzuo zeli or ‘handicraft regulations’, 
off icial documents and compilations that previously received little scholarly 
1 In 2009, China ranked f irst in world merchandise exports, and in 2015 its manufactures 
made up 94.3 percent of its total exports. See World Trade Organization (ed.), International Trade 
Statistics 2015, p. 25, World Trade Statistical Review 2016, p. 44 ff., and ‘Trade Profiles: China’ for the 
2015 data. Recently, some observers argue that Chinese manufacturing has already passed the 
stage of being a mere ‘workbench’. See for instance Jennifer Hudson, 1000 New Designs, p. 8 [2006]; 
Lin Chaoyi et al., ‘Die 100 innovativsten Unternehmen aus China’, p. 149 [2014]; Martin Wocher, 
‘Explaining China’s Buying Binge’ (16 March 2016). The assertion is that Chinese producers not 
only execute given designs but also develop their own ones (Hudson), that their focus shifts to 
innovation and improvement of quality (Lin), and that Chinese investors increasingly acquire 
high-end production plants abroad (Wocher).
2 ‘State and Handicrafts in Peking, 1700-1900’, DFG project VO 472/10, Tübingen University, 
Institute for Chinese and Korean Studies.
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attention but are now being increasingly appreciated. Between 1997 and 2007, 
these sources were reproduced in several large reprint series. Together with 
colleagues from Qinghua University, the author established an inventory of 
all known handicraft regulations.3 Up until the present, these administrative 
references, account books, and cost estimates have proved to be a valuable 
source of information, for instance in the hands of architects and historians 
of architecture who analyze and rebuild historical buildings in the course 
of initiatives for the preservation of Chinese cultural heritage. Handicraft 
regulations also contain information relevant to socioeconomic history 
concerning wage norms and structures of cooperation and supervision 
together with the rules of conduct within the palace precincts.
If seen as an integral group of texts, these handicraft regulations clearly 
show which productive sectors were of concern to the state administration, 
and they convey insights into the norms of accountability and quality con-
trol. Although similar compendia are known from periods prior to the Qing, 
their number and broad coverage of craft sectors are unique. However, so far 
they have not been widely taken into account. Before outlining the issues 
of relevance for the pertinence of state administration to craft production, 
it is necessary to consider the state of the f ield as regards the economic and 
technical history of the late imperial era.
Current Approaches to Chinese Economic History
Three influential paradigms have shaped the reception of the economic 
history of late imperial China since the foundation of the People’s Republic 
in 1949.
In the f irst three decades of the People’s Republic of China, Chinese 
Marxist economic historians concentrated on the question of why an 
indigenous industrial capitalism did not develop in China in the course 
of the period of commercialization of the sixteenth century, whereas 
in Western Europe similar developments prepared the ground for the 
emergence of capitalism. The theory of the so-called ‘sprouts of capitalism’ 
has engendered a great amount of valuable empirical research on Chinese 
craft production as well as the only overviews of craft history in Chinese 
up to this date. However, the question as to why full-f ledged industrial 
capitalism had not set in before the advent of Western imperialism remains 
inconclusive. In view of the actual developmental path of the Chinese 
3 ‘Union List of Handicraft Regulations of the Qing Dynasty’.
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economy that includes moderate development under socialism and a 
subsequent trend to world market integration, the approach of identifying 
the characteristics of ‘sprouts of capitalism’ has subsided. As Timothy 
Brook observed in 1999, since the 1980s, ‘incorporation [of capitalism] 
rather than transcendence [is] the current concern’ for Chinese scholarly 
research in the social sciences.4
As economic reforms reopened Chinese markets to the capitalist world, 
and in consideration of the economic success of China’s neighbouring coun-
tries Japan and the four ‘small dragons’ South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
and Singapore, certain traits of economic behaviour and social ethics of the 
merchant or entrepreneur class were ascribed to the common ‘Confucian’ 
heritage of these nations and polities.5 The theses of ‘New Confucianism’ or 
‘Post-Confucianism’, formulated by the Chinese American-based scholars Yü 
Ying-shih and Tu Wei-ming, quite astonished researchers in the West, who 
were aware that throughout the twentieth century, Marxist and non-Marxist 
scholarship had blamed Confucianism, and especially its family values, as 
a hindrance to capitalism and modernity. The New Confucian about-turn 
away from the negative image of Confucianism to a positive and dynamic 
set of values (from the perspective of a capitalist and industrialized society), 
with a paradigmatic f igure such as the ‘Confucian merchant’, gave a more 
optimistic view of Chinese history, especially for the nineteenth century, 
which according to the Marxist Party orthodoxy had merely been an era 
of stagnation.6 Now Confucianism was seen as a stimulus for capitalism 
similar to the Protestant ethic that Max Weber had identif ied as the driving 
force behind the rise of Western capitalism. Weber’s explanation of the 
question of why China had not developed an indigenous capitalism, which 
was attributed to a ‘religious inner-worldliness’ and the despotic power of 
Chinese officialdom, was thus ‘turned on its head’ (Zurndorfer) by Yu and Tu’s 
focus on the impact of Confucian merchant ethics for the commercialization 
that started in the sixteenth century.7
A third, historically revisionist theory on the position of China in the 
eighteenth-century global economy has been developed by the so-called 
‘California School’, especially its representatives Roy Bin Wong and Kenneth 
4 Timothy Brook, Capitalism, p. 156. Nevertheless, the concept is still being discussed and 
applied by certain researchers, such as for instance Ma Yong, ‘Xiandaihua qidian’ (2015) and or 
Wang Haiming ‘Zibenzhuyi mengya gainian fenxi’ (2016).
5 For a perceptive analysis of the revision of the role of ‘Confucianism’ in Chinese politics, 
society, and economy, see Harriet Zurndorfer, ‘Confusing Confucianism with Capitalism’.
6 Brook, Capitalism, p. 154.
7 Zurndorfer, ‘Confusing Confucianism with Capitalism’, pp. 7-8.
24 State anD CraftS in the Qing DynaSt y (1644-1911) 
Pomeranz.8 This school comes to the conclusion that with regard to a 
variety of crucial economic factors, such as demography, capital accumula-
tion, labour systems, markets, rural production, consumption, and even 
technology, China and Europe were on a more or less equal level before a 
transitional phase of 1750-1800. According to this line of thought, until the 
mid-eighteenth century, Western Europe was not uniquely productive or 
economically eff icient from a global perspective, and it seems most likely 
that until the middle of the eighteenth century, no part of the world was 
headed for an industrial breakthrough.9 It was more or less contingency, 
namely the convenient location of coal in England as well as the products of 
overseas colonies, especially American cotton, that enabled Great Britain to 
launch its industrial revolution.10 This view (as a whole or in its components) 
has caused much controversy in Europe, the U.S.A., and China. It has, for 
instance, triggered a debate between the representatives of the California 
School and those who see the traditional Chinese state as being inher-
ently ineff icient in promoting technological advances and responsible for 
continuous involution of the economy since the mid-eighteenth century. 
This opposition to the California School has found its most prominent 
representative in Philip C.C. Huang, who considers the situation in China 
during the eighteenth century as the beginning of an economic disaster that 
was overcome only in the last two decades or perhaps even continues to this 
day.11 Experts of European economic and social history remain sceptical as 
to whether European and Chinese incomes and standards of living around 
1800 in the most advanced Chinese and Western European regions were 
actually on a par.12 Other historians not related to the California School 
have nuanced the idea that the imperial state acted as an impediment to 
economic development, claiming that it made positive or at least reasonable 
contributions in particular phases of the Qing dynasty.13
8 Pomeranz, The Great Divergence; Wong, China Transformed; Rosenthal and Wong, Before 
and Beyond Divergence.
9 Pomeranz, The Great Divergence, p. 206.
10 Pomeranz, ibid., pp. 51-52 (coal), 54/55 (cotton), 66 (coal), 283-285 (cotton).
11 See Philip C.C. Huang ‘Development or involution’ and Pomeranz’ reply, ‘Beyond the East-West 
Binary’. For overviews regarding the state of the debate, see Peer Vries ‘The California School and 
Beyond’, Patrick O’Brien, ‘Ten Years of Debate on the Origins of the Great Divergence’, Robert 
Eng, ‘From ‘The West and the Rest’ to Global Interconnectedness’.
12 Robert Allen et al., ‘Wages, Prices, and Living Standards in China’, pp. 9, 31.
13 See, for instance, Helen Dunstan’s arguments for the basically good conditions for policymak-
ing during the Qianlong period, despite the emperor’s autocratic propensities, in her State or 
Merchant, p. 468 ff., or Jane Kate Leonard’s study on the handling of the Grand Canal Crisis in 
the 1820s, Controlling from Afar, p. 251 ff.
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The above three paradigms focus on agriculture, commerce, and manu-
facturing to varying degrees. Early Marxist historiography emphasized 
the rise of commercial capitalism; the study of Confucian merchants by 
itself sees commerce and merchants as the most important driving forces 
of the economy. The paradigm of the Great Divergence takes the entire 
economy into focus but in the case of manufacturing it stresses the rural and 
predominantly textile handicrafts, which constituted the biggest segment of 
craft production during the Qing dynasty.14 Yet the state interfered relatively 
little in that f ield. Consequently, economic history writing, especially that 
of the California School, hardly takes into account the state regulations on 
urban craft production from which the present study sets out.
In their overview of the economic situation in the early Qing, Wang 
Yeh-chien and Ramon Myers define three distinct f ields of the economy: the 
state sector or ‘command economy’; the subsistence sector or the ‘natural’, 
‘customary’ economy; and a small, urban ‘private’ or ‘commercial’ sector that 
produced for the market.15 In quantitative terms, they estimate that about 
three-quarters of the production of China’s ca. 272 million rural population 
in the mid-1780s was bound for the self-supplying or ‘customary’ economy, 
and the remainder for the market economy. These two sectors were closely 
interrelated and expanded together.16 According to Myers and Wang, the 
early Qing state intervened in the market economy in order ‘to win the 
allegiance of the people, prevent local power holders from becoming too 
wealthy and influential, and ensure social order.’17
Approaching the situation from the perspective of the Qing government, 
its economic policies were aimed at keeping an increasing population fed 
and were occupied by methods that were labour and yield-intensive but 
not capital-intensive. The state promoted agriculture in combination with 
handicraft production in a system of small-sized, independent producers, 
where the household farm formed the principal unit for taxation. The 
most basic pattern was that of the tilling man and the weaving woman, 
respectively producing grains and textiles.18 Protoindustrial household 
production for the market was deemed tolerable for the representatives of 
the state, yet specialization in artisan activities was regarded as undesirable, 
14 Pomeranz, The Great Divergence, p. 86.
15 Wang and Myers, ‘Economic Development, 1644-1800’, p. 645.
16 Ibid., p. 643, 644. According to these authors (p. 536, with reference to John Hicks, An Outline 
of Economic History), the customary economy relates to traditionally established practices and 
conventions, as opposed to the market economy and the command economy.
17 Ibid., p. 591.
18 Francesca Bray, ‘Towards a Critical History of Non-Western Technology’, pp. 168-190.
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especially if the gendered division of labour eroded in the process. The 
Confucian state doctrine in general also expressed a disdain for com-
merce. However, merchants held an important position as distributors 
and brokers, and the importance of their cooperation with the state and its 
off icials was perfectly clear to the central government. In the expanding 
commercialization of the sixteenth century, merchants gained increasing 
political and social inf luence. The most successful among them could 
afford to have their children schooled in the Confucian scriptures, and to 
have them participate in the off icial examinations with the possibility of 
entering off icialdom. This might allow their descendants to rise to higher 
social positions and cross the demarcation between the two opposing social 
and functional groups.19
In Western historical research, state and merchant elites are often pitted 
against each other. This is clearly expressed in the title of Helen Dunstan’s 
study on the eighteenth-century Chinese grain trade, State or Merchant? 
(2006). The same dichotomy can be found in Susan Mann’s Local Merchants 
and the Chinese Bureaucracy, 1750-1950 (1987), which focuses on tax farming, 
a ‘liturgical’ service in Max Weber’s sense that the merchants provided the 
government, and Wellington Chan’s Merchants, Mandarins and Modern 
Enterprise in Late Ch’ing China (1977). The study f ield that aimed at defining 
the ‘Confucian merchant ethics’ in the 1980s and 1990s focused on the role 
of the merchants in the Chinese state and society. Much less research is 
available on manufacture, handicrafts, and the position of artisans. Thus, 
the present study intends to provide insights into why the social status of 
the crafts and craftspeople remained lower than that of commerce and 
merchants throughout the Qing dynasty.
The Perspective of Technical History
Chinese craft history pertains not only to the socio-economic f ield but 
also to technical history. In the framework of the history of science and 
technology, the main impulse for a huge, comparative overview came from 
the West and must be credited to Joseph Needham  (1900-1995). Many of the 
volumes of the series Science and Civilisation in China, which he commenced 
in 1954, deal with craft technologies such as construction in wood, earth, and 
19 Esherick and Rankin in Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance, p. 12, include 
merchants as an important element of their ‘elite’ concept next to the gentry, who are def ined 
by examination degrees and potential access to positions in the bureaucracy.
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stone;20 shipbuilding;21 paper making and printing;22 military technologies;23 
textile technologies;24 the processing of food and beverages;25 and ceramic 
production26. Volumes on mining and salt production have appeared recently 
or are in preparation.27 In Japan, a chronological series on the history of 
Chinese science and technology has been edited by Yabuuchi Kiyoshi at 
the Research Institute for Humanities (Jimbun kagaku kenkyūjo 人文科
学研究所) of Kyōto University. After some of the volumes of Science and 
Civilisation in China were translated into Chinese, a comparable Chinese 
project was launched and is nearing its completion.28 The volumes of another 
series recently edited by Lu Yongxiang are more focused on handicrafts and 
traditional arts and crafts.29
Some of the contributions to Science and Civilisation in China contain 
information on the living and working conditions of the artisans and also 
distinguish between their work in the service of the state and their private 
production for the market.30 In the volume on Mechanical Engineering, for 
instance, Joseph Needham gave a concise historical overview of the social 
20 Vol. IV: Physics and Physical Technology, Part 3: Civil Engineering and Nautics (1971), especially 
pp. 38-58 ‘Walls, and the Wall’ and pp. 58-145 ‘Building Technology’.
21 Ibid., ‘Nautical Technology’, pp. 379-699.
22 Vol. V: Chemistry and Chemical Technology, Part 1: Paper and Printing, by Tsien Tsuen-Hsuin 
(1985).
23 Vol. V, Part 6: Military Technology: Missiles and Sieges, by Joseph Needham, Robin D.S. Yates, 
Krzysztof Gawlikowski, Edward McEwen, and Wang Ling (1994); Part 7: Military Technology: 
The Gunpowder Epic, by Joseph Needham, Ho Ping-Yu, Lu Gwei-djen, and Wang Ling (1987).
24 Vol. V, Part 9: Textile Technology: Spinning and Reeling, by Dieter Kuhn (1986).
25 Vol. VI: Biology and Biological Technology, Part 3: Agroindustries and Forestry, by Christian 
A. Daniels and Nicholas K. Menzies (1996); Part 5: Fermentations and Food Science, by H.T. Huang 
(2000).
26 Vol. V, Part 12: Ceramic Technology, by Rose Kerr and Nigel Wood, with Ts’ai Mei-fen and 
Zhang Fukang (2004).
27 Vol. V, Part 13: Mining, by Peter Golas (1999) and Vol. V, section 37, The Salt Industry, by Hans 
Ulrich Vogel, with Luo Jungpang and Zhang Xuejun (in preparation).
28 Zhongguo kexue jishu shi (History of Science and Technology in China), general editors Lu 
Jiaxi  (1915-2001), Guo Shuchun, and Li Jiaming. Beijing: Kexue chubanshe, since 1991. 30 volumes 
are planned, of which 27 were recorded in the electronic catalogue of the National Library of 
China (Beijing) as of September 2017. The volumes that pertain to technical subjects concern 
Mechanics, Architecture, Bridge-building, Mining, Textile Technology, Ceramics, Paper and 
Printing, Traff ic, Military Technology, and Metrology.
29 Zhongguo chuantong gongyi quanji, with volumes on folk handicrafts (2007); research on 
traditional machines (2006); papermaking and printing (2006); carving (2005); silk weaving 
and dyeing (2005); gold, silver, and f ine gold crafts and cloisonné (2004-2005); ceramics (2004); 
Chinese materia medica; and f ireworks (2004).
30 Most notably Vol. V, Part 12: Ceramic Technology, pp. 184-239, ‘Chinese porcelain and the 
city of Ching-te-chen’, especially pp. 209-213, ‘Labour relations’.
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backgrounds of engineers and artisans in the imperial workshops and in 
household or small-scale family workshop production up until the Ming 
dynasty.31 Thus, although the main concern of the works in this series 
is not primarily on social or economic issues, they nevertheless serve as 
indispensable guides to technical questions and Western and Chinese 
comparative perspectives.
Recently, studies that combine technical, cultural, and socio-economic 
approaches have shown in ever greater depth and detail the wide range of 
Chinese material culture and work organization during the late imperial 
era.32 In addition to the series Science and Civilisation in China mentioned 
above, Schäfer (1998), Piontek-Ma (1999), and Kuhn and Schäfer (2002) have 
published studies on the imperial manufactories for silk processing, while 
Harriet Zurndorfer researched the cotton sector (2009 and 2011). Francesca 
Bray has examined more broadly women’s work and handicraft in her work 
Technology and Gender: Fabrics of Power in Late Imperial China. For build-
ing, next to Ruitenbeek’s classical study on carpentry (1993) and Knapp’s 
multiple volumes on popular housing (1986, 1993, 1994), Bodolec’s work on the 
architecture of cave dwellings and vault construction constitutes outstanding 
and original research. Money casting technologies are one of the aspects 
of the Tübingen research group ‘Monies, Markets, and Finance in China 
and East Asia’ based at the Tübingen University Institute for Chinese and 
Korean Studies, and have been researched by Burger (1976, 2005), Vogel (1983, 
2005), and Hartill (2003). Publications on the printing sector have become 
a most prolif ic f ield in recent years. Important contributions that combine 
technical, sociological, and economic aspects have been brought forth by 
Brokaw (2007), McDermott (2006), Reed (2004), Chow (2004), and Chia (2002).
Chinese Craft History
Research on Chinese craft history in the framework of social and economic 
history is from a fairly recent date. After early studies from the 1920s and 
1930s, notably the investigations on artisans in the service of the state 
by Ju Qingyuan,33 or the pioneering work on the Chinese guilds by Quan 
31 Science and Civilisation in China, Vol. IV, Part 2: Mechanical Engineering (1965), pp. 10-50.
32 The social history of craftspeople in early imperial China has been researched in the 
masterful book by Anthony J. Barbieri-Low, Artisans in Early Imperial China (2007).
33 Ju Qingyuan, ‘Handai de guanfu gongye’ (1934), Tang Song guan si gongye (1934), ‘Yuandai 
xiguan jianghu yanjiu’, ‘Yuandai xiguan jianghu yanjiu buyi’ (1935).
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Hansheng,34 which could also draw on early American social survey ap-
proaches by John Stewart Burgess and Sidney Gamble, a lapse in scholarship 
ensued due to war and revolution.
Book-length analyses of Chinese handicrafts from the f irst decade of the 
People’s Republic of China are rare. One notable exception is Chen Shiqi’s study 
on the Ming dynasty crafts.35 The early 1950s were a time of collecting and 
editing source materials, such as the series on the transition to mechanized 
production by Yan Zhongping and Peng Zeyi. In the next phase of research, 
starting around 1955, economic and social historians arranged research on 
the crafts within the framework of the five-stage model of development from 
the slaveholder society to communism that had been formulated by Guo 
Moruo and slightly altered by Lü Zhenyu on the basis of Marx and Stalin’s 
historical periodizations.36 The discussion on the beginnings of capitalism 
was an attempt to justify the existence of socialism in China, which according 
to the f ive-stage model should have been preceded by a phase of capitalism. 
Because an indigenous industrial capitalism did not arise in China without 
the intervention of the imperialist powers, Chinese researchers explored 
the phenomena of commercialization and commercial capital since the 
sixteenth century. They concentrated on the marketing structures in the 
commercial sector and also on labour relations and the issue of free wage 
labour as an indicator of proletarization and thus capitalism. The combined 
research efforts in this line of thought appeared in essay collections on crafts, 
commerce, and social relations from the Song to the Ming and Qing periods.37 
The last of these, Zhongguo zibenzhuyi de mengya (The sprouts of Chinese 
capitalism), was edited by Xu Dixin and Wu Chengming and published in 
1985, at a time when the debate had once more gained momentum and then 
slowly faded out.38 It has been translated into English and constitutes to date 
the most detailed craft history of Ming and Qing China in that language, even 
if its main research interest was not crafts but capitalism.
The Cultural Revolution caused a standstill in academic pursuits in the 
f ield that lasted more than a decade. Since the 1980s, in the process of the 
34 Zhongguo hanghui zhidu shi (1934).
35 Chen Shiqi, Mingdai guan shougongye de yanjiu (1955).
36 Brook Capitalism, pp. 134, 150.
37 Zhongguo ziben zhuyi mengya wenti taolun ji (1957), Zhongguo ziben zhuyi mengya wenti 
taolunji xubian (1960), Zhongguo ziben zhuyi mengya wenti lunwen ji (1983).
38 Although the model is nowadays frequently criticized for the inherent expection that China 
should have developed a European type of capitalism, variant opinions that do not downrightly 
reject this paradigm can be found also in the more recent discourse, for instance Cao Shouliang, 
‘Zhongguo zibenzhuyi mengya yanjiu lilun jichu bianxi’ (2011), p. 255.
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shift from the socialist command economy to a ‘socialist market economy’, 
the f ield of economic studies and economic history has broadened and the 
number of scholars increased. Since the beginnings of academic research 
in economic history in the People’s Republic of China, the focus had been 
on agricultural production and landownership. Currently, more and more 
scholars have extended their research to topics in the commercial and 
f inancial sectors like markets, commodity circulation, banking, and credit 
in the past and present.
The research on handicrafts since the 1980s has brought forth monographs 
and theses that have specialized on the craft landscape of particular regions 
such as Jiangnan,39 Suzhou,40 Fujian,41 and Huizhou in Anhui,42 and on 
particular eras such as the Yuan dynasty,43 or on particular craft branches 
such as cotton spinning and weaving.44 Topical issues such as the transition 
from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ artisans and crafts have been addressed in the 
theses and monographs by Kong Jingyuan, who also reflects upon the role of 
handicrafts and manufacturing in socialist China;45 by Yu Tongyuan,46 who 
stresses the transformation of the artisans’ skills; and by Peng Nansheng , one 
of the most important and productive craft historians who takes particular 
interest in socio-economic change, having published a comprehensive study 
on the Chinese guilds of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.47 
At present, research is increasingly concentrating on the modern social, 
economic, and technical history related to traditional craft production in 
the twentieth century, on craft production by the different ethnic groups in 
China, and on the skills of contemporary craftspeople who have preserved 
the knowledge of traditional techniques. This is connected to the activities 
to safeguard the Intangible Cultural Heritage, which, as def ined by the 
unesco, includes ‘traditional craftsmanship’ (chuantong shougongyi).48
39 Li Bozhong, Jiangnan de zaoqi gongyehua (2000); Yu Haiping, Songdai Jiangnan shougongye 
fazhan yanjiu, Ph.D. Diss. (2005).
40 Duan Benluo and Zhang Qifu, Suzhou shougongye shi (1986).
41 Zeng Ling, Ming Qing Fujian shougongye jingji yanjiu, Ph.D. Diss. (1991).
42 Bao Yilai, Huizhou gongyi (2005).
43 Liu Liya, Yuandai shougongye yanjiu, Ph.D. Diss. (2004).
44 Xu Xinwu, Yapian zhanzheng qian Zhongguo mian fangzhi shougongye (1981).
45 Kong Jingyuan, Shougongye yu Zhongguo jingji bianqian, Ph.D. Diss. (1987).
46 Yu Tongyuan, Chuantong gongjiang (2012).
47 Peng Nansheng, Zhongjian jingji (2002), Hanghui zhidu de jindai mingyun (2003), Ban 
gongyehua (2007).
48 unesco, ‘Text of the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage’ 
(‘Baohu fei wuzhi wenhua yichan gongyue’), Art. 2, Sect. 2e. The list of crafts acknowledged 
by the unesco since 2008 as ‘Elements on the Lists of Intangible Cultural Heritage’ in China 
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In the Republic of China on Taiwan, outstanding research on sixteenth 
and seventeenth-century craft production has been formulated by Luo 
Lixing.49 Billy Kee-long So from the Chinese University of Hong Kong has 
published studies about the Song export ceramics industry in South Fujian 
in the framework of his research on Chinese economic institutions and 
spatial patterns.50
No scholarly overviews of Chinese craft history appeared in Mainland 
China prior to 1981. Since then, representative works by Tong Shuye (1981), 
Zhu Cishou (1988-1990), Liu Guoliang (1990-2003), Ji Ruxun (1998), Zheng 
Xuemeng (2002), Wei Mingkong (ed.) (2004-2005), and Liu Yongcheng (2000) 
have appeared. Moreover, about a dozen material collections on guilds have 
been published, and Peng Zeyi’s important source collection Zhongguo jindai 
shougongye shi ziliao 1840-1949 has been reprinted, which despite its title 
contains valuable materials from the Qing dynasty prior to 1840.
The relation of state and crafts is discussed in these volumes from a long-
term perspective. Looking at the three most important of these overviews, 
several changes in the research perspectives in the course of more than 
forty years emerge.
The f irst of these histories, Tong Shuye’s Zhongguo shougongye shangye 
fazhan shi (History of the development of Chinese crafts and commerce), 
was published posthumously. Tong Shuye (1908-1968) was a specialist in 
ancient and early modern Chinese history, historical geography, and art 
history. His scope of research was very broad and included topics such as 
painting, ceramics, and porcelain. In his early years, Tong taught at several 
universities and colleges in Shanghai. Between 1945 and 1949, he worked as 
the section head of the Historical Department of the Shanghai Museum, and 
in 1949 he became a professor of history at Shandong University.51 Tong’s 
work, the f irst continuous Chinese narrative on craft history, represents a 
typical view from the f irst decade of the People’s Republic of China. As such, 
he was obliged to discuss the elements of incipient capitalism in the Qing 
includes eleven items, for instance, specif ic types of architectural and naval carpentry, printing, 
and textile crafts (see unesco, ‘Elements on the Lists of Intangible Cultural Heritage’), while 
the National List of ‘Representative Cultural Heritage’ in China proclaimed by the State Council 
between 2006 and 2014 comprises more than 200 crafts (see Zhonghua renmin gongheguo Wenhua 
bu, ‘Guojiaji fei wuzhi wenhua yichan daibiaoxing xiangmu’).
49 Luo Lixing, Shiliu shiqi shiji shougongye de shengchan fazhan (1997).
50 Billy So, ‘The Trade Ceramics Industry’ (1994), ‘Liang Song Minnan’ (1997), ‘Regional Economic 
Integration: A Case Study of Export Ceramics in South Fukien’, in Prosperity, Region, and Institu-
tions in Maritime China, pp. 186-203.
51 Zhao Zhongwen, Zhongguo lishixue da cidian, p. 522; Wang Xinghua, ‘Tong Shuye xiansheng 
er san shi’. 
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dynasty. Tong explains the rise of capitalism in conjunction with the decline 
of registration of artisans in the mid-sixteenth century, but he emphasized 
that until the First Opium War (1839-1842), these ‘sprouts’ were not very 
robust.52 He presents the Qing period as a time of ‘long-lasting stagnation’, 
which was mainly due to the fact that the Manchu Qing, ‘a backward tribe’ 
(luohou buzu 落后部族), invaded and ruled the Middle Plains (i.e. China 
proper)’. Tong charges that great damage was brought about by the Jurchen 
(the ancestors of the Manchu and rulers of the Jin dynasty, 1115-1234) in North 
China and the Mongols (rulers of the Yuan dynasty, 1279-1368) to all of China, 
causing ‘a setback of the Chinese feudal economy for two hundred to three 
hundred years’.53 The early Qing rulers, particularly the Yongzheng emperor 
(reg. 1723-1735), a ‘dictatorial prince of evil’ (zhuanzhi mowang 专制魔王),54 
crushed the tender sprouts of capitalism by promoting agriculture and 
disregarding contemporary ‘democratic’ calls that the crafts and commerce 
should also be treated and esteemed as fundamental economic pursuits. 
According to Tong, the Manchus carried out this economic policy since 
they feared capitalism as a danger to their ‘tribal, feudalistic rule’. This 
had consequences for domestic and foreign capitalism, so that the Qing 
restrained foreign commerce not because of ‘nationalist’ sentiments but in 
order to ward off foreign capitalism.55 Guilds were principally mutual aid 
‘citizens’ organizations’ (shimin zuzhi 市民組織) for resistance against the 
oppression and exploitation by the government and, as such, a continuation 
of the Ming citizens’ movement.
How did the government allegedly exploit the artisans? Tong stated that 
although the artisan corvée labour system of the preceding Ming dynasty 
was formally abolished by the f irst Qing rulers, in fact local authorities 
still drafted artisans to execute labour obligations. Wage levels were quite 
varied within and between craft branches, with the best salaries in the silk 
and cotton-weaving sector. Tong believed that the remuneration in state 
manufactories was lower than in the private sector but did not elaborate 
on this point.56
Tong’s sweeping statements about ‘tribal feudalism’, which are no longer 
politically correct in today’s China, also stand in contrast to present-day 
knowledge of the achievements of the Qing and the Yongzheng emperor in 






particular, whose administrative eff iciency is praised in recent scholarship 
both in China and abroad. This does not deny the problems caused by 
his autocratic government style.57 Like all his colleagues, Tong Shuye was 
working under extreme political pressure, and the views on political and 
economic causalities expressed in his work conform to the exigencies of 
the times.58 It is remarkable, though, that capitalism is presented here as 
desirable and that its presumed crushing is portrayed as a grave error of the 
strong state, and even that the guilds were described as an anti-government 
citizens’ movement. The emphasis on these points is so distinct that one may 
speculate that Tong was making an underlying historical analogy at a time 
of the most intensive state and party control of all intellectual pursuits.59
Zhu Cishou’s Zhongguo gudai gongye shi (History of Chinese traditional 
industries) superseded Tong Shuye’s account in length and depth. Born in 
1922, the author received his Bachelor’s degree in economics at the Chongqing 
Central University in 1946, and in 1949 he graduated from the Department 
for Industrial Economy of Qinghua University in Peking. From 1950 to 1952, 
he worked as an editor of the journals Zhongguo gongye (Chinese industry) 
and Shengchan yu jishu (Production and technology). He started his academic 
career at the Department of Economics at Fudan University and was assigned 
to teach labour organization and wage payment in industrial enterprises 
at the Department for Industrial Management of the Shanghai College 
of Finance and Economics (Shanghai caijing xueyuan). In August 1958, 
he was once again transferred to an editorial position at the Economics 
Department of Shanghai renmin chubanshe (Shanghai People’s Publishers). 
In November 1978, he returned to a professorship at the Shanghai College 
of Finance and Economics.60
57 Pierre-Etienne Will, Nourishing the people. See Rowe for the Yongzheng emperor’s relationship 
with his high-ranking off icials (William T. Rowe, Saving the World, pp. 50-52); Spence for the 
tolerance shown by the emperor in an attempted anti-Qing rebellion (Jonathan Spence, Treason 
by the Book); and Madeleine Zelin, ‘The Yung-cheng Reign’, pp. 190-191, p. 229 for his activist 
administrative style.
58 A website that is dedicated to his relationship with his teacher Gu Jiegang mentions that 
in the initial ‘movement for the remodelling of intellectuals’ thought’ (zhishifenzi sixiang 
gaizao yundong) 知识分子思想改造运动 [in 1954], he was forced to commit self-criticism, 
but his declarations were refused nine times, until he f inally renounced Gu Jiegang’s School 
of Historical Criticism, ‘Discriminations of Ancient History’ gushibian pai古史辨派. See ‘Tong 
Shuye’. Further information on Tong’s relationship to Gu Jiegang and on the political pressure 
he was exposed to is given in his biography authored by his daughter Tong Jiaoying, Cong lianyu 
zhong shenghua, Chapters 3, 5, and 6.
59 Tong Shuye, Zhongguo shougongye shangye fazhan shi, p. 372.
60 All information from the frontispiece of Zhongguo gudai gongye shi and the postface, 
pp. 987-989.
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Zhu’s book is the first of a three-volume series on ancient and early modern 
crafts and on industrialization published between 1988 and 1990. He started 
research for this work in the 1940s and included the latest archaeological 
f indings for the prehistorical and early historical periods.
For the Qing period, the choice of sources does not diverge so markedly 
from Tong Shuye’s account, but due to the more relaxed political circum-
stances, Zhu Cishou could offer a more nuanced and full account of the 
crafts during the Qing. Taking a chronological approach, the work introduces 
‘state crafts’ and ‘private crafts’ in separate sections. Zhu Cishou sees a 
peak of government-run manufactories in comparison to private crafts in 
the Yuan.61 From the Ming period on, he perceived a gradual decline of the 
state and a simultaneous rise of the private commercial sector, together 
with the decline – or rather ‘destruction’ – of the natural, self-sustaining 
subsistence economy.62 According to Zhu Cishou, capitalism arose especially 
in the mining and smelting, ceramics, and spinning and weaving sectors. He 
attributes this to the fact that the government sector was corrupt and the 
private sector active and productive. The elements of capitalist production 
present in the Chinese economy during the Ming and Qing were a transition 
from private handicraft workshops to craft manufactories, which no longer 
supplied end users but used contractors and distributors to trade China-wide 
and overseas. According to this narrative, commercialization brought the 
natural subsistence economy to an end.63
In its harsh criticism of the overall performance of the Qing dynasty, Zhu’s 
work stands in the tradition of the 1950s and 1960s economic historiography. 
Since the existence of hired labour is an important indicator of capitalism, 
Zhu took great care to quantify the number of people employed in large-scale 
manufactories, salt wells, and mines.64
The most recent series of Chinese craft history, Zhongguo shougongye 
jingji tongshi (General economic history of the Chinese crafts), published in 
four volumes between May 2004 and May 2005, was edited by Wei Mingkong 
(born 1956). The section on the Qing was written by Xu Jianqing (born 1951). 
Wei and Xu are colleagues at the Department of Economics of the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences in Peking. Since this work was written by a group 
of authors who all are experts of the specif ic periods they treat and who had 
newly revealed materials at their disposition, the work was extended to more 





than twice the length of Zhu Cishou’s history. While the structure resembles 
that of its precursor, with a presentation in chronological, dynastic order; 
separate treatment of ‘off icial crafts’ and ‘private crafts’; and subsequent 
sections with industrial monographs; there has been a great improvement 
in depth and detail.
For these authors, ‘sprouts of capitalism’ no longer constitute a research 
objective for the Chinese economy. The term does not occur in Xu Jianqing’s 
account. Instead, she studies the ‘development’ or ‘growth’ of the handicraft 
sector. In her analysis, during the Qing, the off icial sector with its imperial 
manufactories, palace workshops, and monopoly industries like salt and iron 
production shrank compared to earlier periods. However, rather than heaping 
blame on the Qing rulers or bureaucracy, as most studies in the f irst three 
decades of the People’s Republic of China do, she presents this tendency as an 
inevitable consequence of the expansion of the commercial market. It can be 
considered as a kind of ‘decline’, but she also discusses the advantages that the 
shift from production under control of the state bureaucracy to production 
in ‘free’ enterprises entailed for both the suppliers and for the government as 
a customer.65 Thus, she arrives at a more balanced evaluation of the function 
of the state and the stimuli it gave to craft production by concentrating the 
most skilled craftspeople in its manufactories and by controlling the quality 
of their products. When these technical and administrative skills spread 
to the civilian craft branches, they could surpass the state sector in which, 
due to the specific problems of bureaucratic recruitment and remuneration, 
corruption was widespread, especially in the nineteenth century. The author 
also looks beyond the mid-nineteenth century divide but f inds the state 
largely lacking the vigour to revive its former handicraft manufactories that 
had been destroyed in the Taiping rebellion.66
Approach and Research Questions
This overview of Chinese craft historiography ‒ especially the growing 
appreciation of (or rather the diminishing blame directed at) the Qing 
administration for its policies towards craft production ‒ brings up several 
questions that will be addressed in the present study.
The f irst concerns the eff iciency of the Qing state in its direct and 
indirect control of the crafts and industries during its entire rule. The 
65 Xu Jianqing, Qingdai qianqi, pp. 334-335.
66 Ibid., p. 336.
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Chinese craft histories that focus on the early and mid-Qing state portray 
in a somewhat strident tone the decline of handicraft manufacturing that 
was directly managed by the Qing. Zhu Cishou , for instance, generalized 
that
The commercial sector was active, whereas in the government production, 
graft was practiced and money embezzled; therefore the corrupt off icial 
crafts could not continue. The off icial crafts of that time harassed the 
population in an extreme manner: What is called a ‘fair estimate of prices’ 
is actually cruel extortion, what is nominally ‘cash payment in mutual 
agreement’ is actually seizing for free.67
Zhu claimed that since the government sector in the Qing dynasty was 
much reduced in size and in the branches it covered, it satisf ied its demand 
of goods by purchase and requisition at regulated prices below the market 
level. With regard to wages, he conceded that clear regulations for wage 
payment existed and that the wages in the regulated sector were not lower 
than on the free market, yet he maintained that the positions of the workers 
were not absolutely free.68
Even in the later historiography that takes a more appreciative view 
of the achievements of the Qing off icial crafts, the qualif ication of their 
demise still bears negative nuances, such as ‘in the latter half of the Qing, 
the off icial crafts lingered on, and under the combined pressure from the 
commercial sector and modern mechanization faced their last days.’69
The present study argues that even if the government did not always 
comply with market prices and wages, and even if complaints about graft, 
embezzlement, and arbitrary wage deductions were common throughout 
the Qing dynasty, there are records of regulations pertaining to prices and 
wages that stipulate keeping to the market quotas as well as the usage of 
extra subsidies ( jintie) if the regulated prices did not meet actual expenses. 
Emperors and the central administration were well aware of the misalloca-
tion of government funds and worked toward greater accountability of all 
echelons of off icials, of which the ‘regulations and precedents’ (zeli) yield 
clear proof. Norms and practice correlated more in the early and mid-Qing 
period and began diverging more and more in the course of the nineteenth 
67 Zhu Cishou, Zhongguo gudai gongye shi, p. 43. The quotation is from a Ming dynasty gazetteer 
of Zhangzhou in Fujian, but Zhu implicitly extends the criticism to the Qing dynasty.
68 Zhu Cishou, Zhongguo gudai gongye shi, pp. 787-788.
69 Xu Jianqing, ‘Qingdai qianqi’, p. 555, also in Zhongguo shougongye jingji tongshi, vol. 4, p. 336.
introDuC tion 37
century, although phases of more energetic attempts at regulation can be 
discerned at this time as well.70
As for the demise of the off icial crafts, these did not end with the Taiping 
rebellion and the Opium Wars, and even if the state was no longer engaging 
in handicraft production on a large scale thereafter, the end of the off icial 
handicraft manufactories came gradually and was not in the f irst place due 
to corruption and mismanagement. Rather, the state maintained its role in 
promoting new technologies and was the leading force in the early stages 
of Chinese industrialization. Therefore, while looking at the phasing out 
of traditional craft methods, this study will also look into the promotion of 
mechanized production by the Qing state, which took place at the same time.
In addition, the question of the impact of foreign technology transfer will 
be considered. New technology and imperialism in the form of encroach-
ments on Qing territory came hand in hand. However, how strong were 
the inroads that foreign capital made on the Chinese handicrafts? It has 
been pointed out by Bramall and Nolan that in Chinese Marxist economic 
historiography, if the pre-Opium War economy is perceived as stagnant, 
the impact of the West and Japan functioned as a necessary challenge 
and stimulus for economic progress, whereas if the view of the pre-1840s 
economy is dynamic, the growth between 1840 and 1940 could be seen as 
a result of proto-industrialization rather than stimulation from outside. In 
short, the foreign challenge in one view becomes a liability in the other.71 
In concrete terms, Albert Feuerwerker has repeatedly refuted the view that 
foreign technology and capital crushed the Chinese handicraft industries 
altogether, arguing that although this applied to the important sectors 
of handicraft cotton spinning and ginning, other crafts like oil pressing, 
rice milling, mining by traditional methods, and silk weaving or minor 
handicrafts like the production of f irecrackers, fans, bamboo furniture, 
and agricultural tools were much less or not at all influenced.72 The present 
study explores this viewpoint with a focus on shipbuilding and printing.
The problem of the performance of the state is closely related to the 
cyclical conception of the rise, f lourishing, and decline of dynasties. The 
model has been called into question because it cannot explain long-term 
socioeconomic trends that cover phases extending over several dynasties.73 
Its explanatory power for broad social and economic processes is limited 
70 Leonard, Controlling from Afar and ‘Timeliness and Innovation’.
71 Bramall and Nolan, ‘Introduction’, p. xiv.
72 Feuerwerker, ‘Economic trends in the late Ch’ing empire’, pp. 26-28.
73 Zurndorfer, ‘A Guide to the “New” Chinese History’, p. 184.
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due to its f ixation on the activities of the central government. However, 
applying it in an extended version which takes into account the impact of 
local counterparts of the central government – the provincial elites and 
administrations – this study asks how we can account for the ‘decline’ of 
the Qing in consideration of Esherick and Rankin’s statement that in the 
f irst decade of the twentieth century not only local elites but also the state 
was re-organizing and increasing its resources.74
The second f ield of inquiry concerns the position of the craftspeople in 
Qing society. A millennia-old concept of the role of the artisans ranks them 
in the third position after the scholar-off icials and farmers, and before 
the merchants. How does this concept relate to what is known about the 
lot of the artisans in the Qing period? The historical record is full of the 
emancipation of the merchants during the Qing, the rise of their status, and 
the ‘blurring of boundaries’ between the scholars and the merchants. This 
tendency obviously did not include the artisans, whose position according 
to the Confucian orthodoxy was not lower than that of the merchants or 
even slightly higher, but who in real life had fewer chances than merchants 
to attain social esteem. The present study argues that only the artisan who 
became a merchant by marketing his products and by hiring labour could 
aspire to reach social respectability and recognition beyond his own circles. 
Until the very last years of the Qing, the esteem of the political elite could 
be acquired by passing off icial examinations, or, since the early nineteenth 
century, by purchasing an off icial title. Much capital was necessary for 
this costly procedure, which could hardly be earned by a small individual 
workshop, and certainly not with hired labour or agricultural subsidiary 
craft production. If there was a way to bypass off icial examinations, it 
applied only for a very small part of those artisans who either were closely 
associated with the court or to those who produced luxury items ‒ but even 
then, it was the items they produced rather than the producers that were 
appreciated by the cultural elites.75
In view of this distinction between artisans and merchants, this study 
also examines the Chinese guilds as professional associations of these two 
groups. Can the subordinate status of the artisans be recognized in guild 
structures? The British historian James Farr def ines the power relations 
74 Esherick and Rankin, Chinese Local Elites, p. 341.
75 For a parallel trend as shown in the case of the sixteenth-century German city of Nürnberg, 
where even a successful family of painters could not enter the ranks of the urban political elites, 
see Rainer S. Elkar, ‘Fragen und Probleme einer interdisziplinären Handwerksgeschichte’, 
pp. 10-11.
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within the European guilds as a ‘trend towards oligarchy within the guilds 
and in urban politics. Wealthier artisans would dominate the guilds, and the 
artisans would be increasingly excluded from the constitutional political 
community.’76 Can similar tendencies be discerned in the Chinese guilds?
Finally, to come to an assessment of the Qing state’s treatment of the 
artisans, a look is taken at the interdependence of the guilds and local 
politics. In his studies on Hankou, William Rowe showed how guilds took 
over many of the previous tasks of the government in municipal administra-
tion and the organization of welfare activities.77 Did this endure until the 
end of the Qing, or did the government try to gain back lost ground, as the 
statement by Esherick and Rankin suggests?
The present study, in sum, aims to come to terms with earlier Marxist 
Chinese historiography which claims that the Qing dynasty lacked the 
efficiency to promote manufacturing and eventually bring about indigenous 
capitalism.78 It also strives to show that, on the contrary, the Qing administra-
tion operated rationally in many respects and that the agents in the private 
market were relatively free from government coercion.
Methodically, this study explores normative sources as well as archival 
material with a more immediate and less historiographical functions. It 
draws on the economic historians Peng Zeyi (1916-1994) and Chen Zhen’s 
collections of historical materials on the crafts and guilds79 as well as the 
Qing dynasty regulatory guidelines, zeli and Huidian (Collected Statutes). 
For the aspects of both shipbuilding and printing, the records of Western 
eyewitnesses in nineteenth-century China and, especially for printing, 
recently published interviews with veteran craftspeople are also considered.
76 Farr, Artisans in Europe, p. 188.
77 Rowe, Hankow, p. 299 ff., for ‘corporate functions’ like education, common f inances, and 
cemeteries, and p. 317 ff. for ‘community service functions’ like f iref ighting, maintaining the 
infrastructure, security services, and armed forces.
78 See for instance Fang Xing, ‘The Retarded Development of Capitalism’, with comments 
on the basic state policy of favouring agriculture at the expense of commerce (p. 392), on the 
policy of ‘neither encouraging nor banning commerce’, and stating that the attitude of the Qing 
court for more lenience towards protoindustrial enterprises such as mining and smelting was 
motivated by political aims rather than by ‘the desire to develop the economy and enrich the 
country’ (p. 395). This all pertains to the period before the Opium War and applies to commerce 
and, by extension, to craft production for the market. For an earlier (c. 1960), less nuanced 
argumentation than Fang Xing’s, see Tong Shuye, Zhongguo shougongye shangye fazhan shi, 
p. 283, with the assertion that the Qing aimed at warding off capitalist elements ‘in order to 
cement their tribal feudalistic rule’.
79 Peng Zeyi (ed.), Zhongguo jindai shougongye shi ziliao, 1840-1949, 4 vols., 1962; Chen Zhen 
(ed.), Zhongguo jindai gongyeshi ziliao. Di san ji: Qing zhengfu, Beiyang zhengfu he Guomindang 
guanliao ziben chuangban he longduan de gongye, 1961.
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Among the Chinese studies on the sector of craft production, the present 
research draws mainly on Zhu Cishou’s Zhongguo gudai gongye shi (History 
of Chinese traditional industries) ; the series edited by Wei Mingkong, 
Zhongguo shougongye jingji tongshi (General economic history of the Chinese 
crafts), especially the section on the Qing written by Xu Jianqing; as well 
as relevant Chinese studies translated into English in the volume Chinese 
Capitalism, 1522-1840, edited by Xu Dixin and Wu Chengming .
In various respects, the argumentation developed in the present study 
pertains to questions raised in the debate on the Great Divergence.80 As 
will become clear in the ensuing chapters, this study does not take global 
or Eurasian comparison as its f irst objective. Instead, it sets out from the 
Chinese perspective and for that reason concentrates on Chinese institutions 
and Chinese political economy. Nevertheless it connects with the approach of 
the California School in considering the basis of the Qing political economy 
as one of relatively light taxation and exigencies on the population in the way 
of corvée services. Moreover, this study shows that merchants’ involvement 
in shipbuilding and ‘donations’ or loans to the state for the upkeep of its 
marine forces constituted a reverse side of this formally moderate taxation. 
State administration plays no great role in Kenneth Pomeranz’s work The 
Great Divergence, yet R. Bin Wong convincingly discusses the impact of 
political economy and the imperial institutions of the Qing.81 Wong has 
recently repeated and enlarged, together with Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, an 
appreciative view of the state administration of public goods, especially 
granaries and infrastructure.82 The present study endorses the view of the 
Qing administration during the eighteenth century as quite eff icient in 
these respects as well as in its attempt to keep expenses under control. The 
argument extends to government efforts of the nineteenth and especially 
the early twentieth century, initiatives that can qualify as useful attempts 
at modernization, although the Qing could not reap the rewards of their 
endeavours. Concerning the social position of artisans, this study contributes 
both concrete data and information on cultural beliefs and convictions 
that can offer a more focused outlook in time and space than theories that 
encompass the entire economies of Europe and Asia.
80 For an insightful analysis of the ideas of the main proponents of the California School and 
the respective critiques, see Peer Vries, ‘The California School and beyond: how to study the 
Great Divergence?’ as well as the 2015 special issue of the Low Countries Journal of Social and 
Economic History (TSEG), 2015/2 with a debate on Vries’ 2013 book Escaping Poverty. The Origins 
of Modern Economic Growth and various critical voices on the paradigm of the ‘Great Divergence’.
81 R. Bin Wong, ‘The political economy of an agrarian empire’ and China Transformed.
82 Rosenthal and Wong, Before and Beyond Divergence, pp. 205, 231.
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The present study also has links with the research f ield of the ‘Confu-
cian merchants’ or ‘merchant-gentlemen’, as formulated in Yü Ying-shih’s 
seminal study on the merchant spirit which also discusses new conceptions 
of the four occupational groups in society.83 However, it expands on the 
craftspeople and their possibilities for study and advancement in off icial 
careers and does not follow Yü in his attempt to show, in Weberian terms, 
parallels between Protestant and Confucian merchant ethics.
The most recent Chinese historiography on the f irst decade of the 
twentieth century revises earlier convictions about the decline and utter 
dysfunction of the government. These new approaches inspired the outlook 
of the present study, which portrays a dynamic re-organization of the bodies 
that had controlled craft production and their attempts to launch industrial, 
mechanized production not only in private enterprises but also in the 
service of the state.
Contents of the Present Volume
With a view to outlining the state engagement in the handicraft sector in 
historical perspective, chapter one starts from the turn of the second mil-
lennium and gives overviews on the Song, Yuan, and Ming dynasty systems 
of allocation of materials and labour, and in particular the remuneration 
of work and the processes of production and distribution. The comparison 
shows that the degree of coercion to perform actual work services varied 
between the dynasties, with arrangements including the substitution of 
corvée for tax payment more important and typical in the Song, and coercive 
measures more typical for the f irst phases of the Yuan and Ming dynasties. 
Consequently, the number of people continuously enrolled in the service of 
the state decreased from the Song to the Ming, with a high peak in the Yuan. 
During the Ming period, the initially strong control of craftspeople receded 
in the course of the dynasty, and the private sector started to overtake the 
state economy.
Chapter two examines the transition from the Ming to the Qing in the 
second half of the seventeenth century, describing an initial expansion of the 
bureaucracies in charge of artisan production but thereafter a downsizing 
and increasing reliance on the market for most branches of handicraft 
production in the course of the latter dynasty. Yet this does not apply to 
craft branches concerned with core necessities of the state: the production 
83 Yu Yingshi (Yü Ying-shih), Zhongguo jinshi zongjiao lunli, pp. 104-121.
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of weapons, military infrastructure, monetary production, and to a certain 
extent printing remained under close state control throughout.
After the f irst decades of the Qing, craftspeople were accommodated by 
not compelling them to corvée service. The great majority of the artisans in 
the service of the state worked as remunerated, hired labourers. Focusing 
on the institutions of the central government that controlled the crafts, 
this section considers administrative and technical tasks as well as the 
increase and decrease in personnel and responsibilities, especially in 
the Ministry of Public Works and the Imperial Household Department. 
As ideas of modernization and industrialization were f irst realized in 
China, the Imperial Household Department maintained the organizational 
modes of the Manchu monarchy, while the Ministry of Public Works 
became a ‘modern’ institution during the transition from the monarchy 
to a republic. Contact with industrialization and Western principles of 
work organization led to more formalized training, most prominently in 
shipbuilding, but apprentice training in mechanized textile production 
was also introduced.
Chapters three to eight consider the government-artisan relationship by 
studying specific sectors. Chapter three concentrates on building, porcelain, 
and textiles, which largely served representative purposes for the central 
government. The reasons the state withdrew from or maintained the 
organization of craft production are also outlined.
Chapter four analyzes in greater detail the perspective of production 
and the institutions involved in state and private naval construction. 
Chapters f ive and six consider the perspective of the workforce in the same 
period, with a retrospective look at the late Ming imperial shipyards. This 
is particularly enlightening in view of the control of the workforce on the 
one hand and, on the other, the options given to the government-registered 
craftspeople of this wharf to select their employment.
In a parallel structure, chapter seven looks at printing in the government 
and private sectors, again focusing on institutions and production, while 
chapter eight explores the workforce in both sectors, their remuneration, 
skills, and training.
Chapter nine, ‘The Artisan’s Place’, examines the role of the artisans in 
society, with a review of the earliest statements which, seen on the basis 
of Confucian statecraft writings, seem to have remained more or less 
stationary during much of Imperial China. However, the perspective on 
the products of the artisans’ and workers’ labour did change with the onset 
of industrialization. It will be argued that although craftspeople ranked 
above the merchants in the traditional ranking of the ‘four occupational 
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groups’ , in actual life they needed to acquire merchant status if they hoped 
to improve their position.
The tenth chapter explores the activities of the relatively autonomous 
institution of Chinese guilds as opposed to the state institutions. Taking an 
evolutionary point of view, the development of craftsmen’s associations from 
merchant guilds is shown, and the point is reconfirmed that craftspeople 
were, in everyday practice, subordinate to merchants. Organizations that had 
great influence in municipal governments in the later nineteenth century 
were merchant guilds that could afford to f inance the ‘liturgical service’ 
of charity, maintain infrastructure, and raise local militia, as opposed to 
the less affluent craft guilds.
The hierarchy within the craftshops was reflected in the guilds too, to 
which journeymen were supposed to belong but where they had less impact 
than the masters. In the late nineteenth century, a sustained trend of eman-
cipation set in with the establishment of journeymen’s guilds. This tendency 
can be placed alongside the f irst traces of industrial proletarianization and 
worker self-consciousness, thus marking a gradual departure from tradition.
Designations and Definitions of Crafts and Craftwork
In present-day usage of Chinese, the closest equivalent to ‘handicrafts’ is 
the term shougongye. This is not a classical designation but instead dates 
from the early twentieth century. The most voluminous Chinese dictionar-
ies, Zhongwen da cidian84 and Hanyu da cidian85 only give def initions of 
the term but no earliest occurrences. Since many translations of Western 
political, economic, and social science terminology originate from Japan 
and were adopted by Chinese intellectuals staying in Japan for shorter or 
longer study terms from the last decade of the nineteenth century onwards, 
a look at Japanese dictionaries may help to limit the time range as to when 
the word was probably adapted. An early reference to a dictionary entry is 
mentioned in the largest Japanese dictionary Nihon kokugo dai jiten. It points 
to an English-Japanese commercial dictionary from 1904, which renders 
‘handicraft’ as shukōgyō 手工業 and def ines it as ‘production solely by 
84 Zhongwen da cidian, vol. 13, no. 12050..4 in its def inition expressly mentions the term 
‘handicrafts’ in English, thus implying, if not stating expressly, that it is a translation. The 
Zhongwen da cidian (f irst edition 1955-1960, revised 1966-1968) is mainly based on the dictionary 
compiled by Morohashi Tetsuji and his team, Dai Kan-Wa jiten, the f irst draft of which was f irst 
published in 1943, but Morohashi’s work does not contain the term shougongye/shukōgyō.
85 Hanyu da cidian, vol. 6, p. 293.
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hand, without using any machinery’.86 An early Japanese-English dictionary 
reference of the year 1911 includes, in addition to the entry ‘shukugyō’, the 
term shukōgyōsha手工業者 as ‘handicraftman’.87
An occurrence of the Chinese term shougongye  can be found in one of 
the earliest modern Chinese encyclopedias, Huang Moxi’s monolingual and 
explanatory Putong baike xin da cidian of 1911. The definition says that this 
term was used in opposition to ‘mechanized industry’ as well as to both 
‘household production’ and ‘manufactory production’. In the f irst sense, this 
implies craft production with simple tools. The second sense signifies artisan 
production with the assistance of a few family members and apprentices. 
The products are directly sold to the consumer for one’s personal prof it.88
‘Handicraft’ is rendered as shouyi 手藝 in Hemeling’s 1915 English-Chinese 
dictionary,89 and starting from 1892, the equivalent of shougong 手工 or shouyi 
is given as ‘craft’ or ‘handicraft’.90 Apart from dictionaries, full text databases 
of Chinese newspapers and articles reveal the earliest occurrences of the term 
‒ one article in 1904 and two in 1906 in the journal Dongfang zazhi (Eastern 
Miscellany), and entries from 1906 in the daily newspaper Shenbao ‒ but 
full text search results in the 1833-1949 Chinese Periodical Full-text Databases 
start only in 1920.91 From this evidence, it can be concluded that the term was 
certainly established in the social and economic sciences by the third decade 
of the twentieth century and that it was probably adopted earlier in Japan.92
The term shougong was preferred in reference to ‘handicraft’ or ‘craft’ 
in China, while Japanese dictionaries suggest the word tewaza 手業, or 
shigoto仕事 (present-day ‘work’, ‘employment’, ‘occupation’), tezaiku 手細工
(‘handicraft’, ‘handiwork’, ‘handmade goods’), and shoku 職 (‘employment’, 
86 Nihon kokugo dai jiten, ‘Jukōgyō’, with reference to Tanaka, Nakagawa, and Itami’s Ei-Wa 
shōgyō shin ji‘i, which renders the term as equivalent for ‘handicraft’.
87 Nitobe and Takakusu, Shinshiki Nichi-Ei jiten (Seventh edition) (A new-style Japanese-English 
Dictionary). The f irst edition dates from 1905.
88 Thanks to Iwo Amelung for this information. The reference is in Huang Moxi, Putong baike 
xin da cidian, vol. 2, no. 312.
89 Karl Hemeling, English-Chinese Dictionary, which was based on the dictionary by G.C. Stent 
published in 1905 by the Maritime Customs.
90 Herbert Giles, Chinese-English Dictionary (1892), F.W. Baller, Analytical Chinese-English 
Dictionary (1900), G.C. Stent, Chinese and English Vocabulary (1898). Samuel Wells Williams’ 
A Syllabic Dictionary of the Chinese Language (1903, f irst ed. 1874) has none of these terms.
91 1833-1949 Chinese Periodical Full-text Databases; Shenbao database, 1874-1949; Dongfang 
zazhi (The Eastern Miscellany) database, 1904-1948. The Chinese Periodical Full-text databases 
include journals and newspaper other than Shenbao and Dongfang zazhi.
92 The f irst article in the full text database of the daily newspaper Yomiuri shimbun with an 
occurrence of the term is from 20 May 1898, p. 6, in a job advertisement for artisans wanted for 
arts and crafts production by a shop in Tokyo.
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‘work’, ‘job’, ‘off ice’), and for crafts, shokugyo 職業 (‘occupation’, ‘busi-
ness’, ‘trade’, ‘vocation’, ‘profession’), shugeiwaza 手藝巧 (‘skilful manual 
techniques’), or kagyō 家業 (‘family occupation’). Among these, some have 
at present acquired much more general meanings, such as shokugyō or 
shigoto, while others have remained in use for ‘handicrafts’. However, in 
Japan as in China, the established scholarly term in social and economic 
history remains shukōgyō/shougongye.
Which was then the traditional term for craft occupations? From the 
technical point of view, craftspeople were f irst and foremost associated with 
the gong and jiang. According to Joseph Needham, the character gong 工, 
used for technical as opposed to agricultural work, shows a tool, probably 
a carpenter’s square,93 and the character jiang 匠 or 匞 for ‘master-artisan’ 
indicates an axe or the ‘technical work’ character in a box or in a carpenter’s 
square ( ju). Needham, following Karlgren, claims that in one of its oracle 
bone forms, the character is interpreted as a man holding a tool,94 but ac-
cording to more recent paleolinguistic research, gong and jiang are probably 
etymologically unrelated.95
The semantic f ield for gong according to the dictionaries Zhongwen da 
cidian (No. 8911) and Hanyu da cidian (vol. 2, p. 951) includes various or all 
types of skilled work, notably musicians and shamans. It also refers to female 
workers and in texts during the f irst millennium B.C., it was interchanged 
with ‘official’ guan, perhaps referring to the officials in charge of the workers.
‘Craftwork’ in the sense closest to its European counterpart, is shougong, 
which refers to manual labour or to artisans,96 and gongyi,97 associated with 
93 He Jinsong, Hanzi xingyi kaoyuan, p. 179-180, claims that the tool could be a rammer used 
for the construction of stamped earth walls. Cf. also Barbieri-Low, Artisans in Early Imperial 
China, p. 36.
94 Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, Vol. 4, Physics and Physical Technology. Part 
II: Mechanical Engineering, p. 9.
95 Thanks to Wolfgang Behr for this information and the reference to He Jinsong.
96 Zhongwen da cidian and Hanyu da cidian do not agree on this point and cite the same locus 
classicus (Chronicle of the Three Kingdoms, Chronicle of Wu, ‘Biography of Sun Xiu’) as reference 
for ‘manual skill’ or ‘manual techniques’ (Zhongwen da cidian, vol. 13, no. 12050..3) or for ‘artisans’ 
(Hanyu da cidian, vol. 6, p. 293). Hanyu da cidian also notes the meaning ‘manual skill’ (shouyi), 
‘work achieved with the hands’, ‘to create with the hands’, ‘subject taught at elementary and 
junior high schools’, but for the latter four def initions the dictionary gives twentieth-century 
references.
97 Both Zhongwen da cidian, vol. 11, no. 8911..98 and Hanyu da cidian, vol. 2, p. 958 def ine it 
as ‘technical’ or ‘manual’ skill and refer to the Xin Tangshu (New dynastic history of the Tang), 
compiled between 1043 and 1060, but Hanyu da cidian in addition quotes an occurrence from 
ca. 800 in Feng Yan, Fengshi wenjian ji (Records of things heard by Mr. Feng) and one from Wang 
Zhen’s Nongshu (Agricultural treatise, chap. 21), dating from 1313.
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‘technical skills’, which was also part of the off icial designations like gongyi 
ju (craft off ice), gongyi zhuanxi suo (craft training bureau), and gongyi chang 
(craft manufacture) given as a designation to the technical and vocational 
schools established after 1902. In present-day usage, gongyi has remained 
more idiomatic than the rather synthetic shougongye.
‘Artisans’ as a social and status group are the gong and occur as such in the 
categorization of the four occupational groups . If seen from the perspective 
of their organizational structure, craft and commercial branches but also 
individual shops or trade enterprises are designated as hang (business lines 
or proto-guilds). State administrations insisted on referring to the duties of 
the artisans as jiangyi or gongyi (master artisan corvée and artisan/labour 
corvée), even in the late Qing when such corvée obligations were formally 
abolished.
The new Chinese term was obviously adapted from Japan, where it had 
been coined after contact with Western concepts. The definitions in the early 
modern dictionaries and encyclopedias show how in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century, due to the growing importance of mechanized 
production, the economic branch and business form of handicraft produc-
tion was terminologically distinguished from the mechanized, industrial 
production in factories by expressly stressing its manual quality.
Finally, as an explanation of the title of this book, both ‘state’ and ‘crafts’ 
are meant literally. Although ‘statecraft’ writings are presented in chapter 
nine, this study’s main focus is on the administration of the Qing and its 
direct and indirect control of craft production both in the service of the 
dynasty and in the private sector. The English term ‘statecraft’ was used for 
the Chinese literature generated by concerned officials and intellectuals who 
intended to improve, and sometimes reproach, the government policies of 
their times. The Chinese term for this literature, jingshi wenbian , does not 
express exactly the same metaphor but still points to writings wishing to ‘set 
in order the times like the threads on the woof of the loom’. This may show 
the aff inity of the terms for political management and for the production 
of material goods in both the English and the Chinese languages.
1. State Engagement in the Handicraft 
Sector
Textual and material evidence shows that since the Shang dynasty (ca. 
sixteenth to eleventh century B.C.), workshops for manufacturing and 
construction existed. They provided weapons and objects for ceremonial and 
everyday use for the court and the ruling elite and planned and executed 
great central building projects like palaces, city walls, and funerary monu-
ments. A great number of bronze vessels were produced for the ceremonial 
use of the rulers. Archeologists have calculated that it would have taken 
18 years ‒ if 10,000 earth pounders were engaged for 330 days per year ‒ to 
complete the stamped-earth city walls of an early Shang city located in the 
vicinity of modern Zhengzhou in Henan.1 Both cases suggest that the work 
organization lay in the hands of specialized groups who could command 
great and, in the case of the bronze casters, highly skilled manpower. These 
workers and artisans most probably stood in the immediate service of the 
rulers and were supervised by their off icials.2
Production and construction for the service of the state have been in-
corporated in various ways into the institutional frameworks of the ruling 
dynasties from that time onward. Between the third century B.C. and the 
tenth century A.D., government and civilian crafts and industries co-existed, 
and more state activist and more laissez-faire periods alternated in the 
longer dynasties of the Han and Tang. The short precursor dynasties Qin 
and Sui maintained a high degree of state activism, which was one of the 
reasons for their premature end.
The labour force especially for building, but also in the workshops, often 
had to serve the state in corvée obligations or in slavery, but the level of 
unfree labour apparently diminished after having reached its apex in the 
Northern and Southern Dynasties and the Sui. In 494 A.D., permanent 
work obligations were f irst reported to have been replaced by work shifts 
from the Liu-Song of the Southern Dynasties.3 The shift system was used 
time and again in subsequent dynasties until the f irst years of the Qing. A 
1 Robert Bagley, ‘Shang Archeology’, p. 167. According to Bagley, the original length of the 
wall was about 7 km, ‘[t]he overall thickness at the base is about 22 m, and the greatest surviving 
height is 9 m.’
2 David Keightley, ‘The Shang: China’s First Historical Dynasty’, especially ‘Dependant Labour’, 
pp. 282-284.
3 Zhu Cishou, Zhongguo gudai gongye shi, p. 291.
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parallel trend consisted in the option to convert labour duty into monetary 
payment.4 These two trends often appeared simultaneously in the middle 
and late phases of dynasties. They suggest a more indirect and rational 
relationship between professional artisans and the state. The rise of the 
guilds as intermediaries between the government on the one hand and the 
artisan and merchant households on the other during the Tang period can 
also be interpreted in this light.
Historical Overview: Official Crafts from the Song to the Ming
In Chinese craft historiography, the transition from labour obligations 
for artisan households to a system of hired labour in the off icial sector 
between the f ifteenth and seventeenth centuries is generally considered 
to be an important institutional and legal change. An overview of the 
methods of recruiting artisan labour for the dynasties and public work 
projects may show whether the break of the Qing government with previous 
practices was a radical rupture or can be understood as part of a more 
gradual process.
Marxist historiography in the tradition of the search of incipient capital-
ism in China assumes that dynastic economic policies created ‘a closed and 
self-sufficient part of the feudal economy, which was ultimately incompatible 
with private handicraft industry’.5 How far does this characterization apply 
for the Song, Yuan, and Ming periods? When did the off icial and the civilian 
sector start to become mutually permeable, so that artisans could f ind 
employment in either of them? To answer these questions, the institutions, 
sizes of the artisan workforce, and the levels of coercion will be compared.
The Song System, 960 to 1276
For several reasons, the Song dynasty represents a major historical turning 
point in Chinese history. From the tenth century onwards, the bureaucratic 
state with an off icialdom that was recruited in (theoretically) impartial and 
equal examinations among the free males prevailed until the end of the 
nineteenth century. The economy expanded and the population increased 
at an unprecedented rate, from around 55 million to 100 million from the 
4 Heinz Friese, Dienstleistungs-System, pp. 15-23, 126-130.
5 Wang Shixin, ‘State Workshops’, p. 65
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mid-tenth to the late thirteenth century.6 Inventions such as the compass, 
porcelain, and gunpowder originate from this dynasty; and block printing 
and printing with movable types were developed commercially. The Song 
possessed a fully monetized commercial economy in which paper money 
was issued by the government in order to secure liquidity in the expand-
ing commodity markets. Copper cash, the small denomination money for 
everyday use, was cast in amounts that were never again reached in Chinese 
history.7 However, on the military f ield, the Song gradually lost out to North 
Asian invaders. In 1126, a Jurchen tribe from northern Manchuria, which had 
assumed the dynastic name Jin, conquered the northern part of the Song 
empire and forced the rulers out of their capital Kaifeng. The Song established 
another, ‘temporary’ capital in Hangzhou/Lin’an south of the Yangzi delta 
and in 1142 off icially ceded the northern part of their territory to the Jin. 
They ruled in the south until their ultimate defeat by the Mongols in 1276.
Historians of China, and of the Song period in particular, in many respects 
see the Song as the apex of the Chinese bureaucratic state and of its cultural 
and economic achievements.8 But variant views have also been formulated. 
Kent Deng, for instance, comes to a quite negative evaluation of the economic 
and administrative performance of the Song government. He argues that 
the Song could not prevent large landholding and high rates of tenancy 
and had to f inance an overpaid off icialdom and an expensive military that 
was ultimately ineffective. Therefore, it prof itably engaged in commercial 
activities. This trend, which had started in the Northern Song, intensif ied 
in the Southern Song when almost half of the territory and revenue sources 
were lost. Moreover, wealth was not spread evenly. Deng has hypothesized 
that migrational shifts ‒ f irst south, out of the direct reach of the government 
of the Northern Song, and during the Southern Song probably back north 
towards the Jin territory ‒ as well as uprisings in the Southern Song showed 
popular discontent with the strong emphasis on the market economy and 
the breaking away from agrarian traditions.9
6 Maddison, Chinese economic performance, pp. 24, 169.
7 The peak was 5 million strings of copper cash and 1.4 million strings of iron cash in the 
Yuanfeng era (978-1085), cf. Peng Xinwei, Monetary History, p. 438, n. 11. The highest average 
production f igures reported in the Qing dynasty were at around 3.5 million per year between 
1761 and 1765; see Burger, ‘Minting during the Qianlong Period’, p. 392.
8 Cf. e.g. John King Fairbank, China. A New History, pp. 88-107, ‘China’s Greatest Age: Northern 
and Southern Song’. See also the discussion in Maddison, Chinese economic performance, pp. 24-25 
on various characterizations of Song growth and dynamism which Maddison believes to be 
exaggerated.
9 Kent Deng, Premodern Chinese Economy, pp. 301-310, 318-320.
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While judgments about the benef its of commercialization during the 
Song dynasty may vary,10 historians agree that state involvement in the 
non-agricultural part of the economy was intense and that the state sec-
tor surpassed the private economy.11 Craft products were bought up by 
the state at f ixed prices. This was the so-called hemai system (acquisition 
by [mutual] agreement) that included a wide product range of textiles, 
porcelain, lacquers, and other luxury goods. Moreover, the provinces were 
required to deliver a f ixed quota of manufactured and other commercial 
goods to the state as ‘tribute’. State monopolies were handled either directly 
or through merchant intermediaries.12
Scope and Size of the Official and Private Artisan Workforce
Artisan labour was allocated by the state in two ways: the craftspeople 
could be employed (mujiang) on a long-term but not necessarily permanent 
basis; this system was also referred to as hegu (consensual employment). 
These persons formed the main force of the state workshops. ‘Conscripted 
[people] from the guilds’ (danghang) or ‘artisans on shift’ ( fanjiang>) were 
summoned to fulf il labour duties for more ad hoc work. Over time, the 
Song guilds developed from instruments of state control to inf luential 
bodies of self-organization.13 Throughout the Song, they formed the 
interface between the individual artisan households and the state and 
were responsible for supplying labour to the government. For example, 
the guilds decided whose turn it was to serve the state in temporary work 
assignments.
There are no systematic overviews of the size of the workforce that the 
state could command. One estimate by Ju Qingyuan14 gives f igures of 7,000 
to 9,000 artisans in the armament manufactories of the central govern-
ment, 18,000 ironsmiths in one military prefecture, and more than 10,000 
workers in government mints (see Table 1). However, these calculations only 
show a fragment of the actual employment in government off ices. Other 
10 For a recent revision of the view that the Song state levied excessive taxes, see Liu Guanglin 
and Andrew Wareham, ‘China and England Compared’, p. 80.
11 Günter Lewin, Die ersten fünfzig Jahre der Song-Dynastie, p. 117.
12 Cf. Deng, Premodern Chinese Economy, p. 307 on changing state policies regarding monopolies. 
Salt, wine, and iron monopolies were given to merchants when they became less prof itable, but 
the more prof itable monopoly on imported medicines was permanently handled by the state.
13 Ju Qingyuan, Tō Sō kōgyōshi, pp. 138-142.
14 Ibid., pp. 31-32.
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historians have added to these data. Zhu Cishou lists all workshops of the 
Palace and the Central Government quoted in the ‘Collected Statutes of 
the Song’.15 In the Northern Song, these were the Palace Domestic Service 
(nei shisheng) and the Directorate for Imperial Manufactories (shaofu 
jian), which in total was made up of 144 sections and subsections. Some 
of these shared their workforce, but if duplications are subtracted, 105 
individual units remain.
The institutions subordinate to the Palace Domestic Service were the 
Manufactory of the Rear Palace Quarters (houyuan zaozuo suo), the Brewery 
of the Court of National Granaries (sinong si du quyuan), the Water Mill 
Off ice (shuimo wu), and the Charcoal Yard (tanchang). The most important 
central government workshops and manufactories that belonged to the 
Directorate for Imperial Manufactories were the Off ice for Arts and Crafts 
(wensi yuan), where ceremonial and ornamental objects for court use were 
produced; the silk weaving manufactory Silk Brocade Off ice (lingjin yuan); 
and the Embroidery Off ice (wenxiu yuan).16 The numbers of artisans em-
ployed here may have ranged from a few dozen to in the hundreds, such as 
the six hundred in the Silk Brocade Off ice.17
At the same level as the Directorate for Imperial Manufactories and 
also concerned with craft production were the Directorate for Construc-
tion ( jiangzuo jian), the Directorate for Armaments ( junqi jian), and the 
Directorate of Waterways (dushui jian).
After the Jin conquered North China, the Song established imperial 
manufactories in their southern capital Lin’an. Institutions were slightly 
reshuffled, so that now the manufactories of the central government were 
all put under the control of the Ministry of Public Works. Zhu Cishou consid-
ers the four main sectors of craft production in the capital to have been 
armament, construction, printing, and the production of objects for off icial 
and court use. He suggests that immediately after the transfer to the south, 
the size of the manufactories was cut down, but in the course of time they 
expanded again.18 State manufactories that were not stationed exclusively in 
the capital consisted of porcelain kilns, iron foundries, mints, armament and 
gunpowder manufactories, shipyards (which were of particular importance 
during the Southern Song), and paper manufactories.
15 Zhu Cishou, Zhongguo gudai gongye shi, p. 428 ff., referring to Song huiyao jigao 宋會要輯稿 
(Editorial draft of the Collected Statutes of the Song), ‘Zhiguan’ (Off icial positions), chap. 29-1.
16 Founded in 1104 with 300 artisans; see Kuhn, Die Song-Dynastie, p. 121.
17 Gao Xuan, Songdai chuantong gongyi, p. 12.
18 Zhu Cishou, Zhongguo gudai gongye shi, p. 430.
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The non-state sector consisted of private workshops, individual craft-
speople, and smaller-scale manufactories as well as workshops in Buddhist 
temples. Kuhn identif ies, for instance, 21 private versus nine state manu-
factories for weaving silk with complicated patterns and points out that 
apart from these, an enormous number of smaller, private manufactories 
for plain silk weaving existed.19
A recent study by Qi Xia comes to the conclusion that in 1068, there were 
between 800,000 and one million artisan households (both private and 
in the service of the state), which in his calculation made up f ive to seven 
percent of all households.20 As to estimates of the f igure of artisans in the 
service of the state during the Southern Song, Hu Xiaopeng estimates a total 
of 50,000 permanent positions and about 300,000 that were hired on a more 
temporary basis for work in mines, salt production, iron smelting, and other 
trades.21 On the basis of Angus Maddison’s population estimates for the early 
Song (Table 6), the permanent workforce amounted to 0.09 percent of the 
entire population of 55 million and 0.05 percent of the population by the 
end of the dynasty. The entire workforce recruited ad hoc by the state was 
0.6 percent at the beginning and 0.35 percent at the end of the Song dynasty.
Remuneration
Work in government manufactories was remunerated and thus not ‘real’ 
corvée labour. However, there is evidence that it was not popular and was 
evaded if possible.
Reports of corruption point to off icials that appropriated the production 
of artisans for their own use or disposal, as well as arbitrary wage cuts by 
off icials, which were especially rampant during the Southern Song.22 In 
this light, the rule that ‘whoever can double his workload will be especially 
rewarded’23 may not have been very attractive.24 However, in contrast to 
19 Kuhn, Die Song-Dynastie, pp. 379-381.
20 Qi Xia, Songdai jingjishi, p. 726, also cited in Gao Xuan, ‘Songdai chuantong gongyi’, p. 14. 
For comparison: Wilfried Reininghaus, ‘Stadt und Handwerk’, p. 6, quotes the f igure of ten to 
twelve percent as the percentage of artisans in the cities at the end of the Holy Roman Empire 
(1806).
21 Hu Xiaopeng, Zhongguo shougongye jingji tongshi, pp. 36-37.
22 Zhu Cishou, Zhongguo gudai gongye shi, p. 432.
23 Ibid., p. 432, quoting Jinshi cuibian 金石萃編, chap. 14, ‘Xuanren houshan ling caishi ji’ 宣
仁後山陵採石記.
24 Guo Daiheng, ‘Yuanming yuan neigong zeli pingshu’, p. 169, attaches a positive connotation to 
this phrase, pointing to the fact that the option to earn an eff iciency wage under fair conditions 
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this, the late Southern Song source Meng liang lu states that ‘In the case of 
work obligations, although this is [the unpopular] ‘consensual employment’, 
if the authorities give out cash and rice for it, [and if] that wage is higher 
than that paid by private employers, then those who are obliged to work 
gladly will do so.’25
Song wage data for artisan labour are not systematically presented in 
government documents but appear in scattered sources. A remuneration 
of two sheng (ca. 1.17 liters) of rice or other grains per day plus a money 
allowance of between 10 and 100 cash coins seems to have been a standard 
wage for low-skill handicrafts but also for military and service sector oc-
cupations. Assuming an average daily consumption of about one liter of rice 
per person each day,26, such wages were adequate to feed one person but did 
not suff ice to support families. The director of the arms manufactory ‘Ten 
Thousand Perfections’ complained in 1166 that the Ministry of Revenue gave 
out only 55 sheng (32.17 liters) of rice and 48 sheng (28.08 liters) of wheat per 
person per month plus a daily food allowance of 100 cash for the workers, 
and that this was not enough.27 Another example from ca. 1078 mentions 
daily wages for building walls and forts of 2 to 2.5 sheng (1.17 to 1.46 liters) 
of rice and 10 cash for pickled vegetables.28 In a state brewery, the pay was 
300 copper cash per day for masters and 250 for unskilled helpers, with 
the option of a bonus for the master in case excellent wine was made.29 By 
contrast, between 1063 and 1077, off icial salaries ranged from 300,000 to 
was different from the Qing system, which did not reward artisans who surpassed their work 
quotas. However, in the Qing, there are records for bonuses for work in the commercial industry 
that exceeded the norms, for instance for the paper dyers in 1756 Suzhou. See Ming Qing Suzhou 
gongshangye beike ji, pp. 90-92.
25 Meng liang lu, chap. 13, p. 105 ‘Tuan hang’ (Guilds and associations). The date of this source 
is disputed. It is given in characters of the hexagenarian cycle and could thus refer to ‘1274’ at 
the end of the Southern Song as well as ‘1334’ under the Mongol Yuan dynasty. Citing internal 
evidence, Umehara Kaoru, Mu ryō roku, vol. 3, pp. 374-375, plausibly argues that although the 
text deals only with the Southern Song and makes no reference to the Yuan rule, it must have 
been written in reminiscence of the splendour of the Southern Song capital. In view of the more 
rigid system of work recruitment under the Yuan, the Southern Song system may have seemed 
more lenient.
26 Xu Jianqing, Qingdai qianqi, p. 642, calculates one Qing dynasty sheng (1.035 liters) as a 
one-day ration.
27 Songshi, chap. 194, p. 4846.
28 Xu zizhi tongjian changbian (Continued Mirror for assistance in administration, Long 
version) 續資治通鑑長編, chap. 343 (Siku quanshu full text database).
29 Cited in Gao Xuan, ‘Songdai chuantong gongyi’, with reference to ‘Regulations and precedents 
on brewing in the government breweries within the city’ (Zaicheng jiuwu zaojiu zeli 在城酒務
造酒則例), p. 12.
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400,000 cash per month for the prime minister and 12,000 to 22,000 cash 
per month for county magistrates.30
In sum, one can discern little change over time in the basic labour institu-
tions of the Song. Labour market conditions seem to have been flexible; the 
public and private sector were not made impermeable by laws or regulations. 
There are thus no indications of a transition of the craft production from 
state dominance to a preponderance of the private industries as in the 
subsequent dynasties.
The Yuan System, 1279-1368
At the outset of the dynasty, the Mongol way of recruiting artisans for the 
service of the state was very different from the Song practice. In a sense, 
artisans were specially favoured by the Mongol elite in all their conquered 
territories, since few skilled artisans existed in Mongolian society previ-
ous to their conquest of sedentary peoples, and these were traditionally 
held in high regard.31 Therefore the Mongols showed strong interest in the 
artisans of the regions that had come under their domination. Artisans who 
specialized in armament production or produced luxury goods were spared 
from massacres in cities, taken to Mongolia, and presented to Mongolian 
nobles as personal servants.32 A famous saying of the times is ‘spare only the 
craftspeople’ (wei jiang de mian ).33 The dynastic history of the Yuan reports 
that in 1235, shortly after the conquest of the Jin dynasty, 720,000 ‘civilian 
artisans’ or ‘ordinary households and artisan households’ were captured in 
the geographical areas corresponding to present-day Shandong, Hebei, and 
Shanxi.34 The term ‘captives’ has been subject to debate in the literature. Ju 
Qingyuan, for instance, refuted the view that these were actually slaves and 
30 Deng, Premodern Chinese Economy, p. 302
31 Frederick Mote, ‘Chinese society under Mongol rule’, p. 654.
32 See Ritsuko Oshima, ‘The Chiang-hu in the Yüan’, p. 72, quoting from A.J. Boyle, The History 
of the World-Conqueror by ‘Ala-ad-Din ‘Ata-Malik Juvaini, translated from the text of Mirza 
Muhammad Qazvini, for the attack on Khorazum (i.e., Chorasan or Choresm) between 1220 
and 1222. Juvaini mentions 100,000 artisans that were spared. When Genghis Khan conquered 
Samarkand in 1220, 30,000 artisans are said to have been taken to Mongolia; see Hu Xiaopeng, 
‘Yuandai de xiguan jianghu’, p. 77.
33 It occurs in Yuanshi, chap. 163, in the biography of Zhang Xiongfei, p. 3819; chap. 119, in 
the biography of Muqali (Muhuali 木華黎), p. 2932, referring to the year 1216; in Liu Yin 劉因, 
Jingxiu ji 靜修集, chap. 21.
34 Yuanshi, chap. 123, biography of Kökö Buqa (Kuokuobuhua 闊闊不花), p. 3023. Oshima, ‘The 
Chiang-hu in the Yüan’, p. 73, considers 民 (ordinary [households]) and 匠 (artisan [households]) 
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held that designations such as ‘captives’ or ‘captive slaves’ (touxia, qukou) 
were ‘merely linguistic habits of the historians’. Conversely, Zhu Cishou 
argues that the Mongols in the eleventh and twelfth centuries had entered 
the slave-holding period of their historical development and therefore 
treated these artisans as captive slaves.35 Declaring oneself to be an artisan 
may often have been a survival strategy. In a eulogy to a Han off icial in 
the service of the Mongols, it is related how in 1232, after the siege of the 
Southern capital of the Jin, he was summoned to assemble the artisans to 
take them north, and sent many more people than those who were actually 
skilled, thus saving innumerable lives.36 The dynastic history of the Yuan 
mentions that from 1275 onwards, more than three-hundred thousand 
artisans were summoned to the north after the Mongols had conquered 
the Southern Song.37 Zhu Cishou outlines three distinct phases of the use 
of artisans in the Yuan dynasty: at f irst, they were forced to serve as slaves; 
later, they were registered as regular and permanent ‘off icial craftspeople’; 
f inally, the system of ‘off icial craftspeople’ was changed to shorter, ad hoc 
labour shifts.38 He argues that initially, the deported artisans stood at the 
mercy of their masters and were often mistreated.39 In the second phase, 
the artisans were formally registered by the state. They worked under 
strict control in the state manufactories and had little personal freedom. 
For instance, they had no choice in marriage, and inheritance of the trade 
was obligatory. However, guidelines for their remuneration were set up in 
1291, and they were allowed to produce and sell anything produced beyond 
their obligations to the state. In the third phase, the government resorted 
more to summoning labour for specif ic short-term obligations. This change 
becomes perceptible in the designations for the corvée duties. In the early 
phases the concerned artisans were referred to as ‘master-artisans’ jiang, 
while the designation ‘worker’ gong dominates later.40
to be two separate categories, while Gao Rongsheng, ‘Yuandai jianghu sanlun’, p. 123, assumes 
that the 720,000 were only artisan households.
35 Chü Ch’ing-yüan, ‘Government artisans of the Yüan Dynasty’, p. 235/236; Zhu Cishou, 
Zhongguo gudai gongye shi, p. 554 ff.
36 Hu Zhiyu, Zishan da quan ji, chap. 16, pp. 1196-283, ‘Dexing Yanjing Taiyuan renjiang daluheqi 
Wang gong shendao bei’ (Epitaph for Mr. Wang, director of the artisans in Dexing, Yanjing, and 
Taiyuan). For a similar account in Baozhou (present-day Baoding in Hebei), cf. Ch’ü Ching-yüan, 
‘Government artisans of the Yüan Dynasty’, p. 235.
37 Yuanshi, chap. 167, p. 3924.
38 Zhu Cishou, Zhongguo gudai gongye shi, p. 556 ff.
39 Ibid., pp. 556/557.
40 Ibid., p. 559; Gao Rongsheng, ‘Yuandai jianghu sanlun’, p. 124; Hu Xiaopeng, ‘Yuandai de 
minjiang’, pp. 66/67.
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Registration and Size of the Official Workforce
Artisans were f irst registered as distinct households by the Mongols in 1252. 
The registers are no longer extant, but the dynastic history of the Yuan as 
well as other contemporary sources mention ‘off icial artisan households’, 
‘civilian [i.e. private] artisan households’, and ‘military artisan households’. 
Apart from these largest categories, other classif ications also occur, such 
as ‘salt making households’, ‘tea producing’, iron smelting’, ‘mining’, and 
‘gold panning’ households.
The appended Table 2 shows a collection of references to numbers of ar-
tisans. These f igures as well as the registration process and categories have 
been researched in detail, but opinions are still divided on how to interpret 
especially the larger f igures. Apart from culling and complementing single 
references, calculatory methods have been applied, such as multiplying the 
off icials in charge of artisans with the estimated number of artisans that 
were subordinate to them. With this method, Ch’ü Ching-yuan arrives at 
a f igure of 300,000 off icial artisan households for the year 1272, excluding 
military artisan households but including 10,000 mangonel makers.41 More 
recent calculations take a broader perspective. Based on sample analyses of 
regional gazetteers, Hu Xiaopeng’s statistics include military, salt making, 
wine and vinegar producing, and mining households.42 His result is more than 
one million households, seven percent of the entire households in 1290. This 
estimate is even doubled by Gao Rongsheng, who includes all available figures 
from historiography and arrives at two million households of official, private, 
and military artisans and (unskilled) workers. If one household is calculated to 
have five members,43 this amounts to ten million artisans and workers for the 
late thirteenth century, and thus no less than ten percent of the population.
Remuneration
Together with the census registration, a remunerative system was estab-
lished. In 1288, it was stipulated that regularly registered persons above 
f ifteen years of age should be given three dou of rice every month (25.08 
liters) and half a jin (316 grams) of salt. Their family members should receive 
41 Chü Ch’ing-yuan, ‘Government artisans of the Yüan Dynasty’, pp. 243-245. Mangonels are 
military machines for casting stones or other projectiles.
42 Hu Xiaopeng, Yuandai de xiguan jianghu, p. 79.
43 Gao Rongsheng, Yuandai jianghu sanlun, p. 124.
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2.5 dou (20.9 liters) for adults above f ifteen years of age and 1.5 dou (12.54 
liters) for young persons between f ive and f ifteen years of age, while no 
rations were given for those under f ive. Those of servile status (qukou 驅
口) were to receive 12.54 liters for adults and 6.27 liters for young persons.44 
However, there are reports of cases when these regulations were not applied. 
The off icial Wang Hui (1227-1304) stated that in two artisans’ off ices, people 
usually earned four dou (33.4 liters) of rice per month and half a jin (316 
grams) of salt, but some were complaining that they had only received 2.5 dou 
(20.9 liters) and no salt at all.45 Other reports show that artisans sometimes 
received 15 jin (9.5 kg) of wheat flour in addition to their rice rations. There 
is scattered evidence for monetary wages of 1.5 tael paper money per month 
plus clothing for summer and winter. Compared to the remuneration during 
the Song, this is lower in terms of food wages, but during the Yuan artisans’ 
incomes were similar to soldiers’ rations.46
The Interface of Official and Private Employment
Studies on the Yuan dynasty artisans concur that it was possible for govern-
ment artisans to work for their own prof it aside from their duties to the 
state.47 In the early Yuan, sources suggest that if ‘civilian artisans’ (minjiang 
民匠) from private workshops were summoned to work obligations, this 
was done according to f ixed rules. However, in the later phase of the Yuan 
dynasty, as the state artisan off ices declined, ad hoc requisitions of labour 
increased. The case of the f irst emperor of the Ming, Zhu Yuanzhang (1328-
1398), illustrates the problems caused by the inflexibility of the registra-
tion system.48 Zhu’s grandfather had been registered as a member of a 
gold-panning household, but the family could neither produce the yearly 
amount of gold which they were obliged to present to the government nor 
change their household status and the obligations linked to it. They had to 
take to tenant farming in order to buy the gold on the market, but without 
suff icient income they eventually had to flee their home region in order to 
evade their f iscal obligations.
44 Tongzhi tiaoge, chap. 13, p. 387 f., ‘Regulations and precedents on provisions for work’ (‘Gongli-
ang zeli’ 工糧則例), p. 390, ‘Precedents on adult and young persons’ (‘Da xiao kou li’ 大小口例).
45 Wang Hui, Qianjian ji, chap. 89, fol. 18a/b.
46 Hu Xiaopeng, Zhongguo shougongye jingji tongshi, p. 607.
47 Ch’ü Ching-yuan, ‘Government artisans of the Yüan Dynasty’, p. 243; Gao Rongsheng, 
‘Yuandai jianghu sanlun’, p. 126.
48 Mote, ‘Chinese society under Mongol rule’, pp. 655/656.
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Although obviously the Yuan system of coerced labour could not be 
maintained with the same vigour during the entire course of the dynasty, 
textual evidence is too scarce to warrant the assumption that a private 
commercial sector unfolded as a result of this process, as it did in the Ming 
dynasty. Yet it is known that during the Yuan, important technological 
innovations occurred in the form of cotton ginning and spinning and that 
the government actively promoted cotton cultivation.49 Export ceramics 
were produced in the Fujian port city of Quanzhou with more or less the 
same intensity and involvement of households in the Yuan period as in the 
preceding Song period, in spite of the fact that the population had decreased 
by half. Billy So therefore assumes that double the amount of households, 
or around 14 percent of the prefectural population of Quanzhou, were 
engaged in full-time non-agricultural production by ca. 1290.50 At least in 
this export-oriented craft branch in the port city with the highest export 
rates on China’s coast, the craft sector was obviously not being repressed 
by the government nor overburdened by labour obligations.
The Ming System, 1368-1644
With only four classes ‒ off icial, commoner, military, and artisan ‒ the Ming 
system of household registration was more clear-cut than that of the Yuan. 
It was f irst devised in 1386 and provided that all registered artisans had to 
render service for three months every two years. The specif ic hardship of 
this system lay in the fact that this work was unpaid and that most service 
was required at the capitals, Nanjing until 1403, and thereafter at both 
Nanjing and Peking. Artisans who lived in remote areas had to travel far to 
fulf ill their obligations. Two reforms were made in 1393 and 1454. In 1393, 
62 craft branches were singled out for which service had to be rendered in 
one- to f ive-year shifts by ‘shift artisans’ (lunban jiang). Carpenters and 
tailors, for instance, were supposed to come to the capital every f ive years, 
while paperhangers,51 embroiderers, bow-makers, and printers had to take 
yearly turns. In 1454, this was once again changed to uniform four-year 
shifts. Other conditions applied for the registered artisans that lived near 
the capital, the so-called resident artisans (zhuzuo jiang). From the reign of 
49 Zurndorfer, ‘The Resistant Fibre’, p. 48.
50 So, Prosperity, Region, and Institutions, p. 196.
51 biaojiang 裱匠, artisans who paste paper to window frames or mount paintings or cal-
ligraphies on hanging scrolls.
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the Yongle emperor (1403-1424), they had to serve ten days every month. At 
f irst, the artisans were expected to work in the capital Nanjing. After the 
relocation of the capital to Peking, artisans from North and Central China 
were registered for service there, while those from the South and Southwest 
were expected in Nanjing, where a secondary capital with a downsized 
version of the Peking central government was maintained.
The number of registered artisans (see Table 4) varied from 232,089 people 
in 1393, of which 129,983 worked on shifts, to 289,000 in 1454 (240,000 for 
the two capitals, of which 25% for Nanjing and 75% for Peking). After the 
corvée obligations were changed to tax payments in 1562, 222,000 to 232,000 
people remained as registered artisans within the respective household 
registration, which indicates that craft occupations remained inherited. 
Off icial Ming dynasty population f igures are notoriously underreported, 
and therefore it is particularly diff icult to def ine the percentage of the 
population that was registered as artisans. On the basis of Martin Heijdra’s 
middle growth rates (see Table 7) for the years 1393 (90 million), 1454 (122 
million), and 1562 (198 million), the percentage of registered artisans is 0.26, 
0.24, and 0.12 percent respectively.52 Taking Angus Maddison’s f igures 
(see Table 6), the values are 0.34, 0.33, and 0.15 percent, calculated with the 
population f igures for 1390, 1450, and 1560, which are slightly higher than 
Heijdra’s. Nevertheless, in comparison to the Yuan, these numbers point 
to the much reduced prof ile of artisans in the permanent service of the 
government, which is certainly due to the greater availability of artisans 
from the labour market from the sixteenth century.
Remuneration of Resident Artisans and Substitution of Work 
Service by Tax Payment
This group’s services were paid with rice provisions of generally three dou 
per month (29.61 liters), with an additional food allowance for days actually 
worked.53 Since the Zhengtong era (1436-1449), extra provisions of one jin 
(590 grams) of salt are mentioned. We f ind no reference to monetary wages 
in the ‘Statutes of the Ming’, but according to Zhu Cishou artisans received 
gratif ications of one to two silver tael on special occasions, such as imperial 
enthronement.
52 For a critique of Heijdra’s estimates, see Robert Marks, ‘China’s Population Size during the 
Ming and Qing’, pp. 4-6.
53 Zhu Cishou, Zhongguo gudai gongye shi, p. 648.
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However, for obvious reasons, both types of registration and work obliga-
tions proved unpractical. In the course of the expanding market economy, 
the practice of labour service as a manner of tax payment in kind became 
obsolete.54 Since 1485, artisans had the option to pay taxes rather than work 
for the state. The artisans from the south were supposed to pay 900 cash 
per person per month, and those from the north 600 cash.55 In 1503 this was 
changed to a payment of 1.8 tael per shift or 450 cash per year, and from 1562 
on it was expressly forbidden to render labour service rather than to pay 
taxes.56 This did not mean that the state no longer employed artisans in 
permanent positions but that the work was now being paid in money and food 
provisions.57 The 1615 compilation Gongbu changku xu zhi (‘What should be 
known about the factories and storehouses of the Ministry of Public Works’) 
has detailed information on the activities and craft branches under off icial 
supervision as well as some wage data for administrators and artisans, and 
f inally the tax income by the artisan shift tax from the provinces.58
Conclusion
The three dynastic administrations all had a distinctive approach to allocat-
ing craft labour. The Song did not register craftspeople as such but made 
sure that the guilds organized the required labour force from their ranks. 
Artisans were hired in permanent positions or worked for shorter shifts in 
palace or government manufactories. Work for the state was remunerated 
in food rations and cash.
The Yuan used a complex system of registration in various household 
categories like ‘off icial artisans’, ‘civilian artisans’, ‘military artisans’, and 
several other specif ic occupations. Slavery or bound labour seems to have 
existed at least during the initial phases. Later artisans had more personal 
freedom, yet the artisan status remained hereditary. As a rule, work was 
remunerated in food provisions.
The registration of artisan households in the Ming was less complex than 
that of the Yuan. An elaborate system of work shifts, mainly at the capital, 
was tried out and changed several times. This type of shift labour was 
54 Cf. Wang Shixin, ‘State Workshops and the Handicraft Industry’, pp. 65-80.
55 Da Ming huidian, chap. 189, fol. 5b.
56 Ibid., chap. 189, fol. 8a.
57 For details, see the section on the Longjiang shipyard in Chapter Six.
58 E.g. Gongbu changku xu zhi, chap. 3, fol. 1 ff., ‘Nianli qianliang’ (年例錢糧 ‘Yearly rules for 
money and provisions’), 1.5 tael per month for a printer.
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unpaid, but the artisans were fed. Resident artisans in the capital worked 
in more frequent shifts of ten days per month and were paid with food 
allowances. A hundred years after the system was initiated, tax payments 
were gradually substituted for obligatory work shifts. Thereafter artisans 
were hired and paid in food and monetary wages.
Population data for the periods in question, disputed as they are, might offer 
a partial explanation of some of the institutional changes. The population 
apparently shrank in periods of dynastic decline and the subsequent uprisings 
and warfare. The interpolations both by Maddison and by Heilig assume a 
decline from the Southern Song to the Yuan, and again at the end of the Ming; 
moreover, Maddison supposes that a marked decline occurred at the end of the 
Yuan.59 A decline in population may result either in greater coercion or, as in 
the case of Europe after the Black Death, in rising wages60 or other incentives 
for the scarcer labour force. Declining population figures may have been one 
factor behind the higher level of compulsion – or at least the attempt of all-
inclusive coverage of artisan workforce by registration – in the early Yuan and 
the early Ming. That the Qing government in its early phase officially abolished 
the artisan household registration, even if in actual practice it took longer for 
its last traces to be eliminated, may be an instance of the contrary measures 
taken in a similar situation – or at least of the political intention to do so. In 
the Ming, when the population and workforce increased and the commodity 
markets expanded, the artisan registration and corvée duties relaxed.
Both during the Yuan and the Ming, demand for skilled artisans was 
high in the initial phases of the dynasty, especially for building palaces, 
defensive structures, and infrastructure. That the government imposed 
stronger or lighter restrictions on the freedom of the workforce hinged also 
on its immediate demand for labour.
The economic situation under the Yuan is still disputed. The arguments 
have been elucidated in a volume of collected essays on the Song-Yuan-Ming 
transition.61 The issue at stake is whether the Yuan was a dark age of decline 
and a turning point that ended the early phase of the Tang-Song commer-
cialization and early modernity, as portrayed by the Japanese historian Naitō 
Kōnan, or whether the trajectory between the Song and the Ming was rather 
an evolutionary phase that led to the second wave of commercialization 
59 Maddison, Chinese economic performance, p. 26, Figure 1.1; Heilig, ‘IIASA Data-Population: 
China’s Population Growth, A.D. 0-2050’.
60 Routt, David, ‘The Economic Impact of the Black Death’.
61 Smith and von Glahn, The Song-Yuan-Ming Transition, especially p. 2, which explains that 
the Yuan are still considered by many scholars as ‘terra incognita’ and the ‘divide between 
mid- and late imperial China’.
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starting in the mid-sixteenth century. The latter is the perception of the 
authors of The Song-Yuan-Ming transition, and most decidedly Li Bozhong.62 
Depending on the perspective taken and on the research object, the outlook 
on the period between the tenth and the sixteenth centuries will differ. Those 
authors who look at the political economy of these eras, as Liu Guanglin did 
with the f iscal administration of the Song, Ming, and Qing dynasties,63 f ind 
more differences and ruptures between these dynasties, while from the 
perspective of agricultural development or from the regional elites based 
outside the power centres, the evolutionary tendencies will seem stronger. 
Timothy Brook has pointed to continuities between the Yuan and the Ming in 
the political and economic field, such as the conflicting legacies of autocracy 
and commercialization.64 Yet even Brook does not explain the arrangements 
for artisans in the service of the state in those two dynasties in terms of 
evolution but rather points to the discontinuity between the great detail of 
household registration in as many as eighty-three different groups in the 
Yuan and the return to the simplifying fourfold structure in the Ming.65
Artisan registration and its gradual dissolution belong to the f ield of 
political economy, and consequently three distinct ways of organization 
emerge that are not directly related in a historical sense. The Yuan system 
was not an inheritance from the Song dynasty but shows the characteristics 
of a steppe and nomad regime with its initial preference for particular artisan 
skills (most notably in military and luxury production) and reservations 
towards agriculture. Military vigour and conquest played a central role in 
the political self-understanding of the Mongols, and traditions of unfree 
labour persisted.
The f igures of off icial artisans in relation to the entire population also 
show that, numerically, direct state organization of the crafts was receding. 
From 350,000 permanent and temporary artisans with work obligations 
in the Song to two million registered artisan households in the Yuan, the 
f igure of 280,000 registered artisans in the early Ming clearly indicates the 
waning engagement of the state. In terms of population f igures, the artisan 
workforce in the service of the state in the Northern Song was at the most 
at 0.6 percent of the entire population; in the Yuan (1290), seven percent of 
the entire households were registered for actual or potential service for the 
62 Ibid., p. 6; Li Bozhong, ‘Was There a ‘Fourteenth-Century Turning Point’?’, pp. 135-175, p. 175.
63 Liu Guanglin, Wrestling for Power and The Chinese Market Economy.
64 Brook, The Troubled Empire, pp. 1 and 22, where the continuities of autocracy and com-
mercialization are linked up to the Song.
65 Ibid., p. 147.
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state; in the Ming, depending on the population estimates assumed, these 
f igures were between 0.26 and 0.15 percent.
The evidence does not warrant the conclusion that under the Song or the 
Yuan system, the initially strong state organization weakened in the course of 
the dynasty. This is the case, however, for the Ming system, where the private 
sector started to supersede the state sector in scope and size. However, its 
characteristic transformation of labour obligations into tax payments was not 
unique to the Ming dynasty. This had also occasionally been implemented 
under dynastic rulers in the f irst millennium A.D. In the Ming, the private 
and state sector became largely permeable after the mid-sixteenth century.
Appendix
Table 1  Artisans and workers in the Song dynasty state workshops, 
manufactories, and mines





imperial arsenal, armament produc-
tion sites, military artisans of a myriad 
Perfections (yuqian junqi suo 御前
軍器所, Junqi jian 軍器監, wanquan 
junjiang 萬全軍匠)
3,700 military artisans
imperial arsenal, eastern and western 
workshops (yuqian junqi suo 御前軍
器所, Dong xi zuofang 東西作坊)






wanquan zhihui萬全指揮 (myriad 
Perfections command)
5,700 military artisans




tion to late 13th 
century)
Paper manufacturing for paper money 
造會紙局
1,200 Paper makers
South Song? Shu jinyuan 蜀錦院




13th century Zhanchun 蘄春, tieqian jian 鉄錢監 
(iron and lead workshop)
300
each day
iron and copper 
smelters






? Coloured metal mining 五金雜產 at 
Shaozhou 韶州
10,000 miners (and 
smelters?)
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iron foundry 鉄冶 500 iron smelters and 
casters
12th century ironsmiths in one military prefecture 
( jun 軍) 
18,000 arms manufactur-
ers: ironsmiths
Source: Ju Qingyuan, Tō Sō kōgyōshi, p. 31-32.
Table 2  Yuan dynasty artisans and workers in state workshops, manufactories, 
and mines
Artisans and institutions Figures (persons)
1276 籍江南民為工匠





1284 among the 300,000 craft households in Jiangnan, 
190,000 should be re-registered as ordinary households 








1310 for building the temple wutai si 五台寺, 1,400 artisans 
and 3,500 soldiers were recruited
1,400工匠(workers 
and artisans)
1236 Minjiang (civilian artisans) 720,000 民匠
(civilian artisans)
4 kilns at Dadu 大都四窯場, 300 artisans and labourers for 




1261 Xiunei si 修内司 (Palace maintenance office) 140 offices, 
450 renjiang 人匠 (ordinary artisans) for construction
450 人匠(civilian 
artisans)
1271-1284 number of craftspeople in Xiunei si enlarged 1,272工匠(workers 
and artisans)
1267/1274 Caishi ju 采石局(Quarries) 2,000+ 夫 
(unskilled workers)





食，復其戶使得以專于其藝 the artisans in the empire 
were inspected, they were assembled in the capital 
and categorized, and their skills were tested and they 
were given food and were registered according to their 
specializations.
Child/juvenile artisans, male and female, were recruited 
and sent to hongzhou 收天下童男童女及工匠，置局弘州 
(今河北陽原縣). thus, there were 300 silk weavers織金
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Artisans and institutions Figures (persons)
Dadu 大都 and Suzhou 蘇州: 600+ hunters and artisans 打捕戶及民匠
600+ (artisans and 
worker households)
Zhiying si 祗應司: Construction of palaces for princes 700工匠 (artisans 
and workers)
rhinoceros horn and ivory craftshops 犀象牙局 150匠戶 (artisan 
households)
foresters of Dadu 大都采山提領所 163夫匠 (unskilled 
workers and 
artisans)
Dianpi ju 甸皮句 (office for hides) 30+匠 (artisans)
Baoding weaving and dyeing office保定織染局 101戶匠 (artisan 
households)
Guanling suilu zhuse minjiang daluhuachi guanguan 管領
隨路諸色民匠達魯花赤管官 (overseer of the Supervi-





Dadu minjiang 大都民匠 (Civilian artisans in Dadu) 202民匠 (civilian 
artisans)
Zhuozhou chengjin ju renjiang 涿州成錦局人匠
Brocade weavers in Zhuozhou
102戶人匠 (civilian 
artisan households)
Source: yang Zihui, Zhongguo lidai renkou tongji ziliao yanjiu, p. 813 ff.
Table 3  Ming dynasty work obligation shifts of builders according to the 1393 
regulations
Craft branch Registered persons Interval
Carpenters 木匠 33,928 five years
Sawyers 鋸匠 9,679 four years
tilers and bricklayers 瓦匠 7,590 four years
Painters and lacquerers 油漆匠 5,137 four years
earth pounders 土工匠 1,376 three years
Scaffolders 搭材匠 1,112 three years
Stone masons 石匠 6,017 two years
Sources: ruitenbeek, Carpentry and Building, p. 17, and Da Ming huidian, chap. 189, fol. 1a-5a.
Table 4  Registered artisans in the Ming dynasty




registered shift obligation artisans 129,983
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labour obligations for nanjing 58,000




1562 tax obligations for Beijing 142,486
ming huidian 
chap. 208
tax obligations for nanjing 59,695
+ missing obligations for nanjing 20,000-30,000 
(estimated)
total 222,181-232,181
Sources: Zhu Cishou, Zhongguo gudai gongye shi, p. 643 ff. and Da Ming huidian, chap. 189.







Directorate of Ceremonial 司禮監 433 1,383
Directorate of Palace eunuchs 内官監 480 1,883
Directorate of imperial regalia 司設監 33 1,437
Directorate of imperial accoutrements1 御用監 40 2,755
Directorate for Credentials2 印綬監 19
Directorate of imperial apparel 尚衣監 42 654
Directorate of the imperial horses 御馬監 11 305
Palace weaving and Dyeing office 内織染局 1,343
Silversmith office 銀作局 23 166
Palace armory 兵仗局 6 1,781
Cap and hat office 巾帽局 498
Sewing office 針工局 1 359
Paper office 寳鈔司 624
Silver Storehouse 司銀庫 15
Storehouse administration 内承運庫 359
Palace granary3 供應庫 4 259
firewood office4 惜薪司 18
Condiments Service5 酒醋麵局 169






Sources: Da Ming huidian, chap. 189 and Sun Jian, Beijing gudai jingji shi, p. 185. 
1 hucker, A Dictionary of Official Titles, no. 8213: this office was responsible for preparing fine wood 
and ivory object for the emperor’s use and for presenting memorials for imperial attention that 
were submitted by the officialdom. 
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2 hucker, A Dictionary of Official Titles, no. 7994: in cooperation with the Directorate of Palace 
Seals (shangbao jian) managed the seals and tallies with which the imperial documents were 
authenticated. 
3 Gugong cidian, p. 131. 
4 ibid. 
5 hucker, A Dictionary of Official Titles, no. 1319: prepared sauces and other condiments for palace 
use.































Source: maddison, Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run, p. 169, table D.1.
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Table 7  A variant estimate for population figures in the Ming and the early Qing 
(million persons)















85 137 185 204
Source: heijdra, ‘the Socio-economic Development of rural China During the ming’, p. 438. 
heijdra assumes that the middle or high growth rates are more probable than the low ones.
2. The Qing Central Government 
Institutions in Control of the 
Handicrafts
This chapter explores the institutional structure of those agencies of the 
Qing central government that controlled craft production and construction, 
together with one of their most important bureaucratic instruments, the 
handicraft regulations. Temporally it covers the entire range of the dynasty 
from the Ming-Qing transition through to the demise of the monarchy and 
the rise of the Republic of China. It does so by concentrating on the craft 
branches in the capital or in its close vicinity.
For the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, during the transition to 
‘modernity’ in the sense of mechanized production, innovations in the govern-
ment vocational schools are discussed, and the industrial policies of the Qing 
administration are outlined. By the nineteenth century, a divergence between 
the court and the central government in terms of government policy towards 
the craft institutions can be analyzed on the basis of official documentation: 
while the government and provinces had their artisan staff reduced to practi-
cally nothing, the court institutions were strengthened rather than weakened.
Political Background
The Manchu Qing rulers who had waged war against the Ming dynasty since 
the early seventeenth century seized the Ming capital Beijing in 1644. The 
Qing were well aware that they ruled as a tiny ethnic minority over the Han 
Chinese, and they identif ied themselves with the Mongol Yuan in several 
respects. Yet their attitude towards the Han Chinese population and elites 
for much of their rule differed markedly from that of the Yuan. The legacy of 
the Ming was adopted in respect to the off icial apparatus und bureaucratic 
structures. The superiority and leadership of the Manchu in the government 
and the military was asserted, and it was ensured that all important positions 
in the administration stood under dual and sometimes triple leadership 
(Manchu, Chinese, Mongol). Yet the conventional road to off icialdom ‒ the 
state examination system ‒ was continued, and the Chinese elites had free 
access to it. As for the population, taxation was relatively low for most of the 
dynasty. For the craftspeople, different than in the previous Yuan and Ming 
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dynasties, off icial corvée duties were not resumed, and the special artisan 
tax of the Ming was abolished in the second year of the Qing dynasty. It was 
re-established in the transitional phase between 1658 and 1681, but after the 
consolidation of Qing rule it was f inally done away with and the artisans 
were included as ordinary households in the land tax register. This meant 
that in a legal sense their occupation was no longer hereditary. Thus, the 
seventeenth century can be characterized as a period of appeasement of 
the Han Chinese, which included, in contrast to the preceding dynasties, 
light-handed policies towards the population in general and craftspeople 
in particular. Artisans in the direct service of the state were grouped into 
various departments of the court and central administration.
In the eighteenth century, the population rose to unprecedented levels. 
This was due to the committed, hands-on if autocratic style of government 
pursued by the second, third, and fourth of the Manchu emperors ‒ Kangxi, 
Yongzheng, and Qianlong ‒ in the initial years of their reign.1 Internal 
security was ensured, and the Qing rule expanded far north, west, and south 
into the realm of Mongolian and Tibetan dominance. If the government style 
was actively committed, this implied that the intention of the emperors 
was to keep the bureaucracy under tight control and to maintain as slim 
an administration as possible.
In the nineteenth century, foreign trade started to cause serious problems, 
as an increase in opium imports negatively impacted what had up to then been 
a positive trade balance. The Chinese government clashed with the opium 
merchants, who were backed by Western governments, and in a sea war that 
broke out over the opium problem, the Chinese were defeated. Consequently, 
China was forced to open up initially f ive ports, and in the end more than 
one hundred, to Western traders. These were known as treaty ports. A major 
ecological crisis followed when in the 1850s the Yellow River changed its bed 
and estuary, causing inundations and devastating large parts of the central 
Chinese plains and their inhabitants. At the same time, the largest uprising 
of the Qing dynasty, the Taiping rebellion, nearly forced the Qing out of 
government and would have ended the dynasty by the 1850s had it not been for 
local militia leaders who fought back and destroyed the rebels. These armies 
became regular parts of the Chinese land forces, and their commanders Li 
Hongzhang (1823-1901), Zeng Guofan (1811-1872), and Zuo Zongtang (1812-1885) 
were rewarded with important government positions. They ushered in a period 
of so-called ‘self-strengthening’. The principal aim of the self-strengthening 
1 Will, Wong et al., Nourishing the People; Carol Shiue, ‘Local Granaries and Central Government 
Disaster Relief ’; Dunstan, State or Merchant?
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efforts was to produce modern weapons and build up a modern army so 
that the Qing empire would be able to rebut any further foreign attacks. 
However, this proved to be infeasible. The worst defeat was suffered when 
the Chinese navy lost not to Western forces but to the Japanese military 
in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895. From that point, calls for constitutional 
reforms became louder. The proponents of reform demanded the promotion 
of commerce, crafts, and industries and called for the abolishment of the 
outdated social hierarchy which perceived the scholar-literati trained in the 
exegesis of Confucian classics as the highest class in Chinese society. In the 
meantime, the Chinese government started to endorse industrialization also 
in the civilian sector, mainly in cotton spinning and weaving, and in mining. 
A system of government-supervised and merchant-financed management of 
large factories, mainly in the treaty ports, was inaugurated. Eventually this 
proved to be problematic because the government officials assigned for these 
tasks often misappropriated funds and were, on the whole, not well-versed 
in operating large enterprises according to market principles.
After China’s defeat by Japan in 1895, foreign manufacturing established 
itself more f irmly in the treaty ports. The f irst attempt at constitutionalism, 
the so-called Hundred Day Reforms of 1898, which had also provided for an 
industrial programme, was crushed by the Empress Dowager Cixi. After the 
f iasco of the anti-foreign Boxer uprising which had ended in the invasion 
of Peking by joint foreign government troops, the Qing government imple-
mented some of the constitutionalists’ reform ideas and realized measures 
to promote industry and commerce. Private mechanized manufacturing 
(so-called ‘indigenous capitalism’) emerged in this period, and among other 
measures, the Qing government institutionalized a new type of vocational 
training centre for craftspeople.
Conventionally, the Qing government is blamed for most of the woes and 
crises that befell China in the nineteenth century; especially when China 
is compared to Japan which, when faced with the same menace of a loss of 
sovereignty, was able to establish a more rational administration and give its 
elites more political participation. Critically as well, the Japanese government 
had managed not to estrange itself from its populace on the issue of ethnicity. 
If the achievements of the period of self-strengthening are assessed, they are 
mostly attributed to the provincial leaders-turned-government officials. The 
last ten years are not taken into account or not attributed to the Qing. This 
view is taken to test here. There is evidence that even from 1901 to 1911 the Qing 
dynasty strove to modernize crafts and initiate industrial production with 
fossil-fueled machinery. Instead of blaming the Qing dynasty’s decadence, 
which is the most commonly held view held by both the nationalists and 
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their socialist successors on the mainland, the following chapters suggest 
looking at what was being achieved on the institutional side.
Government Institutions in Control of the Crafts: Ministries of 
the Central Government and Court Administration
From the beginning, the number of government workshops and manu-
factories in the Qing period was more modest than during the preceding 
dynasties, but their product range was still broad. The main branches of 
activity were the construction of public, religious, and court buildings; silk 
weaving; the production of weapons and armour; ceramics and other arts 
and crafts objects; shipbuilding; cash casting; and printing.
In the central government in Peking, these tasks were mainly organized 
into three institutions: the Ministry of Public Works (gongbu), the Imperial 
Household Department (neiwufu), and the Ministry of Revenue (hubu). 
Provincial administrations organized, in cooperation with the lower-level 
prefectural or district authorities, the construction and maintenance of 
off icial civilian, religious, and military buildings; traff ic arteries; cash 
production; armaments and ammunition; and shipbuilding. To this was 
added, depending on the local situation, river or sea dike conservancy, 
mining, and salt production, although in the latter two cases, the actual 
work and technical organization was in the hands of monopoly merchants 
rather than off icials. The total numbers of artisans in the direct service of 
the government around 1800 may have been more than 40,000, of which 
about 14,000 were engaged in Peking and 26,000 outside the capital in 
various state manufactories and construction sites (see tables 14 and 15).
The Ministry of Public Works: Organization, Tasks, and 
Administrators
The Qing state administration encompassed several large domains of power 
that culminated in the person of the emperor. On the next level was the regular 
civilian officialdom with the Grand Secretariat (neige) as its highest organ, but 
since 1730, this was superseded by a ‘Council of State’ ( junji chu) that consisted 
of five of the emperor’s most trusted consultants who had all previously held 
leading positions elsewhere in the hierarchy.2 The Grand Secretariat controlled 
2 Hucker, Official Titles, No. 1735, pp. 85-86.
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and coordinated the so-called Six Ministries and other specialized departments, 
such as the Court of Colonial Affairs (lifan yuan), which in 1861 was replaced by 
an Office of Foreign Affairs (zongli yamen); the Directorate of Education (guozi 
jian), a kind of imperial university; the Court of Judicial Review (dali si); and 
many other institutions of civil administration.3 Independent of this main axis 
of the bureaucratic hierarchy were the Censorate and the Imperial Household 
Department in the capital, the provincial administrations, and the army.
The system of organizing the fundamental tasks of a government into 
six ministries had been institutionalized since the Sui dynasty (581-617) but 
allegedly goes back to pre-imperial times. Among the concerned Ministries 
of Personnel, Revenue, Rites, War, and Justice/Punishments, the Ministry 
of Public Works ranked sixth and last. The ranking also derived from pre-
imperial times and is attributed to the ‘Rites of Zhou’, a source of disputed 
origin, probably from the later Zhou period or Warring States period (f ifth 
to third century B.C.),4 in which the ministries are also attributed to heaven, 
earth, and the four seasons, with the Ministry of Works as the ‘Winter Office’. 
Research on the hierarchy within the six ministries is not easy to come 
by. Charles O. Hucker briefly remarks that the Ministry of Public Works 
was ‘usually considered the weakest of the Ministries; [it] was sometimes 
consolidated with the Ministry of Justice [xingbu] into a single agency’.5 
According to Hucker, during the Qing dynasty the Ministries of Revenue, 
of Rites, and of Justice retained much of the authority they had wielded 
in the Ming. However, the Ministries of Personnel, of War, and of Public 
Works lost many of their functions to other agencies; the Ministry of Public 
Works in particular had to give up part of its prerogatives to the provincial 
governors and governors-general.6 These last two offices had become regular 
positions in the Qing rather than additional assignments for vice ministers 
of the central government who were sent to the provinces to supervise and 
coordinate.7 Beyond this loss of power – and the increase of prestige for the 
provincial administrators – the age-old inferior position of the Ministry of 
Public Works may have had to do with the area it organized, and the fact 
that it was furthest removed from the ceremonial, cultural, political, and 
military f ields of engagement of its collegiate departments, and had less 
influence on personnel administration than the ‘Ministry of Heaven’.
3 Hucker, Official Titles, No. 1735, pp. 86-87.
4 Michael Loewe (ed.), Early Chinese Texts, pp. 25-29.
5 Hucker, Official Titles, No. 3462.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., No. 2731.
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The Ministry was divided into four major sections and several subordinate 
or co-ordinate services, the detailed functions of which are shown in Box 1.
The records in the historiographic sources ‒ such as the ‘Regulations and 
precedents of the Ministry of Public Works’ (Gongbu zeli), the ‘Collected 
Statutes with factual precedents’ (Huidian shili), and the ‘Draft history of 
the Qing dynasty’ (Qingshi gao) ‒ all document the responsibilities and the 
off icial positions accorded to each of these off ices and facilities in great 
detail, but also with a slight variance.
Box 1. Subdivisions and responsibilities of the Ministry of Public Works
Name Function
Bureau of Construction  
yingshan qingli si 營繕清
吏司
estimating and accounting for construction and main-
tenance of city walls, buildings for official examinations 
(offices and examination sheds), granaries, garrison 
buildings, jails, and minor constructions like stele pavilions 
and sheds in the capital and the provinces.
Supervising building and maintenance projects of altars, 
temples, and official buildings in all provinces
acquisition of timber and bricks; the handling of taxes in 
kind to be submitted in reed and timber
Printing and distributing of regulations concerning 
building projects
Control of timber storehouses and timber yards (mu-
chang), and the glazed tile kilns at the liuli chang  site in 
the outer City of Peking1
Bureau of forestry and 
weights yuheng qingli si 虞
衡清吏司
Production of weapons, ammunition, fire rods, and ar-
mour, agricultural tools in Xinjiang, all vessels in the capital 
offices made of copper and iron, and official weights
Casting cash in its Baoyuan ju ‘well of fortune’) mints
acquisition of copper, lead, nitre and sulphur, and the 
pearls delivered from the eastern provinces (manchuria).
Specialized storing facilities:
army requirements Storehouse ( junxu ku), responsible for 
tents and flags
nitre and Sulphur Storehouse (xiaohuang ku), received and 
gave out the nitre and sulphur provided by all provinces
ammunition office (huoyao ju), controlled and stored 
ammunition
lead Storehouse (qianzi ku), received and gave out lead 
bullets for big and small rifles and cannons
Cannon Storehouse ( jiaozi ku), preserved old and 
damaged cannons
official Cart office (guan che chu), provided all the carts for 
the officials and organized transports for building projects
firewood recycling Storeplace (lit. Cherish the firewood 
yard, xixin chang), received and gave out recycled wood sent 
in from every place (such as wood poles and bamboo poles)2
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Name Function
Bureau of irrigation and 
transportation dushui 
qingli si 都水清吏司
maintenance of waterways, sea dikes, rivers, canals, irriga-
tion and drainage ditches, fluvial dikes, embankments, 
sluices, bridges, roads, river and marine battleships, ferries, 
tribute rice barges
responsibility for the printed matter and books produced 
in all provinces, and for ceremonial vessels
responsibility for the textiles used in all altars, temples, 
and for official clothing
facilities:
ice vault (bingjiao) that provided the ice needed at all offices
Coloured Silk Storehouse (caichou ku) that received and 
gave out textiles3
State farms Bureau tuntian 
qingli si 屯田清吏司
maintenance of the imperial mausolea and official graves
Collection and distribution of products of mountains and 
marshes, especially firewood, charcoal and coal4
manufacturing Storehouse 
zhizao ku 製造庫
Construction and maintenance of imperial carriages
Production of ceremonial items such as paper effigies of 
door gods and auspicious writings in couplets
Production of sacrifical and other religious objects
Production of clothing5
auditing office (‘Savings 
Storehouse’) jieshen ku 節
慎庫 
Bookkeeping, supervised the timber tax levied at the 
biggest customs stations
Coordination of the finances of the storehouses6
office of estimates liaogu 
suo 料估所 
Control of the estimates for all projects and expenses7
archival, financial and 
bookkeeping facilities
keeping record of expenses and monitoring the progress 
and accounts of specific projects8
1 Gongbu zeli, 1815 ed., chap.117, fol. 1a-1b, for a general description of the responsibilities; 
chap. 1-22 with all regulations concerning the responsibilities of this section; Qingshi gao, 
chap. 114, p. 3292. liuli chang, which was later to become a district famous for antiques and 
book dealers, was defunct by 1825, and the production of the yellow glazed tiles and roof 
decorations for palace buildings was relocated to the western hills near Peking, where raw 
materials were available; see Huidian shili, chap. 875, fol. 5a. 
2 Gongbu zeli, 1815 ed., chap. 117, fol. 2a-2b; chap. 23-38; Qingshi gao, chap. 114, p. 3292. 
3 Gongbu zeli, 1815 ed., chap. 117, fol. 2b-4a; chap. 39-104; Qingshi gao, chap. 114, p. 3292. 
4 Gongbu zeli, 1815 ed., chap. 117, fol. 4a, chap. 105-111; Qingshi gao, chap. 114, p. 3292. 
5 Gongbu zeli, 1815 ed., chap. 117, fol. 4a, chap. 112-114; Qingshi gao, chap. 114, p. 3292. 
6 Gongbu zeli, 1815 ed., chap. 115-116; Qingshi gao, chap. 114, p. 3292. 
7 Gongbu zeli, 1815 ed., chap. 117, fol. 5a; Qingshi gao, chap. 114, p. 3292. 
8 Gongbu zeli, 1815 ed., chap. 117, fol. 5b.
What Preston Torbert has described for the Imperial Household Department 
also holds true for the Ministry of Public Works: It was ‘not a static mass, but 
a constantly changing organism’.8 Similar to most institutions of the central 
8 Torbert, Ch’ing Imperial Household Department, p. 28.
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government and the highest provincial administrations, positions were filled 
with Manchu, Imperial Clansmen, Han Chinese, and Mongol candidates. In 
the nineteenth century, the ministry had about 230 permanent, core off icial 
positions, not including temporary, lower-echelon, unranked secretarial 
assignments or rotational jobs for off icials with permanent positions else-
where in the bureaucracy. A historical account of the addition or deletion 
of positions since the ministry was established in 1631 shows that appoint-
ments were added until about the mid-eighteenth century and then more 
or less remained at this level, as reflected in nineteenth-century sources.9 
A Ministry of Public Works was also maintained in Shengjing (Mukden or 
Shenyang), which had been the capital of the Manchu ruler Nurhaci between 
1634 and 1644, before the Qing established their government in Peking.10 
Table 10 shows the distribution of staff positions according to ethnic and 
social groups. Among the multi-ethnic ruling elite, a distinction was made for 
the highest status group, the Manchu ‘Imperial Clansmen’. ‘Chinese-martial’ 
refers to the Han Chinese members of the Banners, the basic socioeconomic 
unit of the Manchus and their associates. The distribution brings to light the 
preferred allocation of administrative positions for the privileged groups of 
the Qing society. A comparison with the other f ive ministries of the central 
government reveals that, although Manchus were also highly privileged in 
the other ministries, their percentage was highest in the Ministry of Public 
Works. The reason why this was the case is not quite clear. Could it imply 
that the tasks in the Ministry of Public Works were less demanding with 
regard to Classical Chinese erudition?
From the cases of shipbuilding and Yellow River dike maintenance, it 
becomes clear that after the Opium Wars, the Taiping Rebellion and in the 
ensuing period of ‘self-strengthening’ from the mid-nineteenth century 
onward, this ministry lost much of its former status to provincial authorities. 
The marine ships that were built in the Jiangnan Arsenal and the Fujian Navy 
Yard remained out of the actual organizational control of this ministry. The 
most crucial dike-building organization on the lower reaches of the Yellow 
River after it had changed its course in the 1850s was organized by Shandong 
province. However, despite their importance, these institutions were in 
a formal sense perceived to be merely of a temporary nature. Therefore, 
neither the Arsenals nor the Yellow River dike defense are included in the 
Collected Statutes of the Qing Dynasty.11
9 Qingshi gao, chap. 114, pp. 3292-3294.
10 Rawski, The Last Emperors, p. 19.
11 Amelung, Der Gelbe Fluß, pp. 190-192.
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The Artisan Workforce in the Ministry of Public Works
Considering the manifold tasks of the Ministry of Public Works, its artisan 
workforce with permanent positions was not large, and it was further 
reduced in the course of the dynasty (see Table 11). In the Bureau of Con-
struction, the positions for 72 masters and 13 assistants as of 1723 were 
reduced to 44 masters and nine assistants in 1736, and in 1785 to 35 master 
positions, a reduction of over 50 percent. In the Bureau of Forestry and 
Weights, the twelve master positions in 1723 were reduced to three in 1736, 
and the originally thirty master positions in the Bureau of Irrigation and 
Transportation were all abolished by 1736.12
According to the 1822 Huidian shili, the Manufacturing Workshops of the 
Ministry of Public Works provided for 385 artisan positions for silversmiths 
(yinzuo), engravers ( jianzuo), leather and fur makers (pizuo), embroiderers 
(xiuzuo), and armour makers, and 145 positions in the storehouse for the 
door gods (menshen ku) and for door curtains (menlian ku).13
A further craft branch of the ministry was cash production for the remu-
neration of the army in the mint Baoyuan ju, where during its periods of 
highest activity, more than a thousand masters and workers were employed.14 
After 1728, the main mint had two branches with a total of 25 furnaces in 
permanent use and six additional furnaces.15
The two off ices of the mint were badly damaged and their raw materials, 
cash, and silver pilfered by the invading international troops in 1900.16 
12 Peng Zeyi, Zhongguo jindai shougongye, vol. 1, pp. 160-161, citing Jiaqing da Qing huidian 
shili, chap. 717, fol. 1-3 and Huidian shili, chap. 952, fol. 1a ff.
13 Peng Zeyi, Zhongguo jindai shougongye, vol. 1, pp. 158-159, citing the 1822 Jiaqing Da Qing 
huidian shili, j. 721, fol. 21-25. The f igures for the Yongzheng reign are also contained in Huidian 
shili, chap. 957, fol. 15b-16b. Door gods are representations of guardian deities, most often printed 
on paper and f ixed at doors of buildings to ward off evil influences. The respective storehouse 
was in charge of producing, mounting, and storing the eff igies as well as couplet poems written 
on paper or on boards. Like the pictures of the gods, these were attached to or placed close to 
doors and pillars.
14 Vogel, ‘Unrest and Strikes at the Metropolitan Mints’, p. 412. If about 41 to 47 masters and 
workers were employed per furnace, as quoted for the Hangzhou mint between 1730 and 1740, 
more than a thousand artisans would be necessary to operate the 25 permanent furnaces of 
the Baoyuan ju. See Peng Zeyi, Zhongguo jindai shougongye, vol. 1, p. 36, citing the Qianlong 
Hangzhou gazetteer, Qianlong Hangzhou fuzhi, chap. 36, fol. 14-15, and Xu Jianqing, ‘Qingdai 
qianqi’, p. 320.
15 Burger, Ch’ing Cash until 1735, pp. 87-89, Yongzheng plates 5 and 6. According to Burger, the 
Baoyuan ju possibly had three branch off ices.
16 First Historical Archives, Gongbu qianfa tang, No. 163, memorial received Guangxu 27/3/28 
(1901), referring to Russian and German troops who took away the assets of the mints.
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Although they were renovated in 1902,17 the mint was closed down in 
1905 after having cast cash for the last time in the ninth lunar month and 
delivered all its minting metals to the Ministry of Revenue.18
Last but not least, the Ministry of Public Works also organized the produc-
tion of arms, armour, and ammunition. The production site for ammunition, 
zhuoling chang,, was founded in 1645.19 In the Collected Statutes, little 
information is available on the artisans employed here. Judging from a me-
morial of 1865, which suggests that three-thousand soldiers were delegated 
to produce ammunition,20 it is likely that in previous times soldiers were 
also employed for military production.21 Yet as a rule, professional artisans 
in the service of the military were subordinated to the Banner army.
Craft Production Organized by the Ministry of Revenue
The cash coin production of the Ministry of Revenue at the Baoquan ju 
(‘Fountain of Fortune’) was about twice the size of that of the Ministry of 
Public Works. It was thus the largest mint in the Qing empire. The Qing had 
taken over both mints from the Ming and operated them from 1644 on.22 
In 1726, the Baoquan ju was reorganized and divided into four branches 
with f ifty furnaces in permanent use and ten additional furnaces.23 In 
the Qianlong period, more than two-thousand masters and workers were 
employed here.24 Most provinces also operated from one to several mints 
respectively.25
The Baoquan ju was maintained until 1910, although in its last years, 
the quantity of cash cast here was very low, and the Ministry of Revenue 
had already applied to close down the last two remaining branches in 
17 First Historical Archives, Gongbu qianfa tang, No. 167, estimates and reports by the construc-
tion f irms Tianlin muchang 天林木厰 and Tianquan muchang 天泉木厰of Guangxu 28 (1902).
18 First Historical Archives, Gongbu qianfa tang, No. 167, undated draft concerning the quantities 
of mint metals delivered, and an undated memorial draft reporting that the delivery was under 
way.
19 Huidian shili, chap. 894, fol. 7b and Gongbu zeli, 1884 ed., chap. 26, fol. 1a.
20 Huidian shili, chap. 894, fol. 10a/b.
21 For artisans in the Banner garrisons, see Moll-Murata and Theobald, ‘Military employment 
in Qing dynasty China’, pp. 373-374. Theobald, The Second Jinchuan Campaign, pp. 161-162, 
discusses military artisans on campaign.
22 Burger, Ch’ing Cash until 1735, p. 40.
23 Ibid., pp. 87-89, ‘Minting in the Qianlong Period’, p. 383.
24 Vogel, ‘Unrest and Strikes at the Metropolitan Mints’, p. 412.
25 Burger, ‘Minting‘, pp. 383-392.
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1905.26 Modern, machine-made currency was no longer cast but stamped. 
Such machinery was introduced subsequently in most provincial mints, 
and not only cash but also silver coins were produced there. Pioneering 
ventures of stamping money with machines were made in Zhili, Jiangsu, and 
Guangdong in 1887; other provinces joined in 1896, and by 1905 the twelve 
provinces of Guangdong, Zhili (Beiyang), Shandong, Henan, Anhui, Jiangsu, 
Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Hunan, Hubei, Fujian, and Sichuan were all minting with 
machines.27 The merit of the new currency was that the coins were lighter 
than the old cash, and therefore their production was more profitable.28
The monetary historian Peng Xinwei points to the situation in which 
traditional cash was still cast in the mints of the ministries while production 
in the provinces was already mechanized. However, he also mentions the 
existence of stamped coins, the so-called ‘Great Qing Copper Coins’, which 
carried the inscriptions hubu (Ministry of Revenue) or duzhi bu (Ministry 
of Finance), after 1906. In other words, not only the provinces but also the 
ministry experimented with the new technology even before having phased 
out the old casting methods permanently.
Craft Production in the Imperial Household Department
While the Ministry of Public Works organized craft production, building, 
hydraulic management, infrastructure, and armament in the capital and the 
provinces, another institution was more concerned with production for the 
court. This was the Imperial Household Department (neiwu fu) which had 
its workshops within or in the close vicinity of the Forbidden City and the 
country palace Yuanming yuan (Garden of Perfect Brightness). In order to 
keep the power of the eunuchs in check, the Imperial Household Department 
was staffed with bondservants. These were mainly Han Chinese captives 
originating from the region of the Liao River Basin that were subordinate to 
the upper three of the Manchu Eight Banners.29 By 1796 the Department had 
more than f ifty subsections and off icial staff of about 1,600 men, a fourfold 
expansion from its size in 1662, when off icial positions totalled 402.30
26 David Hartill, Qing Cash, pp. 78-79, with reference to Xu Wenxian tongkao 續文獻統考, 
p. 7752.
27 Peng Xinwei, Zhongguo huobi shi, pp. 771-774, transl. Monetary History, pp. 661-663.
28 Peng Xinwei, Zhongguo huobi shi, p. 761.
29 Naquin and Rawski, Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century, p. 7; Torbert, Ch’ing Imperial 
Household Department, p. 27.
30 Torbert, Ch’ing Imperial Household Department, pp. 28-29.
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Its basic task was to provide food, clothing, and shelter for the emperor 
and the court in the central imperial palace of the Forbidden City as well 
as in the Yuanming yuan. Furthermore, it supplied the symbolic and 
ceremonial attributes that were to instill respect in the emperor’s sub-
jects and the envoys from foreign countries. Finally, it had f inancial and 
distributional functions like managing land conf iscated in North China 
and the reallocation thereof to bannermen, and it supervised monopolies 
like the sale of ginseng and of pearls from the emperors’ Manchurian 
domains. It handled the state salt monopoly; the Imperial Silk Weaveries 
in Nanjing, Hangzhou, Suzhou, and in the capital; as well as the porcelain 
manufactory in Jingdezhen, several customs bureaus, and also supported 
favoured merchants with capital.31
The structure of the Imperial Household Department has been compared 
to that of the central government because its main components were in 
some ways analogous to the Six Ministries.32 Thus, the Grand Storage Office 
(guangchu si), in Torbert’s rendering the ‘Department of the Privy Purse’, 
was likened to the Ministry of Revenue. The equivalent to the Ministry of 
Public Works was the Office of Palace Construction (yingzao si). This became 
part of the Imperial Household Department in 1661, was f irst designated as 
‘Ministry of Works of the Interior [Palace]’, and in 1681 received its permanent 
name.33 It organized construction and maintenance within the palace and 
the procurement of charcoal and f irewood. Its seven storehouses and three 
workshops, situated outside the Western palace entrance (Xihua men) in 
the Northern Long Street (Bei changjie),34 sometimes served also as sites of 
production. The timber storehouse (muku) was responsible for carpentry; the 
storehouse of construction materials ( fangku) for stone masonry, bricklaying, 
scaffoldings, and tents; the utensil store (qimin ku) fabricated items from 
rattan and bamboo; the iron storehouse (tieku) received and dispersed 
iron and coal; the charcoal storehouse (tanku) received, dispersed, and 
transported charcoal and had an equivalent in the charcoal and f irewood 
store of the Garden of Perfect Brightness (Yuanming yuan chaitan ku). In 
the porcelain storehouse (ciku), porcelain from the Imperial Manufactory 
at Jingdezhen and other producers was accumulated, and tea was stocked 
in the tea storehouse (chaku). The painting workshop (youhua zuo) was 
31 Naquin and Rawski, Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century, p. 7.
32 Torbert, Ch’ing Imperial Household Department, p. 32.
33 Ibid., p. 35. According to the regulations and precedents of the Department, Qinding zongguan 
Neiwu fu xianxing zeli, vol. 307, p. 366, it was renamed in 1677.
34 Gugong cidian, p. 250.
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responsible for painting and paper hanging; the ironsmiths’ workshop 
(tiezuo) made iron vessels and tools; and the f ireworks workshop (huapao 
zuo) manufactured f irecrackers (see Table 11).35
The most important workshops for arts and crafts objects, the Workshop 
at the Hall for Nourishing the Mind (Yangxin dian zaoban chu), was initially 
situated in this hall but in 1691 relocated to the kitchen rooms of the dwell-
ings of the empress (Cining gong) and was enlarged in 1709.36 Items and 
vessels of precious metals, nephrite, wood, lacquer, copper, cloisonné, and 
glass as well as maps and paintings, weapons, and armour for use at court 
were produced in this centre of luxury production which was the most 
important one in the palace and in the entire empire. The crafts located 
here were originally divided into 42 specialized branches, but after 1765 
they were reduced to thirteen, and then again raised to f ifteen.37
The Grand Storage Off ice (guangchu si, the ‘Ministry of Revenue of the 
Interior’), not only accumulated the material assets of the emperors and 
the tribute gifts they received and awarded in the six storehouses but was 
also a site for craft production in various workshops, as shown in Table 12.
Further craft production sites in the capital under the supervision of the 
Imperial Household Department were the Imperial Printery in the Hall of 
Military Glory (Wuying dian), the arms and armour manufactory of the 
Court of Imperial Armaments (wubei yuan), and the Weaving and Dyeing 
Off ice in the Capital ( Jingnei zhiran ju).
Outside of the capital, the most important workshops under the control 
of the Imperial Household Department were the silk weaving workshops 
in Nanjing, Suzhou, and Hangzhou as well as the porcelain manufactory 
in Jingdezhen.
The Artisan Workforce of the Imperial Household Department
The artisans who worked in the palace workshops came from different 
backgrounds and status groups. Most important among these were the 
banner artisans (qijiang) and the mostly Han Chinese civilian artisans 
(minjiang) who were hired from outside the palace for permanent or tem-
porary assignments. When in permanent positions, they were referred to as 
‘provision artisans’ (shixiang jiang), which means that they received a f ixed 
35 Qinding zongguan Neiwu fu xianxing zeli, vol. 307, pp. 366-367.
36 Ibid., vol. 309, p. 287; Gugong cidian, pp. 20, 261.
37 Peng Zeyi, Zhongguo jindai shougongye, vol. 1, p. 148.
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stipend for buying food and were paid extra daily wages if they participated 
in particular work projects.
The banner artisans were either the higher status off icial artisans (guan-
jiang) or bondservants (baoyi jiang), a transliteration of the Manchurian 
word booi. Off icial artisans came from the Eight Banners, and thus for 
the most part were Manchus or Mongols. The bondservants worked in 
higher or lower craft, administrative, or guarding functions. Their work 
was remunerated, their positions were hereditary, and they were registered 
in the banners.38
The specialized Han Chinese artisans hired from the outside (Han jiang) 
in the Yangxin dian workshops for arts and crafts were again subdivided 
into Northern artisans (beijiang), coming from Peking or North China, and 
Southern artisans (nanjiang), who hailed from Central or South China, with 
the exception of the Shandong glassmakers, who were also considered to 
be Southern artisans. Southern artisans were the most appreciated and 
best paid. They could be hired on a permanent basis. Some of them had 
their household registered with the Imperial Household Department, so 
that they could remain in the capital after retiring. Others were assigned 
permanent positions but were expected to return to their place of household 
registration after their retirement; but temporary assignments for particular 
projects were also possible.39
In the regulations and precedents of some of the sections of the Imperial 
Household Department, we f ind reference to these specif ic artisans groups: 
for instance for the Off ice of Palace Construction in 1677 (see Tables 11 and 
14), where the relation of banner artisans to civilian artisans was roughly 
6:4 within a total of 732 artisan positions. In the time span of the next 140 
years, the artisan positions (not those of the administrative staff) were 
reduced by about 10 percent, and for 1819, the regulations list a total of 665 
positions, of which 396 for banner artisans and 269 for civilian artisans, 
thus maintaining the relation of 6:4.40 They were specialized into as many 
as 62 different craft branches within the large structures of the storehouses 
and the workshops.
38 Cf. Rawski, The Last Emperors, p. 167, who points to the difference between slaves (aha), 
who worked in the f ields, and bondservants (booi), who were engaged in domestic service.
39 Zhu Cishou, Zhongguo gudai gongye shi, pp. 793-794. Eunuchs, for instance, were also gener-
ally expected to return to their home towns once they retired, and the Kangxi and Yongzheng 
emperors made special provisions for those who could not return. In that case, the Imperial 
Household Department had to provide housing for them. See Torbert, Ch’ing Imperial Household 
Department, pp. 47-48.
40 Qinding zongguan Neiwu fu xianxing zeli, vol. 307, pp. 367-369.
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In the Yangxin dian workshops, the positions were also reduced by one-
f ifth over the period from 1691 to 1846 (see Table 14).41
In the Grand Storage Off ice, the positions are specif ied according to 
gender and show a great number of not further specified seamstresses versus 
smaller numbers of male artisans in the more diversif ied craft branches 
(see Tables 12 and 14).42 In contrast to the Off ice of Palace Construction, 
very few positions were provided for civilian craftspeople in this institution. 
For instance, in the early Qing, among 1,460 artisan positions, only 21 were 
foreseen for civilian artisans. Following the trend of the other two off ices, 
the number of positions was reduced here as well. In 1736, 1,026 positions 
remained,43 and in 1813, there were 971 positions for banner artisans and 
43 for civilian artisans.44 The decrease between the early Qing and 1813 
amounts to 33 percent.
Likewise, in the Court of Imperial Armaments, positions were reduced 
by 30 percent within 170 years (see Table 13).45 The workforce was also 
complemented by artisans from other military units. The General Command 
of the Eight Banners, baqi dutong, originally had its own armoury and 
weapons manufactory, but its craftspeople were successively transferred 
to the Court of Imperial Armaments. According to the Collected Statutes, 
the Yongzheng emperor complained in 1730 and 1732 that the craft skills 
of one part of these craftspeople were quite def icient, and the responsible 
commanders were urged to train them better. It was decided that ‘those 
banner people who were neither proficient in the Manchu nor in the Mongol 
languages, neither good riders nor good archers, were to be trained by 
skilled ironsmiths who came from outside the banners to learn casting 
and forging.46
The Weaving and Dyeing Off ice in the Capital, Jingnei zhiran ju, was 
f irst situated at the north of the palace inside the Di’an gate of the imperial 
city, but in 1751 it was transferred to the Longevity hill (Wanshou shan) 
in the summer palace Yihe yuan.47 It came under the supervision of the 
Imperial Household Department in 1664. In its early years, 32 looms and 
825 artisan positions are recorded to have existed. The reductions in this 
branch came sooner and were more radical than in the other off ices and 
41 Ibid., vol. 309, pp. 287-288. 
42 Ibid., vol. 308, pp. 353-359.
43 Ibid., vol. 308, p. 361.
44 Ibid., vol. 308, pp. 361-362.
45 Ibid., vol. 309, p. 93.
46 Huidian shili, chap. 1121, fol. 13b ff.
47 Gugong cidian, p. 248.
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workshops. In 1752, the number of looms was reduced by half, and only 162 
artisan positions remained. Several ‘Southern artisans’ from the Imperial 
Silk Weaveries in Nanjing, Suzhou, and Hangzhou were delegated to these 
workshops, probably to train the Peking weavers in how to weave Southern 
patterns. The workshops were f inally closed down in 1843.48
While the artisan positions were thus diminished in varying degree over 
time, the off icial and administrative posts increased signif icantly by the 
f irst half of the Qing dynasty, and thereafter continued to expand, if at a 
more gradual pace.49 According to the ‘Draft history of the Qing dynasty’, 
a large simultaneous cutback in off icial positions ensued in 1904, with 47 
regular positions eliminated and 59 teachers’ positions at three schools of 
the department that were closed down.50 However, the institution as a whole 
existed even after the end of the dynasty until 1924. Actually, its importance 
increased after the demise of the Manchu rulers because it represented 
the interests of the ex-court (the so-called ‘little court’ xiao chaoting) 
against the Republican government.51 Although it received subsidies of four 
million tael per year, which roughly corresponded to the expenses of the 
court in the year 1911,52 the positions had to be cut subsequently. In 1914, 
272 positions were eliminated but 783 remained, which means that before 
1914, 1055 positions were still f illed in the palace. In 1922, half of the then 
remaining positions were again cut, with 308 remaining.53 By 1924, the 
abdicated emperor Puyi (1906-1967) reshuffled the entire department,54 but 
since he was forced to leave the Forbidden City later that year, the Imperial 
Household Department ceased its functions for good, and the Forbidden 
City became a museum.
Handicraft Regulations
As we have seen, the artisan workforce engaged in the capital was under 
the control of a bureaucratic apparatus which in turn was ordered to use 
the resources of the state with great diligence and frugality while at the 
same time ensuring that the best craftsmanship was applied for production 
48 Huidian shili, chap. 1195, fol. 15a/b, fol. 14a.
49 Torbert, Ch’ing Imperial Household Department, p. 28.
50 Qingshi gao, chap. 118, p. 3432.
51 Qi Meiqin, Qingdai neiwufu, pp. 272-273.
52 Ibid., p. 274.
53 Qi Meiqin, Qingdai neiwufu, p. 275.
54 Ibid., p. 276.
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in the workshops of the state. Examples of the late Ming dynasty still 
loomed large, when eunuch supervisors allegedly squeezed labour and 
craft products from the artisans under the pretext of tax or labour duties. 
The Qing emperors were determined to keep taxation and work services 
as light as possible and to ensure the accountability and responsibility of 
its off icials at all levels.
In the case of public construction, before building projects could be 
realized, cost estimates had to be submitted to the central government, 
either to the Ministry of Public Works or directly to the emperor, de-
pending on the scope and importance of the project. The estimates were 
checked in the ministry for factual correctness on the basis of previously 
negotiated price and wage regulations. For luxury production, detailed 
lists of the prices of materials and of the workloads ‒ in workdays or 
fractions thereof ‒ were set up in order to control artisans, foremen, and 
the supervising staff. Moreover, technical data for building, shipbuilding, 
printing, silk weaving, and for a variety of other crafts in the imperial 
workshops were collected for the reference of all concerned off icials who 
were responsible for the technical and f inancial supervision of these 
projects and processes.
Such references were kept in all the concerned off ices, and since the 
Yongzheng reign, they were printed or transcribed in reference books, 
which were called ‘regulations and precedents’ (zeli ). During the Qing 
dynasty, hundreds of such regulations and precedents were set up for all 
ministries and many of the off ices in the capital.55 Those that concerned 
craft production have been referred to as jiangzuo zeli ‘regulations and 
precedents for craft branches’ or simply handicraft regulations. The term 
was coined by the art historian and connoisseur Wang Shixiang in the 
1960s.56
For our context, the important question is whether the existence of 
handicraft regulations was able to prove the eff iciency and accountability 
of the state management of handicrafts. On the one hand, regulation can 
signify an effort to realize transparency, communication, and responsibil-
ity. On the other hand, if too rigorously applied without taking specif ic 
circumstances into account, it can stif le f lexibility and the improvement 
of techniques, or in the case of f inancial regulations lead to hardships for 
the suppliers of material and labour, who may react with various methods 
of evasion.
55 Moll-Murata, ‘New Editions’, p. 255, ‘Union List’.
56 Wang Shixiang, ‘Tan Qingdai de jiangzuo zeli’. 
86 State anD CraftS in the Qing DynaSt y (1644-1911) 
Handicraft regulations fall into mainly three areas. They can focus on 
general administration, which means that they concern the bureaucratic 
processes at large, focusing on the use and maintenance of specif ic objects 
(like city walls) and on the coordination of quality control if the objects 
made or repaired were shared with other ministries and with provincial 
governments, but they could also function as general guidelines on employ-
ing the workforce. Regulations like the Qinding gongbu zeli of the Ministry 
of Public Works or the Zongguan neiwufu xianxing zeli of the Imperial 
Household Department belong to this type.
A further type of regulation concentrates on technical issues. These are 
the zuofa or ‘production methods’. The term should not be misunderstood: 
rather than stating how things are made (joined, woven, turned, carved, 
etc.), zuofa gave information on the material used and the working time 
required and were intended for supervising off icials and accounting of-
f ices in the concerned ministries or provincial administrations. General 
zuofa that describe ‘model’ types of buildings are rare. For the Ministry of 
Public Works, the basic work was the Gongcheng zuofa (Technical instruc-
tions for the building crafts) of 1734 ‒ the best known, often reprinted, 
and handcopied work on building types and their components. As far as 
technical detail and expertise is concerned, architectural historians prefer 
the clarity of the Song dynasty predecessor of this work, the twelfth-century 
Yingzao fashi (Patterns of architecture). In contrast to the Yingzao fashi, 
the Gongcheng zuofa emphasizes economy and f inance,57 and it served this 
purpose well. In 1741, shortly after the Gongcheng zuofa was published, the 
Imperial Household Department compiled its own Neiting gongcheng zuofa 
(Technical instructions for the building crafts of the Interior Courts) and, 
in addition to this, specif ic regulations for the country palace, Yuanming 
yuan nei gongcheng zuofa zeli.58
Finally, the purely f inancial f ield is covered in the zeli on prices and 
wages. In 1736, all ministries and important central government institu-
tions compiled prices of materials decided by the Nine Ministers ( Jiuqing 
yiding wuliao jiazhi), which quotes prices for nearly 3,000 items ranging 
from gold and silver vessels, silk, perfume, and musical instruments 
down to ropes, timber, and tiles.59 The professed concern of the compilers 
57 Ruitenbeek, Carpentry and Building, p. 28.
58 ‘Union list’ no. 1-4-15. The catalogue of the Tōkyō Kokkai toshokan has a Yuanming yuan 
gongcheng zuofa zeli (‘Union list’ no. 1-4-25), which I have not been able to investigate. It may 
refer to the same work.
59 Song and Moll-Murata, ‘Notes on Qing Dynasty “Handicraft Regulations and Precedents”’, 
p. 92.
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was to keep track of the price f luctuations due to copper inf lation and 
thus to pay prices at or near market rates rather than government-set, 
downwardly adjusted prices. Given the objective of the Qing govern-
ment not to burden the population with expenses and labour services 
for the authorities, evidently such regulations would have been updated 
periodically. Although grain prices were observed and reported to the 
central government frequently,60 the same was not the case for building 
materials. Moreover, the prices in the provinces may have varied widely 
from those in Peking. More than thirty years later, another initiative 
was started in order to at least settle the latter problem. Chen Hongmou 
(1696-1771), an outstanding f ield administrator who had served as governor 
or governor-general in most provinces of the Qing empire, was an avid 
collector of socio-economic data.61 He launched an empire-wide project 
for collecting prices and wages in public building. The extant parts of the 
Wuliao jiazhi zeli (Regulations and precedents on prices of materials) date 
from 1769, with later additions for Sichuan (1792) and Rehe (1795). I was able 
to locate most of the provincial editions, so that prices and wages for over 
900 districts are available.62 Moreover, Chen Hongmou had similar plans 
for an empire-wide coverage of prices for shipbuilding. Fewer provincial 
editions seem to have been compiled in that project, but those of Fujian, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Hunan are still extant. As the Fujian edition, Qinding 
Fujian sheng waihai zhanchuan zeli (Imperially endorsed regulations 
and precedents on seagoing battleships of Fujian province) shows, these 
compilations are actually combinations of the zuofa and the price and wage 
regulation type that state the composition of each ship and the respective 
prices and wages in detail and in total. The intention of the promoter of 
this project was to collect market prices and wages and to make sure that 
the provinces could report them for reimbursement. In his study on the 
Wuliao jiazhi zeli, Chen Chaoyong doubts whether this was ever realized, 
especially for the timber prices. The prices sent to the Ministry of Public 
Works for evaluation and promulgation corresponded to prices already 
available thirty years before. The only difference was that now an increase 
in price was reported.63 Thus, the prices in the Wuliao jiazhi zeli, which 
60 Lillian Li, ‘Grain Prices in Zhili Province’.
61 Rowe, Saving the World, p. 355.
62 For databases of the entire works on Zhili, Yunnan, Gansu, and Hunan, see ‘Databases on 
Materials, Wages, and Transport Costs in Public Construction in the Qianlong Era’. For the 
wage data of all extant provincial editions, see ‘Regulated wages paid by the state in public 
construction’.
63 Chen Chaoyong, ‘Qianlong chao Wuliao jiazhi zeli zhong de wujia he gongjia’, p. 329.
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show great variance within and among the provinces, can be considered 
as ref lecting not precisely market prices but actual regional differences. 
Apparently these compilations were deemed important in the ministry 
and the provincial administrations. Otherwise, amendments for the border 
provinces would not have been compiled, and the Jiangsu edition would 
not have been reprinted in the Daoguang reign (1820-1851).64 Why were 
the price regulations not adjusted? Looking at the shipbuilding prices, 
we f ind that, ever since the Qianlong era, subsidies could be added ( jia 
jintie) if the procurement prices for shipbuilding material were too low. 
This option may have existed in construction as well. Iwo Amelung has 
discussed the accounting procedures for dike building and comes to the 
conclusion that in the early nineteenth century, rather than applying for 
subsidies which by then had also become insuff icient to cover expenses, the 
River Administration off icials usually engaged in ‘creative bookkeeping’. 
This meant that a larger dike breach would be reported than had actually 
occurred, in order to secure suff icient funds for the repairs65 and perhaps 
also for the pockets of the off icials involved.
For some very specialized craft branches, the regulations could be quite 
rudimentary. According to a study on rock landscape architecture, when the 
landscape gardeners (shanzi jiang) constructed artif icial hills in gardens 
next to imperial palaces and villas, the materials they used ‒ stones of 
bizarre shapes and sizes ‒ could hardly be evaluated on a normative basis. 
Without regulations on sizes and working hours, the accounts sent in for 
reimbursement seem grossly overstated. According to the account books of 
1772, for a specif ic rock garden next to the pavilion Wenjin ge in the Bishu 
shanzhuang mountain resort in Rehe, an improbable labour force of 403 
people was engaged daily in a quite small garden for one year. It is not that 
without zeli the bookkeeping off icials could not have inquired into the 
case, but on the basis of regulations and precedents, the control of cases of 
likely embezzlement must have been easier.66
The most comprehensive handicraft regulations are those of the Ministry 
of Public Works. An overview of the distribution of those works that have 
been discovered and catalogued so far67 reveals the following trends.
64 Sheng Jun, ‘Qing Qianlong chao Jiangsu sheng wujia gongzi tongji’, p. 108. I have not seen 
the reprint, but the prices and wages quoted by Sheng Jun are the same as in the 1769 edition.
65 Amelung, ‘Preliminary Observations on ‘Regulations and Precedents for River Works’, 
p. 296.
66 Yang Naiji, ‘Qinggong dang’an zhong de dieshi gongliao shili’, p. 18.
67 ‘Union List’.
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Table 8  Handicraft regulations compiled by the Ministry of Public Works
General regulations, adminis-
tration and coordination
Technical procedures Financial aspects: Prices 
for materials and wages 
Gongbu xianxing zeli, ca. 18961, ms.
Gongbu gong liao zeli, ca. 
18862, 15 chap., ms.
Qinding gongbu zeli, 1884, 116 
chap.
Qinding gongbu xuzeng 
zuofa zeli, Jiaqing 24 (1819), 
153 chap.
Qinding gongbu zeli, Jiaqing 20 
(1815), 142 chap.
Gongbu xuzeng zuofa zeli 
Jiaqing 22 (1817), 136 chap.
Qinding gongbu zeli, Qianlong 58 
(1793), 98 chap.
Qinding wuliao jiazhi zeli, 
1769, with sequels, 220 
chap.
Qinding gongbu zeli, Qianlong 24 
(1759), 95 chap.
Qinding gongbu zeli, Qianlong 14 
(1749), 50 chap.; with appendix 
Chengyu yizhang zuofa (manu-
facturing methods for imperial 
carriages and insignia) 
Gongcheng zuofa, 
yongzheng 1734, 74 chap.
Jiuqing yiding wuliao 
jiazhi, 1736, 4 (+4) chap. 
1 Song and moll-murata, ‘notes on Qing Dynasty “handicraft regulations and Precedents”’, p. 105. 
2 ibid., p. 108.
From its beginning in Yongzheng and throughout the prolif ic Qianlong 
reign, and having undergone a new stocktaking under Jiaqing and an active 
f inale in the Guangxu reign, the zeli obviously fulf illed its function as a 
bureaucratic device quite well. Accounting and setting procurement prices 
was certainly the most problematic aspect of the zeli. As both Jane Kate 
Leonard and Iwo Amelung stress, f lexibility in their application was of 
the utmost importance. Looking, for instance, at the rule of the Daoguang 
emperor, it seems that during this reign, the instrument of price regulating 
zeli was put to more effective use than under his predecessor Jiaqing.68
68 Amelung, ‘Preliminary Observations on ‘Regulations and Precedents for River Works’’, 
p. 301; Leonard, ‘Timeliness and Innovation’, p. 462.
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To sum up, regulations and precedents for the handicrafts in the service 
of the state can be taken as indicators of state eff iciency – at least of efforts 
made to ensure transparency and accountability within the administration. 
For technical zeli, not much amendment was necessary once the standards, 
especially those in building, were set. The situation is different for f inancial 
zeli, because unlike construction and production methods, the market 
prices f luctutated. Timber prices in particular tended to rise over time. 
Chen Chaoyong has shown that artif icially low prices were laid down in the 
Wuliao jiazhi zeli. However, the fact that only these quotas could be reported 
for reimbursement to the Ministries of Public Works and of Revenue does 
not mean that the state could coerce dealers into providing the materials at 
below-market prices. Rather, they were to serve as a standard from which 
provincial administrators would have to f ind additional funds to f inance 
their projects. For instance, already at the time when the respective zeli were 
compiled, the costs of shipbuilding exceeded the budgetary provisions of 
the central government. To cover the expenses, the provinces could either 
perform ‘creative bookkeeping’69 or collect contributions from private 
persons, for instance shipowners in Fujian. In the case of city walls, affluent 
people in the localities could sponsor their construction or repair – but the 
district magistrates were warned not to impose funds for the city walls 
as penal punishments. Such prohibitions suggest that this had actually 
occurred.70
Labour Organization and Wage Payment according to Handicraft 
Regulations
The off icially acknowledged, legally binding regulations and precedents 
of the central government contain comparatively little information on 
labour administration. The quoted wages appear to be normative and allow, 
in most cases, only for the differentiation between skilled and unskilled 
labour. One source that specif ies a branch-differentiated pay scale is the 
Jiuqing yiding wuliao jiazhi, according to which in 1736, carpenters (mujiang), 
69 Amelung, ‘Preliminary Observations on ‘Regulations and Precedents for River Works’’, 
p. 296, 300.
70 The regulations in Gongbu zeli, 1884 ed., chap. 6, lay out the rules for the renovation of city 
walls. On fol. 6a, honorary decorations of private persons who funded renovations of city walls 
are mentioned; a rule on fol. 7a-b forbids off icials to impose ‘donations’ on private persons for 
the maintenance of walls, and on fol. 8a it is stated that donations for the city wall should not 
be imposed as legal punishments.
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stone masons (shijiang), bricklayers (zhuanjiang), tilers (wajiang), paint 
makers (youjiang), and painters (huajiang) earned 154 cash for one workday, 
scaffolders (dacai jiang) received 140, and earth pounders (hangwo jiang) 
100 cash, unskilled labour 75 cash. ‘Food provision artisans’ (shiliang jiang) 
in permanent positions, presumably of the Ministry of Public Works or the 
Imperial Household Department, received, as the term implies, food wages 
and presumably other provisions as well, in addition to monetary wages 
of 60 cash per day.71 At less than half of what a hired artisan earned, one 
can hardly say that they were privileged or that the hired artisans seem 
to have been unfairly treated ‒ if they received their entire wages without 
deduction. A set of wage notations from ca. 1766 from the Imperial Household 
Department concerning construction at the Yuanming yuan notes 0.154 tael 
for ‘master artisans of all trades’ but 0.18 tael for interior decorators (caizi 
jiang), a low 0.0375 tael for food provision artisans, 0.14 tael for artif icial 
stone hill gardeners (shanzi jiang), 0.09 tael for earth pounders, and 0.08 tael 
for unskilled labour. From the point of view of the contemporaneous Wuliao 
jiazhi zeli, these were high wages, only occurring in sparsely populated 
Manchuria, the frontier of Xinjiang, and certain regions of Zhili province, 
as compared to lows of 0.03 tael for unskilled labourers in a considerable 
number of districts in Henan.72
In silk weaving at the imperial workshops, differentiation was made 
also to the extent that some wages were paid as time wages, while others 
were piece wages. In 1686, monetary wages were paid in addition to food 
wages. The highly qualif ied designers and those who installed the design 
patterns on the looms received a monthly wage of two tael, while the costs 
for the two persons who wove and pulled threads were 0.06 and 0.03 tael 
per day respectively, with extra food provisions in addition to the grain 
given out every month. Only the amount of grain for the entire weaving 
off ice is specif ied. If it was divided evenly, every worker received 0.4 shi 
(41.42 l) of grain per month.73 If the Southern weavers travelled north to 
work in the Peking Imperial Silk Weaveries, their wages and food provisions 
increased.74 They could earn 3 tael per month (0.12 per day if they worked 
25 days) and 2 hu of rice (103.55 l), while hired workers received between 
71 Jiuqing yiding wuliao jiazhi, chap. 4, fol. 24a/b (p. 202).
72 ‘Regulated wages paid by the state in public construction. Data from Wuliao jiazhi zeli’.
73 Peng Zeyi, Zhongguo jindai shougongye shi ziliao, vol. 1, pp. 90-92, quoting Sun Pei 孫珮, 
Suzhou zhizao ju zhi 蘇州製造局志 (Treatise on the Silk Weaving Off ices of Suzhou, 1686). See 
the translation by Elke Piontek-Ma, Der Bericht von Sun Pei, pp. 55-62.
74 The copper to silver exchange rate was almost equal in 1686 Jiangsu (833:1) and 1752 Peking 
(840:1). See Exchange rates.
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1.5 and 2.5 tael per month and 21 hu (1087 l) of rice [every year], to be given 
out every season. In addition, each worker received a room for lodging.75
Any comparison to the private market is diff icult because no silk weaving 
wages are included in the set of wage notations we possess. In the literature 
we f ind information that the wages paid in the state workshops were higher 
than those in the private sector.76 Comparable wage notations exist for print-
ing (see Table 48 ‘Wages in commercial printing for carving 100 characters’) 
and, according to these, wages in the service of the state were equal or higher 
to those in the private sector.
Labour organization in the palace workshops was based on a f lexible 
system that allowed the hiring of experts from outside the palace. In some 
f ields, especially those involved in luxury production, this could ensure 
the transfer of technology and artistic skills to the commercial sector. The 
court engaged artisans from the entire empire who specialized in working 
the materials from their places of origin. Especially the Qianlong emperor 
had strong preferences for design in the arts and crafts and communicated 
these to the artisans and artists.77 After their assignments were f inished, 
such artisans could return to their home regions and spread the ‘court style’. 
Art historians argue that due to the fact that the Qing did not monopolize 
the skills and designs of the artisans in the palace workshops and instead 
secured the spread of the emperors and the court’s aesthetic concepts, to 
this day the Qing palace style has retained a strong impact on arts and 
crafts production in China.78
For instance, the glass and enamel section of the palace workshop Yangxin 
dian zaoban chu attained considerable fame. Chinese artisans worked 
75 Huidian shili, chap. 1195, fol. 15a/b, p. 19005. 21 hu to be given out per ‘season’ ( ji 季) plus 
the living facilities seem out of proportion to the wages of the southern weavers if ‘season’ 
implies three months; it might refer to a period of longer duration. Peng Zeyi, Zhongguo jindai 
shougongye shi ziliao, vol. 1, p. 72, quoting from a memorial of Haiwang 海望 (d. 1755), Grand 
Minister Supervisor-in-Chief of the Imperial Household Department from 1735, mentions ‘the 
regulations of the Imperial Household Department on hiring outside artisans, which provide for 
21 hu of rice per person and year, in addition to 1 tael of monetary wages.’ 21 hu per year amounts 
to 90.6 l per month. This memorial is interesting since it suggests the wage scale of 2.5, 1.5, and 
1 tael ‘as an incentive’ for various levels of skill instead of uniform wages of 1 tael for foremen, 
weavers, and draw boys alike. Draw boys were the assistants in draw weaving who helped the 
weavers to control the warp thread by pulling on draw threads. In Chinese draw looms, the 
‘tower’ from where the threads are manipulated is vertically installed upon the loom. The 
assistant works while sitting on top of the tower and therefore should be a light person, hence 
‘boy’.
76 Fan Jinmin, ‘Qingdai feichu jiangji de lishi yiyi’, p. 114.
77 Veit, ‘Jean-Denis Attiret’, pp. 144, 153.
78 Michèle Pirazzoli- t’Serstevens, ‘Die Mandschu-Kaiser und die Kunst’, p. 98.
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together here with European missionaries and further developed European 
enamel techniques. The artisans mostly hailed from Boshan, a district in 
Shandong that also supplied the raw materials. Precious cloisonné pieces 
originate from here.79 Moreover, artisans from North and South China and 
Uighur masters worked jade (nephrite) from Xinjiang and Mongolia in the 
associated ‘sceptre house’ Ruyi guan, where European missionaries since 
1680 constructed precious clocks, often decorated in the European style, 
that stood in high demand at court and among the affluent.80
Some highly visible symbols of imperial power, however, remained 
reserved for the court and the imperial clan. For instance, in construction, 
the yellow glazed tiles81 were not allowed except for court buildings, palaces, 
and religious buildings for the state cult.
In the palace workshops, huge clerical and security forces were always 
at hand, and all administrative actions were regulated in the f inest detail, 
which individual artisans working in the palace must have found awe-
inspiring and not exactly an invitation to resistance or argument. The 
situation changes if one looks at the administration in the provinces, for 
example when city walls were built. Although general guidelines were given 
in the regulations and precedents of the Ministry of Public Works,82 the 
actual administrative knowledge especially on how to hire and manage the 
workforce, which often numbered hundreds or thousands of hands, are not 
contained in these compendia. A short manuscript guidebook for off icials 
organizing city wall building of ca. 1744 has survived, which offers insight 
into the main concerns of an off icial overseeing medium-sized or large 
building projects.83 The basic problems that the author strongly emphasizes 
in Chenggong shiyi (Requirements and organization of work on city walls) are 
that the off icials should keep personal control over all steps of the building 
procedures, starting from the burning of the bricks to the f inal touches on 
the wall. Labour organization should absolutely not be delegated to brokers 
or ‘good-for-nothing loafers’ who all too readily offered their services. Since 
off icials in charge of wall building could not negotiate wages with every 
single worker, the workers’ foremen should be directly approached without 
79 Wu Jianyong, Beijing tongshi, p. 342.
80 Jami, Catherine, ‘Europäische Wissenschaft und Technik am Hofe der Kaiser von China’, 
p. 323.
81 Gongbu zeli, 1884 ed., chap. 14, fol. 4a, ‘Off icials and civilians should not presume to use 
glazed tiles or city wall bricks for their houses and walls. If this prohibition should be violated, 
it will be severely punished, and the responsible off icial will also suffer sanctions.’
82 Gongbu zeli, 1884 ed., chap. 4-6; 1815 ed., chap. 2-7.
83 Moll-Murata, ‘Maintenance and Renovation’, pp. 251-256.
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intermediaries. Moreover, all wages and materials should remain at the 
market level and be paid out without deductions.
Government Restrictions of Craft Activities
If artisans’ wages in the capital were not exploitatively low, what kinds of 
restrictions were inflicted on the craft sector that convince present-day 
Chinese authors that the Qing state stifled rather than promoted the crafts?
Such constraints were imposed in several ways, some affecting all craft 
branches, while others were confined to particularly scarce raw materials. 
One basic problem was that although the artisan registration had been 
nominally abolished in 1645 and all work in the service of the state should 
have been remunerated at market or close to market wages, throughout 
the Qing multiple complaints were heard that this lenient policy was 
contravened. This was effected either by local off icials or by staff lower 
in the bureaucratic hierarchies who illegally requisitioned work services 
and/or handicraft objects from individual craftspeople or from guilds. One 
could say that the off icial emancipation of the artisans from their particular 
service status was one side of the coin, and extortion was the other. This 
tendency had a parallel in the low land taxes and frozen corvée tax rates 
of the Qing state and the illegal extraction of unwarranted extra fees by 
individual tax collectors during the actual collection process.
Moreover, the transition to the system of using exclusively hired labour 
proved more problematic than was possibly anticipated. The Qing court 
in 1645 promulgated that ‘except for the artisans in the capital province 
(Zhili), the others no longer have to pay the artisan tax that substitutes their 
corvée service in the capital’ and that ‘they are only liable to obligations 
like the other civilians’.84 In principle, artisans should thereafter have been 
recruited only if they were willing to be hired out. They should have been 
remunerated and been obliged to pay only land tax. However, it is frequently 
mentioned in the literature that off icials made arbitrary deductions from 
the artisans’ wages.85 For instance in the weaving off ices of Nanjing, 
Suzhou, and Hangzhou, where the transition to the hiring system resulted 
in labour scarcity, off icials are reported to have resorted to the previous 
methods of requisitioning labour by coercion and of pocketing parts of the 
84 Fan Jinmin, ‘Qingdai feichu jiangji de lishi yiyi’, p. 111, citing Qingchao wenxian tongkao 清
朝文獻通考, chap. 21, zhiyi 職役, 1, and Qing Shizu shilu 清世祖實錄, chap. 16.
85 Fan Jinmin, ‘Qingdai feichu jiangji de lishi yiyi’, p. 112.
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wages.86 The basic problem of the early Qing years was that although the 
central government had freed the artisans – in a grand gesture that was 
expected from a new ruling house – it still badly needed this workforce in 
construction and for the products from the manufactories. Since labour 
supply and demand did not tally, from 1658 on the government resumed the 
collection of the artisan tax.87 In the meanwhile, if artisans had given up 
their trade and left their place of registration, their children and offspring 
or their relatives, even those who were not in the trade, were still required 
to f inance the tax.88 Cases of double taxation were also reported. It took 
another few decades until both the artisan registration and the artisan tax 
were abolished for good. Apparently this was not realized in all provinces 
simultaneously but rather faded out only gradually.89
A further unpopular measure by the Qing government that inflicted 
hardships on the maritime population was the so-called ‘sea prohibition’. 
In order to crack down on the maritime empire of the contender Zheng 
Chenggong (Coxinga) and related piracy, the Qing forbade shipbuilding, 
f ishery, and in fact all settlement within a security belt of about f ifteen 
kilometres from the sea.90
To a lesser degree, the censorship activities of the Qianlong emperor in 
the 1770s and 1780s interfered with the development of the printing trades.
In the f ield of raw materials, the use of certain metals and minerals 
was restricted or downright forbidden. The government was particularly 
concerned about the availability of copper for minting, especially in the 
early Qing period before the Yunnan copper mines yielded suff icient ore, 
as well as counterfeiting, smelting down, and trimming of cash. Therefore, 
the use of brass utensils was forbidden between 1726 and 1736. After 1736, 
the use and fabrication of brass utensils still was monitored, especially in 
Peking.91 In theory, all copper was bought up by the state, and only after the 
mid-Qianlong reign was a small amount of so-called ‘commercial’ copper 
legally available on the market.92 Mining policies were often erratic and could 
86 Ibid. Compare also Piontek-Ma, Der Bericht von Sun Pei, p. 60, who, referring to Liu Yongzheng 
and Hong Huanchun, also argues that the labour in the early phase was obligatory, although it 
was remunerated.
87 Fan Jinmin, Qingdai feichu jiangji de lishi yiyi, p. 112, citing Qingchao wenxian tongkao, 
chap. 21, zhiyi, 1.
88 Fan Jinmin, ‘Qingdai feichu jiangji de lishi yiyi’, p. 112, for cases from Suzhou, Zhejiang, 
Anhui, and Shanxi.
89 Ibid., pp. 112-113, with reference to Zhejiang (1697) and Jiangxi (1688).
90 For details, see chapters four and f ive.
91 See Vogel, Chinese Central Monetary Policy, sect. II.
92 Fang Zhuofen et al., ‘Copper Mining and Smelting in Yunnan’, p. 285.
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thus cause shortages of other raw materials. The strictest controls applied to 
sulphur and saltpetre, used for the fabrication of explosives and forbidden in 
the private sector.93 Iron and coal could be mined, bought, and sold freely. 
A contravention of the prohibition to export iron is shown when iron pots 
from Foshan were sold to foreign merchants between 1729 and 1731.94
On the whole, restrictions and active prohibitions seem to have been less 
of a problem for craft production than the basic orientation of the Qing state 
that wanted to maintain the livelihood of the farming majority and provide 
food for its increasing population. Until the mid-nineteenth century upheavals, 
Qing policies did not aim to promote inland or overseas trade and commercial 
manufacturing but strove instead to keep farmers on the land, producing for 
their own subsistence rather than commercial crops. Exports and imports 
were legally restricted, so that at least off icially, only four ports (Canton in 
Guangdong, Zhangzhou in Fujian, Ningbo in Zhejiang, and Yuntaishan in 
Jiangsu) were open for Chinese merchants after 1684, and foreign traders were 
confined to one harbour, Canton, between 1757 and the First Opium War.95
Institutional Reforms in the Twentieth Century
As stated above, the period of self-strengthening that followed in the wake of 
the First and Second Opium Wars (1839-1842, 1856-1858) and the suppression 
of the Taiping rebellion triggered the introduction of modern military 
technology. One decade later, the government also promoted mechanized 
production for civilian purposes. These enterprises functioned as ad hoc 
government off ices that also communicated with the Ministry of Public 
Works but did not belong to the core responsibilities of the ministry. Rather, 
the provincial governors or governors-general of the territories where 
the new enterprises were located organized the funds for operation and 
supervised the entire management. The fact that the new, prestigious, and 
profitable technologies were situated in agencies in which the Ministry of 
Public Works was not vitally involved certainly did not enhance its standing 
within the government structure.
The constitutional reforms of 1903-1906 brought about the end to this 
ministry in its traditional form. In 1903, a Ministry of Commerce (shangbu) 
was established, and the former Ministry of Public Works was merged with it 
93 Fang Zhuofen et al., ‘The Iron Industry’, p. 253.
94 Ibid., p. 261.
95 Fang Xing, ‘The Iron Industry’, pp. 395-396.
the Qing Central government inStitutionS in Control of the hanDiCraftS 97
in 1906 as the newly designated Ministry of Agriculture, Industry, and Com-
merce (nong gong shang bu). Thereafter, the responsibilities for construction 
projects were given over to the new Ministry of Civil Administration, the 
control of timber tax and ship administration was transmitted to the Min-
istry of Finance, the production of arms and military engines was included 
in the Army Ministry, and the care for ceremonial vessels was subordinated 
to the Imperial Household Department and the Ministry of Rites.
The new ministry was divided into four sections, one each for agriculture, 
crafts and industry, commerce, and general administration. The tasks of 
the Section for Craft and Industrial Affairs (gongwu si) are described as ‘the 
administration of materials for craft and industrial production, production 
of tools and machines, work promotion and recruitment of workforce, 
organization of factories, nationwide investigation of mines, management 
of regulations for establishing factories’.96
Other subsections and facilities of the ministry were the Off icial News-
paper Off ice for Commercial Affairs, the Commercial Journal Off ice, the 
Commercial Law Office, the Trademark Bureau, the Company Registration 
Bureau, the Bureau for Weights and Measures, the Industrial Laboratory, the 
Laboratory for Chemical Analysis of Ores, the Industrial Exhibition Hall, the 
Capital Craft and Industry Off ice, the Capital Apprentice Training Off ice 
(later renamed Industrial Training School), the Capital Business School, 
the Higher Agricultural School, the Bureau for Craft and Industry, and the 
Agricultural Experimentation Site.97
Comparing the tasks and institutions of the old Ministry of Public Works 
and the new Ministry of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce, what be-
comes evident is that the important concerns of the public sector ‒ such 
as constructing and maintaining the infrastructure and public buildings 
like granaries and examination off ices or civilian and military off ices and 
housing facilities as well as transport vessels ‒ were all detached from its 
responsibilities, and that its most important new obligation was to foster 
private enterprise by way of legislation and education.
The present-day assessment of the achievements of the new ministry is 
ambiguous. On the negative side, the previous Ministry of Commerce had 
stood under the leadership of an allegedly corrupt and inept imperial prince, 
Zaizhen (1876-1947), whose successor in 1907, Puting, a Manchu and imperial 
clansman, did not have a high profile.98 The ministry did not have much of 
96 Zhongguo guanzhi da cidian, p. 1516.
97 Ibid.
98 Wellington Chan, ‘Government, merchants and industry to 1911’, pp. 449, 453. 
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an impact in the provinces, and it lost the struggle with the Ministry of Post 
and Communications over the complete control of the state-owned China 
Merchants’ Steam Navigation Company and had to share responsibilities with 
this rival institution.99 However, the legal framework for commercial law on 
the whole proved effective, if in varying degrees: the Company Law (1904) was 
most significant,100 while the law on patent rights (1906) had less impact.101 In 
the field of industrial, commercial, and agricultural promotion, the activities 
of the ministries have been considered more favourable as far as vocational 
training was concerned. A system of awards and brevet ranks for outstanding 
engineering and technical skills was set up, f irst within the 1898 Hundred 
Day Reforms, and once again in 1903, aimed at investors and promoters. 
Furthermore, a comprehensive system of distinctions for craftwork and in 
the technical and commercial sectors was established. However, not many 
rewards were actually bestowed; especially for investors and promoters, the 
sums they had to invest were too high. Guo and Pan quote a f igure of ten 
million Chinese dollars and the hiring of more than one-thousand workers 
as requirements for a lifelong title of baronet (nanjue).102 These authors also 
give two examples of craftspeople being rewarded: a piece of embroidery 
on an eight-panelled folding screen (1904) and a straw hat (1907) reaped a 
fourth-grade and a f ifth-grade commercial award respectively.103
Government Schools for Crafts and Technical Learning
Among the reform efforts of the newly founded Ministry of Commerce, the 
new vocational schools stand out as a positive asset that was inherited and 
enhanced by the governments that followed the Qing. Formal vocational 
training was also actively fostered in the provinces and by the Eight Banner 
organization. Even an initiative by the Empress Dowager Cixi is recorded: 
she suggested setting up a weaving and embroidery school for the palace 
women. Everybody, no matter what rank, was allowed to join the school in 
99 Ibid., p. 450.
100 Ibid., p. 446.
101 Compare Deli Yang, ‘The Development of the Intellectual Property in China’, p. 5, who dates 
the f irst trademark regulations to 1904 and the f irst copyright law to 1910, and discusses the 
preceding government efforts for the protection of inventor’s rights in some industries, such as 
mechanised techniques in weaving (1882), papermaking (1889), winemaking (1895), and yarn 
spinning (1895) as approved by the Guangxu emperor.
102 Guo and Pan, Qingmo shangbu, p. 87.
103 Ibid., p. 87.
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order to learn a trade, to appreciate the diff iculty of craft production, and 
also to ease their transition to life as commoners.104
However, the usual target group outside the palace were destitute youths, 
male and female, to whom the central and provincial governments offered 
professional training mostly in the traditional crafts. Precursors of such 
schools in the provinces were, for instance, weaving schools in Jiangsu, 
Henan, and Yunnan, where teenage girls were taught spinning and weaving. 
They paid no tuition fees and were rewarded if they graduated successfully.105 
These are isolated cases recorded in Peng Zeyi’s comprehensive collection of 
materials for craft history from the Qing dynasty to the Republican period. 
More such local or regional level activities may have been going on in the 
decades that preceded the political reforms of the early twentieth century, 
and vocational training was not only provided by the state on its various 
administrative levels but also upon private initiative. However, the greatest 
impulse came from the side of the government in the early twentieth century. 
In 1902, even before the formal foundation of the Ministry of Commerce, 
the f irst proposals to establish a ‘Craft Off ice for Agriculture, Industry, 
and Commerce’ (Nong gong shang gongyi ju) in Peking were made by the 
later Minister of Commerce, Chen Bi (1852-1928), and the actual operation 
of the Craft Off ice began in 1904.106 Its main objective was to train a target 
group of 500 apprentices in the branches of weaving, embroidery, dyeing, 
woodworking, leather working, glass production, paper making, rattan 
weaving, painting and lacquering, design, iron working, and well boring in 
a model school for the entire empire.107 According to the statistics published 
by the ministry in 1908, the actual number of students was 392, the other 
109 school members being teachers, foremen, and skilled craftspeople.108
104 Peng Zeyi, Zhongguo jindai shougongye, vol. 2, p. 515, quoting from the Peking gazette Beijing 
bao 北京報 of 1904. Not all women lived in the palace permanently, but they were drafted for 
f ive to ten-year shifts as servants between the ages of thirteen and thirty. See Evelyn Rawski, The 
Last Emperors, p. 170, for a f igure of 150 to 200 maids in palace service under Empress Dowager 
Cixi, but over 2,000 in the 1730s, and 650 to 850 from the 1770s through 1831.
105 Peng Zeyi, Zhongguo jindai shougongye, vol. 1, pp. 224-227.
106 Peng Zeyi, Zhongguo jindai shougongye, vol. 2, p. 510.
107 From the memorial of the Ministry of Agriculture, Craft and Industry, and Commerce to 
the throne for opening a new factory for the Off ice, 1907, published in the Nong gong shang bu 
gongyi ju kuoyun shiban jianzhang 農工商部工藝局擴充試辦簡章 (Short regulations for the 
trial extension of the Off ice for Crafts of the Ministry of Agriculture, Crafts and Industries, and 
Commerce), p. 1, p. 4, quoted in Peng Zeyi, Zhongguo jindai shougongye, vol. 2, pp. 509, 511.
108 Peng Zeyi, Zhongguo jindai shougongye, vol. 2, p. 510, Table ‘Nong gong shang bu gongyiju 
gaikuang, 1904-1908 nian’ 農工商部工藝局概況 1904-1908年 (Overview of the Craft Off ice of 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Craft and Industry, and Commerce, 1904-1908).
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Peng Nansheng’s tabulation of the government craft schools in the f irst 
decade of the twentieth century gives an overview of seventeen central 
institutions in each province and the capital. Together with the branch 
schools opened in every province, they number well over f ive hundred, 
but the number of students remains somewhat elusive and in some cases 
can only be estimated.
Table 9  Government craft and industry schools in Peking and the provinces, 
1901-1909
Name of the institution Year of 
establish-
ment








nonggongshang gongyi ju 1902 Peking 500 1
Beiyang gongyi ju 1903 tianjin, Zhili ? 112
Jinan gongyi zhuanxi suo 1905 Jinan, Shandong ? 102
Shanxi sheng gongyi ju 1902 taiyuan, Shanxi ? 10
Jiangxi gongyi yuan 1901 nanchang, Jiangxi ? 76
Sichuan tongsheng quangong ju 1903 Chengdu, Sichuan ? 73
guangdong gongyi ju 1904 Canton, guangdong ? 21
guangxi gongyi ju 1904 guilin, guangxi 200 14
fujian gongyi chang 1903 fuzhou, fujian 160 14
Zhejiang gongyi zhuanxi suo 1905 hangzhou, Zhejiang 160 39
Suzhou gongyi ju ? Suzhou, Jiangsu 
(Jiangnan)
100 8
Shaanxi gongyi chang 1904 Xi‘an, Shanxi 100 12
gansu quangong ju 1906 lanzhou, gansu 100 49
anhui quansheng gongyi chang 1908 hefei, anhui 3
fengtian gongyi zhuanxi suo 1906 Shenyang, fengtian 
(Shengjing)
129 12





Jilin shixi gongchang 1909 Songhuajiang south 
bank, Jinlin
?  6
total       558
Source: Peng nansheng, Hanghui zhidu de xiandai mingyun, pp. 308-309.
As Table 9 shows, the distribution of the schools in the provinces was quite 
uneven. It was highest in Zhili and Shandong and conspicuously low in the 
affluent Jiangnan region and the other relatively well-off southeastern prov-
inces of Zhejiang, Guangdong, and Fujian. A comparison with Peng Zeyi’s 
f igures for 1913, which include ‘industrial off ices’ (gongye ge ju), ‘industrial 
training centers’ (gongye gezhong chuanxi suo), ‘work promotion places’ 
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(quan gong chang), and ‘public and private reconstruction workshops’ (gong 
si jianshe ge gongchang) still shows basically the same structure, with Zhili, 
Shandong, and Jiangxi ranking f irst.
As to the number of student-apprentices that each of these schools could 
accommodate, the scope of 400 in the capital Craft Off ice and 640 in the 
Tianjin experimental manufactory (Tianjin shixi gongchang) was clearly 
the highest.109 Peng Nansheng gives f igures of 100 to 200 for the provincial 
off ices. Peng Zeyi’s detailed table on the situation in Zhili between 1904 
and 1910, which includes information on 87 vocational training sites, mainly 
established on the district level, reports between four and 640 apprentices, 
totaling 3,298, with an average of 38. This includes two expressly female 
vocational training sites teaching textile trades with an aggregate number 
of 402 apprentices. In addition, ‘houses of correction’ or ‘training centers 
for vagrants’ (youmin 遊民) reported training facilities for at least 272 
convicts.110 The duration of apprenticeship in the schools is not specif ied 
but may have varied between several months and three years.111 Therefore, 
the actual number of trainees graduated from the Zhili schools in the seven 
years covered might add up to at least 6,000 to 7,000. Extending this f igure 
to the seventeen provincial institutions named above might yield a total 
number of 102,000 to 119,000 graduates.
In comparison to the training offered in the traditional apprentice system 
provided by the masters of individual workshops, Peng Nansheng points 
to the following differences.112 The off icial vocational schools had two 
purposes: f irst, to promote crafts and industries, and second, to create 
occupational programmes for poverty reduction and the settlement of 
‘unoccupied migrants’. Basically – according to their own accounts – they 
were non-prof it organizations and not subject to economic competition, 
while the individual workshops produced for the livelihood of the master 
and his family and had to compete within their guild formations. The official 
schools could take up students from a broader range of ages, extending 
109 Peng Zeyi, Zhongguo jindai shougongye, vol. 2, p. 528, ‘Zhili geshu chuanxi gongchang 
gaikuang’ 直隸各屬傳習工廠概況 (Overview of all types of training manufactories in Zhili, 
1904-1910); p. 533, ‘Zhili geshu zuifan xiyisuo gaikuang’ 直隸各屬罪犯習藝所概況 (Overview 
of all types of craft training facilities for convicts in Zhili, 1904-1908).
110 Peng Zeyi, Zhongguo jindai shougongye, vol. 2, p. 528, ‘Zhili geshu chuanxi gongchang 
gaikuang’, p. 532.
111 The Peking Craft Off ice foresaw f lexible terms of one to two years, while the Hubei Eight 
Banner Craft Off ice and the Sichuan Labour Promotion Off ice provided for three terms per 
year. See Peng Nansheng, Hanghui zhidu, p. 314. 
112 Peng Nansheng, Hanghui zhidu, pp. 312-315.
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from 12 to 25 years, and were thus open to the very young and the very old 
in terms of vocational training. Individual masters within the guild system 
would certainly not take on apprentices without references, and parents 
often had to pay an entry fee to the master for the apprenticeship. The 
off icial schools fed the students and offered them a small stipend of one 
yuan per month, while the traditional system as a rule provided only food 
and housing. Moreover, training in the off icial schools was more flexible 
regarding the period before graduation. Quick learners could graduate sooner 
and were offered rewards and graduation certif icates, while a guild master 
would be quite interested to keep especially his gifted apprentices in the 
workshops for as long as possible. Basically, the schools were interested in 
teaching large numbers of apprentices, while within the guilds, the number 
of apprentices was suspiciously monitored and often limited to only one 
in order to keep cheap labour equably available to all members or to limit 
competition on the labour market altogether if demand became slack.113
Finally, the schools not only offered training on the job but also reading, 
writing, and calculation skills or in some cases taught English and gave a 
basic introduction to the natural sciences.114 In the traditional system, such 
training was not provided by the individual craftshops. However, some 
guilds established elementary schools in order to teach reading and writing 
skills,115 and from the early twentieth century, we know of at least one case 
in which a vocational school was f inanced and organized by a guild, the 
carpenters’ guild (Suzhou Ziyi gongsuo).116
The number of graduates calculated above can only give a rough ap-
proximation, and in relation to an estimated population of 423 million in 
1910117 it may seem minuscule. Nevertheless, the concerted efforts of the 
113 Peng Zeyi, Zhongguo jindai shougongye, vol. 1, pp. 190-191, for f ive different guilds with 
the rule chu yi jin yi 出一進一 (when you let one apprentice go, you can take on the next), with 
apprentice terms from 1.5 to three years. See Bradstock, Craft Guilds in Ch’ing Dynasty China, 
pp. 189-190, for more examples and the observation that if the labour market was too crowded, 
some guilds temporarily halted the apprentice system for several years.
114 Peng Nansheng, Hanghui zhidu, pp. 314-315.
115 Ibid., pp. 55-56, refers to elementary schools established by the Shanghai customs brokers’ 
guild. At Suzhou, the silk and satin guild (1889), the book merchants’ guild (early twentieth 
century), the stone masons (1906), and the embroiderers (1906) also each f inanced elementary 
schools for twenty to forty pupils from within and without the trade. Niida Noboru, Chūgoku 
no shakai to girudo, p. 222, mentions schools for the children of guild members set up ‘recently’ 
in Peking by the hairdressers and tailors. In Shanghai, the shipping merchants founded an 
elementary school in 1906 (‘Shanghai zui zao de huiguan’).
116 Peng Nansheng, Hanghui zhidu, p. 56.
117 Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run, p. 169.
the Qing Central government inStitutionS in Control of the hanDiCraftS 103
central and provincial governments, which markedly differed from the 
earlier professed disinterest in expanding craft production on the part 
of the commercial sector, show that the principles of state dirigisme had 
taken root even in the administration of the Qing dynasty. The vocational 
schools became one of the assets that the Republican state took over from 
the monarchy and enhanced in the following years.
Appendix
Table 10  Official positions in the Ministry of Public Works and the other ministries 
of the central government







Gongbu zeli, 1815 
edition1
187 34 6 0 0 230*
Percentage 82% 15% 3% 0% 0%
Gongbu zeli, 1884 
edition2
177 28 5 4 0 224*
Percentage 81% 15% 2% 2% 0%
Qingshi gao3 193 19 5 5 11 233
Percentage 83% 8% 2% 2% 5%
Official positions in the other ministries of the central 
government (for comparison) Source: Qingshi gao4
ministry of Personnel 
libu 吏部
60% 24% 5% 2% 9% 143
ministry of revenue 
hubu 戶部
72% 17% 2% 2% 7% 270
ministry of rites libu 
禮部 
70% 17% 5% 3% 5% 96
ministry of war bingbu 
兵部
62,5% 21,5% 8% 2% 6% 150
ministry of Justice 
xingbu 刑部
57% 35% 1% 1,5% 5,5% 308
*not all positions are specified according to ethnic groups. 
1 Gongbu zeli, 1815 ed., chap. 118, fol. 1a-3a, ‘e que’ 額缺. 
2 ibid., 1884 ed., chap. 102, fol. 2a-4a: ‘Siyuan bitieshi kushi e que’ 司員筆帖式庫使額缺. 
3 Qingshi gao, chap. 114, pp. 3291-3292. 
4 ibid., pp. 3271-3290.
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Table 11  The Workforce at the Office of Palace Construction of the Imperial 















10 guards, 13 scribes 
and bookkeepers
73 103





10 guards, 8 scribes 
and bookkeepers
71 68




8 guards 13 26
iron storehouse tieku 
鐡庫











7 guardsmen, 58 sula
yuanming yuan firewood 
and charcoal storehouse










weishu sijiang, 7 
assistants












3 guardsmen 32 42
total 34 237 424 308
Source: Qinding zongguan Neiwu fu xianxing zeli, vol. 307, pp. 366-367.
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Table 12  Artisan workforce at the Grand Storage Office of the Imperial Household 






























(of which 1190 female positions)
Source: Qinding zongguan Neiwu fu xianxing zeli, vol. 308, pp. 353-359.
Table 13  Artisan workforce at the Court of Imperial Armaments of the Imperial 
Household Department  wubei yuan 武備院
Branch Before Kangxi 9 (1670) Ca. 1841
Bow makers 187 499
arrow makers 60 39
arrow tip makers 40
tent makers 36
ironsmiths 991 633
armour makers 21 30
felt makers 485 106
Saddle makers 167 59
tanners 266 216
total 2253 1582
Source: Qinding zongguan Neiwu fu xianxing zeli, vol. 309, p. 93.
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Table 15  Estimate of artisans in government manufactories outside Peking, 
eighteenth century
Institution/Craft branch Date Persons
Jiangning zhizaoju 江寧織造局(nanjing 
weaving and Dyeing office)/weavers
1745 1,780
dyers and silk reelers 777
Suzhou zhizaoju
蘇州織造局
(Suzhou weaving and Dyeing office)/
weavers
1745 1,932
designers and others 243
Hangzhou zhizaoju
杭州織造局
(hangzhou weaving and Dyeing office)/
weavers
1745 1,800
dyers and silk reelers 530
Jingdezhen imperial Porcelain kiln 景德
鎮御器厰/porcelain manufacturers
300 permanent artisans; 
together with various assisting 
functions ca. 1,000
26 government mints for copper cash in 
the provinces/copper casters
Qianlong era at an average of 100 workers 
per mint: 2,600
about 40 government shipyards Qianlong era at an average of 400 artisans 
and workers (figures from 
biggest ming shipyard): 16,000 
total 26,662
Sources: Zhu Cishou, Zhongguo gudai gongye shi, p. 789 (Jiangning), p. 792 (Suzhou, hangzhou), 
p. 790 (Jingdezhen), Burger, ‘minting’, pp. 377-391, this study, section ‘shipbuilding’.
3. The Rise, Decline, and Reinforcement 
of the Crafts in the Service of the State
Historians’ opinions are divided as to the usefulness of the classical 
pattern of ascent, f lourishing, decay, and decline for the structural 
framework of analysis of political entities. In China, this had been a 
time-honoured concept applied to all dynastic histories. Yet it has been 
criticized because it focuses too much on the central government and 
is therefore not able to analyze socio-economic trends over periods that 
span several dynasties, most prominently the ‘commercial revolutions’ 
in the Song and the Ming.1
Nonetheless, since dynastic power did rise, flourish, and decline, this basic 
pattern for the shifts in power relations is certainly applicable to the core 
political decision-makers. This is especially so when it is combined with a 
complementary perspective on local and regional elites and bureaucracies, 
whose influence tends to increase after the central power has passed its 
apex.2 Naquin and Rawski have modif ied the paradigm with regard to the 
most influential networks or factions in the empire. In their three-phase 
model, imperial princes and Manchu institutions f irst wielded the greatest 
political power between 1644 and the 1730s; in the second phase, between 
the 1730s and the 1820s, the off icial examinations for both Manchus and 
Chinese were the career path to highest political influence, and the most 
powerful institution in the central government was the Grand Council. 
During the third phase, lasting from 1820 to the end of the Qing dynasty, 
extrabureaucratic, intellectual networks and provincial administrators 
dominated, although at the top of the central government, Manchu control 
resurged.3 It was not embodied in the persons of the young or weak emperors 
Xianfeng, Tongzhi, Guangxu, and Puyi but by their regents: Empress Dowager 
Cixi, the mother of the Tongzhi and the aunt of the Guangxu emperors, 
Prince Gong (Yixin, 1840-1891), the brother of the Xianfeng emperor, and 
Zaifeng (1883-1851), the father of the last emperor Puyi.
In this sense, this could be considered dynastic decline if the power of 
the dynasty is associated only with the influence of the emperor. However, 
1 Zurndorfer, ‘A Guide to the “New” Chinese History’, p. 184. 
2 For a study of this phenomenon in the f ield of local and regional historiography, see Moll-
Murata, Die chinesische Regionalbeschreibung, esp. p. 239.
3 Naquin and Rawski, Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century, pp. 52-53.
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if other powerful personalities from the imperial clan are considered, the 
downward trend was not that obvious.4
In regard to the f inancial strength of the Qing empire, the record is 
ambiguous. Naquin and Rawski maintain that in the eighteenth century, the 
Qing state collected a surplus in taxes, which amounted to 24 million tael in 
1736 and was tripled by 1786. However, the government also spent much of 
the revenues for warfare: 23 million tael for the conquest of Xinjiang (1755-
1760), and three times as much for the campaigns in Jinchuan in Western 
Sichuan (1772-1776). In the 1790s, for the f irst time the court did not have 
enough funds when it repressed the White Lotus rebellions. At one hundred 
million tael, it swallowed up more than 130 percent of the yearly income of 
the central government. Moreover, since 1840, indemnities demanded by 
the imperialist states put an extra strain on the budget of the Qing state. The 
additional tax charged since the suppression of the Taiping rebellion, lijin, 
remained in the provinces and thus could not help the f inancial situation of 
the central government. By 1900, the Chinese central government obtained 
less of the gross national product than in 1753.5
R. Bin Wong notes however that after the mid-nineteenth century, ‘whatever 
the Qing state’s weaknesses, raising money was not among them’.6 He points 
to the capabilities of the Qing state to raise commercial taxes and especially 
customs revenues and quotes a figure of 49.5 million tael of revenue raised in 
1849, 77 percent of which came from agriculture and the rest from commerce. 
A total of 77 million tael was collected in 1885 due to a fourfold increase in 
commercial revenues. According to Wong, annual expenditures of the Qing 
ranged from 30 to 40 million tael between the 1720s and the early 1840s and 
reached 70 to 80 million tael per year between the 1860s and the early 1890s, 
while the gross income rose to as much as 302 million tael of revenue gathered in 
1911, of which about 50 million came from agriculture, another 45 million from 
miscellaneous sources, and more than 207 million from commercial taxes.7
Moreover, whereas Naquin and Rawski point to the weakness of the 
military sector in the nineteenth century as well as the problem that since 
the Taiping rebellion the central government army was unable to maintain 
a military monopoly,8 Bin Wong emphasizes the successful suppression of 
the Taiping (1850-1864), Nian (1851-1868), and Muslim (1867-1873) rebellions 
4 Ibid., pp. 218-219.
5 Naquin and Rawski, Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century, p. 219.
6 R. Bin Wong, China Transformed, p. 156.
7 Ibid., pp. 155-156.
8 Naquin and Rawski, Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century, p. 219.
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and the fact that most of the regional armies that fought these rebels were 
demobilized in the 1870s.9
In terms of the state’s involvement in the economy, Naquin and Rawski 
mention the long-term trend away from mining and manufacturing, tea 
and salt production, domestic and foreign trade and claim that
The Qing state never reconciled the divergence between traditional 
notions of its proper economic function and its increasing impotence, 
nor did it evolve a new vision of its role in the economy. Until the last 
decade of its life, it preferred to try to preserve stability in the midst of 
change rather than to promote development.10
In their analysis, particularism existed in the economy and in the bureaucracy 
during the expanding commercialization, so that administrative responsibili-
ties were assumed by private parties rather than public entities.11 This implied 
that the local elites took on many government functions, but it was only 
in the twentieth century that they turned their power against the state.12
On this point, Bin Wong maintains that the state could mobilize the 
funds to build up steamship lines and railways and not only heavy military 
industries but also light industries like textiles, thus expanding its range of 
activities in the late nineteenth century.13
These apparently conflicting views demonstrate that with regard to the 
state administration of craft manufacture, a general trend of retreat from direct 
management can be observed after activist beginnings. But in the final years 
of the dynasty, the commitment intensified once again and diversified into 
the promotion of manual trades as well as the introduction of mechanized 
production. In order to demonstrate this trend, the following sections outline 
the particular patterns of development in the main sectors of state engagement.
The State Retires: Building Projects in the Nineteenth Century
As shown in the preceding chapter, the number of permanent positions in 
the Bureau of Construction (yingshan si) of the Ministry of Public Works 
9 R. Bin Wong, China Transformed, p. 155.
10 Naquin and Rawski, Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century, p. 223.
11 Ibid., pp. 223-225.
12 Ibid., p. 229.
13 R. Bin Wong, China Transformed, p. 155.
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was not high and receded by almost half in the course of the dynasty. By 
contrast, in the palace the permanent positions for builders were almost 
tenfold that of the Ministry and were reduced by only eleven percent. For 
building, the workforce was usually hired in temporary assignments. After 
1860, the names of the construction companies and even the individual 
owners of these companies begin to appear in estimates and various types 
of communications in archival materials or the documentation of particular 
projects. For instance, in the 1872-1873 reconstruction project for the country 
palace Yuanming yuan, which in 1860 had been destroyed by English and 
French troops in the wake of the Second Opium War, seven f irms and their 
owners were named in the archival documents of the Imperial Household 
Department. The project was broken off due to a lack of funds, little support 
from political decision-makers, and the difficulty in acquiring the necessary 
timber.14 The task of the building firms in this project was to contract labour 
(baogong) and provide less costly building materials.15 A case that neverthe-
less shows the interaction of government officials and a private craftsperson 
and building contractor occurred during the construction of the mausoleum 
for the Xianfeng emperor, Dingling, in 1874. Guo Fenglin, the owner of the 
timber yard and carpentry shop Xianghe muchang in Peking, had clashed and 
verbally abused a Section Director about the payment of compensation for 
repairing a pavilion built over a well that had collapsed within the warranty 
time.16 This act of insubordination, which caused considerable commotion and 
paperwork, shows the self-assertion of the concerned person who maintained, 
certainly in order to stress his probity and status, that he had previously 
donated money to the state and acquired the off icial title of baoshou bei 保
守備 (defender-in-attendance).17 Guo and other owners of timber yards and 
construction firms18 are referred to in the late Qing documents as shangren. 
As ordinary workmen or masters ( jiang), they would hardly have been 
acceptable as business partners in off icial work projects.
With regard to the production of building materials, the imperial kilns 
may serve as an example. As both Zhu Cishou and Xu Jianqing have pointed 
out, the Qing dynasty operated fewer kilns for baking bricks and tiles than 
the Ming dynasty. The three centres were the Liuli chang (Glazed Tile 
14 Liu Dunzhen, ’Tongzhi chongxiu Yuanmingyuan shiliao’, p. 56.
15 Ibid., p. 44.
16 Gongcheng beiyao, chap. 7, pp. 1-18. The entire chapter is dedicated to the incident. The sum 
in question was 450 tael.
17 Ibid., chap. 7, p. 15.
18 For instance, the owners of the timber yards Tianlin muchang 天林木厰 and Tianquan 
muchang 天泉木厰 in Peking who renovated the off icial mint Baoyuan ju in 1902.
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Manufactory) in Peking, which was used continuously until 1825 and then 
relocated to the Western Hills near Peking; the brick manufactories in Linqing 
and Shandong; and the Suzhou Metal Tile Manufactory (Jinzhuan chang).19 
The Liuli chang Manufactory was supervised by one Han and one Manchu 
official, but apparently from early on, the operational risk was outsourced to 
so-called ‘kiln households’ (yaohu), which are mentioned since 1694. These 
brick bakers also had to pay a land tax for the plots where their kilns were 
situated. Therefore this can hardly have been an imperial manufactory but 
rather subcontracted workshops that supplied the state.20 The other two sites 
were activated in case of large building projects but not permanently run, and 
were no longer used after the Daoguang reign.21 Xu Jianqing refers to Suzhou 
brickmakers who obtained their food rations even if the kilns were not in 
operation. She suggests that this applied also to other government workshops 
and manufactories, such as the silk weavers in Jiangnan, the porcelain potters 
in Jingdezhen, and the shipbuilders in Fujian and Hangzhou.22
Thus, although off icial building projects were directed and administered 
by the state, they required a considerable standing workforce for palace 
buildings only. For buildings outside the palace and also within the palace 
precincts (if a larger workforce was required), workers were hired by means 
of a contractual system. The building materials for the state were not per-
manently kept on stock but provided from the market in the case of timber 
and in a kind of subcontracting system for bricks.
The Three Silk Weaveries in Jiangnan
The state weaving manufactories in the Lower Yangzi region, the Jiangnan 
san zhizao ju, located in Suzhou, Nanjing, and Hangzhou, were revived in 
the f irst years of the Qing rule after they had been closed down at the end 
of the Ming dynasty.23 Their responsibility was to reel the silk, to dye, 
to weave, and partly to embroider the fabrics used at court and for high 
19 Zhu Cishou, Zhongguo gudai gongye shi, pp. 789-790, Xu Jianqing, Qingdai qianqi, p. 329. 
Kerr et al., Ceramic Technology, p. 516, point out that the Suzhou tiles were referred to as ‘metal 
tiles’ for the metallic sound they emitted when struck. Their colour was actually black.
20 Xu Jianqing, Qingdai qianqi, pp. 329-330.
21 Ibid., p. 328.
22 Ibid., p. 334.
23 For the scope of production of the Ming state weaveries, see Schäfer and Kuhn, Weaving 
an economic pattern in Ming times. These authors date the interruption of state silk production 
during the Ming-Qing transition from 1628 to 1645 (p. 56).
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off icials as well as the textiles used as gifts from the emperor to off icials 
or emissaries from tributary states.24
In relation to their size in the Ming dynasty, the three weaveries were 
enlarged so that the number of looms as well as artisans was more than 
doubled. In the first decades of the Qing, these vacancies could not be filled, 
so that by 1667, in Suzhou 170 looms were missing.25 The actual f igure of 800 
looms was probably reached around 1686. Furthermore, a system of outsourcing 
in silk weaving seems to have applied, at least in certain phases and for certain 
parts of the production. This was the so-called lingzhi (‘weaving to order’) 
system, in which the authorities gave out licenses to the weaving households 
for subcontracting people to weave in the manufactory.26 The system was 
inherited from the Ming. After initial confusion in the early years of the Qing, 
the practice emerged that the state provided the materials and paid the artisans 
monetary wages and food rations. They had the status of official artisans and 
worked in the government weaveries under strict supervision and discipline.27
Table 16  The norm quotas of looms and artisans at the Three Silk Weaveries in the 
early and mid-Qing




Early Qing, [ca. 1686] 1725 1745 1745
nanjing 538 557 600 2,550
Suzhou 800 710 663 2,175
hangzhou 770 750 600 2,330
total 2,108 2,017 1,836 7,055
Sources: fang Xing et al., ‘Silk weaving in Jiangsu and Zhejiang’, p. 206, and Peng Zeyi, ‘Qingdai 
qianqi’, p. 99.
In relation to the private weaveries, the total number of looms and people 
employed in the three silk weaveries in the mid-eighteenth century (about 
7,000) was not large. According to Zhu Cishou, in the Qianlong and Jiaqing 
reigns, the aggregate number of satin (duan) looms in Nanjing was as high as 
30,000. Private weaveries in Suzhou had a total number of 10,000 looms and 
24 Shih Min-hsiung, The Silk Industry in Ch’ing China, p. 39.
25 Piontek-Ma, Der Bericht von Sun Pei, p. 63.
26 Fang Xing et al., ‘Silk Weaving in Jiangsu and Zhejiang’, p. 205.
27 Ibid.
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340 dyeing workshops, and the private weaveries in the city of Hangzhou 
had about 3,000 looms.28 The looms of the Imperial Weavery in Nanjing 
thus amounted to only two percent of those of the private weaveries. For 
Suzhou this f igure was six percent, and for Hangzhou twenty percent. Other 
estimates give even higher f igures for the private looms.29
In the Taiping rebellion, all of the three weaveries were badly damaged. 
They were rebuilt in the Tongzhi reign (1864-1872), but thereafter operated 
only at a reduced level with about one-third of the original looms and 
artisans.30 For 1870, Shih Min-hsiung quotes f igures of about 600 looms 
in Nanjing, 240 in Suzhou, and 122 in Hangzhou.31 The weavery in Nanjing 
was dissolved in 1904 because it seemed uneconomic to have two imperial 
workshops, Suzhou and Nanjing, in one province.32 The main reasons for the 
decline may have been less demand from the court and the high prices for raw 
silk, which had doubled since the post-Taiping period.33 Xu Jianqing points 
to the fact that after the Taiping period, the court turned to the commercial 
market for its needs. In the case of satin from Nanjing, the percentage of 
the weaves bought from private producers amounted to up to 80 percent.34
‘Prosperity is not on the wane’:35 The Jingdezhen Porcelain 
Manufactory
The market town of Jingdezhen was founded in the f irst year of the Jingde 
era in the Northern Song (1004) and from early on produced ‘real’ porcelain, 
in contrast to the earthenware produced by other Southern Song centres 
of ceramic production.36 Porcelain, similar to tea, was sent to the court as 
28 Zhu Cishou, Zhongguo gudai gongye shi, p. 789.
29 Fang Xing et al., ‘Silk Weaving in Jiangsu and Zhejiang’, p. 207, assume an aggregate number 
of 80,000 looms in the two provinces Zhejiang and Jiangsu.
30 Xu Jianqing, Qingdai qianqi, p. 324.
31 Shih Min-hsiung, The Silk Industry in Ch’ing China, p. 47.
32 Peng Zeyi, Zhongguo jindai shougongye, vol. 2, p. 504, quoting from Donghua xulu 東華續
錄 for the year Guangxu 30 (1904).
33 Shih Min-hsiung, The Silk Industry in Ch’ing China, pp. 47-49. Shih dates the closure to 1894, 
but this is not corroborated by the three sources cited by Peng Zeyi.
34 Xu Jianqing, Qingdai qianqi, p. 324.
35 This was the impression of an English traveller to Jingdezhen, Mr. Drew, in 1869. Decennial 
Reports, 1882-1891, p. 205.
36 Definitions for ‘porcelain’ vary in China and the West. Traditionally, in the West, transparency 
is the criterion for deciding whether a piece of ceramic constitutes porcelain; in China the clear 
sound coming forth from pieces of porcelain struck against each other serves as distinctive feature 
for ci 瓷 as opposed to the earthenware tao 陶. Rose Kerr et al. quote the modern def inition 
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‘tribute’, a kind of natural tax, and the quality of the items was controlled by 
government off icials.37 Yet it was only in the Ming dynasty that a completely 
state-run government manufactory with kilns was established.38 From 
this time on, the local Jingdezhen ware was referred to as ‘off icial ware’ 
guanyao. The imperial manufactory f irst operated 20 kilns, then 58 in 
the Xuande reign (1425-1436)39 ‒ each for different kinds of wares ‒ and 23 
specialized workshops for the particular steps of production. In the Zhengde 
and Jiajing reigns (1505-1566), 300 craftsmen including masons, carpenters, 
and blacksmiths were employed in addition to hired labour.40 Another 
source refers to 500 craftsmen and over 1,000 labourers at the imperial kilns 
during the Jiajing reign.41 At the same time, private kilns also flourished. 
Porcelain was being made in f ive or six other locations in the Ming empire, 
but the off icial manufactory and the private enterprises at Jingdezhen had 
become the centre of the industry. According to the technical compendium 
Tiangong kaiwu  (‘The exploitation of the works of nature’, 1637), by the 
end of the dynasty Jingdezhen produced more than all other regions put 
together.42 The imperial manufactory continued to produce until 1608.43
In the Qing dynasty, the imperial manufactory and kilns were reopened on 
the original site in 165444 and refurbished in 1680. They flourished for about 
one hundred years under the direction of off icial commissioners sent from 
‘a vitrif ied, white, and translucent ware --- that is f ired at 1,300° C plus’ (Kerr et al., Ceramic 
Technology, p. 9, from Hamer & Hamer, The Potter’s Dictionary of Materials and Techniques 1975, 
p. 229) but qualify this by noting that Chinese porcelain was not necessarily white or translucent, 
and it was f ired at temperatures between 1,150 and 1,400° C. In Kerr’s view, porcelain was not 
‘invented’ but rather ‘discovered’ or, more accurately, it ‘emerged’ in China when potters in the 
north experimented with whiter materials and higher kiln temperatures. Scholarly opinions 
on the earliest specimens of ‘real’ porcelain vary. Kerr and colleagues consider that ‘the world’s 
f irst true porcelains’ were the Xing wares made in Hebei province during the early Tang dynasty 
(Kerr et al., Ceramic Technology, pp. 151-152).
37 Kerr et al., Ceramic Technology, pp. 185-186.
38 The founding date is disputed. Some authors assume that the year 1369 (Sayer [transl.], 
Ching-te-chen t’ao-lu, p. 41) is correct. Others, as in Jingdezhen taoci shigao, pp. 96-97, doubt 
that a manufactory could have been built as early as that, just after the rise of the Ming, and 
suggest the year 1402 instead. For further discussion, see also Kerr et al., Ceramic Technology, 
p. 186, fn. 273.
39 Sayer (transl.), Ching-te-chen t’ao-lu, p. 41.
40 Fang Zhuofen et al., ‘The Porcelain Industry of Jingdezhen’, p. 311, Zhongguo taoci shi, p. 366, 
quoting from Jiangxi da zhi 江西大志, ‘Taoshu’ 陶書.
41 Jiangxi tongzhi (1881), chap. 93, fol. 9a, Memorial by Xu Zhi.
42 Xu Jianqing, Qingdai qianqi, p. 557; Fang Zhuofen et al., ‘The Porcelain Industry of Jingdezhen’, 
p. 309, both referring to Song Yingxing, Tiangong kaiwu, chap. 2.
43 Kerr et al., Ceramic Technology, p. 188.
44 Jiangxi sheng tongzhi, chap. 93, fol. 7a.
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Peking. The manufacturing and despatch of porcelain was arranged by the 
Palace Workshops ([Yangxin dian] zaoban chu) of the Imperial Household 
Department. The workshops would send order lists and models to the manu-
factory that would be produced under the supervision of the superintendent’s 
assistant in Jingdezhen. After control by the resident superintendent, who 
often also oversaw the customs affairs of the region, the f inished porcelain 
in standard and substandard quality would be shipped to Peking.45 In the 
palace, the porcelain was received in the porcelain storehouse, ciku, of the 
Imperial Household Department.46
The number of craft specialisations in the imperial manufactory is given as 
23, as in the Ming, and the number of kilns as six, each for a specif ic type of 
vessel. It is disputed whether facilities of this limited size could produce the 
output stated for the Yongzheng and Qianlong eras.47 Lu Jiaming, referring 
to the ‘Record on Porcelain in Jingdezhen’ ( Jingdezhen taolu, 1815), argues 
that from the early eighteenth century on, the late Ming method of forming 
and painting in the imperial manufactory and f iring in private kilns must 
have been reintroduced.48 Yet during the Qing, the practice was managed 
more eff iciently than in the Ming, so that the kiln owners did not take the 
risk alone.49 After the reconstruction in 1866, only low temperature muffle 
furnaces for f iring overglaze ornamentation remained in use in the imperial 
manufactory.50
The superintendents of the early and mid-eighteenth century became 
famous because of their achievements in quality improvements, so that the 
wares produced during their terms of office were given their names. We thus 
know of ‘Lang ware’ after Lang Tingji, superintendent from 1705 to 1712; ‘Nian 
ware’ after Nian Xiyao, superintendent from 1726 to 1735; and most illustrious 
45 Kerr et al., Ceramic Technology, p. 201.
46 The porcelain chamber belonged to one of the Six Storehouses liu ku 六庫of the Grand Storage 
off ice guangchu si . Besides ‘old and new porcelain’, gold, silver, enamel, inlay, bronze, and tin 
dishes and vessels were accumulated there. See Zongguan neiwufu xianxing zeli, ‘Guangchu si’‘, 
chap. 1, p. 352.
47 Fang Zhuofen et al., ‘The Porcelain Industry of Jingdezhen’, p. 312, Lu Jiaming, ‘Ming Qing 
shiqi Jingdezhen yuqichang’, p. 32.
48 Lu Jiaming, ‘Ming Qing shiqi Jingdezhen yuqichang’, p. 31, see Jingdezhen taolu tushuo, 
chap. 10, p. 261: 囯朝初燒造龍缸未成，至唐窯始復其制，搭民官燒。［…］然今則厰器盡搭燒
民窯，照數給置，無役派賠累也, (transl. Sayer) p. 112: ‘In the beginning of the present dynasty 
they [the palace factory] failed to make dragon jars, and it was not until T’ang Ying’s time that 
they resumed their manufacture using private kilns for that purpose. […] To-day the palace 
articles are entirely farmed out to private kilns, payment being made according to the numbers 
to be baked, and the losses incurred by the default of the workmen do not fall upon them.’
49 Kerr et al., Ceramic Technology, p. 200.
50 Kerr et al., Ceramic Technology, p. 200.
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of all, ‘Tang ware’ after Tang Ying (1682-1756),51 Nian Xiyao’s assistant since 
1728 and superintendent between 1736 and 1756. Lao Ge, the assistant to 
Tang and succeeding superintendents from 1741 to 1768, maintained the high 
quality standards after Tang Ying’s death, but after Lao Ge’s own retirement, 
artistic standards are said to have not reached the same level again.52 From 
1787 onwards, the connection to the central government and the Imperial 
Household Department seems to have become looser, so that together with 
the director of the nearest customs station on the Yangzi River, Jiujiang, 
who previously had also been in charge,53 regional administrators took over 
the responsibility for the imperial manufactory.54 In the attacks by Taiping 
troops and counterattacks by the government army between 1854 and 1864, 
the manufactory was destroyed and the workforce scattered.
The manufactory was rebuilt in 1866 on a larger scale than before.55 Reports 
on the period between 1866 and 1910 are relatively scarce. Most documents 
recording the despatch to Peking at the Jiujiang customs station are extant.56 
Based on these, Liang Miaotai has set up a statistical table of the production 
volume and the expenses in the last years of the Qing. Production figures are 
reported until 1908 and expenses until 1910.57 At a yearly average of 22,000 
pieces of f irst-grade (shangse) and second-grade (cise) quality, the production 
was not much lower than in the best years of Qianlong, when the respective 
norm figures were 29,000 pieces.58 However, concerning the quality norms 
set by the government, f irst-grade pieces according to the 1743 norm figures 
were acceptable in a range of 62-65 percent, and second-grade pieces between 
35 and 38 percent. Up to 20 percent of kiln wasters (that is, misf ired pieces) 
were allowed.59 Between 1866 and 1908, the factual f igures were 30 percent 
f irst-grade and 70 percent second-grade pieces, and a percentage of 18 for 
51 For biographical information, see Hummel (ed.), Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period, p. 442.
52 Kerr et al., Ceramic Technology, p. 27.
53 Fu and Zhen, ‘Tang Ying nianpu’, state that Tang Ying directed the Jiujiang customs and 
worked concurrently as the Director of the Imperial Manufactory from 1739. He would spend 
half a month during the f iring periods in spring and in autumn at the Manufactory. According to 
Zhu Shan, ‘Taoci shi shang bei yiwang de ren’, pp. 36-37, it was Lao Ge who stayed in Jingdezhen 
continuously as deputy director during Tang’s absences in Jiujiang.
54 Kerr et al., Ceramic Technology, p. 188; Jiangxi tongzhi, chap. 93, fol. 8a.
55 Lu Jiaming, ‘Ming Qing shiqi Jingdezhen yuqichang’, p. 32. Jiangxi tongzhi, chap. 93, fol. 8a.
56 However, at the First Historical Archives in Peking they were ‘lent out for publication’ in 
2006.
57 Liang Miaotai, Ming Qing Jingdezhen, pp. 112-113.
58 Tang Ying ji, ‘Taocheng jishi’ 陶成紀事 (Record of facts about porcelain production), p. 950, 
also quoted by Lan Pu in Jingdezhen taolu tushuo, p. 62, (transl. Sayer) p. 12.
59 Tang Ying ji, ‘Taocheng jishi’, p. 950.
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wasters. Liang Miaotai’s table of expenses shows that the court in the late 
Qing period spent considerable amounts for porcelain: for the despatches 
between 1870 to 1910, this totaled 975,470 tael or an average of ca. 25,000 
tael per year.60 By comparison, the highest norms in the two hundred years 
before the Opium War were set at 10,000 tael per year in 1739.61
Therefore, it can hardly be argued that the imperial porcelain manufactory 
at Jingdezhen experienced a marked economic decline in the last f ifty years 
of the dynasty, even if the f iring process was outsourced to private kilns. 
Regarding the wares produced in the Tongzhi reign (1862-1874), a Dutch 
porcelain expert concludes that the late Qing potters ‘hadn’t lost their skills’.62
As in silk weaving, the quality of the porcelain from the imperial manu-
factory was arguably the highest and set the standard for the commercial 
market,63 and again as in silk weaving, the commercial market had a far bigger 
output than the imperial manufactory. Since systematic and long-term data 
are missing for the private sector, its production can only be estimated on the 
basis of reported numbers and the f iring capacities of kilns. Fang Zhuofen 
and colleagues point out that the total output of Jingdezhen porcelain in the 
early Qing has been calculated on the basis of the consumption of f irewood 
at about 200,000 dan64 or 40 million pieces per year, but they assume that 
for the Qianlong reign, the f igure must have been about 300,000 dan or 60 
million pieces a year. The maximum – but not undisputed – quota for imperial 
porcelain was ‘several hundred thousand pieces’.65 If this implies about 
500,000 pieces, then the imperial porcelain amounted to about 0.8 percent 
of the private production at its most active period.66
The manufactory was closed down in 1910 and succeeded by the Ji-
angxi Porcelain Company ( Jiangxi ciye gongsi) that operated partly with 
60 Liang Miaotai, Ming Qing Jingdezhen, pp. 123-126. Two years were not included in this 
account. 
61 Ibid., p. 120, 129.
62 Nanne Ottema, Chineesche Ceramiek, p. 233.
63 Since off icial production was f ired at private kilns, some was illegally appropriated from 
there. For the faking of the marks on imperial wares, see Liang Miaotai, Ming Qing Jingdezhen, 
p. 138. The kiln wasters were either sent to Peking for sale, or they were sold on site. See Kerr et 
al., Ceramic Technology, pp. 200-201.
64 dan 擔 is the unit for a kiln load of 200 porcelain pieces.
65 Tang Ying ji, p. 144 (Preface to the gazetteer of Fuliang, the district where the market town 
Jingdezhen was situated, Fuliang xianzhi 浮梁縣志, dated 1740). However, this f igure has been 
doubted by Lu Jiaming, ‘Ming Qing shiqi Jingdezhen yuqichang’, p. 32, who supposes that it 
spans several years, since Tang Ying in 1743 reported the quota of a maximum of 29,000 pieces 
per year.
66 Fang Zhuofen et al., ‘The Porcelain Industry of Jingdezhen’, p. 314.
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government funds from the provinces of Hebei, Hubei, Jiangsu, Anhui, and 
Jiangxi and partly with private capital.67
Patterns of Development and Decline
The three sectors outlined above show how the state withdrew from the 
organization of craft production in varying degrees and for different reasons.
In building, the system of cooperation with local building companies 
and timber merchants who were employed especially for recruiting the 
workforce is evident for the later phases. State administration still con-
trolled all accounting procedures, the allocation of building materials, 
and the progress and execution of the work. For glazed tiles and bricks, 
sub-contractors worked on demand, while timber was allocated from the 
market.
Silk weaving is a clear case in point of Xu Jianqing’s model of state 
engagement in the crafts, according to which the state at f irst organized 
and f inanced craft branches in which the private sector could not supply 
its needs but later retired from the active organization of weaveries and 
relied on the commercial sector for its silk textiles.68
In the manufacturing of porcelain, the output of the state workshops was 
also extremely small but was leading in design and workmanship. Since 
forming and f iring are such distinct phases of the working process that 
require very different equipment and skills, kiln work could be outsourced 
from early on, but forming and decoration remained within the imperial 
porcelain manufactory. The ‘decline’ of the off icial sector is therefore less 
marked than in the silk weaving sector.
In the two sectors of luxury production, silk weaving and porcelain 
manufacture, the state did not produce for profit, although in the case of 
porcelain, kiln wasters or at times second-grade porcelain were sold on the 
open market and thus could make up for some of the production costs. In the 
late nineteenth century, the costs for silk weaves for the use of the court were 
lower if bought from commercial producers than those produced at the state 
manufactories. What is the reason, then, that the government maintained 
the craft production almost to the end of the dynasty? For porcelain, it has 
been plausibly argued that the main reason for this was that imperial patterns 
67 Kerr et al., Ceramic Technology, p. 188; Jiangxi sheng qinggongye ting (ed.), Jingdezhen taoci 
shigao, p. 270.
68 Xu Jianqing, Qingdai qianqi, p. 554.
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had to be preserved.69 For silk weaving, Paolo Santangelo explains that the 
manufactories were not economic enterprises but political and organizational 
centres. Since they came under the supervision of high-ranking bondservants 
from the Imperial Household Department whose relationship to the emperor 
was particularly close, they can be understood as a representation of the 
court in the most affluent region of the empire that lay far away from Peking. 
Especially in the early Qing, the supervisors of the Nanjing and Suzhou 
weaveries often informed the emperors about the political and economic 
situation in Jiangnan.70 Moreover, they also organized the acquisition of 
various objects produced in the region ‒ not only silk weaves.71 Although the 
informal services for the emperor were no longer required in the late Qing, 
reports about silk prices and the labour market were regularly delivered also 
in this period. The Jingdezhen manufactory did not have the same politically 
and economically essential functions as the weaving manufactories.
As the three samples show, the reasons for state engagement or retreat 
were complex and pertained to local political situations and the nature of 
the commodity that was being produced.
The following chapters present investigations on two craft branches 
that do not belong to the f ield of luxury production but were of strategic 
importance for two fundamental tasks of the Qing state: security and 
information. Shipbuilding in the military f ield served to defend China’s sea 
frontier and to transport grain provisions for the court and the army. Printing 
produced the texts used for the legitimation of the Qing state, the education 
and civilization of its subjects, and the dissemination of information to 
its off icials. Both branches of production belong to the complementary 
f ields to which the self-strengthening effort of the nineteenth century was 
devoted: the preservation of the Chinese ‘cultural essence’ (tiyong) and the 
application of modern Western techniques.
These two craft branches will be treated in more detail because it was in 
these branches that mechanization and technology transfer were actively 
realized by central and local governments at an earlier date than in the other 
sectors. Thus they exemplif ied a particular dynamism in times of crisis.
69 Lu Jiaming, ‘Ming Qing shiqi Jingdezhen yuqichang’, p. 32.
70 Santangelo, ‘The Imperial Factories of Suzhou’, p. 285.
71 Among the documents concerning the Suzhou weaving manufactory in the First Historical 
Archives, Peking, we found, for instance, the production prices of white jade bowls. The jade 
carvers earned the palace standard wage of 0.154 tael per day. First Historical Archives, Neiwufu 
tang qingce 内務府堂清冊, Gongye 工業, nos. 94 and 106 from 1770 and 1775; a late document 
from 1884 records the purchase of bamboo items. Neiwufu tang qingce, Gongye 273, Su[zhou] 
蘇 226 for a purchase in 1884.

4. Government Shipbuilding
Naval construction, together with the production of ordnance, takes a special 
position among the branches of production in which the Qing state engaged 
actively. They constitute central elements in the transition to the mechanization 
and industrialization of the Chinese economy in the second half of the nine-
teenth century. For the basic hypothesis of this study ‒ the relative efficiency of 
craft and industrial administration by the Qing state over its entire duration ‒ we 
will first explore the achievements of the state in ship construction.
One of the central tasks that any government must fulf il is to provide 
the basic supplies for the government, its off icials, and its military as well 
as border defence and the maintenance of internal order. In the imperial 
Chinese state, devices for the transport of provisions and of armed forces 
were considered to be so strategically important that the only option was to 
produce them in institutions under direct government control. Therefore, 
state shipyards at f luvial and sea harbours were operated and managed 
by the ministries responsible for Public Works, Finances and the Military. 
However, ship construction both for grain transport and the f luvial and 
naval forces receded in output and eff iciency from its highest levels in the 
early eighteenth century until the period of interior and exterior cataclysms 
of the Taiping rebellion and the Opium Wars.
When the military crises of the nineteenth century took place, together 
with the financial predicament of the central government and the disaster of 
the Yellow River flooding, substitutes for the grain transport vessels and the 
favoured transport route on the Grand Canal had to be found. Grain shipping 
was f irst transferred to commercial shippers and later to the first ‘merchant 
managed and off icially supervised’ China Merchants’ Steam Navigation 
Company (CMSNC). With regard to the marine forces, the security of the 
Qing dynasty and its sovereignty was threatened from overseas by faster ships 
and more destructive weapons. Although the Qing state soon acquired such 
vessels and military materiel from abroad, top officials felt uneasy about the 
paradoxical situation of having to rely on potential and real enemies to provide 
weapons and military transport facilities for the country’s national defence.
The court faction around Prince Gong (Yixin 1840-1891), the founder of 
the Office of Foreign Affairs (Zongli yamen) saw this danger and agreed to 
the demands of the high-ranking provincial officials and military men, Zeng 
Guofan, Li Hongzhang, and Zuo Zongtang, to set up arsenals and shipyards in 
Western style. The aim of this so-called self-strengthening (ziqiang) programme 
was to learn the techniques of mechanical production in the military sector as 
124 State anD CraftS in the Qing DynaSt y (1644-1911) 
quickly as possible to reach a level of self-sufficiency within a few years. What 
were the achievements and the failures of government shipbuilding in the early 
and mid-Qing and during the period of self-strengthening? With a view to 
the thesis of the relative efficiency of the Qing, we will look at the output and 
financing in naval construction and explore the organization of government 
shipyards before and after the advent of steam navigation. In chapter five, this 
will be set against the activities of private shipyards so as to come to an estimate 
of the relative size of both sectors and their relationships and interdependence.
Government Shipbuilding in the Civilian Sector: Grain Tax 
Shipment and Organization
Within the system of taxation, the rice growing regions in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Anhui, Hubei, Hunan, Shandong, and Jiangxi were subjected to a special 
imperial grain tax. This so-called tribute rice and other natural produce in 
smaller quantities, such as millet and beans, timber, mats, and bamboo, were 
shipped on the Grand Canal to the capital to supply the court, the off icials 
of the central government, and the troops stationed in Peking. Since Peking 
lies about one thousand kilometres north of the abundant rice regions, 
considerable logistical efforts were necessary to achieve this task. As Harold 
Hinton has aptly formulated, grain tribute ‘occupied a position particularly 
close to the hearts and stomachs of the emperors and their courts.’1
Table 17  Volume of tribute grain shipment in the early nineteenth century
grains collected ca. 6.2 mio shi (443,300 tons)
Thereof  
grains used for covering the costs of collection, 
transport, and storage
ca. 2.8 mio shi (200,200 tons)
grains that reached the Peking granaries ca. 3.4 mio shi (243,100 tons)
From the grains that reached the Peking granaries  
  Salaries in kind for court, nobility, officials ca. 0.4 mio shi (28,600 tons)
  military provisions for soldiers in the capital ca. 2.4 mio shi (171,600 tons)
  Sacrificial use, gruel stations, sales on  
  open market for stabilizing food prices ca. 0.6 mio shi (42,900 tons)
For comparison  
grains that reached Peking granaries, early Qing ca. 4.4 mio shi (314,600 tons)
Source: Based on data from leonard, Controlling from Afar, pp. 98-99.
1 Hinton, Grain Tribute System, p. 97.
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In the Ming dynasty, which since 1420 had also established their capital 
in Peking, grain transport had been handled by the military, and state 
shipyards had built the grain transport ships (see Figure 1). The measure-
ments of these two mast ships were an average length of 18 to 26 metres 
and had a width of 3 to 3.4 metres. The cargo-carrying capacity was about 
2,000 shi [140 tons].2
This system was essentially taken over by the Qing.Together with tak-
ing care of the general tax grain administration, the provinces were also 
responsible for the construction and maintenance of the vessels. Grain 
boat captains and crews were selected from a group of hereditary tenants 
on military colonies (tuntian). Between the late seventeenth and the early 
nineteenth century, the number of state ships and crews decreased by 
approximately 43 percent as the volume of tribute grain diminished.3
2 Leonard, Controlling from Afar, pp. 103-4. Huidian, chap. 935, fol. 3b (Kangxi 22, 1683) gives 
the ‘new pattern’ to which the grain ships of all provinces should conform: 7.1 zhang (22.72 m) 
length and 1.44 zhang (4.60 m) width. However, subsequent sections of the chapter discuss various 
deviations from this model. The smaller-sized lighters (bochuan) ranged in lengths from 18.56 
m (Tianjin) and 16.96 m (Shandong) to 14.4 m (Jiangsu) and widths of 3.54 m (Tianjin), 3.84 m 
(Shandong), and 2.94 m (Jiangsu) and eight to nine holds (specif ications in Huidian, chap. 935, 
fol. 7b, 9b, 11b for Tianjin 1786 and Shandong and Jiangsu 1788).
3 Hinton, Grain Tribute System, pp. 11-12.
Figure 1  Grain transport ship, Caofang chuan 
Source: Qing illustration to the late ming text Tiangong kaiwu  by Song yingxing (1637), p. 178.
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Table 18  Quotas for the number of grain transport ships in the grain-providing 
provinces
Province Original 







Shandong 1,054 887 thereof 361 official, 185 self-
organized (zibei) ships; those 
who transported for Shandong: 
646; those who assisted the 
transport of henan: 241
Jiangnan Jiang’an grain 
circuit
4,887 2,696 including 97 who assisted the 
transport of henan





huguang (hubei and hunan) 886 358
total 10,515 5,983
Source: Huidian shili, chap. 202, fol. 1b.
From the late eighteenth century onward, the junction of the Grand Canal 
and the Yellow River became so silted that the traff ic from the Yangzi 
Delta to the capital was slowed down or at times even blocked. Inland 
transport was maintained by using small-size lighter boats (bochuan) 
upon the entire Grand Canal or at least for certain stretches.4 The south-
ern provinces were also admonished time and again to downsize their 
regular grain ships. This can be seen from the references in the Collected 
Statutes presented in Table 19, which documents the government norm 
measurements.5
4 Leonard, Controlling from Afar, p. 39, 48, 49, 102, and ‘Timeliness and Innovation’ p. 454, 
459 ff., where she points out the three options described in the government regulations on 
Canal shipping: transfer shipment, which ‘included the cart haulage of the cargoes over 
the south bank of the Yellow River to waiting lighters that ferried the grain across the river 
for northward transport to the capital’ (op. cit., p. 454), sea transport and lock transport, 
which used a hydraulic device to send the grain ships over the Grand Canal – Yellow River 
junction. Huidian, chap. 935, fol. 7b, 9b, 11b specif ies the measurements for 1786 (Tianjin) 
and 1788 (Shandong and Jiangsu), with lengths ranging from 18.56 m (Tianjin) and 16.96 m 
(Shandong) to 14.4 m (Jiangsu), and widths of 3.54 m (Tianjin), 3.84 m (Shandong) and 2.94 
m (Jiangsu).
5 Huidian shili, chap. 935, fol. 14b.
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Table 19  Grain ship sizes
Date and reference 
in Collected Statutes 
(Huidian shili)
Province Length Width Depth of 
holds




7.1 zhang/22.72 m 1.44 zhang/ 
4.60 m




Between 9 and 10 
zhang (28.8-32 m), 
normally 10, never less 
than 9




‘smaller’ than in the 
southern provinces

























In 1826 and 1847, experiments with grain transport by sea were carried out. 
Sea shipment was organized by private merchants.6 In the 1850s, the Yellow 
River changed its bed so that its estuary no longer lay south but north of 
the Shandong peninsula. This caused enormous f loods and made traff ic 
from the regions south of the Yangzi to Tongzhou altogether impossible. 
Moreover, the regions near the junction of the Grand Canal and the Yellow 
River lay in the territory of the Taiping rebels and thus out of the control 
of the central government. Therefore, from 1851 onward, the tribute grain 
that was still being sent to the capital was shipped entirely by merchants 
via the sea route from the Yangzi Delta to Tianjin. Such new developments 
temporarily benefited some safer regions, such as Ningbo in Zhejiang. The 
concerned shipping merchants cooperated (and competed) in the so-called 
associations of the ‘Northern’ bei hao ’ and the ‘Southern ship traders’ nan 
hao, the Northerners hailing from Jiangnan and Shandong, the Southerners 
from Fujian and Guangdong, with local Ningbo people represented in both 
associations.7 These groups had already participated in the 1826 experiment 
with sea transport, employing 130 merchant ships of the ‘Northern ship 
traders’ to Tianjin, and between 10,000 and 20,000 weighing masters, dock 
6 Huidian shili, chap. 935, fol. 17b/18a (Daoguang 2, 1822). Leonard, Controlling from Afar, p. 39 
ff.; Ni Yuping, ‘Caoliang haiyun’, p. 125.
7 Shiba Yoshinobu,’ Ningpo and Its Hinterland’, p. 399.
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workers, porters, shipwrights, and sail and rope makers at Ningbo harbour.8 
In the 1850s, as Zhejiang delivered 600,000 to 700,000 shi of grain to the north, 
sea trade and shipbuilding boomed again. The cargo was delivered on board 
f lat bottomed sand ships9 (Figure 2) and the typical Ningbo ‘egg ships’,10 
but the changed strategic situation also prompted the trading companies 
to acquire, for 70,000 tael, the steam ship Baoshun as a security escort for 
their northbound vessels.11
After the Taiping rebellion was defeated, and as foreign competition in 
sea transport increased, ship trade and shipbuilding in Ningbo entered into 
a decline. Only 400 of the original 3,000 sand ships reported in the 1840s 
still existed in 1867, and the number of egg ships in the possession of the 
northern ship traders dropped from 200 to 100 after 1864.12
8 Ni Yuping, ‘Caoliang haiyun’, p. 2, referring to Duan Qingguang 段清光, Jinghu zizhuan 
nianpu 鏡湖自撰年譜 (Jinghu’s autobiographical chronology).
9 ‘Sand ships’ (Shachuan) were named after their region of origin, the Chongming islands 
or sands in the Yangzi estuary (Zhonghua wenhua jingcui fenlei cidian, p. 599). An alternative 
etymology is that these ships were suitable for sailing in shallow coastal waters, sandbanks, 
and shoals. Sand ships were mainly constructed in the Yangzi delta area and in coastal regions 
north of it. They were used for coastal and open sea transport as well as the interface between 
f luvial and marine transport. They had a f lat U-shaped bottom, a low draft between 0.7 and 
2.5 metres, and were most often sized about 30 by 6 metres, with a loading capacity of several 
hundred metric tons (Deng Gang, Chinese Maritime Activities, p. 29). Their bow and stern were 
both square. They were slower than keeled ships but could still reach acceptable speeds because 
of their shallow draft and their many sails on multiple masts (Fang Zhuofen et al., ‘Shanghai 
Maritime Shipping’, p. 359). Sand ships were made of Chinese f ir (shamu) or pine (songmu) timber 
(Xu Jianqing, Qingdai qianqi, p. 594; Scheuring, Drachenfluß-Werft, p. 129, identif ies shamu as 
Cunninghamia lanceolata.) A vessel of this type was still found circulating at Wusong in Jiangsu 
province by researchers of the Shanghai Digital Ship Museum in 2002. For the richly illustrated 
documentation of this research, see the relevant pages of the Digital Ship Museum of Jiaotong 
University, Shanghai: http://shipmuseum.sjtu.edu.cn/shachuan/shachuaninfo.htm.
10 The so-called ‘egg ships’ (danchuan) form an intermediary type between the f lat bottom 
and the V-shaped ocean-going keel vessels. Deng Gang in Chinese Maritime Activities, p. 29, 
introduces it as the third most basic type of Chinese sailing ships. The ship originates from 
Ningbo and is commonly also referred to as ‘Ningbo junk’ (Sun Wujun, ‘Zhongguo diyi sou 
lun’). This type was adapted for sailing the shallow sea waters to the north as well as the greater 
depths to the south of Ningbo. It was used for overseas grain transport after 1826 (Ni Yuping, 
‘Caoliang haiyun’, p. 125).
11 Ni Yuping, ‘Caoliang haiyun’, p. 126, referring to Zhejiang haiyun quan’an xinbian 浙江海運
全案新編 (New edition of the complete archives of Zhejiang sea transport), chap. 6, ‘Fangyang 
xunhu shiyi’ 放洋巡護事宜 (Requirements and organization of security for seafaring).
12 Ni Yuping, ‘Caoliang haiyun’, p. 127, referring to Chouban yiwu shimo (Tongzhi chao) 籌辦夷
務始末，同治潮 (The management of barbarian affairs, from A to Z. Tongzhi era), chap. 28 (for 
sand ships) and Haifang dang. Goumai chuanpao (3) 海防檔，購買船炮（3）(Coastal defence 
archives: Acquisition of ships and cannons), ed. Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, 1957, p. 816.
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Figure 2  Sand ship, Shachuan
Source: illustration in the encyclopedia Gujin tushu jicheng (1726), reprint 1884, section ‘Jingji 
huibian’ 經濟彙編 (Collection on governance), ‘rongzheng dian’ 戎政典 (military administration), 
‘Shuizhan bu’ 水戰部 (naval warfare), ‘huikao’ 彙考 (extracts from standard works), chapter 79, fol. 
8a/2 (in 1964 reprint, vol. 749, p. 9/2).
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The Qing government was now in a dilemma as to how to reorganize grain 
transport. Grand Canal transport was possible only on certain stretches, 
but most of the grain ships had been destroyed during the war. In 1866 the 
Shanghai Customs Intendant Ying Baoshi suggested that the court either 
buy up all available seagoing sand ships or, as he petitioned in 1869, acquire 
foreign sailing ships ( jiabanchuan)13 for the grain transport. However, both 
options as well as steamship transport were deemed too costly for the Qing 
state. Until 1873, about one million shi of the tribute, only one half of the 
pre-Taiping quotas, was shipped to Tianjin in chartered private sailing ships 
and from there to Tongzhou by lighters.14 Eventually, the Governor-General of 
Zhili province, Li Hongzhang (1823-1901), succeeded in promoting the China 
Merchants’ Steam Navigation Company (CMSNC) in 1872. This was the first 
company under ‘off icial supervision and merchant management’ (guandu 
shangban), which implied special government protection and control and 
mainly merchant capitalization. Li Hongzhang made arrangements to 
let this company ‒ the literal Chinese designation implies a ‘government 
bureau promoting merchant [engagement] in steam navigation’ rather than 
a ‘company’ ‒ organize the shipment of grain tribute. At f irst, despite its 
name, its fleet consisted not only of steamships, but started out with a ratio 
of 80 percent sand ships and 20 percent steam ships. This was later changed to 
sixty percent sand ships and forty percent steam ships. In 1877, Li Hongzhang 
decided that 40 to 50 percent of the grain tribute from Zhejiang and Jiangsu 
must be transported by steamship. In order to fight foreign competition, the 
CMSNC bought up the two biggest foreign shipping f irms including their 
steamships, docks, and administrative buildings in Shanghai: the Shanghai 
Steam Navigation Company (Qichang), founded in 1862, the f irst domestic 
steam shipping company ever to be established in China; and the English 
Butterf ield and Swire Company (Taigu or Taikoo), founded in 1866.15 The 
business form of government control and merchant management was and 
still is seen as a downright failure, or at least is heavily criticised for its many 
shortcomings, especially in comparison to the achievements of the foreign 
competitors (see Table 23).16 Yet the CMSNC successfully, and from 1902 onward 
13 jiabanchuan, ‘double-plank ship’, see Xin Yuan’ou, Zhongguo jindai, p. 6.
14 Hinton, Grain Tribute System, p. 90, 99.
15 This is Ni Yuping’s version of the events in ‘Caoliang haiyun’, p. 126. Liu Kwang-ching, 
‘Steamship Enterprise’, p. 440, only mentions the takeover of Russell & Co.’s Shanghai Steam 
Navigation Company in 1877. According to Liu Kwang-ching, op cit., p. 448, in 1883 the CMSNC 
acquired eight steamships from the China Navigation Company, under the agency of Butterf ield 
and Swire, but the latter remained an – eventually more successful – competitor.
16 Liu Kwang-ching, ‘Steamship Enterprise’, pp. 452-4.
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exclusively, handled the tax grain shipment until the system was abolished 
in early 1911. Since the transport canal Beihe that links Tianjin and Tongzhou 
also became heavily silted and was hardly navigable after 1894, lighterage once 
more became a problem and was given up after 1902, when the last part of the 
journey was covered by railway. Before the twentieth century, the CMSNC did 
not allow Chinese competitors into the market, but with government backing 
ensured that it retained at least the Chinese transport monopoly throughout 
the nineteenth century.17
For our context, it is important to note that the company did not actively 
promote shipbuilding. It bought its vessels mainly from foreign manufactur-
ers at Shanghai and Hong Kong.18 However, in 1874 it initiated the founda-
tion of a maintenance and repair company for the CMSNC ships that was 
capitalized by merchants and operated formally as an independent company 
under the name Tongmao but de facto probably was a spin-off under ‘of-
f icial control’ like the CMSNC. At f irst, all its workers and technicians were 
Chinese, but after two years, foreigners were called in for assistance. At its 
own repair shipyard in the Shanghai industrial quarter Hongkou, all the 
machinery was steam powered. Due to mismanagement, it had to be closed 
down in 1879 and was then taken over as a private company by a previous 
staff member of the CMSNC. Besides repair, in the 1880s, six small iron hull 
steamers were constructed here, but it also was closed down again in 1886.19
The Qing management of tribute grain shipment, including the construc-
tion of the needed ships, exemplifies the options and the dilemmas of a large 
empire upon the threshold of industrialized, fossil-fuelled transportation. 
Turning to ship construction for military purposes, the emerging picture 
becomes even clearer. For this purpose, it is necessary to turn back to the 
early days of Qing administration.
Government Shipbuilding in the Military Sector: Construction of 
Sailing Ships for the Naval Forces
Until the late nineteenth century, the Qing armed forces consisted of the two 
large units known as ‘Eight Banners’ and ‘Green Standards’. The Eight Banners 
17 Ibid. p. 453.
18 Cornet, Etat et entreprises, p. 41. However, Pong, Shen Pao-chen, p. 236, states that in early 
1874, three vessels of the Fujian Navy Yard were turned over to the China Merchants’ Steam 
Navigation Company.
19 Xin Yuan’ou, Zhongguo jindai, p. 205.
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were composed of Manchu, Mongols, and Han Chinese who had surrendered 
early to the Manchus, while the ‘Green Standards’ formed the provincial 
troops with a soldiery of surrendered Ming men. In the eighteenth century, 
the standing troops totalled about 200,000 bannermen and 660,000 Green 
Standard troops.20 The marine forces shuishi belonged to the Green Standards 
and thus not to the core troops under the direct command of the emperor or 
imperial princes. Like all Green Standard units, they constituted ‘a kind of 
provincial constabulary, or a ready reserve force’ and were formally subject 
to the administrative jurisdiction of the Ministry of War but actually came 
under the actual control of provincial civilian administrators (governors 
and governors-general) and military commanders (tidu) in each province.21
The administrative control by the Ministry of War implied that the num-
ber, quality, construction, and maintenance of marine ships were supervised 
by that ministry and, as far as technical matters were concerned, the Ministry 
of Public Works, which in cooperation with the Ministry of Revenue also 
formally decided on funds to be allocated to the provinces for their marine 
equipment. The actual shipbuilding was carried out in provincial shipyards.
The activities and attitudes of the central government and the provincial 
administrations toward defensive shipbuilding are reflected in the chapters 
of the Collected Statutes of the Qing Dynasty with Factual Precedents, 
Qinding Da Qing huidian shili (1899, hereafter Huidian shili), concerning 
the Ministry of Public Works.22 The chapters of the Ministry of War include 
the overall f igures of government ships for the situation of about 1880 and 
original quotas of the early eighteenth century.






(ca. 1736 = 100)
Shengjing not mentioned 10  
Zhili not mentioned 50  
Shandong 12 20 166.67
Jiangsu 575 684 thereof 2 
steamships
118.96
anhui 82 332 404.88
Jiangxi 39 185 474.36
20 For a discussion of the statistical evidence, see Moll-Murata and Theobald, ‘Military employ-
ment in Qing dynasty China’, pp. 346-349.
21 Hucker, Dictionary of Official Titles, p. 91.







(ca. 1736 = 100)
fujian 394 81 20.56
Zhejiang 471 469 99.58
hubei 86 200 232.56
hunan 70 68 97.14
guangdong 705 349 thereof 22 
steamships
49.50
total 2,434 2,4481 100.01
Source: Huidian shili, chap. 712, fol. 1a-7a. 
1 note the difference of 247 ships less in the statistics given by worcester, Junks and Sampans, 
p. 612, ‘Chinese war vessels and their Stations’, which he quoted from The Chinese Repository, vol. 
20 (1851), p. 379.
In these statistics, the grand total remain virtually unchanged, yet the quotas 
for several provinces showed a large increase (for the inland provinces Anhui, 
Jiangxi, and Hubei). There was also a moderate increase for the coastal Zhili 
and Shandong provinces, a slight decrease for the coastal Zhejiang and 
inland Hunan, and a large decrease for Guangdong and Fujian, the most 
sea-oriented of all the provinces. To embed this evidence, four distinct 
phases of defensive shipbuilding can be discerned from the compilation of 
edicts and memorials that were exchanged between provincial off icials, 
the central government, and the emperors (and their edict writers).
Phase 1: Initial reconstruction and succession of the Ming System, 
ca. 1675-1722
In the middle and late Kangxi era, especially after the maritime empire of 
Zheng Chenggong (Coxinga) on the southeastern coast and Taiwan had been 
defeated in 1683, the Qing actively established coastal defence according to 
the model of the Ming. Supervision and organization of shipbuilding was 
delegated to the provinces and their shipyards (see Table 21). The methods 
of f inancing by the provinces and norm prices of ships were laid out. The 
cycle of shipbuilding was a small overhaul after three years, a large one after 
f ive years, and if the ships were still usable after another f ive years, another 
general overhaul.23 When ships were broken up, the utilizable materials 
were to be recycled and built into the new ships.
23 Huidian shili, chap. 936, fol. 1a (Kangxi 13, 1674). In Kangxi 29 (1690) this pattern was modif ied 
into a small overhaul after three years, a big overhaul after six years, and if the ship was still 
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Phase 2: Expansion and consolidation, 1723-ca. 1750
Although there were problems in the f inancing and timing of the repairs, 
a conviction that such issues could be solved by methods of extra subsidies 
and moral exhortation underlies the memorials and edicts of the Yongzheng 
and early Qianlong period.
Phase 3: Reorganization, fleet reductions, and downsizing of 
ships, ca. 1750-1840
Despite government sanctions and guidelines, the situation did not improve. 
In the next phase, for about ninety years from the mid-eighteenth century 
to 1840, major reshuffles and a reorganization of navy and fluvial marine 
vessels took place. The f irst cry of alarm came in 1759, when the central 
government was no longer sure whether the situation could be remedied by 
increased care in carrying out overhauls and reconstructions. The emperor 
commented on a memorial stating that for the spring drills at the Chongming 
marine station in Jiangsu, only f ive patrol ships were present. The ships of the 
other marine patrol stations were all at the shipyard for repair.24 A similar 
incident occurred in 1817, when a censor found out that in the Jiaozhou bay 
in Shandong, some ships had remained in the shipyard for between eight 
and ten years, waiting for overhauls.25
Therefore the Collected Statutes of this period abound with information 
on reductions of battleships from the off icial vessel registers or replacement 
by other, more economic or more eff icient ship types.26 Off icials repeatedly 
proposed to rebuild the battleships in the form of merchant ships, since 
the latter were found more suitable for chasing pirates. The emperor and 
central government were aware that merchant ships lasted at least twice as 
long as battleships,27 but this was to a large extent due to the unsatisfactory 
maintenance of the state ships. However, not everybody was convinced 
that downsizing the ships would solve the problem. In 1790, government 
functional after nine years, another big overhaul; if not, it was broken up and reconstructed 
with part of the usable material. For the f luvial marine, a small overhaul after nine years was 
provided, but the rest of the maintenance procedure was the same.
24 Huidian shili, chap. 937, fol. 1a.
25 Ibid., fol. 20a.
26 The f irst relevant record states that in 1754 the ten ships of the Lüshun marine patrol station 
in Fengtian province were reduced to four. Huidian shili, chap. 937, fol. 1b.
27 Huidian shili, chap. 936, fol. 14b, edict Qianlong 13 (1748).
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off icials in Guangdong province memorialized that sea marine ships had 
to be sturdy enough for numerous troops and ordnance. They should not 
all be constructed like merchant ships, because chasing pirates was not 
their only purpose.28
Phase 4: Crisis, reform, and modernization, 1840-1911
The shock of the First Opium War (1839-1842), which started out and was 
decided at sea, prefigured the last phase of off icial shipbuilding (1840-1911). 
It can again be subdivided into a phase of disillusioned assessment of the 
current situation, an episode of the commitment of local elites, and after 
1865, reform efforts as proposed by provincial administrators with varying 
support and funding by the central government. In 1844, a sober account 
of the situation of the Jiangnan fleet states that of its 275 ships, none was 
actually well maintained. It was suggested that their number should be 
reduced to 135 and that they should all be repaired at the Jiangnan and 
Suzhou shipyards at market prices (shijia 市價).29 The total costs of 357,102 
tael for one ten-year cycle of maintenance, 2,645 tael per ship, were to be 
covered by the districts and the province of Jiangnan.30 In the case of the 
Fujian f leet, the Ministry of Public Works informed the province that if 
Fujian raised the funds for shipbuilding, the ministry would cover the costs 
for cannons and guns.31
The Cantonese population was the most exposed to new developments 
in Western warfare and transport, and after the controversies on the opium 
trade escalated, a group of Cantonese merchants, scholars, and off icials 
engaged in researching and developing Western ordnance and shipbuild-
ing.32 The most famous action was that of Pan Shicheng (c. 1804-1873) , who 
donated four large sailing ships in a hybrid Western and Cantonese style 
with a value of 19,000 tael each, and an American-type battleship of the 
same size for 43,000 tael.33
28 Ibid., chap. 937, fol. 11b.
29 Huidian shili, chap. 938, fol. 9a.
30 Ibid., fol. 11b.
31 Ibid., fol. 13a, Daoguang 27 (1847).
32 Kennedy, The Arms of Kiangnan, p. 14.
33 Huidian shili, chap. 938, fol. 12b, Daoguang 24 (1844). According to Gideon Chen’s study, 
Pan’s f irst ship was f inished in 1841 and had a copper bottom. See Gideon Chen, Lin Tse-hsü, 
p. 36. For the biographical data of Pan Shicheng, see Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period, p. 606, 
and Chen Zehong, ‘Pan Shicheng luekao’, Guangdong shizhi 1995/Z1, pp. 69-70.
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After this episode, entries in the Statutes are shorter and more widely 
interspersed and seem to be taken at random from the routine documenta-
tion of the Ministry of Public Works. Thus, in 1866, 14 new gunboats and 
sampans34 built for the Shandong f leet and 36 new cannon boats built 
for Zhili in 1867 are mentioned.35 The last entry, from 1878, concerns the 
relocation of seven battleships from Shandong to Zhili.36 Li Hongzhang in 
1872 had suggested giving up traditional shipbuilding altogether, at least for 
navy ships. This idea was rejected by the Off ice of Foreign Affairs (Zongli 
yamen),37 but nevertheless the main government allocations after the 1860s 
went to the development of steam navigation. In this f ield, the Ministry of 
Public Works was no longer involved.
Locations of Government Shipyards
Although the records of the locations of the government shipyards in 
the Huidian shili are not complete, they nevertheless ref lect where the 
main centres of shipbuilding were from the beginning of the dynasty up 
to the mid-nineteenth century. A total of 44 shipyards established (or re-
established) between 1670 (Nanjing) and 1851 (Fengtian) are mentioned in 
the Collected Statutes (see Table 22). Some of them had branches; others 
were not included. No locations in the border regions Mongolia, Xinjiang, 
Tibet, Yunnan, Guangxi, and Guizhou, and the provinces Zhili, Gansu, 
Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Sichuan are mentioned. It seems improbable that not 
even temporary sites were set up in some of the provinces such as Zhili, 
Yunnan, and Guizhou. The end station of the Grand Canal at Tongzhou in 
Zhili, for instance, certainly had at least maintenance facilities.38 However, 
the Collected Statutes also show evidence that ships for one province could 
be built in another province where materials and/or technical skills were 
more abundant. Generally speaking, the southern provinces constructed the 
ships for the north. Thus in Qianlong 1785, Jiangxi and Huguang provinces 
built 1,200 lighters for Zhili. However, there are also cases of an alternative, 
namely to send the timber to Tianjin and have the ships built there. In 
34 Small cruisers, a general reference to open or half-decked boats of 30 to 40 feet (c. 9 to 12 
meters) measurement. See Worcester, Junks and Sampans, p. 614.
35 Huidian, chap. 938, fol. 14b.
36 Ibid., fol. 15b/16a.
37 Kuo Ting-yee, ‘Self-Strengthening’, p. 510.
38 According to Hinton, Grain Tribute System, p. 11, ships were repaired by personnel of the 
altogether 67 transport stations weisuo along the Grand Canal and the related waterways.
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1822, the emperor endorsed a complaint by the provincial administrator 
Songyun, who reported that the lighters were not well built in Zhili because 
the craftspeople there were inexperienced. He suggested returning to the 
previous system and having the f inished ships sent to Tianjin rather than 
the material.39 In another case, in the Qianlong reign, shipbuilders from 
Hubei and Hunan were sent to the Yunnan border to construct ships for a 
military expedition against Burma.40
Mechanized Shipbuilding in the Era of Self-Strengthening
The government modernization efforts of the last f ifty years of the Qing 
dynasty were focused on armaments and shipbuilding. This was carried 
out in what is in the Western literature referred to as ‘arsenals’ and in 
Chinese as ‘manufacturing bureaus’ (zhizao ju) or ‘machine manufacturing 
bureaus’ ( jiqi zhizao ju) and the Fujian Navy Yard (Fujian chuanzheng ju). 
Table 23 shows the number and various lines of production of these f irst 
sites of government-organized mechanization of craft branches. The broad 
designation ‘manufacturing bureau’, f irst coined by Li Hongzhang for the 
Jiangnan Arsenal, was chosen because production in these f irst mechanized 
workshops was intended not only for military but also, in a second step, 
for civilian purposes.41 At the same time, the arsenals were government 
off ices administrated by traditional off icials, who had to learn the ways 
of administration in mechanized production factories with a workforce 
of one to two-thousand and an important group of technicians, and with 
foreigners in leading technical positions. The idea that Western military 
technology must be adopted had already been formulated in the 1840s 
by the elites that sought to remedy the situation of Chinese helplessness 
against Western military aggression. Wei Yuan (1794-1856), a scholar and 
mid-level administrator who cooperated with the Opium Commissioner 
Lin Zexu  (1785-1850) in Canton, demanded this most clearly in the f irst 
Chinese work on Western countries, the Haiguo tuzhi (Illustrated treatise 
on the maritime kingdoms, 1843). He advocated the establishment of an 
arsenal and shipyard in Canton, the hiring of foreign experts as teachers 
39 Huidian shili, chap. 935, fol. 7a, 16a.
40 Qingshi gao, chap. 135, p. 3997. The place where the ships were built is given as Manmu 蠻
暮, probably a variant of Manmu 曼暮, which according to the Historical Atlas of China, vol. 8, 
p. 48, lay beyond the western border of Yunnan.
41 Kennedy, The Arms of Kiangnan, p. 47.
138 State anD CraftS in the Qing DynaSt y (1644-1911) 
on shipbuilding and navigation, and the inclusion of formal examinations 
of technical knowledge and navigational skills in the imperial examination 
system.42
The two main propagators of mechanized manufacturing in the era of 
self-strengthening were Zeng Guofan (1811-1872) and Li Hongzhang (1823-
1901). Both Zeng and Li were high-level regional army commanders who 
had helped the Qing dynasty defeat the Taiping rebellion with their Hunan 
(Zeng) and Anhui (Li) armies and were therefore rewarded with the ranks 
of provincial governors. Zeng had supported Li’s nomination, yet they dif-
fered in their priorities for modernizing China and for f ighting imperialist 
enemies and internal adversaries of the Qing dynasty. Zeng Guofan placed 
the most emphasis on naval construction and marine development, while Li 
Hongzhang stressed arms manufacturing and the spread of mechanization 
also into fields of civilian manufacture.43 They found a compromise in setting 
up arsenals at different sites with specif ic tasks: the Jiangnan Arsenal in 
Shanghai for small arms, the Jinling (Nanjing) Arsenal for heavy ordnance, 
and the Tianjin Arsenal for powder and ammunition. One exception was 
that, at Zeng Guofan’s personal suggestion, steamships were also built at 
the Jiangnan Arsenal.44 Another representative of the self-strengthening 
programme, Zuo Zongtang (1812-1885), a general of the Hunan army who 
had also fought the Taiping and later subdued the Moslem uprisings in 
Xinjiang and the Northwest, while acting as Governor-General of Fujian 
and Zhejiang, had proposed the establishment of a great shipyard at Fuzhou.
The earliest arsenal at Anqing in Anhui, Li Hongzhang’s home province, 
took up pre-Taiping initiatives and experimented with steamship construc-
tion. In 1863, a small steamer was turned out, but its quality and speed were 
found wanting. The construction team had been entirely Chinese, and from 
this prototype it became clear that more expert Western knowledge and 
technical transfer were necessary. Therefore, foreigners were employed both 
in the Jiangnan Arsenal and the Fujian Navy Yard as directors or co-directors, 
technicians, teachers, and translators. In Shanghai the main influence was 
British and American, while in Fuzhou the advisors were French.
Other facilities that experimented with steamship technology were the 
Tianjin Arsenal at Dagu, established in 1880, and the off icial shipyard in 
Whampoa/Huangpu near Canton that was founded in 1885. Both had limited 
outputs of up to ten smaller warships. Finally, in 1890 a large dockyard for 
42 Hao and Wang, ‘Chinese Views of Western Relations’, p. 149.
43 Kennedy, The Arms of Kiangnan, p. 76.
44 Ibid.
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the repair and maintenance of the steamships of the North China f leet 
was built in Lüshun on Liaodong peninsula in Fengtian province. It was 
equipped with a 400-foot stone dock and cost three million tael. A thousand 
workers were employed here, and between 1890 and 1894, 58 steamships were 
repaired at the dock. However, in 1894 it was damaged in the Sino-Japanese 
War and was greatly reduced in scale. In 1897 it was occupied by Russia and 
after the Sino-Russian War in 1905 was taken over by Japan.45
Scope of Production of the Jiangnan Arsenal
In 1865, the Jiangnan Arsenal was established by taking over an American 
shipyard, Thomas Hunt and Company (in Chinese known as Qiji tiechang) 
in the Hongkou district of the Shanghai foreign settlement, and by merging 
this with the two smaller Shanghai arsenals. The Shanghai Circuit Intendant 
was the principal director. Technical work was the domain of foreigners, 
who were either retained from the original employer or recruited later.46 
In production and policy, the Jiangnan Arsenal followed what Thomas 
Kennedy has called a ‘zigzag course of development’.47 This was due to the 
different priorities that its two founders, Li Hongzhang and Zeng Guofan, 
identif ied in terms of China’s defence and their alternating influence on the 
Jiangnan Arsenal. In its f irst two years, the Arsenal produced small arms, 
as Li Hongzhang felt that arms and ammunition were the f irst priority for 
f ighting internal enemies, in this case the Nian uprising in Central and 
Northern China. But after Li was called to replace and relieve Zeng Guofan 
as the commander of the North China pacification campaign, Zeng returned 
to his post of Governor-General of Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and Anhui and decided 
to initiate ship production at the Arsenal. With additional funds from the 
Shanghai maritime customs income, the Arsenal moved to a more spacious 
site at Gaochang miao on the banks of the Huangpu River, where a plant 
for steamship construction and a dry dock was built.48 The f irst ship, the 
600-ton steamer Dianji, was launched in August 1868. Subsequently, fourteen 
steamships were built until 1875 (see Table 23).49 In the years between 1867 
45 Xin Yuan’ou, Zhongguo jindai, pp. 164-5;; Immanuel Hsü, ‘Foreign Relations’, p. 112; Liu 
Kwang-ching, ‘Miltary Challenge’, p. 256.
46 Kuo Ting-yee, ‘Self-Strengthening’, pp. 520-21.
47 Kennedy, The Arms of Kiangnan, p. 58.
48 Ibid., pp. 59/60.
49 The 1983 History of the Jiangnan Arsenal, Jiangnan zaochuan chang changshi (hereafter 
cited as Jiangnan 1983), p. 39, table 2, based on Wei Yungong, Jiangnan zhizaoju, chap. 3, fol. 55a-b 
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and 1875, 97 percent of the annual income of the Arsenal ‒ ca. 450,000 
tael ‒ came from the Shanghai Maritime Customs, and 44 percent thereof 
was devoted to steamship construction and upkeep.50
The f irst ships were provided with steam engines in wooden hulls. 
Technical advances were made in the improvement of the propeller system, 
which was introduced in the second vessel to replace the previous paddle 
wheel propulsion. On the third ship, the propeller was inserted at a more 
protected position below the waterline. Armaments also became increasingly 
sophisticated. Moreover, the shipyard experimented with twin propellers 
and armour-plated gunboats. All these vessels had a shallow draft and were 
well adapted for manoeuvring in harbours and rivers.51
After Zeng Guofan’s death, Li Hongzhang’s inf luence prevailed, and 
as a result the shipbuilding programme of the Jiangnan Arsenal was 
stopped in 1875. In his function as Governor-General of Zhili since 1870, 
Li was also the responsible Commissioner for the Maritime Defence of 
North China. In the general discussion on defensive strategies to coun-
ter the menaces to the Qing dynasty from the separatist movement in 
Xinjiang and the threat to Taiwan from the Japanese (1874-75), Li had 
frequently complained that the ships built at the Jiangnan Arsenal were 
too expensive, not adapted to the needs of Chinese coastal defence, and 
inferior in quality to Western steamships.52 Moreover, he argued that 
the arsenals, and most of all the Jiangnan Arsenal, should focus their 
efforts on ordnance, ammunition, or shipbuilding and not extend their 
activities too broadly. Even his colleague Shen Baozhen  (1820-1879), the 
Commissioner for Maritime Defence of South China who had previously 
been responsible for the Fujian Navy Yard, agreed that, at that moment, 
building up a defence f leet for Northern China had priority. Therefore, the 
government funds for maritime defence were all allocated to the North 
China Navy, and the Jiangnan Arsenal concentrated on the production of 
small weapons. Yet, since funds earmarked for the Northern navy had to 
be diverted to disaster relief, Li Hongzhang was not able to provide for the 
ironclad steamships as intended. Shen Baozhen thought that in this case, 
(‘Steamships constructed in our shipyard’); Kennedy’s statistics also take the more complete 
f igures given by Wei Yungong in chap. 3, fol. 2a-6b, 16a, 27a, as well as archival sources into 
account. Kennedy, The Arms of Kiangnan, pp. 161/2, table 1. Meng Yue, ‘Hybrid Science’, p. 16, 
refers to eleven ships built in ten years (1868-1876), thereof ten warships, f ive wooden and f ive 
with iron hulls.
50 Kennedy, The Arms of Kiangnan, pp. 61-2.
51 Ibid., pp. 60-1.
52 Kennedy, The Arms of Kiangnan, p. 95.
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the Southern Fleet should at least have some additional wooden hulled 
steamers for joint operations with the Northern Fleet.53 This eventually 
led to the construction of a few more ships in the Jiangnan Arsenal, most 
notably the Baomin, which was f inished in 1885. However, there are no 
reports of new ships being made between 1885 and 1905, although the 
steamship department was obviously retained during this period for 
maintenance.54 In 1905, shipbuilding and arms construction were off icially 
divided. The arsenal remained subordinate to the Ministry of War, while 
the shipyard became a commercial company that produced for prof it and 
also supplied civilian customers.55
Scope of Production of the Fujian Navy Yard
From the beginning, production at the shipyard of Mawei near Fuzhou was 
focused on shipbuilding. It was established in 1866 upon the initiative of Zuo 
Zongtang and subordinated to the Fujian Bureau for Naval Administration 
(or Fujian Navy Yard). Shen Baozhen, who had previously acted as provincial 
Governor of Jiangxi, led it until 1875, when he was appointed to the post 
of Governor-General of Jiangsu, Anhui, and Jiangxi and Commissioner of 
Trade for the Southern Ports. Funds provided for this venture were even 
bigger than those for the Jiangnan Arsenal. The original budget for Fuzhou 
provided for expenditures of three million tael over f ive years, but actually 
5.25 million were spent in the f irst six-and-a-half years until July 1874,56 
exceeding the original estimates considerably. The Chinese government 
had contracted for the construction of 16 steamships with two French naval 
constructors, Prosper Giquel (1835-1886) and Paul d’Aiguebelle (1831-1875).57 
With a workforce of 45 foreign technicians, 2,000 Chinese craftsmen, and 900 
labourers as well as a Chinese staff of 150 off icials, this task could be nearly 
fulf illed: f ifteen ships were launched within f ive years, among them ten 
between 1,000 and 1,450 tons.58 Compared to the products of the Jiangnan 
Arsenal, the Fuzhou ships were considered to be of superior quality but still 
not up to the European standards of 1870. Between 1875 and 1877, only four 
ships were turned out, but one of them, the Weiyuan, a composite model 
53 Ibid., p. 100.
54 Wei Yungong, Jiangnan zhizaoju, chap. 2, fol. 4b.
55 Cornet, Etat et entreprises, p. 58.
56 Kuo Ting-yee, ‘Self-Strengthening’, pp. 522-24.
57 For a critical appraisal of Giquel’s achievements, see Leibo, Transferring Technology to China.
58 Kuo Ting-yee, loc. cit.
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with an iron frame and wooden exterior, was equipped with a compound 
engine that had been built at the yard.59 Compound machines constituted 
a considerable technical advance through their eff icient use of steam. They 
had been introduced in European and U.S. merchant ships after the 1860s, 
but the British navy started to use them only after 1876; thereafter most 
other navies followed their example.60 Thus the production at Fujian was 
up to date with recent technological developments.
A big shock for the Chinese government, and particularly for the reform-
ers, was the destruction of the entire Fuzhou f leet in the bombardment 
of the Mawei shipyard by the French marine in 1884. This occurred in 
the course of the French expansion in Annam, where China had also 
claimed special rights that the French were not prepared to acknowl-
edge. Historians today believe that it was not entirely due to French 
technological superiority that China lost the battle but also the result of 
insuff icient coordination between the regional Chinese f leets and their 
commanders (the Northern Fleet based at Weihaiwei and Port Arthur, 
and the Southern Fleet based at Shanghai, Fuzhou, and Canton) as well as 
their lack of experience in modern naval strategy.61 In Benjamin Elman’s 
analysis, the Chinese f leet had consisted of eleven wooden ships, and the 
nearby eight French vessels were ironclad, but the Chinese ships could 
have outmanoeuvred the heavier French ships. The Fuzhou f leet fought 
practically unassisted and was taken by surprise, since the French had 
attacked without warning.62
The losses of ships in this battle did not bring the Mawei shipbuilding 
project to a complete standstill, but it was certainly slowed down. This was 
also related to the death of its founder and main supporter, Zuo Zongtang, 
and the rise of the North China f leet under Li Hongzhang as the main 
Chinese navy.63 The overall production of the Fuzhou shipyard is given 
as 40 vessels built in the 46 years between 1866 and 1911, for which 19.21 
million tael were used ‒ 8.52 for ‘actual’ construction costs and the rest for 
administration or downright ‘waste’.64
59 Kuo Ting-yee, ‘Self-Strengthening’, p. 524, 533.
60 Radunz, 100 Jahre, pp. 150-152.
61 Elman, On their Own Terms, pp. 377-8. Kennedy, Arms of Kiangnan, p. 89. Meng Yue, ‘Hybrid 
Science’, p. 17.
62 Elman, On their Own Terms, p. 378.
63 Ibid.
64 Entry ‘Fuzhou chuanzheng ju Mawei chuanchang’ 福州船政局马尾船厂, in Chuanbo shuzi 
bowuguan, quoting from Shuiyun jishu cidian 水运技术词典 (Dictionary of water transport), 
p. 109.
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From the perspective of their output, the achievements of both shipyards 
regarding quantity and quality were not impressive compared to those 
Western countries where steam navigation had f irst been developed. A con-
siderable part of the North Chinese and South Chinese steamship fleet had 
to be acquired from European manufacturers, who could produce cheaper 
and higher quality ships. However, the technological gap was narrowed, 
and industrialization and mechanization were started in these ventures.
Schools for Technical Learning
One of the great differences between traditional and modern government 
shipbuilding is that in the biggest shipyards, formal education and training 
was offered to some of the apprentices and artisans. The Chinese administra-
tors had accepted the advice of their foreign consultants that steam technol-
ogy and mechanized production of ordnance and ammunition could not 
be transmitted in informal on-the-job training. This type of education was 
part of the larger plans of the founders of the self-strengthening programme, 
namely to enable China to enter into the phase of domestic mechanized 
production in the military and civilian sectors with less reliance upon 
foreign goods. This entailed the theoretical acquisition of Western science 
and technology and its practical application. Each of these steps was highly 
problematical and controversial. Eventually, internal resistance against the 
modernization programmes waned as traditional elites became aware that 
after China’s defeats in the 1884 conflict with France and the 1894/5 war 
with Japan, and the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion by international 
armed forces, the Chinese administrative and defensive system could not 
help but modernize.
Up to the present, the methods and impact of technology transfer and 
acquisition form one of the big issues in China’s relation to the world. The 
beginnings of this in the 1860s have been studied by a wide range of scholars, 
who all offer their specif ic assessments of this complicated process.65 For 
our topic, we need to come to a perspective on what difference the option 
for formal technical learning meant for the workforce in shipbuilding, the 
skilled artisans, and the apprentices.
65 The classical study is Biggerstaff, Earliest Modern Government Schools (1961), on which 
Kennedy, The Arms of Kiangnan, relies, and Bennet, John Fryer. More recent assessments are 
contained in Pong, Shen Pao-chen, Cornet, Etat et entreprises, Meng Yue, ‘Hybrid Science’, and 
Elman, On Their Own Terms.
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The earliest, largest and best-documented centres of learning in naval 
construction were at the Fuzhou Shipyard and the Jiangnan Arsenal, which 
will be presented in the following sections.66
Technical Learning in the Fujian Navy Yard and the Jiangnan 
Arsenal
As in naval production, the profile of the Fujian Navy Yard in education on 
shipbuilding stands out clearer than that of the Arsenal. The school of the 
Navy Yard was established in 1867 under the name Qiushi tang (Academy for 
the Search of Truth). Zuo Zongtang had planned that European engineers 
and technicians f irst be employed here as teachers for a period of f ive years. 
Thereafter, Chinese teaching and training staff would take over from them. 
Students should come from ‘all levels of society’, but the ideal target group 
were ‘intelligent local boys with some literary knowledge’.67
About 100 pupils of age 14 enrolled initially.68 By 1873, the apex of the 
school’s activities, the French director Prosper Giquel reported that more 
than 300 students and apprentices from the various departments of the 
yard were registered.69 However, the dropout rate was high, even in the 
initial phase of the school. From 105 students admitted in 1867, only 39 
remained at the end of 1873.70 From 1874 to 1897, the so-called ‘period of 
self-management’, the student numbers declined due to the curtailment 
of funds and less enthusiasm and support by the central government and 
provincial off icials. Statistics from 1884 show a total of 188 students. In the 
early 1890s, school activities slowed down, but the school was not closed 
down. Between 1907 and 1913, no new students were recruited, and in 1913 it 
was reorganized into three separate schools for naval construction (zhizao 
xuexiao), the navy school (haijun xuexiao), and the technical school (yishu 
xuexiao).71
66 At a later stage, elements of shipbuilding and navigation also taught at the Huangpu/
Whampoa ‘School of Western Learning’ (Xixue guan), founded in 1880 and subsequently renamed 
‘Guangdong shixue guan’ (Guangdong School for Practical Studies). See Biggerstaff, Earliest 
Modern Government Schools, pp. 47-48, and Jiaoyu da cidian, vol. 10, p. 134.
67 Biggerstaff, Earliest Modern Government Schools, pp. 201, 205.
68 Kuo Ting-yee, ‘Self-Strengthening’, p. 532.
69 Biggerstaff, Earliest Modern Government Schools, p. 217; Giquel, Foochow Arsenal, p. 20.
70 Biggerstaff, Earliest Modern Government Schools, p. 210. Giquel, loc. cit. reports that the high 
attrition rate was due to six cases of death, and sixty pupils who were ‘incapable’ of following 
their courses and had been sent away.
71 Ibid., pp. 221, 226-241.
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Teaching and learning was realized at different levels and in various 
disciplines. In his account of the achievements of the school after seven 
years, director Giquel described that the school consisted of a ‘French 
Division’ and an ‘English Division’. The French Division consisted of the 
Department for Naval Construction (zhizao xuetang), the Department for 
Design (huishi yuan), and the Department for Apprentices (yipu), while 
the English Division or Naval Academy had Departments for Theoretical 
Navigation ( jiashi xuetang) and Practical Navigation (lianchuan) as well as 
an Engine Room (guanlun xuetang).72 Except for those from the Apprentice 
Department, the graduates from the French and English Divisions were 
supposed to become naval engineers and off icers after full-time study 
of f ive years. The Apprentice Department provided part-time tuition for 
future foremen. It was set up later (1868) than the rest of the school, after it 
had become evident that mere on-the-job training for the workforce, such 
as carpenters, ironworkers, brass workers, and ship construction workers, 
created only a few able foremen.73 Therefore, groups of ten to forty boys 
between the age of fourteen and seventeen from the operation divisions were 
to learn theoretical foundations for one-and-a-half hours before and after 
work. In the night and morning classes, these ‘apprentices’ (yitu) studied 
French, arithmetic, geometry, algebra, drawing, and took part in a course 
descriptive of engines. The course lasted three years or longer, and after 
graduation the young workers were expected ‘to make a specif ication of 
the designs of an engine, to calculate the masses and weights of each of the 
parts; they are able, further, to describe the working of it in its most minute 
details’. Two classes of about twenty students each had f inished the course 
by 1874. Director Giquel was particularly pleased about the achievements 
in this department, and the student statistics of 1884 show that the biggest 
group of the students, 32 percent, followed the apprentice course.74 At the 
same time, during the production processes, on-the-job training for the 
regular workforce was given by French instructors during the initial phase 
and by their Chinese successors thereafter.
The English Division did not provide for a separate apprentice course. 
However, the full-time schooling in the engine room was targeted for students 
recruited from Hong Kong and Shanghai who had experience of iron working 
and a basic knowledge of English. This was desirable because few of the 
French, English, and at one period also German instructors spoke Chinese.
72 Ibid., p. 210.
73 Ibid., p. 209.
74 Biggerstaff, Earliest Modern Government Schools, pp. 213-4, 227.
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The Jiangnan Arsenal also had technical curricula, but we do not know 
whether these were actually utilized. Regulations set up in 1870 provided for 
on-the-job training for workmen in the machine shops, shipyard, and arms 
factory. The instructors were to be the foreign and later Chinese engineers 
and machinists. Evening classes for workers and ship crews were also 
planned, and f inally the curriculum of the Arsenal’s famous and highly 
productive translation and interpretation department (Guang fangyan 
guan, Institute for the Dissemination of Foreign Languages, 1870) was to be 
expanded so as to include scientif ic and engineering departments. Foreign 
engineers were to teach two classes from 6 to 9 P.M., one in machinery and 
shipbuilding and the other on navigation and naval manoeuvres, for skilled 
workers, pilots, sailors, and ship mechanics who could follow the lectures 
with the help of interpreters.75
More formal training was offered to several dozen apprentices who in 
1875 were sent to the Guang fangyan guan to study Western and Chinese 
subjects. Biggerstaff assumes that they were assigned to technical teaching 
departments.76 Later technical instruction outside the Guang fangyan guan 
was provided in a separate ‘technical school’ (Gongyi xuetang) established 
in 1898. It was planned to admit f ifty students per year. Twenty of them were 
slotted to be children of Arsenal workers or artisans. One course was to last for 
four years.77 The technical school and the Guang fangyan guan were combined 
in 1905 to form a Gongye xuetang (industrial school), but soon afterwards 
they were reorganized into a primary, middle, and higher military school.78
What both schools had in common was the diff iculty of acquiring 
technical knowledge in foreign languages. Moreover, at least in the f irst 
decades of the modernization initiatives, job perspectives after graduation 
were uncertain for the new engineers and naval off icers if they could not 
stay on in their original schools. On a more general level, conservative 
elites doubted or even denied the necessity of modernization and modern 
education. Since the technical education offered in the Arsenals and the 
shipyard were so unorthodox, it had to be made attractive to the students 
by free tuition, board, and room and the promise of military or civilian titles 
in the traditional off icial system after graduation. This break with tradition 
highly irritated those in the Confucian establishment who saw graduation 
from these schools as a cheap shortcut to the coveted examination grades 
75 Ibid., p. 168. Cornet, Etat et entreprises, p. 44, quoting from Bennet, John Fryer, pp. 9-11.
76 Biggerstaff, Earliest Modern Government Schools, p. 188.
77 Cornet, Etat et entreprises, p. 44.
78 Biggerstaff, Earliest Modern Government Schools, p. 193.
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that opened the way into off icialdom.79 As a matter of fact, the Fujian Navy 
Yard  engineers had diff iculty f inding jobs within the yard or the navy, and 
some of them sought employment with foreign f irms or foreign consulates 
to work as translators or interpreters.80
Nevertheless, to the workers and apprentices, this systematic change in 
knowledge transfer must have had its challenging sides. The traditional chain 
of professional training, either from master to apprentice or from family elders 
to the next generation, was broken up. Theoretical scientific knowledge was 
made available to workers and artisans. The schools fostered skills that could 
be applied more widely than within the confines of the particular institution, 
and f inally cultural transfer was offered from foreign teachers in foreign 
languages ‒ all this was new and could benefit the pioneer generation of 
workers and technicians, if carefully and consequently carried out. That it was 
actively propagated by some of the Chinese statesmen as early as the 1870s and 
1880s constitutes the big difference between shipbuilding and arms production 
and the other craft branches that were directly managed by the government.
Appendix
Table 21  List of documented state shipyards











kangxi 9 (1670); 
‘re-established’ in 
kangxi 33 (1694)
2 Huai’an Qingjiang 清江 
shipyard 
kangxi 33 (1694) 
‘re-established’
Personnel of huai’an 
shipyard reduced in 
Qian-long 24 (1759)
3 Huai’an Shandong 
shipyard
yongzheng 2 (1724)
4 Suzhou kangxi 57 (1718), in 
yongzheng 10 (1732) 
location moved to 
taicang zhou, liuhe 
defang 太倉州，劉
河地方 
79 Biggerstaff, Earliest Modern Government Schools, p. 73; Cornet, Etat et entreprises, p. 44; Kuo 
Ting-yee, ‘Self-strengthening’, p. 529.
80 Biggerstaff, Earliest Modern Government Schools, p. 84.
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5 Yangzhou kangxi 57 (1718), in 
yongzheng 9 (1731) 
location moved to 
Jiangning
6 Zhenjiang yongzheng 5 (1727)
7 Songjiang yongzheng 5 (1727), 
in yong-zheng 10 
(1732) moved to 
taicang zhou, liuhe 
difang 
8
Shanghai in yongzheng 9 















13 Outside Liuhe pai 劉
河牌外
Qianlong 24 (1759)
14 old shipyard at Haizhou 
New Dike海州新壩
Qianlong 26 (1761)
15 Xiazhen difang 夏鎮
地方
Qianlong 31 (1764) 
ships for Xuzhou 
pre-viously built 
in Jiangning, now 
new shipyard 
established here
16 Shandong Linqing Qianlong 14 (1749)
17 Linqing, hujia wan 胡
家灣
Qianlong 47 (1782)
18 Jiaozhou (ships of 
Southern Command)
kangxi 57 (1718; only 
repair)
19 Dengzhou (ships of 
northern Command) 
kangxi 57 (1718; only 
repair)
20 Zhejiang Renhe yongzheng 2 (1724) kangxi 57 (1718)
21 Qiantang yongzheng 2 (1724) kangxi 57 (1718)
22 Ningbo kangxi 57 (1718)
23 Wenzhou kangxi 57 (1718)
24 Zhapu yongzheng 11 (1733)
25 fengtian on the liao, yidunhe, 
and huntongjiang rivers 
kangxi 22 (1683)
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26 Fengtian shipyard Xianfeng 1 (1851)
27 heilongjiang kangxi 22 (1683)
28 fujian Fuzhou kangxi 57 (1718)
29 Zhangzhou kangxi 57 (1718)
30 Taiwan kangxi 57 (1718; 
repair only)
31 Quanzhou yongzheng 7 (1729)
32 Xiamen in Qianlong 1 (1736), 
the official shipyard 
of Quanzhou was 
moved to Xiamen
33 guangdong Guangzhou henan 
difang 河南地方
Qianlong 17 (1752)
34 Chaozhou anbu difang 
庵埠地方
Qianlong 17 (1752)
35 Gaozhou Zhikai difang 
芷𦫼地方
Before Qianlong 
8 (1743); then 
location be moved 
to guangzhou; 
mentioned again in 
Qianlong 17 (1752) 
36 Qiongzhou, hainan, 
haikou difang 海南海
口地方
Qianlong 17 (1752) 
37 longmen difang 龍門
地方
Qianlong 2 (1737)
38 hubei Wuchang yongzheng 2 (1724)
39 Hanyang yongzheng 2 (1724)
anhui Anqing ‘local shipyard’ yongzheng 2 (1724)
41 Xin’an ‘local shipyard’ yongzheng 2 (1724)
42 Xuanzhou ‘local 
shipyard’
yongzheng 2 (1724)
43 Jianyang ‘local shipyard’ yongzheng 2 (1724)
44 Jiangxi ‘all guard stations should 
establish local shipyards’
yongzheng 2 (1724)
Source: this list is based on the chapters 202 (Hubu: Caoyun), 935 (Gongbu: Chuanzheng: Liang-
chuan), and 936 to 938 (Gongbu: Chuanzheng: Zhanchuan) of the Collected Statutes (Huidian shili), 
which do not give a systematic geographical coverage of all official shipyards in the provinces, but 
they contain a compilation of relevant memorials, decisions, and edicts concerning grain ships 
(liangchuan 糧船) and battleships (zhanchuan 戰船). 
1 the photomechanic reprint edition of Wenxing shuju has the character 大, the scanned version 
in the online full text database Chinese Text Project has 太. See Huidian shili, chap. 935, fol. 4b, and 
http://ctext.org/library.pl?if=en&file=27560&page=9&editwiki=587292#box(166,384,0,2).
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1,000 wooden hull, 
propeller
118,031











2,800 wooden hull, 
propeller
355,190
6 By July 1872 armour plate, 
twin propeller
5,360
7 By July 1872 armour plate,
twin propeller
See below














2800 wooden hull, 
propeller
318,717










11 1874-75 armour plate, 
twin Propeller
8,960
12 1874-75 armor plate, 
twin propeller
10,943
13 1874-75 motorized 
sampan
990







650 400 twin 
propeller









Source: adapted from kennedy, The Arms of Kiangnan, p. 161/2, table 1, and Jiangnan zaochuan 
chang changshi, p. 39, table 2. the figures given for horsepower vary for all except two ships. 
figures in brackets are from Jiangnan zaochuan chang changshi.

5. Private Shipbuilding, Private and 
Government Cooperation , and 
Procurement Prices
Throughout the Qing dynasty, shipbuilding for the market economy sur-
passed the state sector in output. In Southeast China, shipping arguably 
constituted the most important mode of transport in the Ming and Qing 
periods. Its pervasiveness and the huge amount of vessels always impressed 
foreign visitors who approached China from the sea.1
The government and the private shipbuilding sector had been cooperating 
in various ways since the beginning of the dynasty. Early on, when the 
authority of the Qing was still threatened from the sea by the power base of 
Zheng Chenggong and his descendants on Taiwan, the Qing imposed a sea 
ban, a policy inherited from the Ming. Between 1662 and 1683, not only was 
construction of coastal and overseas ships forbidden but orders were given 
to destroy existing sea ships in private possession. After this unpromising 
start, a gradual deregulation followed and policy towards seafaring traders 
and shipbuilders became less constraining after the Qing dynasty had 
consolidated its rule over maritime China by conquering Taiwan in 1683.
In addition, licensed merchants organized the distribution of state 
monopoly goods such as salt, minerals, and fuel. This type of economic 
activity has been characterized as ‘hybrid’ organization as opposed to 
‘marketplace’, ‘public’, and ‘private’.2 In consequence, the construction of 
transport vessels for these transactions also had a hybrid quality, since the 
ships were used both for government (public) and commercial (market) 
purposes and were f inanced by the monopoly merchants. In the course of 
the eighteenth century, this also applied to a part of the lighters used in 
the tax grain system and in the nineteenth century for the seagoing vessels 
that substituted for the off icial grain ships.
In the period of the First Opium War, merchants actively promoted tech-
nology transfer in naval technology and ordnance. Although the Daoguang 
1 Audemard, Jonques chinoises, p. 20, cites Père Barnadine (An Account of the Empire of China, 
1745), Navarrete (An Account of the Empire of China, 1650) on ships at Macau and Père D. Gandar 
(Variétés Sinologiques no. 4, 1894, ‘Le Canal Impérial’) on the ships on the Grand Canal. Their 
number seemed to surpass anything these observers had seen in their home countries.
2 Myers and Wang, ‘Economic Development’, p. 624 ff., 630.
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emperor  was interested in this initiative, at that time this was obstructed 
by the provinces.3 Another twenty years later, after the dynasty had nearly 
been extinguished by the Taiping rebels, a new group of provincial governors, 
who were all military men, ushered in the phase of self-strengthening 
with priority given to the mechanized production of ordnance and steam 
engines. Due to the much larger investments necessary for shipbuilding 
with machine technology and the diff iculty in acquiring the necessary 
skills and knowledge, some decades passed before private enterprises could 
enter the market as steamship and machine manufacturers. From the late 
nineteenth century, Chinese-owned f irms off icially supplied the Chinese 
navy, but competition with foreign shipbuilding enterprises remained acute.
While in the preceding chapter, the state-private relationship was 
portrayed from the perspective of the state and the example of merchant 
participation in the tribute grain shipment was discussed, here we will 
consider the side of shipbuilding in the private sector, starting out with 
an overview of the locations of shipbuilding, both for the construction 
of wind-propelled wooden ships and for steamships, together with the 
estimated numbers of ships circulating in Chinese waters at different points 
in time. Thereafter, documented prices of the government ships will be set 
off against prices of ships on the market in order to come to an assessment of 
the cooperation of government and private shipbuilding and ship transport 
in the traditional and the mechanized sectors.
Sites for Shipbuilding, Major Ship Types, and Estimated Number 
of Ships
Geographically, the centres for off icial shipbuilding were also centres 
of private shipbuilding. It seems likely that by the late Ming, the private 
sector had already overtaken the off icial sector in scope and perhaps in 
quality. After an interval during which seafaring was prohibited,4 private 
shipbuilding from 1683 onwards once again surpassed the off icial sector. 
The Qing centres of shipbuilding were the coastal provinces of Fujian and 
Guangdong in the South, Zhejiang and Jiangsu in the Yangzi delta and 
Qiantang estuary, Shandong and Zhili in the North, and Jilin and Liaoning 
(Fengtian) in Manchuria. Evidence for shipbuilding on the rivers comes 
from Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, and Sichuan and from the Songhua jiang in Jilin 
3 Gideon Chen, Lin Tse-hsü, p. 58.
4 For details, see the section ‘The Relationship of Government and Private Shipbuilding’.
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and Heilongjiang. No systematic off icial accounts are available, but from 
scattered evidence, an overview can be gained as laid out in Figure 6.5 As 
has been pointed out by Xu Jianqing, a huge variety of ship types was built 
all over China. She estimates that, during the Qing dynasty, two-thousand 
to three-thousand different ship types existed.6 Attributing the ship types 
to geographic regions does not mean, however, that the specif ic ships were 
exclusively built in that region. On the contrary, all types could and were 
constructed in all shipbuilding centres.
In Fujian, the biggest concentration of shipbuilding sites lay in the pre-
fectures of Quanzhou, Zhangzhou, and Fuzhou. The Quanzhou districts of 
Tong’an, Jinjiang, Hui’an, and Xiamen were especially productive, with Xiamen 
(Amoy) in Quanzhou prefecture acting as an important newcomer (1727), 
which attracted large numbers of migrants. Xiamen peaked in the Qianlong 
era and in the Jiaqing era still boasted over one-thousand seagoing merchant 
vessels. Tong’an produced a type of commercial ship (Tong’an sou 同安艘) that 
was faster than official ships. Therefore in 1795/96, the government ordered 
the rebuilding of marine ships for the Fengtian fleet in the Tong’an style.7
The Fujian ship was the typical seagoing ship in use at least since the 
ninth century. With its keel and a V-shaped bottom, it was not suitable for 
shallow waters. It had three to f ive masts and multiple stern rudders to 
improve steering. It was built with iron nails and caulked with hemp and 
tong oil.8 They were usually made of f ir timber (Cryptomeria, shamu). The 
Grand Fujian ship as described in the encyclopedia Gujin tushu jicheng had 
a deeper draft (3.50 to 3.60 m) than the sand junks and was therefore not 
convenient for the marine patrols if the pirates they chased came close to 
the coast; but models with shallower drafts were also developed in Fujian.9
In Guangdong, the largest shipbuilding centre was Canton (Guangzhou). 
According to Audemard, in the 1840s, English residents in Canton estimated 
seeing about 40,000 junks and a population of 200,000 living and working on 
house boats.10 Since Canton had for long been the only port off icially open 
for foreign trade (ca. 1720-1842), demand for shipbuilding and maintenance 
was especially large. As with the Tong’an style boats in Fujian, in the late 
1790s, the Canton-style civilian rice ships (miting) seemed more convenient 
5 Xu Jianqing, Qingdai qianqi, pp. 583-594. The following geographical overview mainly 
follows Xu Jianqing’s presentation.
6 Ibid., p. 594.
7 Huidian shili, chap. 937, fol. 15a.
8 Deng Gang, Chinese Maritime Activities, p. 27.
9 Audemard, Jonques chinoises, pp. 53-55.
10 Ibid., p. 21.
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Figure 3  Big Fujian ship, Da Fuchuan
Source: illustration in Gujin tushu jicheng (1726), reprint 1884, section ‘Jingji huibian’ 經濟彙編 
(Collection on governance), ‘rongzheng dian’ 戎政典 (military administration), ‘Shuizhan bu’ 水
戰部 (naval warfare), ‘huikao’ 彙考 (extracts from standard works), chapter 79, fol. 8a/2 (in 1964 
reprint, vol. 749, p. 15/2).
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for the naval forces’ patrol needs than other models and were therefore to 
be rebuilt for the Guangdong fleet in this style.11 Since the Canton harbour 
Henan silted up, the port was moved to Huangpu/Whampoa. This is also 
where sometimes as many as one-hundred foreign ships moored. In Guang-
dong, Chenghai developed as a new harbour and shipbuilding centre.
Guangdong ships were also oceangoing ships with keels that had larger 
dimensions than most Fujian type ships and a steeper V-form of their bot-
toms than Fujian-style ships. They were made of more expensive timber, 
so-called ‘ironwood’ (tielimu 鐵力木; 鐵梨木; 鉄栗木, commonly identif ied 
as Mesua ferrea, commercial name Penaga)12. According to the Gujin tushi 
jicheng, a Guangdong ship would cost twice as much but was also more 
durable than a Fujian ship because of the high quality of the timber, which is 
very strong relative to its weight and displacement.13 By the mid-eighteenth 
century, tielimu became scarce; and today it is probably all but extinct in 
Guangdong. After the mid-eighteenth century, at least part of the Guangdong 
ships were built in Southeast Asia (Siam and Malaysia). The size of a large 
Guangdong ship for a crew of several hundred men could reach 165 feet (ca. 
52.8 m) in length, the crossbeam 36 feet (11.5 m) and abreast with a mast 
120 feet (38.4 m) tall. The English privateer Captain William Dampier was 
impressed by these masts, which he likened to ‘any Third-Rate Man of Wars 
Mast in England, and yet not pieced together as ours, but made of one grown 
Tree; and in all my Travels I never saw any single Tree-masts so big in the 
body, and yet so well tapered, as I have seen in the Chinese Jonks’. Most 
ships had one or two masts, but the larger one possessed three to f ive.14
In Jiangsu, the province that produced the most government grain 
ships, the most important shipyards in Jiangsu lay in Nanjing (Jiangning), 
Yangzhou, and Yizheng on the Yangzi, Suzhou, and the Shanghai (Songjiang) 
area with Taicang and Chongming island.
The number of Jiangsu or ‘Jiangnan’ ships has been estimated at 5,000 
seagoing vessels of 2,000-3,000 shi15 in the ports of Shanghai and Zhapu 
(in Zhejiang) in the early Jiaqing era, and for the Daoguang era, about 3,600 
seagoing freighters over 1,000 shi in and around Shanghai alone. In the early 
11 Huidian shili, chap. 937, fol. 15a (Jiaqing 4, 1799).
12 For a variant identif ication of tielimu as Erythrophleum fordii, see Lin Yangsan, ‘Mingshi 
jiaju’. Both are valuable hardwood trees native to Guangdong, Guangxi, and Southeast Asia.
13 Audemard, Jonques chinoises, p. 49.
14 Marks, Tigers, Rice, Silk, and Silt, pp. 168/9, quoting from Ye Xian’en et al., Guangdong 
hangyun shi, gudai bufen (The history of shipping in Guangdong in the ancient times) and 
William Dampier, A New Voyage Round the World.
15 As a measure of ship capacity, one shi amounts to c. 70 kg.
162 State anD CraftS in the Qing DynaSt y (1644-1911) 
Figure 4  Guangdong ship, Guangdong chuan
Source: illustration in Gujin tushu jicheng (1726), reprint 1884, section ‘Jingji huibian’ 經濟彙編 
(Collection on governance), ‘rongzheng dian’ 戎政典 (military administration), ‘Shuizhan bu’ 水
戰部 (naval warfare), ‘huikao’ 彙考 (extracts from standard works), chapter 79, fol. 7b/3, (in 1964 
reprint, vol. 749, p. 14/3).
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nineteenth century, as prof its declined, their number sank to about 1,400 
and later stabilized at about 2,000. Including smaller vessels of 400-900 shi, 
they numbered about 3,000.16
The richest shipowners were reported from the Shanghai area, especially 
Chongming, where the sand ships were originally produced. Before the 
Opium War, shipbuilding in Shanghai on both sides of the Huangpu River 
was already quite advanced. From here, there is more evidence on successful 
private shipowners who also manufactured the ships they used. For instance, 
Zhang Yuanlong (d. 1710) in the early eighteenth century planned to build 
up a f leet of hundred ships for trade with the Liaodong peninsula.17 The 
brothers Ge Yuanxiang  and Ge Yuanrui  of the ‘Ge family shipyard’ in the 
eighteenth century also traded with Shandong and Fengtian in the North. 
These are just a few examples; more manufacturers and traders are known 
from Shanghai, and at least in the big Jiangsu centres of Suzhou, Nanjing, 
and Yangzhou, the situation was probably similar.
After Shanghai became a treaty port in 1842, it developed into the most 
important site for shipbuilding in Jiangsu. A manufacturer and trader of 
renown in this period was Zhu Puzhai, who specialized in big oceangoing 
vessels and by the end of the century owned seven freighters that circulated 
in the Yellow and South China Sea.18
Another manufacturing region of importance within Jiangsu was the 
Wujiang district on Lake Tai, where small and big f ishing ships for lakes 
and rivers were built.
In Zhejiang province, the biggest centres for seagoing vessels were situated 
in the Hangzhou, Ningbo, and Wenzhou areas. Inland ships were built on the 
south banks of Lake Tai. More than a thousand ships circulated on the Fuchun 
or Qiantang River and were probably constructed in the adjacent villages.
In the provinces along the mid and upper reaches of the Yangzi ‒ Hunan, 
Hubei, Jiangxi, and Sichuan ‒ shipbuilding developed as the upper reaches 
of the river were made navigable. In Sichuan, the biggest centres were 
Chongqing (Jiangbei ting) and Wan(yuan) xian.
In the North, the off icial shipyards were situated in Linqing, Dengzhou, 
and Jiaozhou on the Shandong peninsula and in Tianjin in Zhili province.
In Manchuria, off icial shipyards existed in Jilin on the rivers Songhua 
jiang, Liaohe, and Heilongjiang. According to one report, during the Qianlong 
16 Fang Zhuofen et al., ‘Shanghai shipping’, p. 362.
17 Actually, these plans did not materialize but were crushed on charges of smuggling. See 
Tang Bo, ‘Da haishang’.
18 Xu Jianqing, ‘Qingdai qianqi’, p. 600.
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reign, 30,000 to 40,000 migrants from Shandong and other provinces were 
found to be working at the off icial shipyard in Ningguta (today’s Ning’an) on 
the Mudanjiang River. Moreover, in 1824, the Fengtian authorities checked 
on unlicensed private shipbuilders and found 46 persons and more than 80 
ships that had traded between Liaoyang and Niuzhuang.19
Overall estimates of ships circulating in Chinese waters before the Opium 
War assume 9,000 sea ships with a transport capacity of 700-800 shi (over 
50 tons) and 200,000 sailing ships below 50 tons travelling in inland waters, 
not including f ishing boats, farmer boats, and small barges without sails, 
totalling more than 200,000 sailing ships and a transport capacity of four 
to f ive million tons.20 To get an idea of how this compared to the number of 
government-owned ships at the time, we can look at the records for grain ships 
and patrol ships. Assuming a f igure of 10,515 grain ships circa 1662 and 6,000 
circa 1812, and adding to this a figure of 2,400 (see Table 20, ‘Quotas for coastal 
and fluvial guard and patrol ships of all sizes’), we arrive at a total of about 
13,000 off icial ships before 1800 and about 8,500 after 1800. This constitutes 
about 6.5 and 4 percent respectively of the overall f igure of 200,000. Although 
this is only a rough approximation that does not take transport capacity into 
account, it nevertheless shows the relationship between public and private 
shipping. If we apply the lower f igure of 130,000 private transport ships on 
the yearly tax records, to which Deng Gang refers for the second half of the 
eighteenth century, off icial ships accounted for ten percentage of the total 
number of ships in China.21 For the transitional period between the Qing 
and the Republic, Deng Gang estimates the number of f ishing boats alone at 
1.08 boats for each fishing household, which, on the basis of data for Fengtian 
prefecture, total about 101,926 households for coastal China in his calculations. 
This amounts to at least 110,000 private f ishing boats.
Foreign and Chinese Mechanized Shipbuilding
After the f irst treaty ports were opened in 1842, in the f irst days of steamship 
technology, Chinese shipbuilding artisans were not yet able to carry out the 
19 Xu Jianqing, Qingdai qianqi, p. 593.
20 Ibid., p. 596, citing Fan Baichuan 樊百川, Zhongguo lunchuan yunye de xingqi 中国轮船运
业的兴起 (The rise of steamship transport in China), Sichuan renmin chubanshe 1985.
21 Deng Gang, Chinese Maritime Activities, p. 69, referring to Gongzhong zhupi zouzhe (Palace 
memorials of the Qing with imperial rescripts), entry ‘Customs under the Qianlong reign’. Deng 
also quotes a total f igure of 988,000 to 1,163,584 ‘junks’ operating in the 1930s on Chinese inland 
and sea waters (from Thomas Rawski, Economic growth in prewar China, pp. 403-4.)
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repairs of engines, propellers, and boilers. Therefore, foreign shipbuilders 
established repair and shipbuilding companies in China. According to the 
post-Opium War treaties, foreign manufacturers were not allowed to set up 
production in China before 1895, but the Chinese government tolerated them 
in the treaty ports.22 According to admittedly incomplete statistics, a total of 
67 foreign ship constructors set up business in China successively between 
1843 and 1896 and constructed 91 ships, most of them steam-propelled. While 
the f irst foreign shipbuilding companies were established in Hong Kong 
and Canton, Shanghai gained greater importance after the mid-1860s. Of 
the 67 f irms, 43 percent were located in Canton and Hong Kong, 38 percent 
in Shanghai, and 19 percent in other treaty ports (Shantou in Guangdong, 
Fuzhou and Xiamen in Fujian, Yantai in Shandong, Tianjin in Zhili), while 
21 percent of the ships were built in Hong Kong and Canton, 77 percent in 
Shanghai, and only two percent in other treaty ports.23
The f irst of these was the Couper shipyard, founded in 1845 at Canton/
Whampoa by the Scotsman J. John Couper, which was considered to be 
the biggest shipyard in China until the early 1860s.24 In Shanghai, foreign 
shipbuilders had been present since the 1850s. The f irst shipyard here was 
established by the American George Purvis and Company, while the biggest 
manufacturers were the British f irm Nicholson & Boyd Co. (Xiangsheng, 
founded in 1862) and S.C. Farnham & Co., which was f irst American-owned, 
then British-owned  (Yesong, founded in 1864).25 The foreign shipyards could 
rely on a developed and expanding infrastructure for shipbuilding supplies 
and metalworking. Small docks for Chinese sailing ships were already present 
on the east bank of the Huangpu River in Shanghai’s southern suburb Nanshi, 
and a Shanghai shipyard established by Gu Minghai in the Pudong suburbs 
specialized in the construction of small sailing ships and lighters of f ive 
to ten tons. Several small smithies that hailed from Hangzhou, Wuxi, and 
Suzhou had migrated to Shanghai during the Taiping rebellion. The Pu family 
from Shaoxing reportedly owned ten workshops for iron tools. Shipbuilders 
from Wuxi had come to the little f luvial harbour of Xinzha, setting up 75 
small workshops. Some members of the Xiangshan workshops near Suzhou 
who specialized in iron smelting and carpentry had migrated to Shanghai. 
Copper and tin smiths had been concentrated in Suzhou, Nanjing, Shaoxing, 
22 Feuerwerker, ‘Economic Trends’, pp. 28-29.
23 Xin Yuan’ou, Zhongguo jindai, p. 42.
24 Xu Shulan, Kepai chuanwu yizhi.
25 Cornet, Etat et entreprises, pp. 17-8, quoting from Wang Zhiyi, Zhongguo jindai zaochuan 
shi (History of modern Chinese shipbuilding). Xin Yuan’ou, Zhongguo jindai, pp. 19-47.
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and Ningbo since the f ifteenth century. Many of these proto-industrial 
workshops became suppliers to the foreign and Chinese shipyards.
Colonial governments also engaged in shipbuilding, such as the Russians 
from 1898 in Dalian, taken over by the Japanese after the Russo-Japanese 
War of 1904, as well as the German colonial government in Qingdao between 
1898 and 1914.26
In modern, mechanized shipbuilding, foreign f irms and in part also 
the colonial shipbuilding facilities were competitors with the Chinese 
government institutions of Jiangnan Arsenal and the Fujian Navy Yard. 
Farnham, the largest of them, employed 2,000 Chinese workers in the 1880s. 
In 1888, 2,500 to 4,500 workers were hired in the Kowloon plant of the British 
Admiralty Dock. In 1902, the Russian-built dockyard at Dalian employed 
495 workers and technicians, of which 409 were Chinese, 80 Russians, and 
six Indians. In 1903, the labour force of the newly founded German shipyard 
at Qingdao totalled 703, with 33 European and 670 Chinese workers and 
technicians. Including temporary workers, this total rose to as much as 
3,000 by 1914.27 Smaller establishments, such as the British New Amoy 
Dock Company (est. 1892), still had 200 Chinese workers under permanent 
contract and in case of demand hired more on a temporary basis.28
A few private Chinese manufacturers also managed to establish them-
selves in the niche between the foreign f irms and the Chinese government 
shipbuilding ventures. Their numbers were limited, and their scope of 
production and numbers of hired workers remained very modest, at least 
before the Sino-Japanese War. Xin Yuan’ou has collected evidence for twelve 
privately capitalized shipbuilding and machine construction companies 
established between 1869 and 1894 in Shanghai, two in Canton, and one 
each in Tianjin and Hanyang. Their initial investments ranged between 
300 and 1,000 tael and the numbers of hired workers between twenty and 
f ifty. Only one of them, the Junhe’an machine manufacturers in Canton 
founded in 1888, had a higher initial capitalization of 3,000 to 4,000 tael 
and an estimated workforce of f ifty to one-hundred. The business scope 
of these companies included steamship repair and the construction of 
small steamships as well as silk f ilature machines and mechanic cotton 
gins.29 After the Sino-Japanese War, in the course of a more active industrial 
government policy, several dozens of entrepreneurs established machine 
26 ‘Kiautschou’, in Deutsches Kolonial-Lexikon, ‘19. Gouvernementswerft’.
27 Xin Yuan’ou, Zhongguo jindai, pp. 62-68.
28 Ibid., pp. 33-45.
29 Xin Yuan’ou, Zhongguo jindai, p. 209.
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manufacturing and shipbuilding companies. The largest among these were 
Song Weichen’s Yangzi machine manufacturing company (Yangzi jiqichang, 
established 1907) in Wuhan with a capitalization of 400,000 tael that could 
build 800 to 1,000-ton lighters and 100-ton motor ships. In 1907, it employed 
3,000 workers. In July 1911, the Qing navy placed an order of three steamships, 
which eventually were delivered in 1916. In Shanghai, the biggest f irm was 
the Searching for Novelty Machine and Steamship Construction Company 
(Qiuxin jiqi lunchuan zhizao chang), which Zhu Zhiyao (1863-1955), the son 
of the Shanghai ship owner Zhu Puzhai, started with a relatively small 
capitalization of 40,000 tael. After additional investments, capitalization 
in 1910 increased to 316,000 tael. With a workforce of 500, this company 
constructed 19 ships between 1906 and 1910 ‒ mostly steam propelled but 
also sailing ships ‒ for the Chinese customs, the CMSNC, and other steam 
navigation companies. In Canton, a former ship carpenter at the Jiangnan 
Arsenal, Lin Jing, founded after 1891 the Perpetual Prof it for Guangzhou 
Steamship Construction Company (Guang changli zhuangzao lunchuan 
chang), which together with other smaller manufacturers constructed 
ten steam ships. The capitalization of the largest Chinese manufacturers 
amounted to only one-tenth that of the big foreign f irms, and they could 
not compete with the high annual subsidies of the Jiangnan Arsenal and the 
Fuzhou Navy Yard.30 Nevertheless, a private market gradually developed 
mechanized manufacturing and especially in Shanghai offered new job 
opportunities for a workforce with expertise in machine production.
The Relationship of Government and Private Shipbuilding
The state controlled, interacted, and competed with the commercial sector 
in several ways. Between 1662 and 1683, the Qing adopted similar measures 
of ‘sea prohibition’ as the Ming had done. Private sea trade was severely 
forbidden in order to crack down on the descendants of the Ming dynasty 
and their supporters.31 The coastal population was forced to settle further 
inland and leave an evacuation belt of thirty li (approximately 15 km) to the 
sea shores. The existing ships were to be burned by imperial order. Appar-
ently the Qing troops did carry out this decree, and only a small group of 
smugglers and pirates escaped the prohibition to bases in Southeast Asia.32 
30 Ibid., pp. 210-216.
31 Xu Jianqing, Qingdai qianqi, p. 594, p. 582/3. 
32 Marks, Tigers, Rice, p. 167. See also chapter two, ‘Government Restrictions of Craft Activities’.
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In 1683 the territory of Zheng Chenggong, a Ming loyalist who had set up 
his own administration on Taiwan and was owner of seven-thousand ships, 
had been destroyed by the Qing, and Taiwan was declared part of Fujian 
province. Subsequently, the ban was lifted. Settlement on the coast as well 
as trade and f ishing were once again permitted, but for security reasons, 
the sizes and possession of the ships were restricted. At f irst, the maximum 
acceptable size was up to 500 shi (ca. 25-35 tons). In the year Kangxi 42 (1703), 
this limitation was relaxed. Now merchant ships with up to two masts, a 
width of 1.8 zhang, and a maximum of 28 helmsmen on board were allowed 
to circulate on inland, coastal, and sea waters. But shipowners had to remain 
on board during the journey. It was forbidden to lease ships. Restrictions 
notwithstanding, shipbuilding boomed. This was so much the case that the 
timber used for Guangdong ships, tielimu (the ‘iron hardwood’), became all but 
extinct in the second half of the eighteenth century, and the Guangdong ships 
were often ordered in Southeast Asia rather than built in China.33 In Fujian 
province, Xiamen developed into an entrepôt for Southeast Asian timber.
About sixty years later, the restrictions on leasing were also suspended, 
and from 1818 the size of the ships and number of masts were no longer 
prescribed. However, regional administrations still registered the shippers 
and supervised their coming and going.34 The ‘secret’ (i.e. unregistered) 
production and sale of ships was still forbidden by the Qianlong era, but as 
a 1781 document in the provincial regulations of Fujian states, if shipowners 
fell on hard times, it was very common and ‘diff icult to punish’ if they sold 
their ships.35 Sales were permitted and private shipyards could operate 
legally if they were known and acknowledged by the regional authorities.
Keeping in mind the ratio of government to private ships, it is doubtful 
whether non-compliance with rules could actually be sanctioned. In the 
encyclopedia Gujin tushu jicheng, for instance, the section on sand ships 
documenting the situation of the late Ming and early Qing notes that the first 
Ming emperor had restricted the number of masts to two and had rigorously 
forbidden that they should be taken to sea without official permission. In the 
course of the dynasty, this law fell into oblivion, and a huge sand ship could have 
up to five masts, covering as many as a thousand Chinese miles (594 km or 320 
sea miles) per day. The shippers would install removable masts, which were 
reinserted after the ships had passed official scrutiny in the harbours. Another 
33 Marks, Tigers, Rice, pp. 167-8.
34 See, for instance, Grant Alger, ‘Regulatory Regionalism’.
35 Fujian shengli, p. 642, ‘Shangyu chuanzhi maimai liding zhangcheng’ 商譽船隻買賣立定
章程 (Regulations established for the sale of merchant and f ishing ships’).
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rule that allowed only one ship per family is cited here as well. Audemard states 
that the sand ships he saw (in the first decade of the twentieth century) had 
four or f ive masts. Typically three of them were removable.36
The renting of ships between shipowners and merchants, another profit-
seeking activity that was initially prohibited, was increasingly reported 
from the late eighteenth century, with references to merchants who owned 
between ten to more than f ifty ships. In the early nineteenth century, 
merchants in the Shanghai region who possessed less than f ive ships were 
considered small shipowners.37
There is ample evidence of cooperation between the state and the private 
sector, which warrants the opinion that the exploitation and suppression of 
the private sector was not as severe as early Chinese Marxist historiography 
suggests. Merchants rented out their ships to the authorities to chase pirates, 
even if they were sometimes afraid of the vindictiveness of the freebooters, 
as in 1794 Guangdong.38 Or in the case of 1817 Shandong, the government had 
neglected to maintain a number of its ships, forcing the local authorities to 
rent private ships ‒ which had never been taken to sea for inspection and 
manoeuvres ‒ to make up for the lack of marine vessels.39 There was also a 
contrary case when, in 1710, a shipping merchant was found to have illegally 
‘rented’ battleships for trading rice. The culprit was Zhang Yuanlong, who 
had intended to build up a large merchant fleet of one-hundred ships and 
had also used his family connections to the Governor-General of Liang 
Jiang to get access to the battleships.40
Merchants also volunteered to offer considerable credit to the govern-
ment for f inancing lighters, as the Tianjin salt merchants did in 1785. They 
advanced 300,000 tael for building an additional 1,200 lighters, to be refunded 
within ten years. This granted them the continuous free disposition of their 
own vessels, which previously had been requisitioned by grain transport 
authorities.41 Likewise, the Collected Statutes report that in 1764, Xiamen 
overseas merchants (yanghang) donated 7,000 tael to build battleships. 
This fact is recorded in conjunction with the release and legalization of 
36 Audemard, Jonques chinoises, pp. 73-76. See also the illustration in Chapter Four.
37 Xu Jianqing, Qingdai qianqi, p. 599, quotes evidence of a shipowner possessing more than 
ten Fujian style freighters, of Shanghai region merchants owning 40 to 50 sand ships, of an owner 
in the Zhejiang district Ciqi who transported 40,000 shi of tribute grain overseas in 30 ships, 
and of a private shipyard in Wuqing zhen on Lake Tai that rented out all the ships it produced.
38 Huidian shili, chap. 937, fol. 14a.
39 Ibid., fol. 20a, see above.
40 Tang Bo, Da haishang.
41 Huidian shili, chap. 203, fol. 3a-5b; chap. 935, fol. 6a-7a.
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overseas trade, formulated in the ‘Regulations on overseas trade’ (Yanghang 
maoyi zhangcheng) which the provincial administrator Chen Hongmou 
(1696-1771) had promoted.42
A most active period of private initiatives for marine defence followed 
the First Opium War, 1839-1842, when Canton merchants like Pan Shicheng 
and others experimented with new ship design and ordnance, which they 
presented to the court.43 Pan’s was not an isolated case. Elsewhere, experi-
ments with shipbuilding and, more generally, the adaptation of Western naval 
and military equipment were also carried out with the aim to construct 
larger, faster, and better armoured vessels. In 1841, a frigate junk of about 
three-hundred tons, built after a European model, was found by British 
invaders in a dry dock at Xiamen. At the same time, a paddle-wheel ship, using 
human instead of steam power, was developed in Ningbo by Gong Zhenlin, a 
district administrator of Jiaxing in Zhejiang and Canton.44 Twenty years later, 
in 1862, members of the Shanghai gentry rented a fleet of seven steamships 
to transport the government troops led by Li Hongzhang for the defence of 
Shanghai and the Yangzi Delta against the invading Taiping armies.45
In sum, a general tendency of deregulation evolved in the second half of 
the eighteenth century, and at the same time private merchants supported 
and substituted government efforts in shipbuilding and ship maintenance. 
In the period of self-strengthening in the 1860s and 1870s, regional and local 
elites increasingly assumed roles in public service that had previously been 
the task of government off icials. For shipbuilding and ship transport, this 
became most evident when merchants began to organize the sea transport of 
tribute grain and subsequently cooperated with the government in the China 
Merchants’ Steam Navigation Company and other ‘off icially supervised 
and merchant-organized’ enterprises. Signif icant government shipbuilding 
remained conf ined to ships for the naval forces, even though one of the 
directors of the Shanghai Arsenal, Feng Junguang (1830-1878), suggested 
renting the Arsenal-built steamers out to merchants who transported the 
tribute grain in order to save on maintenance costs.46 His idea was not real-
42 Xiamen zhi, chap. 5, p. 154.
43 As famous as Pan’s Western-style sailing ships was his investment of 65,000 taels in developing 
water mines, which he explained in his Shuilei tushuo (Illustrated account of water mines). In 
1843, he hired a foreign specialist who developed the water mines within nine months, and 
successfully demonstrated the device to the authorities in Tianjin. However, this was not 
adopted. Gideon Chen, Lin Tse-hsü, pp. 44-46, 60.
44 Gideon Chen, Lin Tse-hsü, pp. 32-36.
45 Kuhn, ‘The Taiping Rebellion’, pp. 299, 306.
46 Kennedy, The Arms of Kiangnan, p. 83.
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ized at the time, but it shows that connections to the Chinese private sector 
were actively sought from within the institution of the Jiangnan Arsenal.
Prices and Funding in Shipbuilding
In the course of the Qing dynasty, timber became an increasingly scarce 
commodity, and prices rose continuously. When comparing government 
prices and prices on the free market, Chinese authors often point to the 
low procurement prices for ships, implying that the government exploited 
merchants as well as shipbuilders. One often-cited reference from the late 
Ming, for instance, assesses the prices of privately built versus government-
procured ships in a ratio of three to one.47 However, direct comparisons are 
diff icult, because evidence is widely scattered in time and often vague, not 
mentioning the specif ications of the ships. Without information on equip-
ment and quality, it is diff icult to come to def initive conclusions on how 
exploitative these prices were for the merchant suppliers. Another question 
is what can be inferred about wages from the total prices of the ships.
Evidence is included in Tables 24 and 25. For government grain ships in the 
early Qing, Li Bozhong has calculated a market price of 600 tael, based on the 
amount of tax relief that was granted to several Zhejiang districts which were 
allowed to pay monetary taxes rather than supplying finished ships in kind. 
Another indirect reference from 1731 in the Collected Statutes provides for 
50 tael for shipwrights’ (zuanfu) wages (mentioning that the wages remained 
‘unchanged’ from before) and a maximum of 51 tael for material costs, totalling 
101 tael for government grain ships. This would amount to only one-sixth 
of the presumed ‘market price’ of 1672. Almost ninety years later, in 1760 
and 1761, much higher procurement prices of between 400 and 1,000 tael are 
quoted for Jiangxi and Hunan – provinces that had to send their ships through 
lakes and the Yangzi and thus were bigger than those of the provinces in the 
Yangzi Delta, such as Shandong and Hebei. In 1785, an attempt was made to 
introduce a unified price of 280 tael which provided for simpler equipment, 
but still allowed for varying sizes for the southern and the Yangzi delta ships. 
This arrangement obviously did not last long, since in the following years 
extra subsidies are frequently mentioned. The last recorded price is 800 tael 
for 1812 Zhejiang, including a 590 tael subsidy to the basic price of 208 tael. At 
the same time, a salt transport ship with a carrying capacity of about 750 to 
47 Li Bozhong, Jiangnan de zaoqi gongyehua, p. 253, Xu Jianqing, Qingdai qianqi, p. 597, both 
quoting from Zhang Xie, Dong Xi yang kao, chap. 9.
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2,000 shi, comparable to the bigger grain transport ships, cost 1,600 to 1,700 tael. 
However, this was probably not the average size, which is judged by Hinton 
as varying between 300 to 400 shi, and only occasionally 800 to 1,000 shi.48
Without clear specifications, navy ships and merchant seagoing vessels 
are even less comparable because unlike grain ships, their function was not 
restricted to the transport of goods and their sizes varied more than those of 
the grain ships. More scattered evidence shows decreasing prices between 1646 
and 1682. A most detailed statement for the prices of government battleships is 
contained in the government regulations for the battleships of Fujian province, 
Fujian sheng waihai zhanchuan zeli, of around 1769. Prices range, according to 
equipment and size, between 411 and 1,438 tael. These quotations are especially 
interesting because working wages are mentioned as well. As can be seen from 
Table 25, working wages amounted to only 11 to 15 percent of the entire costs 
per ship, while in the early Qing, subsidies paid for labour and material costs 
of government ships are quoted as more or less equal. However skewed the 
early quotation may be, it shows the tendency of increasing material costs, 
even in government procurement. For 1835, the Collected Statutes actually 
mention the ratio of prices of merchant ships to navy ships used for patrols 
and other purposes. The Liang Jiang (Jiangnan, Jiangxi, Anhui) navy had 
owned eight merchant freighters, which were to be broken up and rebuilt 
as battleships to ease patrols. The costs for those battleships were only half 
that of the freighters.49 If both ship types were acquired at procurement 
prices, and if the statement is factual and not just understated for political 
reasons, this implies that those battleships were cheaper in construction 
than the freighters. If the merchant ships were acquired on the market, this 
reference gives a clue to the price relations, but we still do not know whether 
the equipment and finishing of the two types was comparable.
For 1820, we also have evidence for the market prices of seagoing merchant 
ships at various locations. They range between 15.5 tael per ton in Siam, 
33.6 tael per ton in Chaozhou (Guangdong province), and 44.1 tael per ton 
in Xiamen (Fujian province).50
What was to be done if prices set by the Ministry of Public Works failed to 
meet the actual costs? One method was to supplement the basic prices with 
subsidies. To do so, the actual market prices of ship timber, especially for 
48 Hinton, Grain Tribute System, p. 11.
49 Huidian shili, chap. 938, fol. 8a.
50 Marks, Tigers, Rice, p. 167. Marks calculated the prices per ton by applying the conversion of 
rate of 59.5 kg per shi. This is the conversion corresponding to the weight of an Imperial standard 
kuping shi to 131.58 [British] pounds. If the conversion of ca. 70 kg per shi, taking the shi as 120 jin of 
0.6 kg is applied, as in Ng, Trade and Society, p. xiv, the respective prices are 13.21, 28.5, and 37.5 tael.
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the most costly mast timber (weimu), had to be investigated and reported.51 
Regular subsidies for repair and reconstruction are mentioned in the Col-
lected Statutes. In the case cited for 1736, the subsidy was 125 percent, for 
Shandong battleships in 1737 it was 100 percent, for Guangdong ships it was 
80 percent for breaking up and reconstruction (in 1738), and it was 60 percent 
for large and 40 percent for small overhauls. Special regulations applied for 
Taiwan, since transporting the raw materials there was more expensive.52
Once regular and basic ministry prices and subsidies were def ined, it 
was open to debate as to which authorities should raise the funds for the 
subsidies. In 1741, all Fujian prefectures, not only those where the shipyards 
were situated, were summoned to provide f inancial assistance to buy up 
the timber for the masts of Fujian battleships.53
Other, less ideal methods to cope with a lack of funds were delaying 
necessary repairs and reconstructions, resizing the ships, or using less 
expensive timber such as pine (song) and f ir (sha) rather than oak (limu, 
Quercus chinensis) in order to spare expenses and speed up the construc-
tion and repair processes.54 Delays of necessary repairs are reported from 
1740 for the coastal provinces, where only 70 to 80 percent of the reported 
maintenance work was actually accomplished.55 In an edict, the Qianlong 
emperor admonishes the responsible off icials that even though they were 
enjoying peaceful times, sea defence should be taken seriously ‒ they should 
not, as was often the case, just give the ships a new painting and neglect 
more thorough maintenance. Two years earlier, delays of maintenance and 
reconstruction had been sanctioned in a catalogue of punishments meted 
out to officials in charge of the repair and reconstructions of Jiangnan fluvial 
marine patrol and guard ships.56 They ranged from a f ine of six months’ 
salary for passing the deadline by more than one month and degradation 
by one off icial degree to transfer from one’s position for delays of more than 
f ive months. For high-level supervising off icials such as the governors and 
governors-general, the f ines were lighter, but for passing the deadline for 
51 Huidian shili, chap. 936, fol. 8b, Yongzheng 10 (1731), concerning Guangdong battleships.
52 Ibid., fol. 10a, ‘If in the Jiangnan shipyards patrol sand ships sha xiaochuan 沙唬船 are 
broken up and reconstructed for the price set by the ministry of 100 tael, they shall receive an 
additional subsidy ( jia jintie) of 125 tael.’ Shandong (1737), op. cit., chap. 936, fol. 10b, Guangdong 
(1738), chap. 936, fol. 11a/b, additional 30 percent for big and 20 percent for small overhauls for 
Taiwan (Qianlong 12 (1747), op. cit., chap. 936, fol. 14a).
53 Huidian shili, chap. 936, fol. 13a.
54 Ibid., fol. 14a (Qianlong 8, 1743).
55 Ibid., fol. 12 a.
56 Ibid., fol. 11b. 
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more than f ive months, degradation by one degree and a one-year salary 
stop was still threatened. We do not know whether these sanctions were 
actually carried out; off icials most often will have found good reasons 
for why they were not responsible for the delays. The province-specif ic 
deadlines for small and large overhauls, break ups, and reconstruction 
were set out in 1732.
Access to timber and other materials was not equal among the provinces. 
During early Qing, the southern provinces were still better endowed, but 
from 1822 on, even the Fujian shipyards (Fuzhou, Quanzhou, and Zhangzhou) 
reported timber shortages but were urged by the emperor to f inish at least 
one ship per month.57 At about the same time, Shandong province suffered 
more severely from the lack of timber. Shandong off icials suggested that 
Jiangnan handle the entire shipbuilding procedure on their behalf. This 
was not favourably received by the emperor and the central government. 
Instead, Shandong was ordered to send envoys to acquire timber in Zhejiang 
or Fujian, just as Jiangnan had done.58 The Shandong officials then explained 
that none of the required materials was readily available in Shandong. 
Timber, coir f ibre, vines, oil, iron, and sails were bought in the south, lime, 
charcoal, hemp, linen, and cotton cloth purchased in the north. In view of 
the high transport costs, they preferred having the ships constructed in 
Shanghai and then having them sailed to Shandong. After the expansion 
of overseas trade, timber for shipbuilding, especially Oregon pine, was also 
imported from British Columbia in Canada and Puget Sound in the U.S. 
state of Washington. In Ningbo, for instance, such trade was registered in 
the Customs Registers from 1868.59
As discussed in the last section, merchants’ commitment for sponsoring 
the state’s shipbuilding expenses remained an option that occurred oc-
casionally, according to the sources, and gained in importance over time.
Given that prices for the private and the public sector can only be based 
on relatively vague comparisons and that wages in the private sector are 
as good as unknown, any conclusions we can make in this area remain 
tentative. Procurement prices remained lower than market prices, but we 
may assume that in the course of the eighteenth century, government prices 
moved to converge towards market prices. The sorry state of government 
ships from the nineteenth century on due to their lack of maintenance is 
also proof of the decline of the state’s coercive and f iscal power.
57 Ibid., fol. 4b; this rule was repeated for the Taiwan shipyard in 1835, see chap. 938, fol.7b.
58 Huidian shili, chap. 937, fol. 20b, edict of Jiaqing 23 (1818).
59 Worcester, Junks and Sampans, p. 74.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6. The Shipbuilding Workforce Employed 
by the State and Private Workshops 
and Enterprises
This chapter deals with the working and living conditions of the artisans 
and workers in the government shipbuilding institutions as well as the 
shipbuilders in the commercial and subsistence sector. The question is raised 
as to how the greater appreciation on the part of the central government of 
industry and commerce influenced the lives and professional outlook of the 
shipbuilders. Did the mechanization in this branch and the changed labour 
relations enhance the social respectability of the workers? As in the preceding 
chapters, a long-term perspective will be taken which starts in the late Ming. 
This is because the best information on work organization in an imperial 
shipyard originates from the Ming period. Most outstanding is the monograph 
on the late Ming off icial shipyard at Nanjing, Longjiang chuanchang zhi 
(1553), which draws on previous texts, the Nanchuan ji (An account of the 
Southern ships, 1541) and the Caochuan zhi (Records of River and Canal 
Shipping, compiled in 1501, enlarged in 1544). No comparably comprehensive 
descriptions on shipbuilding exist until the age of mechanization and quality 
control posed new exigencies for accountability upon the off icials and 
engineers in the arsenals. Although strictly speaking, the Ming situation falls 
out of the focus of the present study, we refer to it here under the assumption 
that the problems of personnel and material administration resemble those 
in the Qing off icial shipyards. For the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
off icial evidence of the zeli type includes the regulations and precedents on 
Fujian, Jiangsu, Hunan, and Zhejiang of ca. 1769, which can be complemented 
with the provincial regulations of Fujian (ca. 1874) and the Xiamen gazetteer 
of 1839.1 The zeli, however, concentrate on the cost of materials and the 
composition of ships in order to ensure accountability, as was common in 
other official craft branches, but include very little information on problems 
of labour and personnel administration. Given their strategic importance, it 
seems amazing that government shipyards are not mentioned in the general 
regulations and precedents of the Ministry of Public Works before the 1884 
edition, which includes nineteen short clauses about ‘naval administration’.2
1 ‘Union List’ nos. 1-5-4 to 1-5-6-3, Fujian shengli, Xiamen zhi.
2 Qinding gongbu zeli, Guangxu ed., chap. 72-75.
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An Account from the Sixteenth Century
The Monograph of the Dragon River Shipyard (Longjiang chuanchang zhi) 
shows the decline of the hereditary artisan system that had been adopted 
by the Ming dynasty and the transition from this type of corvée labour to 
wage labour. Our question here is whether the conviction often expressed by 
Chinese historians3 that artisans preferred not to work for the government 
holds true.
In the early Ming system, craftspeople were subjected to a specif ic kind 
of household registration and had to render obligatory labour service at 
the capital for specif ic periods of time. In the course of the Ming dynasty, 
the enforcement of this rigid system declined. From 1485, artisans had the 
option to substitute monetary payment for their service, and in 1562 it was 
expressly forbidden to render labour service instead of monetary payment.4 
The Monograph of the Dragon River Shipyard was written by Li Zhaoxiang, 
the director of the shipyard for several years in the 1550s, at a time when 
corvée obligations had not entirely come to an end but were declining. Li 
states that the workforce originally commanded for obligatory service at the 
shipyard consisted of 400 families from Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Huguang, Fujian, 
and Southern Zhili (i.e., Jiangsu) that were relocated to Nanjing between 1368 
and 1424. Of these, only 245 remained in 1541, and less than 200 in 1551. The 
rest had fled and found work outside the wharf.5 Most of these remaining 
artisan families were poor: ‘only one in ten of them is not hard-pressed for 
food and clothing’. When a shipbuilding project was launched, they received 
no wages or food allowances but instead an advance payment that was later 
deducted from their wages at 20 percent interest.6 Some of them were 
given plots of unused shipyard land for farming in return for rent that had 
to be delivered in the form of the natural produce of hemp and tong-oil. 
These materials were needed for caulking the ships. The tenants did not 
grow these materials on their plots but had to acquire them on the market. 
Moreover, tenants were expected to participate in tasks like water pumping 
or dike maintenance on the grounds of the shipyard.7
The Monograph gives no information on daily, monthly, or piece wages. 
The norms for working time for constructing a number of ship types are 
3 Li Bozhong, Xu Jianqing, Fang Zhuofen et al.
4 Da Ming huidian, chap. 189, fol. 5b, 8a.
5 Longjiang chuanchang zhi, chap. 3, fol. 8a; Scheuring, Drachenfluß-Werft, p. 85.
6 Ibid., chap. 6, fol. 2b; Scheuring, Drachenfluß-Werft, pp. 135-136.
7 Ibid., chap. 5, fol. 1b-6a; Scheuring, Drachenfluß-Werft, p. 126 ff.
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specif ied, including the total working days (gong) and labour costs. Assum-
ing that all artisans received the same wage for one work day, this results 
in wages of around 0.03 silver tael per workday.8 The distinction between 
the work of a master and of an unskilled labourer is not made here. The 
text mentions that for odd jobs such as breaking up ships, marines from 
the nearby Xinjiangkou marine station were employed and paid for by the 
Ministry of War. However, this applied only to the construction of warships. 
The working costs for the imperial ships – those that the emperor and court 
used in Peking and Nanjing – had to be covered entirely by the Ministry of 
Public Works.9 Grain ships were not built at this site.
The author of the Monograph of the Dragon River Shipyard also com-
plained that the estimated work days for the construction of ships often did 
not include the help of unskilled labourers, for example in hauling out the 
ships and setting them into the water after the repair work. These jobs should 
have been taken over by soldiers but often they did not come at all or not in 
the necessary numbers. Control off icials, in order to ingratiate themselves 
with the Ministry of Public Works, did not account for such extra costs, and 
in consequence the artisans were often forced to work overtime without pay, 
which resulted in their impoverishment and in the deteriorating quality of 
the ships.10 Li Zhaoxiang therefore called for ‘compassion’ for the needs of 
the artisans and their families. At the same time, he repeatedly warned that 
artisans as well as merchants and lower-echelon off icials were committing 
a variety of fraud and corrupt practices. Embezzling or ‘saving’ material or 
working time for one’s own advantage could involve mixing old (recycled) 
and new nails when only new nails should be used; boring holes in planks 
without nailing them but applying caulking mass on them as if nails had 
been used; sawing the boards too thinly to ensure that the stocks of timber 
would suffice; using new materials instead of recycling them; and superficial 
caulking. Generally, the author observed that hired unskilled labour worked 
hastily and less diligently than the soldiers employed for the same jobs.11
Product quality was a constant concern of the leading off icials on the 
shipyard. In 1528, one of the directors complained that the crews handled 
8 Longjiang chuanchang zhi, chap. 7, fol. 2a ff. This obviously was the uniform wage for skilled 
artisans employed by the Ministry of Public Works. Chow Kai-wing, Publishing, p. 53, fn 223, 
mentions the same daily wage for a construction worker, which was slightly lower than in the 
private sector, for which he quotes 0.033 tael per day.
9 Longjiang chuanchang zhi, chap. 1, fol. 25b; Scheuring, Drachenfluß-Werft, p. 48.
10 Ibid., chap. 6, fol. 8a/b. Scheuring, Drachenfluß-Werft, p. 145.
11 Ibid., chap. 6, Fuge zhi 孚革志 ‘Consideration of improvements’, Scheuring, Drachenfluß-Werft, 
pp. 137-147.
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the ships carelessly because they felt little responsibility for public property, 
and therefore the ships were sent for overhauls or breaking up before their 
term was due. Quality control of the f inished ships was extremely important 
because if specialists inspected ships for imperial use, these could last for 
more than thirty years, whereas for battleships the usual term of breaking 
up was merely ten years. Off icials should take care that artisans could not 
conspire with the controllers and pay them hush money if their products 
were found defective.12
The director characterizes the artisans in the imperial shipyard as follows:
The artisan families, although they have been living in the [Southern] 
capital [Nanjing], for generations still are a rough and uncivilized lot. 
Even if their foremen have contact with the off ices every day, they remain 
different from [the clerks] who work in the off ices. If they are relentlessly 
controlled and shaken by intimidation, they will not report on their own 
if they have diff iculties fulf illing their tasks. But if we treat them with 
mildness and severity, compassion and legal sanction [in the appropriate 
degree], make them fear us so they don’t dare to cheat us, feel affection 
for us so they couldn’t bear to cheat us, they would not let us down if 
anything unforeseen should happen, but would gladly come up with 
solutions, and success will be ours.13
As can be seen from the 228 regular positions (Table 28), a considerable 
number of artisans were not located at the shipyard at all, and those few 
that worked there seem to have been employed for more decorative tasks. 
The larger ships certainly could not be built with a workforce as small as 
this. The other workers were probably hired labour.
This monograph of the Dragon River Shipyard also contains detailed 
lists stating how much labour (in man-days) was necessary to build specif ic 
ships. These quotas clearly show the division of labour in ship construction 
into as many as 33 different specializations.
The total man-days are quoted as 2,558.5 gong.14 The overall labour costs 
are given as 76,785 tael. Divided by the total number of man-day, the resulting 
wages amount to ca. 0.03 tael per labour unit. Table 29 only shows the working 
time for the most expensive and lavishly decorated ship in the list. The text 
12 Longjiang chuanchang zhi, chap. 1, fol. 9a, chap. 6. Scheuring, Drachenfluß-Werft, p. 30, 
137-147.
13 Ibid., chap. 6, fol. 2a. Scheuring, Drachenfluß-Werft, p. 135-6.
14 However, when one adds up the posts, the result is 2,564.5 gong.
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includes the working times for twenty more ship types in three construction 
series that span the years 1524 to 1553. The expenses and man-days for the 
largest battleship, the 400 unit15 flagship of the battleships, were only slightly 
lower (2,487.1 man-days and 74.61 tael). At the low end, f ishing boats with 
work norms of 80 to 90 man-days for labour costs of 2.52 to 2.1 tael were also 
built. To give a rough impression of the wage income of a shipbuilder, if we 
assume an average rice price of 0.58 tael per shi (about 70 kg) in the time 
span 1522-1566,16 a shipbuilder would have to work 19 days for one shi of rice. 
This means he earned about 0.05 shi or 3.5 kg per day. Assuming further a 
subsistence consumption of 171 kg (or 2.44 shi) of rice per person per year in 
‘Coastal Asia’,17 the shipwright in 1553 would have had to work for 185 days to 
feed a family of four only with their daily rice needs. 300 working days per 
year would earn about 15 shi (1,050 kg) of rice. Thus, if work was abundant, 
shipwrights in the Dragon River Shipyard would be able to make ends meet, 
but if not, they would have to turn to other income sources besides wage 
labour on the yard, such as subsistence farming on the f ields of the yard or 
family members somehow making up for the lack of wages.
Were these standard wages of 0.03 tael per day so low that everyone 
would be tempted to defect from the Dragon River Shipyard at the f irst 
occasion? Considering other urban skilled wages, for instance 0.033 tael for a 
construction worker in the private sector, 0.04 tael per day for a weaver, and 
0.05 tael per day for a letter carver (with a daily work quota of 100 characters 
carved)18, the government wage rate was certainly at the lower end. However, 
the working conditions at the government shipyard stated in the monograph 
may well have given the shipbuilders more reason than the moderate norm 
wages to consider whether it was worthwhile to stay on. Thus, the message 
of director Li Zhaoxiang is clearly that skilful personnel management might 
make the difference in keeping the labour force in the service of the state.
The Workforce in the Early and Mid-Qing Period
In the transitional period until around 1700, before the government ship-
yards were formally reestablished, government ships were constructed 
15 The unit liao corresponds to about 55 kg, thus 400 liao are roughly 20 tons. See Scheuring, 
Drachenfluß-Werft, p. 65, fn. 8.
16 Zhongguo huobi shi, p. 849, transl. Monetary History, p. 752.
17 Allen et al., ‘Wages, Prices, and Living Standards in China: In comparison with Europe, 
India, and Japan’, ‘Table 2: Subsistence Lifestyles’, ‘Coastal Asia’.
18 All wages from Chow Kai-wing, Publishing, pp. 53-54.
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at shipyards that were installed ad hoc and according to demand. After 
the establishment of government shipyards, the artisans were probably 
hired, as was the case in the late Ming. In Guangdong, about 30 foremen 
(touyi) were employed in the government shipyard at Anfu in Chaozhou 
prefecture. Their positions could be inherited by their offspring, but this 
was not the case for hired artisans.19 The other artisans were hired in the 
surrounding areas where shipbuilding was developed. This is not to say that 
shipbuilders were always employed and remunerated according to market 
conditions. Documentary evidence from the 1736 routine memorials of the 
Ministry of Public Works shows that the shipbuilders were occasionally 
requisitioned (paibo) to work for the state and rewarded in kind (‘rice, salt, 
and brushwood’) but not paid the full wages. The ministerial off icials asked 
for approval to change this system and to account for the working wages in 
full when applying for shipbuilding. This particular case did not occur at 
a well-established government shipyard but during ad hoc activities when 
ferryboats in Shengjing, Manchuria had to be built. We note, however, the 
awareness of the ministry that even in such situations, wages should have 
been paid in money and not at depressed procurement prices.20
During the Qianlong era, the government regulations for shipbuilding in 
Fujian (after 1769) explicitly state the wages of shipbuilders: ship carpenters, 
joiners, sawyers, caulkers, ironsmiths, tailors, painters and paint makers, rope 
makers, coir palm workers, rattan workers, character carvers, sturdy labourers 
(unskilled labour), all at 0.05 tael per gong (working day).21 This was the average 
ration accounted for feeding a soldier per day in the early Qing.22 The amazing 
fact here is that although we find a division of labour into more than ten craft 
branches and between skilled ‘master artisans’ ( jiang) and unskilled labourers 
( fu), the wages still seem as undifferentiated as in the Ming. Extra payment 
or food rations may have been included but is not documented here.
19 Xu Jianqing, Qingdai qianqi, p. 332, quoting from Guangdong chuanyun shi, Gudai bufen 
(History of Guangdong transport, Historical part). Renmin jiaotong chubanshe 1989.
20 Gongke tiben 工科題本 (Routine memorials of the Ministry of Public Works), vol. 1, 88, 
2-84-1, Zaochuan gongcheng: Yiban chuanzhi 造船工程：一般船隻 (Shipbuilding: Civilian ships), 
Qianlong 1/6/10, routine memorial by Maizhu 邁柱, Minister of Public Works of the Secondary 
Capital Shengjing, et al.
21 ‘Wages paid for armament, military equipment, and shipbuilding workers, 1769 and 1816’.
22 Peng Xinwei, Zhongguo huobi shi, p. 849, transl. Monetary History, p. 752. See also Luo Ergang, 
Luying bingzhi, p. 344, who quotes a monthly wage of 1.5 tael for a cavalryman and 1 tael for a 
foot soldier of the Green Standard troops in the f irst year (1644) of the dynasty. Mark C. Elliott, 
The Manchu Way, p. 192, specif ies a monetary wage and grain allowances for the stipend of the 
bannermen. The monetary part varied according to rank and location of service, with a typical 
monthly wage of 4 tael in the capital and 3 tael in provincial garrisons.
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These regulations apply to all government shipyards of Fujian, namely 
Fuzhou, Zhangzhou, Xiamen, and Taiwan. A source from the Ming contains 
a more qualitative appraisal of the different skills of the workforce. The 
government ships used to exchange tribute with Liuqiu/Ryūkyū (present-day 
Okinawa) were built in Fujian, and the specif ic differences of shipbuilding 
in Fujian are mentioned in a text on the missions to Liuqiu. It claims that 
the Fuzhou shipbuilders painstakingly maintained the patterns of the 
regulations but were inflexible; the Zhangzhou and Quanzhou shipbuilders 
were good at choosing materials and built stable ships, but their workman-
ship was rough. As a modern naval historian might suppose, these general 
patterns were also true in the Qing.23 However, migration may have led to 
a certain integration of shipbuilding skills and priorities for construction. 
The Xiamen gazetteer states that since the off icial shipyard was newly 
established in 1736, it surpassed and gradually replaced the Quanzhou 
shipyard and attracted migrant shipbuilders from other regions in Fujian.24
No explicit information is available as to how many artisans worked in one 
shipyard or of the size of the labour force in official and private shipbuilding. 
On the basis of evidence for the Ming and Qing periods, Li Bozhong has 
estimated a workforce of over 10,000 in the Jiangnan region for the grain 
ships and military ships in the government sector as well as for the merchant 
and f ishing ships built in the private sector. For Jiangnan in the Qing era, 
he assumes a workforce of several tens of thousands that specialized in 
government shipbuilding and ship maintenance.25 For a rough estimate of 
the workforce of government shipbuilders in all provincial shipyards, we set 
out from Li Bozhong’s f igures for Jiangnan.26 Since the maintenance cycle of 
grain ships lasted ten years, after which the ships were routinely broken up, 
the usable parts recycled and new material used for the rest, one-tenth of 
the fleet had to be rebuilt every year.27 The grain fleet of Jiangnan consisted 
of some 3,000 ships according to the 1812 quotas. Li Bozhong assumes 3,750 
shipbuilders working permanently (300 days/year) to construct and maintain 
the annual reconstruction quota of one-tenth (300 ships), which is about 
12.5 men per ship in the case of routine work procedures without particular 
peaks or lulls. For the entire grain fleet of 6,000 ships, this adds up to 7,500 
shipbuilders who built the yearly norm of 600 ships.
23 Lai Zhengwei 赖正维, Ming Qing shiqi, pp. 80-82.
24 Xiamen zhi, chap. 5, p. 154.
25 Li Bozhong, Jiangnan de zaoqi gongyehua, p. 264.
26 See table ‘Quotas for grain transport ships in the grain providing provinces’.
27 Huidian shili, chap. 202, fol. 4a (Kangxi 13, 1674); chap. 935, fol. 5a (Yongzheng 1, 1723).
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Likewise, Li Bozhong  estimates that 5,000 shipbuilders constructed ten 
percent of the one-thousand sea ships (f lat-bottom sand ships) ‒ that is, 
around 100 ships every year ‒ that were necessary for the experiment with 
sea shipments of tax grain in 1826. Since this project was organized and 
f inanced by merchants, this f igure does not strictly speaking concern the 
government sector. However, here the ratio of 50 shipbuilders for one ship is 
of interest. Applied to the entire battleship fleet of roughly 2,400 ships (see 
chapter four, Table 20 ‘Quotas for coastal and fluvial guard and patrol ships 
of all sizes’), and setting out from the production f igure of one-tenth of the 
fleet annually, the result is an overall f igure of 240 ships x 50 shipbuilders = 
12,000 shipbuilders permanently engaged in government naval construction.
Adding up the grain ship and the navy shipbuilders yields a total of 
roughly 20,000 workmen. Divided by the number of about forty off icial 
civilian and military shipyards recorded in the Collected Statutes, this 
results in a f igure of about 400 workmen per government shipyard, which 
tallies with the original f igure of labour obligations reported for the Dragon 
River Shipyard at Nanjing.28 By the mid-sixteenth century, only half of the 
artisans remained, but since the other labour was hired on demand, the 
f igure of 400 seems fairly consistent, even if at particular peak periods a 
greater workforce must have been engaged in the government shipyards.29 
Their work load at times was divided among several smaller local shipyards 
that may have been established temporarily.
The Dragon River Shipyard with an area of about 500,000 square metres 
was probably the largest shipyard worldwide;30 another contemporary 
reference shows that, for instance, the Fuzhou shipyard (or one of them) 
28 Compare also Xu Jianqing’s estimate that a grain transport shipyard built more than hundred 
ships yearly and employed several hundred workers, and that a military shipyard had an average 
production of several dozen of ships yearly. However, this decreased in the nineteenth century; 
in 1822, the Fujian shipyards, which lacked suitable timber, were ordered to maintain at least 
the production of one ship per month. See Huidian shili, chap. 938, fol. 4a.
29 Li Bozhong, Jiangnan de zaoqi gongyehua, on pp. 256/7 cites a statement from Yao Tinglin 
in Linian ji (Annual chronicle) that in 1677, the Songjiang prefecture was ordered to provide 
f ifteen big sand ships for the naval forces. The responsible off icials commented: ‘To achieve 
thousand work units (gong) every day and to f inish the work in three months is certainly not 
an easy task.’
30 For comparison, Frederic Lane, Venice, p. 362, quotes a size of 60 acres (242,811 square meters) 
for the Venetian arsenal in the 1560s. In the Mediterranean, this arsenal was only matched in 
size by the Imperial Arsenal at the Golden Horn in Istanbul, for which no estimates are available. 
See İdris Bostan, ‘Tersane-i Amire’, p. 559. Its successor that is operative to this day, the Halic 
shipyards, covers an area of 68,000 square meters. On the Atlantic, the Portuguese Royal Shipyard 
Ribeira das Naus, judging from the position given on historical and present-day maps, such as 
the sixteenth-century copper engraving ‘Olisippo Lissabona’, ‘Planta de Lisboa Arruinada pelo 
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measured only 7,000 square metres (10.5 mu) including the artisans’ living 
quarters.31
The government shipyards most probably remained the biggest employers 
in shipbuilding. It is as yet not possible to compare wages in the private 
shipbuilding sector to those of the government sector, since wage data are 
extremely rare. We have so far only localized one instance, a payment of 
5,000 copper cash for caulking a leaking boat in Baling district in Hunan.32 
Judging from the differences in the procurement prices of government ships 
and market prices (see chapter f ive, Table 24), ranging from twice to three 
times the amount for private ships, we can assume that the privately built 
ships were more carefully worked and more costly materials were used, and 
that wages may also have been higher. The government obviously paid sub-
sistence wages to its workforce like those of the military, and in fact soldiers 
may have been employed for auxiliary jobs as in the Ming. One part of the 
positions in the government shipyards may have been hereditary, linking up 
to the tradition followed in the early Ming period, but the main workforce 
was hired. There are no indications that large shipbuilding enterprises 
existed before the late nineteenth century.33 Rather, clusters of smaller 
shipyards may have cooperated when building the larger seagoing ships, so 
that wage labour may have been quite restricted. Thus, family enterprises 
would have prevailed as in the supplying sectors of sail and net making.
The Workforce in Private Enterprises after the Opening of the 
Treaty Ports and in the Earliest Phases of Industrialization
After the Opium War and the opening of the treaty ports, the workforce 
engaged in shipbuilding increased where the demand was the greatest. 
At this point in time, foreign manufacturers also offered work opportuni-
ties. However, the mechanized production of steamships did not start 
terremoto de 1755’, and ‘Terreiro do Paço’ (1879) could have measured maximally about 20,000 
square meters.
31 Shi Liuqiu lu san zhong [1606], mission of Xia Ziyang 夏子陽, p. 238 ‘shipbuilding’.
32 Peng Zeyi, Zhongguo jindai shougongye, vol. 1, pp. 396-414, translated in ‘Wages paid on the 
free market’.
33 The samples for larger proto-capitalist or capitalist enterprises, depending on the def inition, 
cited by Zhu Cishou, Zhongguo gudai gongye shi, pp. 789-804, include mining of iron and copper 
ores, metal smelting and ref ining; cotton processing; the Shaanxi timber industry; papermaking; 
salt wells in Sichuan, sugar production in Taiwan; tea curing; and flour mills; but not shipbuilding. 
Likewise, Myers and Wang, ‘Economic Developments’, p. 644, point out that by 1800, ‘few private 
organizations had achieved large-scale size and complexity’.
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immediately and everywhere. For several decades to come, the use of 
wind-propelled vessels also intensif ied, as the numbers of sailing ships 
entered and cleared at Shanghai during the years 1902-1941 (Figure 10) 
show. Rising from 6,379 entries and clearances in 1902 to a peak of 77,420 in 
1935, the f igure dropped sharply in 1937, when the Republican government 
was forced out of its capital Nanjing, and Shanghai was occupied by the 
Japanese, but in 1940 returned to 21,428. At the same time, the number of 
steamships in Chinese possession rose continuously, with setbacks during 
the French-Chinese War in 1884 and in the last decade of the Qing dynasty 
(Figures 11 and 12). On the Upper Yangzi, the turning point for transported 
tonnage occurred between 1919 and 1920, when the transport volume by 
steamship rose from 58,728 to 75,386 tons, while the tonnage of sailing ship 
transports sank from 74,289 to 40,757 tons. The last year with information 
on sailing ship traff ic was 1925, when one sailing ship transported 20 tons 
of goods. At the same time, the f igures of steamships in Chinese possession, 
f irst reported in 1882 at 30 and a tonnage of 22,111, had by 1921 risen to 1,592 
ships with a transport capability of 183,286 tons (Figures 13 and 14).
From personal observation and statistical evidence, the Chinese Maritime 
Customs Inspector Worcester concluded that, at least up to 1935, wooden 
sailing ships had not yet disappeared. However, the junks that did circulate 
were smaller, and the profusion of ship types seen in the Shanghai harbour 
in the late nineteenth century existed no longer. Worcester stresses the case 
of the Fuzhou merchant ships, of which by the 1930s only eleven rapidly 
disintegrating specimens were left in Chinese waters, the most recent of 
them twenty years old.34 For a comparison to inland navigation, the 1922-1931 
numbers and tonnage of steamships and sailing ships circulating on the 
Yu river in Guangxi shows that wooden sailing ships still were in use by 
1931, even if their number had declined also on this rather minor traff ic 
artery (Figures 15 and 16). In sum, the sailing ships that were still in use in 
the f irst half of the twentieth century were smaller and could mainly be 
found further inland.
Figures on the global situation of the steamships and sailing ships are 
controversial. French sources state that by as early as 1860, the number of 
sailing ships worldwide equalled those of steamships.35 The transport volume 
of steamships as a rule being larger than that of sailing ships, this information 
conflicts with the statement of a German expert who claimed that the net 
34 Worcester, Junks and Sampans, p. 194, 197.
35 Cornet, Etat et entreprises, p. 19, referring to André Reussner, and Nicolas André, La puissance 
navale dans l’histoire, 1815-1914, p. 37.
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volume of the worldwide sailing fleet equalled that of the entire steamship 
f leet only by 1892, and that by 1900 the steamship tonnage increased to 
twice the tonnage of sailing ships. He added that by 1907, 15 to 20 percent of 
all ships were sailing ships and 85 to 80 percent were steamships.36 In any 
case, not only had the number of sailing ships in China not declined by the 
end of the Qing dynasty, but the number of steamships was also increasing. 
Moreover, if steam technology was applied, the engines were often inserted 
in wooden rather than steel ships, which caused a more gradual transition 
from traditional ship carpentry to the manufacturing of metal ships.37
As far as is known from written evidence before the mid-nineteenth 
century, the size of the workforce in private shipyards ranged from family 
businesses to enterprises that hired workers in the range of a dozen. In 
accordance with the increased shipbuilding activities, the reports about 
shipyards for traditional wooden ships show that those that employed a 
larger workforce date from the end of the nineteenth century. In Sichuan, 
in the district of Jiangbei ting in Chongqing prefecture on the Upper Yangzi, 
40-50 shipyards for wooden boats employed 2,000 shipbuilders, and thus 
each had a workforce of 40 to 50 persons. They operated permanently and 
produced 700-800 wooden ships of 30 to 100 tons per year.38 However, in 
shipbuilding areas such as the Lake Tai region, smaller shipyards could form 
cooperative clusters that offered work opportunities for local shipbuilders 
beyond the scope of one single workplace. For one of the Sichuan shipbuilding 
centres, Wan(yuan) xian, the trade is described as a typical side business 
for farmers until the Republican era.39 By comparison, a recent account of 
a typical family business of shipbuilders in Zhoushan in Zhejiang province, 
which is currently in its fourth generation, describes a workforce during the 
period between 1925 and 1953 of one father and four sons who were joined 
by their wives, thus totalling nine persons in peak times.40 As for the South 
China region around Hong Kong, wooden sailing ships were a frequent sight 
up to the 1970s, and for inland water traff ic, sailing ships gave way only 
gradually to engine-propelled craft.41
36 Radunz, 100 Jahre, p. 134, referring to an undated paper by the Bremen mayor Johannes 
Rösing (1833-1909), Die Segelschiffahrt und ihre Zukunft, Bremen.
37 For evidence of the building of traditional sailing ships in Hong Kong in 1979, see Maitland, 
Setting Sails, pp. 57-61.
38 Xu Jianqing, ‘Qingdai qianqi’, p. 602, citing Xu Zengze 許增澤, Sichuan gudai zaochuanye 
fazhan guiji 四川古代造船業發展軌跡 (Traces of historical shipbuilding in Sichuan’).
39 Ibid., citing the local gazetteer Wanyuan xianzhi萬源縣志, chap. 3.
40 Xin Yi, Zheng Ming (eds.), Putuo chuantong muchuan zhizao jiyi, pp. 126-139.
41 Maitland, Setting Sails, p. 59.
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According to Worcester’s description of a typical shipyard for Yangzi 
ships, the working time was from 8 A.M. until dark, with a break of one hour 
at noon and two hours during the summer months. The shipwrights were 
usually offered three meals a day by their master. Sawyers and caulkers42 
formed ‘a different class’. Sawyers were initiated into their trade, which was 
not considered as highly skilled, from their childhood.43
The supplying trades of sailmaking and net making were also specialized. 
Worcester reports for the 1930s that all nets used in the Ningbo f ishing 
industry were manufactured in only two or three places, where the popula-
tion mainly or exclusively relied on net production. As in the sailmaking 
trade, the entire family was engaged. While the sailmakers did not process 
the yarn or weave the sail cloth on their own, the net makers’ families 
processed the raw material hemp from the stalk to the f inished product.44
According to Worcester, all work in these handicraft shipyards was 
exclusively handwork, marking a strong contrast to the fully mechanized 
workshops of the government and foreign steamship manufacturers.
The Workforce of the Jiangnan Arsenal and the Fujian Navy Yard
Unlike the management of the government shipyards under the Ministry 
of Public Works, the concerns of the Jiangnan Arsenal and the Fujian Navy 
Yard were more in the domestic and international limelight. Therefore, the 
information on its workforce also stands out in clearer prof ile than the 
rather indirect conclusions we can gain for the previous periods.
The first big difference between traditional provincial shipyards and their 
mechanized counterparts was the size of their workforces. At the Jiangnan 
Arsenal, the workforce rose from about 200 Chinese workers (including 
100 from Thomas Hunt and Company and 100 from two smaller Shanghai 
arsenals that had been retained, as well as eight foreign technicians) to 
1,300 Chinese and 13 foreigners by 1869. In 1876 it consisted of ca. 2,000 
Chinese workers.45 After 1890, the workforce increased to about 3,000. 
42 For documentation of shipbuilding at Hong Kong, see the illustrations in f igure 1 to 3.
43 Worcester, Junks and Sampans, pp. 34-5.
44 Ibid., pp. 178/9, 183 for net makers, with a detailed description of the work processes and the 
children’s tasks, mainly spinning (p. 72). While complimentary to the net makers, Worcester 
notes that the workmanship of the family sail makers compared unfavourably to those of their 
professional British counterparts, with an average of only 72 stitches to the square yard against 
the 120 prescribed by the British Navy.
45 Jiangnan 1983, pp. 84-85.
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From the monograph on the arsenal published in 1905, Chinese historians 
have extracted the following f igures.
Table 26  Number of workers in the Jiangnan Arsenal in 1905
Work type Number Remarks
Skilled workers工匠 2,314 including child labour 童工
unskilled workers for odd jobs 小工 486
Porters 夫役 40 not engaged in production
total 2,840
Source: Jiangnan 1975, p. 22, adapted from Jiangnan zhizao ju ji, chap. 2, pp. 13-14. foremen not 
included.
However, these workers were not all shipbuilders. At the time of stocktaking, 
no new ships had been built at the arsenal for twenty years. Nevertheless, the 
monograph lists the administrative and productive personnel of the ‘Steam-
ship plant’ lunchuan chang as follows: one weiyuan (commissioner), two 
overseers (sishi), three foremen ( jiangmu), 105 skilled workers (gongjiang), 
and 72 unskilled workers (xiaogong),46 who must have been employed for 
maintenance and repair services.
The arsenal was guarded by 100 patrol soldiers ( fanghuying) and 270 
artillery soldiers (paoduiying) whose task was not only to test the weapons 
but also to keep the workers under control.47 The 133 administrative positions 
that had accumulated over time were reduced to 80 between 1885 and 1890.48
At the Fujian Navy Yard, the workforce rose from about 300 at its foun-
dation in 1867 to 500 in 1869 and to as much as 3,000 at the peak of the 
construction process. Thereafter, the normal level was about 1,900, including 
600 employed at the dockyard, 800 in the workshops, and 500 porters. 
Moreover, 500 soldiers guarded the premises and were also employed for 
unskilled manual labour, similar to the case of the Dragon River Shipyard 
340 years earlier. The administrative staff was formed by about 150 members, 
most of whom came from the local gentry.49
Both institutions initially encountered diff iculties f inding skilled labour. 
According to the 1975 history of the arsenal, at f irst skilled workers from 
the Hunt Shipyard were hired but also Qing army soldiers from the smaller 
46 Wei Yungong, Jiangnan zhizaoju, chap. 2, fol. 4b.
47 Jiangnan 1975, p. 19.
48 Cornet, Etat et entreprises, p. 26.
49 Pong, Shen Pao-chen, p. 209.
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Shanghai ammunition and ordnance arsenals that had been merged with the 
Hunt Shipyard to form the Jiangnan Arsenal. After the arsenal moved to the 
bigger site in the southern suburbs of Shanghai, new recruitment methods 
were tried out. Recruitment officers travelled to exterior provinces and hired 
skilled workers, demobilized Anhui and Hunan soldiers, and children from 
orphanages.50 Working at the arsenal was not popular with the farmers who 
lived nearby. According to the 1975 history, they resented the fact that their 
land had been expropriated and worked at the arsenal only if they had gone 
bankrupt. The 1983 history identif ies the fear of machine production and 
the strict military control of the workplace as reasons for local resentment.51
Experienced workers were few at the time of the foundation and still 
by 1894, only eight percent of all Shanghai workers were employed in 
mechanized production. This constituted 3.84 percent of the workforce in 
the ‘modern industrial’ sector of the entire country.52 The skilled ‒ and also 
unskilled ‒ non-local workforce often came from Hong Kong and treaty port 
cities, especially Canton, Fuzhou, and Ningbo. In 1898, one of the streets in 
front of the arsenal was called ‘Guangdong Street’ because many Guangdong 
natives lived and worked there.53 The Fujian Arsenal initially also experienced 
a shortage of skilled workers. Blacksmiths and carpenters had to be hired from 
Shanghai and Hong Kong. Later, most workers could be recruited locally.54
In the so-called sub-contractual system (baogongzhi), workers were 
recruited by intermediary agents, often foremen or low-level off icials. The 
workers depended on the recruiters for their wages, and the recruiters were 
responsible for the workers’ personal conduct and work performance. In the 
arsenal, this method seems to have officially started in the early twentieth 
century, when about 70 percent of the workers were hired as sub-contractual 
labour and only 30 percent had a permanent position.55 One of the undesirable 
consequences of the sub-contracting system was that the intermediaries could 
abuse their power in many ways, and they often squeezed money out of the 
contract workers. This occurred in the Jiangnan Arsenal as well as in the Navy 
Yard after the demise of the first director Shen Baozhen.56 When considering 
the wage levels of these institutions, therefore, it is important to keep in mind 
that not the entire wage may have arrived in the hands of the workers.
50 Jiangnan 1975, pp. 17-18.
51 Jiangnan 1983, p. 86.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., p. 87.
54 Pong, Shen Pao-chen, p. 208, 212.
55 Cornet, Etat et entreprises, p. 127.
56 Ibid.; Pong, Shen Pao-chen, p. 212.
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Working Conditions and Wage Payment
At the Navy Yard in Fuzhou, all workers received contracts for five years.57 They 
worked a six-day week with few holidays, one each in spring and autumn and 
one week at New Year. A leave of 21 days was granted for mourning deceased 
parents ‒ which was short in comparison to the hundred-day leave given to 
the students of the Navy Yard School for the same circumstances. The working 
hours were 8½ hours in winter, nine in spring and autumn, and ten in summer 
for the skilled workers, who on average received 7 to 21 tael per month.
Unskilled workers were paid 4.5 to 7 tael per month for an eleven-hour 
day. Further wage incentives were given to skilled labour recruited in Hong 
Kong and Shanghai. Foremen could earn 21 to 49 tael a month.
According to the 1975 history, wages at the Jiangnan Arsenal ranged 
on average between f ive to ten silver dollars (yinyuan) per month, which 
amounts to 3.75 to 7.5 tael. Skilled wages were about 7.5 tael, while unskilled 
and children’s wages were between 3.75 and 4.5 tael.58 Monthly salaries 
of off icials varied from 200 Hunan tael59 for a director-general (zongban), 
150 tael for a director (huiban), 80 tael for a coordinator (tidiao), and 25 to 
30 tael for commissioners (weiyuan) and overseers (sishi).60
On the basis of the 1904 account of the Jiangnan Arsenal, the 1983 history 
calculated some of the wages.
The 1975 history has a similar table61 based on the same source but with 
slightly differing daily rates in silver dollars: skilled workers 0.56 dollars; child 
workers 0.21 dollars; unskilled workers 0.176 dollars; porters less than 0.1 dollars. 
The slight difference is due to the fact that the wages were notated as lump sums 
for the different departments of the enterprise and that the disbursed currencies 
and rhythms of wage and salary payment differed. Foreign specialists were paid 
monthly in pound sterling (yingbang) and Chinese administrative commis-
sioners in silver tael. Foremen, skilled workers, and child workers received daily 
wages in silver dollars (yangyuan), and unskilled labourers in copper cash.62
Arsenal wages in 1904 were about average for factory work in Shanghai, 
where skilled carpenters, smiths, and dock workers (qugong) earned between 
57 The following information about wages, working times, and labour organization are all 
from Pong, Shen Pao-chen, pp. 210-212, who collected them from several sources which show 
variances in the range of 20 to 40 percent.
58 Jiangnan 1975, p. 20.
59 1.0363 Hunan tael corresponded to 1 standard treasury tael.
60 Jiangnan 1975, p. 33.
61 Ibid., p. 30.
62 Wei Yungong, Jiangnan zhizaoju, chap. 2, fol. 3a.
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0.6 and 0.85 silver dollars per day. The ‘child labour’ force (tonggong or youtong) 
is explained as a group of ‘apprentices’ (yitu), but in the view of Chinese 
historians it actually was exploitative child labour. Conclusive evidence about 
the age at which children started working is not available. One old arsenal 
worker cited in the 1975 history said that his father joined the arsenal at the 
age of ten.63 In 1904, about 300 child workers and 400 unskilled workers 
were employed. The 1975 history states that the conversion between various 
types of silver dollars (big and small) when the wages were paid out was to 
the advantage of the officials at the expense of the wage earners. Unskilled 
labourers were paid in debased cash of low value. Thus, deductions from the 
wage rates stated in the sources were frequently made. One director in 1903 
reported as one of his achievements that during his tenure the wages were 
paid out in full without deductions; this implies that before then, wages were 
cut.64 As in Fuzhou, the working week had six days. Until 1890, the Jiangnan 
Arsenal workers had an eight-hour day, but thereafter the norm was nine hours.
Accounts both of the Fujian Navy Yard and the Jiangnan Arsenal stress the 
huge differences between the Chinese wages and the salaries of the foreign 
specialists. In Fuzhou, the wages of the foreigners between 1868 and 1874 
‘constituted the largest item of maintenance’: 12,000 tael per month out of 
total operation costs of between 50,000 and 80,000 tael, while the labour 
costs for about 2,000 Chinese were 10,000 tael per month. Assuming there 
were about 50 French and English experts, their average salaries would 
63 Jiangnan 1975, p. 20.
64 Ibid., p. 31, 33.
Table 27  Daily wage rates at the Jiangnan Arsenal in 1904









foreign technician 洋匠 11.433 8.57475 357.28
managers 委員，提調，幫辦 1.773 1.32975 55.41
(administrative) overseers 司事 0.886 0.6645 27.69
foremen 匠目 1.746 1.3095 54.56
Skilled workers 工匠 0.652 0.489 20.38
Child worker 幼童 0.207 0.15525 6.47
unskilled workers 小工 0.166 0.1245 5.19
Sources: Jiangnan 1983, p. 89, based on wei yungong, Jiangnan, chap. 2, pp. 3-14. rice prices from 
Zhongguo jindai gongyeshi ziliao, vol. 1, p. 1209. Prices for 1904: 1 shi (156 shijin) 5 dollar (yuan), each 
pound (shijin) cost 0.032 yuan.
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have been about 240 tael.65 Likewise, the Jiangnan Arsenal salaries ranged 
between 160 and 270 tael per month.66 By comparison, the nominal wages 
in Fuzhou were slightly higher than those in Shanghai.
Work Discipline and Living Conditions
Since the Jiangnan Arsenal and the Fujian Navy Yard stood under the overall 
control of the Ministry of War and produced exclusively for defence, military 
discipline was enforced on the work sites. In retrospect, Shen Baozhen’s ad-
ministrative and educational achievements as director of the Fujian Navy Yard 
between 1868-1875 stand out clearer than those of his colleagues in Shanghai, 
the Shanghai Circuit Intendants Ding Richang (1823-1882) and Ying Baoshi, 
and the Directors Han Dianjia, Shen Baojing, and Feng Junguang. In his study 
on this administrator, David Pong argues that while Shen had internalized 
traditional elite values, for instance a disdain for physical labour and exercise, 
he nevertheless sought to introduce elements of Western learning even in the 
curricula for the apprentices and the workers and decidedly advocated a general 
revision of the official educational system. Shen Baozhen vigorously enforced 
discipline at the shipyard, the schools, and the workers’ living quarters. These 
dormitories at f irst were overcrowded, but soon more houses were built to 
provide for more space and to improve hygiene. Movement between the 
dormitory wards was forbidden at night, and within the wards, drunkenness, 
gambling, opium smoking, and rowdiness were all heavily sanctioned.
This type of management reflects a Confucian authoritarian approach 
and also a scholar-gentry bias against the lower classes.67 At the same time, 
while Shen was in control, he tried to enforce the same discipline on all 
employees of the shipyard, including the mid and low-level administrators, 
in order to prevent corruption. Punishments could be draconian: one man 
was tried and executed for stealing brass in 1869.68
What did this mean for the workers in the shipyard? Paternalistic attitudes 
and disregard of phsical labour on the part of administrative elites were 
common in the mid-nineteenth century. Disciplinary enforcement certainly 
was not unknown in the army and military production sites. Nonetheless, 
protection against corruption can only have been welcome. Compared to 
65 Kuo Ting-yee, ‘Self-Strengthening’, p. 524.
66 Jiangnan 1975, p. 20; Wei Yungong, Jiangnan zhizaoju, chap. 2, fol. 9b.
67 Pong, Shen Pao-chen, pp. 209-210.
68 Ibid., p. 209.
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the Shanghai Arsenal, wages at the Fujian Navy Yard were relatively high. 
Finally, the young workers had the opportunity to pursue vocational training 
and basic education in the apprentice classes. The idea that some of the 
apprentices should receive more intensive training to raise them above the 
level of foremen probably came from the foreign consultants rather than 
the Chinese directors, but the fact that they agreed to such reforms shows a 
degree of openness on the part of the Chinese administrators. The presence 
of foreigners and the necessity to learn from them in their own languages, 
although disturbing to orthodox elites outside the shipyard, may have been 
an attractive benefit for some of the younger workforce.
Reports and assessments of the Jiangnan Arsenal are quite somber, 
especially with regard to the workforce and the living conditions. The 1975 
and 1983 histories are certainly prejudiced against the administration and 
on some points are rather exaggerated in their indignation. Hardly any 
contemporary or present-day military production site worldwide would allow 
its workers come and go without security controls, and harsh punishment in 
case of disobedience was not exceptional to this industry. The authors’ claims 
of arrogance on the part of the off icials towards the workers are plausible; 
it may well be that the off icials ‒ or at least some of them ‒ regarded the 
workforce as mere ‘corvée labourers in off icial service’ (zai guan renyi), as 
the 1975 history charges.69 However, it was perfectly clear to the officials that 
they had to pay these workers, especially the skilled among them, if they were 
to stay on. That work accidents often occurred and were insufficiently or not 
at all insured was again a common contemporary phenomenon worldwide in 
the early industrial phases, which by then was just beginning to be addressed 
by the labour movements in Western countries. Nevertheless it shows little 
consideration for the workforce if no invalidity insurances were provided 
for workers but only for the administrative staff who died on duty.70
Moreover, we must take into account the reports on corporal punishment, 
the exploitation of workers ‒ especially young children ‒ and most of all 
the poor and cramped housing conditions in the arsenal dormitories with 
a mere 100 bays ( jian) of housing for 1,300 workers in low, dark, and moist 
rooms in the vicinity of the Huangpu River.71 After some time, the obligation 
to live in these dormitories was lifted, but for many workers, the housing 
69 Jiangnan 1975, p. 19.
70 Ibid., p. 34, cites the case of one off icial of the lowest rank (sishi, overseer) who died on 
duty. His family received a compensation of 2,000 tael. If workers died on duty, the Arsenal only 
covered the costs of a simple coff in and a low sum for funerary expenses.
71 Jiangnan 1975, pp. 20-21. The measure of the bay ( jian) length varies between 2.5 m and 5.5 
m; each room for thirteen workers each can hardly have been more than 30 square meters.
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outside the arsenal did not offer much of an improvement. Sometimes 
these facilities were even worse, with no access to clean water or sanitation. 
Moreover, between 1870 and 1905, rice prices increased by 66 percent and 
coal prices by 38 percent, while wages stagnated. As a result, some of the 
unskilled labour and porters could never afford to marry and have a family. 
In the case of families, all members had to work to support themselves ‒ a 
fact that on its own cannot be considered an indication of exploitation in 
the contemporary context, even if the 1975 history implies this.72
Strikes and workers’ protests in the Jiangnan Arsenal were triggered by 
the long working hours and the brutal treatment workers received from 
off icials and overseers. The f irst recorded strike occurred in 1883, and 
between 1905 and 1927, about ten strikes were resolved.73 In view of the 
unfavourable conditions, the number of strikes may seem to be low, but 
the workplace was heavily guarded and protesters were more likely to be 
heavily punished than in other industries. At the Fujian Navy Yard, at least 
during Shen Baozhen’s term of administration, no strikes were reported.74
The Fujian Navy Yard may have been a better organized workplace in 
its initial phase with a more enduring leadership, slightly higher wages, 
and better housing facilities. The military drill and discipline may have 
been stricter here, but since the orientation towards shipbuilding and the 
acquisition of skills was clear from the beginning, also for apprentices, 
technical learning may have been easier to accomplish in this institution.
Conclusion
From the perspective of the artisans, the observed periods witnessed change 
and acceleration in much more drastic ways than in the centuries before. 
The Ming-Qing transition brought about the legal abolition of corvée labour. 
As a rule, labour was hired in the government shipyards, but for building 
the ships of the naval forces, soldiers were probably engaged as unskilled 
workers, as in the late Ming. The scant evidence we possess suggests that 
building ships for the government was not well paid. Clearly the prices for 
72 See ibid., p. 31, for a case where an Arsenal worker raised vegetables after work and sold 
them to increase the family income, while his 14-year old son also worked in the Arsenal and 
his daughter made stockings.
73 Cornet, Etat et entreprises, p. 138.
74 The only report of unrest at the shipyard dates from 1899, when a contest of skills between 
the Chinese and foreign workers f lared up into a riot. Chinese workers were wounded, and a 
strike followed. Li Yunjun, Wan Qing, p. 786, Nov. 28.
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government ships were procurement costs at a rate much lower than those 
on the free market. The question remains whether this price difference was 
mainly due to the prices for materials, which had been rising since the late 
Ming, or whether it was also affected by the artif icially low wages paid by 
the government.
The rise of steam navigation in China proceeded at a fairly slow pace, while 
trade volumes increased much faster due to China’s rising participation in 
the world market. Traditional wooden sailing ships were built by private 
shipyards for at least one or two more decades after the fall of the Qing 
dynasty. In the area of mechanized production of steamships, artisans turned 
into industrial workers. We may wonder whether that was a desirable process 
for those personally involved. Initially, the wages and working hours seem to 
have been more acceptable; but inadequate housing and the strict military 
control of work on the sites, at least in the Jiangnan Arsenal, must have made 
work unattractive. The situation deteriorated rather than improved after 
the arsenal was managed as a private enterprise. Nevertheless, this was a 
place for learning mechanized production on the job as well as for receiving 
a more formalized education. Moreover, working conditions for apprentices 
in the private sector, judging from the accounts given in Reed’s work on early 
printing machinery production, do not seem to have been much better.75 The 
Shanghai Arsenal was an important institution for spreading technological 
know-how, despite diff icult working conditions. It is no coincidence that 
in the early days of the printing machine industry ‒ in which Shanghai 
became leading in the early twentieth century76 ‒ mechanics who had 
previously worked at the arsenal started to develop machines rather than 
just concentrating upon repair and maintenance.77
Shipbuilding between the seventeenth and early twentieth centuries 
passed through two phases of more rigorous control by the central government 
and the gradual takeover by regional and merchant elites: between the 1650s 
and the 1830s, and between the mid-1860s and the end of the dynasty. In the 
second, much shorter phase, government shipbuilding served as a kind of 
catalyst that eventually spread new knowledge and skills into sectors that 
were beyond the direct influence of the government. Thus, even if govern-
ment institutions could not promote economical production and could not 
keep up with the latest technology, they were actively behind the launch of 
modernization in shipbuilding and in the supply of raw materials in China.
75 Reed, Gutenberg, p. 147.
76 Ibid., p. 134.
77 Ibid., p. 146.
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Throughout his work Setting Sails, Derek Maitland stresses the continuity 
in the construction of junks up until the late 1970s. The illustrations for the 
book were taken by photographer Nik Wheeler, who kindly provided several 
of his pictures and granted permission to reproduce them.
Figure 7  Construction of wooden sailing ships in the 1970s, Hong Kong
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Figure 8  Compartments within the hull construction
fotograph: nik wheeler, reproduced with permission. See also maitland, Setting Sails, p. 60.
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Figure 9  The caulking procedure
fotograph: nik wheeler, reproduced with permission. See also maitland, Setting Sails, p. 61.
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Appendix




40 廂長 xiangzhang group leaders1
45 作頭 zuotou foremen2
38 内官監匠 neiguanjian jiang artisans for the eunuch Bureau3
4 御馬監匠 yumajian jiang artisans for the imperial Stables4
3 丁字庫匠 dingziku jiang artisans of the t-shaped storehouse5
2 寳船匠 baochuanchang jiang Shipbuilders of the treasure Ship Shipyard6
3 酒醋麫庫匠 jiucumianju jiang artisans in the imperial wine and vinegar 
Press and noodle Store7
37 後湖水夫 houhu shuifu Sailors of the Posterior lake8
20 看料匠丁 kanliao jiangding artisan-guardians for the material storage9
15 更夫 gengfu night watchmen
4 橋夫 qiaofu Bridge guards
1 腳頭 jiaotou foreman of the porters
船戶 chuanhu Shippers
佃戶 dianhu tenants
16 上作頭 shangzuotou Superior foremen,10 working as:
3 蓬作 pengzuo Sailmakers
1 旗作 qizuo flag maker
1 油畫作 youhuazuo Painter and paint maker
1 皷作 guzuo Drum maker
1 Group leaders: The artisans were divided into four groups (xiang) according to their specific branch: 
1) Makers of wooden parts, oars, and ropes; 2) Shipwrights, smiths, and ropemakers for heavy ropes; 3) 
Caulkers; and 4) Mat and sailmakers. Each group was divided into ten units (jia), and each of the ten 
units originally consisted of ten families. Each group was supervised by a group leader, who was chosen 
among them on a rotational basis for three months. Many of the artisans quit, however, so that the 
actual f igures are given as 245 in 1541 and below 200 in 1551. See Scheuring, Drachenfluß-Werft, p. 84.
2 Foremen were chosen from the families that rendered more than one member’s labour.
3 Artisans for the Eunuch Bureau: Shipyard artisans who worked for the eunuchs in the palace 
and formed ceremonial vessels. The shipyard paid their wages.
4 Artisans for the Imperial Stables: Shipyard artisans who produced mangers and drinking buckets 
for the Imperial Stables.
5 Artisans in the T-shaped Storehouse built wooden containers for f ish oil used in caulking.
6 Although the storehouses of the Treasure Ship Shipyard were dilapidated, two artisans were 
commanded to work there.
7 The artisans in the Imperial Wine and Vinegar Press and Flour Store were hired out, like their 
colleagues who were sent to the Imperial Stables.
8 This was a popular odd job for shipyard artisans because work was lighter than in the yards.
9 Artisan-guardians for the material storage: Originally the artisans worked as guardsmen, too, 
but this assignment was stopped in 1508, and people from outside were hired for the security service.
10 The Superior foremen were directly subordinated to the Ministry of Public Works and probably 
responsible for special tasks, such as interior decoration.




1 銅作 tongzuo Coppersmith
1 糹條 作 taozuo Cord and ribbon maker
1 鑄作 zhuzuo metal caster 
1 蜊殼作 likezuo Shell polisher
1 穿椅作 chuanyizuo Chair maker
1 貼金作 tiejinzuo gilder
1 纓作 yingzuo tassel maker
1 旋作 xuanzuo Jade carver 
2 箍桶作 gutongzuo vat makers
Source: Scheuring, Drachenfluß-Werft, pp. 84-9, Longjiang chuanchang zhi chap. 3, fol. 8a.
Table 29  Labour force required for the construction of a Big Imperial Ship On 
Permanent Duty Yubei da huangchuan 預備大黃船, 1503
No. Craft 
branch
Transcription Translation Working 
units
(man-days)
1 船木作 chuanmu zuo Shipwrights 780
2 鋸作 Juzuo Sawyers 225
3 裝修作 zhuangxiu zuo interior decorators 310
4 雕鑾作 diaoluan zuo wood carvers 58
5 鋸作 Juzuo Sawyers 74





lime grinders, hemp cutters, nail hole 
drillers
43.5
8 鉄作 tiezuo ironsmiths 130
9 上鉄作 shang tiezuo Superior smiths 27.5
10 蓬作 pengzuo mat makers 91.5
11 索作 suozuo rope makers 74
12 上索作 shang suozuo Superior rope makers 1.5
13 纜作 lanzuo truss makers 29.5
14 竹作 zhuzuo Bamboo winders 20.5
15 油漆作 youqi zuo Painters, paint makers 133
16 五墨作 wuhei zuo Paint makers 32.5
17 粧鑾作 zhuangluan zuo Curtain makers and interior decorators 8
18 抹金作 mojin zuo gilders 4
19 旗作 qizuo flag makers 6
20 鼓作 guzuo Drum makers 6
21 蜊殼作 like zuo Shell polishers 23.5
22 纓作 yingzuo tassel makers 2.5
23 旋作 xuanzuo winch makers 5
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No. Craft 
branch
Transcription Translation Working 
units
(man-days)
24 染作 ranzuo Dyers 103
25 裁縫作 caifeng zuo tailors 9.5
26 擺錫 boxi zuo tin casters 1.5
27 雙綫作 shuangxian zuo leather workers 2
28 縧作 taozuo Silk ribbon makers 4
29 穿椅作 chuanyi zuo hammock chair makers (?)1 6
30 桶作 tongzuo vat makers 12.5
31 銅作 tongzuo Copper smiths 21.5
32 響銅作 xiangtong zuo gong and bell makers 14
33 鑄作 zhuzuo metal casters 5
Source: Scheuring, Drachenfluß-Werft, p. 159, Longjiang chuanchang zhi, chap. 7, fol. 2a-3a. 
1 Scheuring translates this as ‘hängestuhlbauer’ (Drachenfluß-Werft, p. 159).
Table 30  Shipping tonnage of the China Merchants’ Steam Navigation Company and 
the China Navigation Company (founded in 1872 by Butterfield and Swire)
China Merchants’ Steam 
Navigation Company
China Navigation Company
Number of Ships Tonnage Number of Ships Tonnage
fleet during 1877 33 23,967 5 8,361
additions, 1877-93 16 15,378 34 36,630
losses and wrecks, 1877-93 9 6,759 9 9,837
Dismantled, 1877-93 11 7,128 1 611
Sold, 1877-93 3 2,174 - -
fleet during 1893 26 23,284 29 34,543
Source: liu kwang-ching, ‘Steamship enterprise in nineteenth-Century China’, p. 452.
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Source: worcester, Junks and Sampans, p. 198, referring to the statistics of the tidesurveyor’s 
office, Chinese maritime Customs, Shanghai.



































































































Source: yan Zhongping, Zhongguo jindai jingjishi tongji ziliao xuanji, p. 227. Based on the Decennial 
reports of the Shanghai maritime Customs.
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Source: yan Zhongping, Zhongguo jindai jingjishi tongji ziliao xuanji, p. 227.













































Source: yan Zhongping, Zhongguo jindai jingjishi tongji ziliao xuanji, p. 227. the ships circulated on 
the yiyu line 宜渝綫between yichang in hubei and Chongqing in Sichuan.
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Source: yan Zhongping, Zhongguo jindai jingjishi tongji ziliao xuanji, p. 227.






















Source: yan Zhongping, Zhongguo jindai jingjishi tongji ziliao xuanji, p. 236. the ships circulated on 
the yu river 郁江, a tributary to the Xijiang 西江, between nanning in west guangxi and wuzhou 
in east guangxi.
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Source: yan Zhongping, Zhongguo jindai jingjishi tongji ziliao xuanji, p. 236.
7. Printing in the Service of the State
Introduction
The duplication of texts and illustrations with prefabricated moulds does 
not belong to the f ield of subsistence technologies but constitutes one of 
the cultural foundations of the East, West, and South Asian, European, and 
North African civilizations and is one of the basic requirements of most 
governments. Rulers strove to control this means of communication, even 
if on a different level than shipbuilding or the manufacturing of weapons.
In this section, we will explore printing in the service (and under the 
direct supervision) of the state as well as printing in the private economy 
with respect to the question whether the state exploited and tightly con-
trolled the private sector. Moreover, on the basis of the model of dynastic 
rise, f lourishing, and decline and the takeover by local elites and regional 
governments in the later part of the dynasties, we will inquire into the 
modernization efforts of the central and provincial governments. Finally, 
we will look at the situation of masters and workers in the printing trade 
and f ind clues about the social position of ‘artisans’ and ‘merchants’ in 
the trade.
Like its predecessors since the Song, the Qing dynasty used printing 
not only to distribute information to all levels of administration and to 
educate a narrower target group of pupils and students preparing for 
off icial examinations on the state orthodoxy but also to educate ( jiaohua) 
all the emperor’s subjects in morals. Unlike the preceding Ming rulers, the 
Qing were not Han Chinese. They spoke a different language and used 
a different script but still had to present themselves as the patrons and 
legitimate defenders of Han Chinese civilization. Had they not done so, 
they would have faced great diff iculties in securing the administrative 
knowledge and skills of the Chinese scholar-off icial elite. And anything 
but co-operation was out of the question, given the numerical ratio of the 
Manchus to the Han Chinese. Therefore the Qing adopted and ref ined 
the state examinations as their basic method for fostering a meritocracy 
educated in the Confucian state orthodoxy with its texts and commentaries. 
However, the state orthodoxy of the Qing left room for other belief systems 
as long as they did not clash with the ruling system. From time to time, 
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the government also sponsored printing projects of the basic religious 
texts of Buddhism.1
Technically, the craft of printing during the Qing was executed mainly 
as woodblock printing (xylography), which leaves the mirror image of the 
printing parts of the block in relief and cuts away all non-printing parts. To 
a much smaller extent, movable type made of wood, metal alloys based on 
copper or tin, clay, or enamel was also used. From the nineteenth century 
on, missionaries introduced lithography and letterpress printing with cast 
metal type, mainly lead. This type of printing was also promoted by the 
f irst foreign newspaper entrepreneurs in the treaty ports. Gravure printing 
with copperplate had been brought to the Qing court by missionaries in the 
early eighteenth century but did not become a broadly accepted medium 
in the private printing workshops.
On various levels, the government engaged in printing and established 
permanent or temporary printeries. The so-called ‘palace editions’ 
(dianben) stood out for their editorial, technical, and artistic quality 
throughout the dynasty. However, in this f ield of cultural production, 
the Qing court and central government took much longer to adopt new 
technologies and devices than in the military and shipbuilding sector. 
Printing did not belong to the top priorities for modernization before the 
twentieth century.
Printing in the Palace: Scope and Output of the Workshops at the 
Hall of Martial Valour
The single most famous printing agency of the central government was 
the printery in the Hall of Martial Valour (Wuying dian) within the 
Forbidden City. It was situated next to the western palace gate Xihua 
men, south of the administrative buildings of the Imperial Household 
Department ‒ to which it was subordinate2 ‒ and west of the central, 
highest-ranking throne hall Taihe dian, the Hall of Supreme Harmony 
(see Figures 17-19).
1 The largest government printing project for Buddhist texts was the Longzang 龍藏 (Dragon 
Tripitaka), comprising 1,662 works, which could be completed in the relatively short time of three 
years (1735 to 1738) by using some of the old printing blocks carved during the Ming period. See 
Tsien Tsuen-hsuin, Paper and Printing, p. 185.
2 On the relationship between the Wuying dian printery and the Imperial Household Depart-
ment, see Yang Yuliang, ‘Wuying dian xiushuchu ji neiwufu xiushu ge guan’, especially the 
organizational charts on p. 39 and 40.
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During the Ming-Qing transition, the pretender Li Zicheng (1606-1645) oc-
cupied the Ming palace in 1644 and chose this compound as his government 
seat. After the Manchus took over Peking later that year, the regent Dorgon 
set up his administrative seat here. In 1680, the production site Wuying 
dian Palace Workshop (Wuying dian zaobanchu) was f irst established 
here. In 1729, it was explicitly named Wuying dian Book Production Site 
(Wuying dian xiushu chu) after some workshops that were not directly 
related to printing ‒ such as the ateliers of the ink slab makers, the enamel 
makers, and the painters ‒ were relocated to the workshops at the palace 
3 The importance and accuracy of the map of the Imperial City produced during the early 
years of the Qianlong reign (ca. 1740) has been pointed out by Yang Naiji, Qianlong Jingcheng 
quantu kaolue. For a recent investigation of palace workshops Yangxin dian zaoban chu on the 
basis also of this map, see Zhang Xueyu and Li Xiaocen’s study ‘Qinggong Zaobanchu chengli 
ruogan wenti xintan’, p. 9.
Figure 17  Position of the Wuying dian Printery within the Imperial Palace in 
Peking
Source: Based on Kenryū keijō zenzu/Qianlong jingcheng quantu, fold 7, p. 6-7, and fold 8, pp. 6-7.3
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Figure 18  Entrance of the Main Hall of Wuying dian
Figure 19  Entrance to the Wuying dian compound
Source: Photographs taken by the author in august 2006, after the compound had been 
renovated and reopened to the public.
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hall Yangxin dian (Yangxin dian zaoban chu).4 Prior to 1680, printing had 
taken place in the Imperial Household Office of Rites, as under the Ming, and 
since the styles and layouts of early Qing printing strongly resembled that 
of the late Ming, it has been assumed that the Qing may have retained the 
personnel from the Ming palace printery, the so-called ‘classics manufactory’ 
( jingchang).5
The printing activities of the central government flourished between 1729 
and c. 1805. With a permanent staff of about one-hundred, the highest quality 
of materials, and sometimes even personal supervision by the emperors, the 
‘palace editions’ were products of the highest quality that were distributed 
not only to the capital off ices but also to the provincial governments. The 
government promoted the reproduction of these exemplars (model editions 
to be used for reprinting) by provincial government printeries and also 
by private publishers. The palace editions were also sold in less luxurious 
binding and paper.
Statistics on the total output of the Wuying dian are not available; Chinese 
book historians have estimated an output of at least 381 by 1805,6 but an 
analysis of provincial holdings and the imperial library at the secondary 
capital Shenyang (Shengjing) reveals that the number of imprints until 
the end of the dynasty was 572.7 The texts include personal writings by 
the Qing emperors; histories of previous dynasties; reprints of the histori-
cal, philosophical, and literary writings of previous dynasties; records of 
military campaigns of the Qing and its expansion to the West; dictionaries, 
encyclopedias, and collectanea; literary works; and, last but not least, some 
works introducing European sciences, especially astronomy, cartography, 
and mathematics that were written by the Jesuit missionaries of the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth century. The output of the palace print-
eries ‒ expressed in the four traditional bibliographic categories of the 
Confucian canonical classics, histories (and all types of administrative 
guides and handbooks as well as legal codices), thinkers (including scientif ic 
and proto-scientif ic writings, f ine arts, encyclopedias, as well as Buddhist 
and Daoist writings and canons), and literary collections (including prose, 
poetry, and drama) is as follows:
4 Liu Qiang, ‘Qing Wuying dian’, p. 266.
5 Ibid.
6 Lu Shaw, Imperial Printing, p. 15.
7 Liu Qiang, ‘Qing Wuying dian’, p. 266, referring to Zhu Saihong, ‘Wuying dian’, pp. 29-30, 
who quotes from the Annotated bibliography of Qing Imperial Household printings Qingdai 
neifu keshu mulu jieti. However, Zhu points out that not all ‘Imperial printings’ or ‘palace copies’ 
were produced in the Wuying dian.
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Table 31  Output of palace edition printings, in numbers of titles, since the 





















1 1 1 3 0.06
yongzheng
1723-1735 [12]
1 3 1 5 0.4
Qianlong
1736-1795 [60]
31 156 28 24 148 387 6.45
Jiaqing
1796-1820 [25]
38 6 27 71 2.84
Daoguang
1820-1850 [31]
4 25 8 9 46 1.48
Xianfeng
1851-1861 [11]
1 10 6 5 22 2
tongzhi
1862-1874 [13]
4 7 1 12 0.92
guangxu
1875-1908 [34]




unknown date 1 1 2
total 268 [250] 39 249 69 67 148 572 2.28
Source: Zhu Saihong, ‘wuying dian’, p. 30, referring to Qingdai neifu keshu mulu jieti.
Lu Shaw, in her account of the printer, dates the period of decline in printing 
to after 1805. On the basis of recent research, the nineteenth century does 
not seem quite as bleak, but it is clear that the Qianlong era constitutes 
the peak of production of high-quality prints. In the nineteenth century, 
the printing activities at the Wuying dian were continued even though 
its f inances were cut in the 1840s due to urgent government expenses for 
the Opium War. A f ire destroyed the greater part of the Wuying dian in 
1869 as well as most books and some of the printing blocks. It was rebuilt 
but was struck by lightning in the Guangxu era; in 1901, the hall burned 
down once again.8 After 1869, much of the printing was delegated either 
8 Schierlitz, ‘Zur Technik’, p. 37, referring to Osvald Sirén, The Imperial Palaces of Peking 
(Paris 1926), Luther C. Goodrich, The Literary Inquisition of Ch’ien-lung (Baltimore 1935), and 
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to provincial printing off ices that proliferated and blossomed after the 
mid-nineteenth century or to private printing enterprises by mediation 
of the Off ice of Foreign Affairs (Zongli yamen). However, archival records 
show that on a much reduced scale, the Wuying dian printery was active 
until at least 1910.9 However, the main impetus and innovatory energy after 
the mid-nineteenth century was to be found in the provincial printeries 
and private printing enterprises.
Large Printing Projects with Movable Types
As the above table shows, the highest output of individual works was during 
the Qianlong era. Yet counting individual titles or titles in collections gives a 
skewed view. The huge encyclopedia Gujin tushu jicheng (Complete collection 
of old and new illustrations and texts), which was begun under the Kangxi 
and finished under the Yongzheng emperor, is exceptional in its size, boasting 
over 10,000 chapters bound in 5,020 volumes, as well as being impressive in 
terms of the technical process of its production.10 The edition was printed 
with movable copper type in about sixty sets over three years from 1726 to 
1728.11 An estimated 230,000 to 250,000 copper (or rather, brass) types were 
produced for the purpose.12 Present-day scholars generally believe that these 
types were not cast but carved.13 The type carvers received piece wages of 
0.025 tael per type produced, while those carving wooden types were only 
paid 0.08 to 0.14 tael for one-hundred types. This is a difference that is more 
feasible if the types for the Gujin tushu jicheng were carved, since it takes 
much more effort to carve metal than wooden types or to cast metal types.14 
Paul Pelliot, ‘Notes de bibliographie chinoise’, Bulletin de l’Ecole française de l’Extrême-Orient, 
2/1902. See also Zhu Saihong, ‘Dianben’, p. 60.
9 The booklet 30, ‘Qianliang dice’ 錢糧底冊 (Money and food provision accounts) of the 
Wuying dian documents in the First Historical Archives dates from 1910. Neiwufu … boce, no. 
432-5-41.
10 Lionel Giles, Index, p. ix, has estimated the volume of the Gujin tushu jicheng to cover 
about three to four times the content of the eleventh edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica 
(1911, 29 vols.). According to Lothar Ledderose, Ten Thousand Things, p. 141, the compilation of 
this encyclopedia also inspired French and English encyclopedists who brought out the French 
Encyclopédie (printed 1751-1765) and the f irst edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica (printed 
1768-1771).
11 See Lu Shaw, Imperial Printing, pp. 48-49, for the controversy on the number of sets printed.
12 In Korea, where printing with metal movable type was more common than in China, various 
alloys are known in which the copper content ranged between 50 and 70 percent. See Table 32.
13 Lu Shaw, Imperial Printing, p. 47.
14 ‘Wages for Printing’.
220 State anD CraftS in the Qing DynaSt y (1644-1911) 
However, the types were not preserved but in 1744 were melted down for 
coin production. Why this was done is not clear. The value of the carved 
types should have been much higher than that of mere scrap material for 
coinage. Moreover, the mass of brass alloy cannot have made an enormous 
difference to the output of monetary coins. Even assuming that the entire 
set of 250,000 types was melted down, this would have yielded between 700 
and 800 strings of thousand cash, if the alloy was more or less the same as 
that used for coinage (see Table 32). In the 1740s, the Metropolitan Mints 
produced a yearly total of 700,000 to 1.5 million strings or 58,333 to 125,000 
strings per month.15 Between 1741 and 1745 (Qianlong 6 to 10), the entire 
annual output has been estimated at an average of 2.1 million strings.16 The 
material obtained from the printery can therefore hardly have made a big 
difference in the monetary liquidity of the capital. The ‘Palace history of the 
Qing’ explains this action of recycling as a cover-up for graft. According to 
this source, the custodians of the copper type storehouse had stolen part 
of the types and, taking advantage of an actual shortage of coins in the 
capital, suggested to have the types melted down for coin production.17 
Another source states that more than half of the original types were found 
to be missing; if that was so, even less was gained by melting the types.18
Several reasons may have prompted the emperor to consent to the de-
struction of the type. First, if there was a perception of an actual scarcity 
of material for coinage, and together with this, the notion that since the 
use of brass was time and again restricted or entirely forbidden by impe-
rial decree,19 the court should show a good example and do away with 
all unnecessary items made of that scarce material.20 Or did the emperor 
15 Vogel, ‘Unrest and Strikes’, p. 395.
16 Burger, ‘Minting‘, p. 392.
17 Lu Shaw, Imperial Printing, p. 48, citing Gongshi xubian, chap. 94, fol. 4a. Tsien Tsuen-hsuin, 
Paper and Printing, p. 216, citing Huidian, chap. 1199, fol. 1b. See also Jin Jian, Wuying dian 
juzhenban chengshi, fol. 1b/2a, who comments that ‘the yield was limited and the loss enormous’ 
(suode youxian er suohao shenduo 所得有限而所耗甚多) when the copper types were melted 
down.
18 Lionel Giles, An Alphabetical Index, p. xvii, citing Wu Changyuan 吳長元 (f l. 1770), Chenyuan 
shilue 宸垣識略 (An outline of knowledge about [everything within the Peking] city walls, 1788).
19 Vogel, Chinese Central Monetary Policy, in sect. II.3 and III.1.c describes brass prohibitions, 
in 1673, 1679, and 1726-1736, but also several control measures against the melting down of coins 
and counterfeiting after the ban was off icially lifted. Thus, in the years 1744-1745, when the 
Wuying dian types were melted down, hundreds of Peking brass manufacturers and dealers 
were ordered to move to workshops provided by the government where their trade would be 
supervised by off icials.
20 For the year 1781, about 655 strings were actually reported as cast from salvaged copper in 
the Peking mints. See Werner Burger, ‘Minting’‘, p. 383.
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and court administration try to save what could be saved before the types 
entirely disappeared from the storehouse? Or does this case show that 
although the printing project of the Gujin tushu jicheng was successfully 
f inished, movable types made of copper were deemed too much of a luxury 
when wood, the more conventional printing material, would have served 
its purpose just as well?21
Another possible explanation that has so far not been discussed in the 
literature would be that at least part of the types were worn down and 
actually had to be recycled. Since one copy of the encyclopedia has about 
100 million characters, after a print run of 64 copies, if each of the 250,000 
types was used regularly (which is not probable); it would have been applied 
more than 25,000 times. It is more likely, however, that some of the types 
were used much more often and some rare ones were hardly taken out of 
the sorting cases at all. Cast lead types can be used for many more print 
runs before they are worn down.22 However, if the types used in this project 
were carved, and if what Christopher Reed concludes for tin types applies 
also for copper (de facto brass) types ‒ namely that ‘brushing’ the paper onto 
the printing forms rather than ‘pressing’ it in a Gutenberg-style printing 
press wears down the types much sooner23 ‒ then at least some of them 
may have been defect after the printing was completed.
At any rate, the technique of printing with metal movable type was suc-
cessfully applied for a project of enormous dimensions, but thereafter its 
use was discontinued in the palace printery. There were certainly economic 
reasons that made the use of metal movable type seem wasteful: the process of 
typesetting ‒ which involves finding the right characters in a set of ca. 25,000 
different characters and sorting back the characters into the type cases after 
the printing was finished ‒ rather than carving the printing blocks must have 
seemed too time-consuming. Moreover, the option of carving rather than 
casting types further slowed down the procedure and made it very costly. At 
the same time, manpower and storage space were abundant in the palace, 
and metal casting was a well-known everyday technology in the workshops of 
the central government, most prominently for casting cash. The Gujin tushu 
21 The reverse case, when monetary metal was requisitioned for making type, occurred in 
1910. From the mint of the Ministry of Revenue, Baoquanju 寶泉局, closed down in 1910, 977,500 
jin (583.372 tons) of lead were requisitioned for the lead-type letterpress of the new ministerial 
printery. See Chen Zhen, Zhongguo jindai, vol. 1, p. 318.
22 Typographus sinensis (W. H. Medhurst), ‘Estimate’, pp. 250-251, mentions that millions of 
tracts can be printed and the types used for twenty years without stopping, with a much smaller 
set of ten types where each has 3,000 different characters.
23 Reed, Gutenberg, pp. 66-67.
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jicheng project was neither the first nor the last where metal movable types 
were applied. The technology, which had first been developed in Korea,24, was 
re-invented in China and is associated with Hua Sui (1439-1513) from Wuxi in 
Jiangsu. It was first used in Jiangnan by several affluent families who intended 
to show themselves as sponsors of learning and printing. Later in the Ming 
dynasty, it was also used in the publishing centre Jianyang in Fujian for com-
mercial printing,25 although the predominant technology remained woodblock 
printing.26 In the Ming, no printing projects with metal movable type of the 
court or central government are known at all. When the Qing court used this 
method, it still retained some of the flair of luxury that it had when the first 
Jiangnan families reprinted the rare works in their libraries in order to transmit 
knowledge and at the same time impress their peers. However, the Gujin 
tushu jicheng project was neither the first nor the most voluminous imperial 
encyclopedia. Under the Ming dynasty, the even bigger Yongle encyclopedia 
(Yongle dadian) had been compiled but due to lack of funds was never printed, 
and the original manuscript was almost entirely lost by the end of the Ming.27 
Thus, even if the Qing could not surpass their predecessors in terms of volume, 
they certainly achieved the printing of their imperial encyclopedia ‒ and not 
in the conventional way but with an alternative technology that few people 
in the empire possessed ‒ from the very material that cash was made of. This 
last fact may have been of some importance for the fate of the printing types 
after they had served their purpose.
The next outstanding project in Qing cultural policy that eventually also 
came to concern the Wuying dian printing off ice was the compilation of 
excellent and rare works extant in the eighteenth century. These were eventu-
ally combined to form the collectanea Siku quanshu (The complete books of 
the Four Storehouses [one each for the bibliographic categories cited above]). 
For this purpose, not only the books and manuscripts in the palace libraries 
but also those in the holdings of provincial authorities and private collectors 
were ordered to be sent to the capital ‒ some for purchase, others on loan. 
In 1773, a commission of three-hundred off icials and scholars was founded 
for collecting, classifying, and annotating ‒ and, in the case of supposed or 
24 See the discussion of several theories about the date of invention of metal movable types in 
Korea, from the earliest (1047-1083) to the date that is generally accepted (1232), ‘The beginning 
of metal type printing’, website of the Cheongju Early Printing Museum. The earliest book 
printed with metal movable types, the Buddhist commentary Jikji 直指 (Revelation of the 
deepest principles), printed in Chinese characters in Korea, is dated 1377.
25 Tsien Tsuen-hsuin, Paper and Printing, pp. 211-213.
26 Lucille Chia, Printing for Profit, p. 257.
27 Endymion Wilkinson, Chinese History, pp. 604-605.
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actual criticism of the dynasty or the emperors, also destroying28 ‒ the books 
that were submitted from all parts of the empire. As a result, 10,246 titles 
were recorded in one extensive and one abridged bibliography. About 3,500 
of these were transcribed eight times in handwriting, bound and stored in 
the Palace and in eight libraries built for that purpose.29
One spin-off of the project, however, kept not only the proofreaders and 
binders but also the character carvers of the Wuying dian busy during the 
1770s and 1780s, producing one of the rarest Chinese handbooks of printing. 
The Ming encyclopedia Yongle dadian had been searched for entire works 
that had not been transmitted individually by the 1770s, and the result of this 
compilation ‒ 138 reconstructed books ‒ was printed by the Wuying dian 
printery between 1773 and 1794 in wooden movable type and included in the 
collectanea Wuying dian juzhenban shu (Wuying dian books [printed with] 
assorted gems). Jin Jian (or, having been of Korean ancestry, Kim Kan, deceased 
1795),30 the Superintendent of the Wuying dian, directed the project. After 
having gained experience with the technical procedures, in 1777 he published 
the illustrated manual Wuying dian juzhenban chengshi (Patterns for printing 
with movable types at the [Imperial Printery] Hall of Martial Valour).31
28 See Kent Guy, The Emperor’s Four Treasuries, pp. 166-200, for a general outline and specif ic 
cases of the so-called ‘literary inquisition’ of the Qianlong emperor in the 1770s and 1780s. This 
refers to a report of 1781 giving the f igure of 52,480 destroyed woodblocks for printing seditious 
books that had been broken up for f irewood (p. 171).
29 Lu Shaw, Imperial Printing, p. 8, 49-50, Ciyuan vol. 4, p. 566: the libraries Wenyuan ge 文
源閣 on the precincts of the country palace Yuanmingyuan to the northwest of the capital; 
Wenyuan ge 文淵閣 in the Forbidden City; Wensu ge 文溯閣 in Shenyang; Wenjin ge 文津閣 
in Rehe; Wenlan ge 文瀾閣 in Hangzhou; Wenhui ge in Yangzhou 文匯閣; and Wenzong ge 文
宗閣 in Zhenjiang. According to Lu Shaw, two manuscripts were stored in the Forbidden City 
at the Huangji Palace 皇極宮 and the Qianqing Palace 乾清宮. This would make a total of nine 
sets. Kent Guy, The Emperor’s Four Treasuries, p. 104, def ines as the f irst among the products of 
the Siku compilation project seven manuscript copies of the Siku quanshu.
30 For biographical information on Jin Jian, see Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period, pp. 159-160. 
One of Jin Jian’s ancestors had joined the court of an early Manchu ruler, Hong Taiji 洪太極 
(reg.1634-1643), as an interpreter. The family remained in the service of the Manchus. Jin’s 
younger sister was a concubine of the Qianlong emperor and mother of three of Qianlong’s 
sons. Therefore, the family was freed from the status of bondservants and became members of 
the Manchu Plain Yellow Banner. Between 1783 and 1792, Jin Jian served as Minister of Public 
Works (‘President of the Board of Works’) and thereafter of the Board of Civil Appointments 
(1792-95). As the Minister of Public Works he also directed several imperial building projects, 
such as the construction of the Imperial Lecture Hall Biyong 辟雍 in the Imperial Academy 
Guozijian 國子監 (1785).
31 Union list 3-2-11. Translated by Richard Rudolph in A Chinese Printing Manual, and discussed 
and commented by Ernst Schierlitz, ‘Zur Technik der Holztypendrucke’. Ironically, the handbook 
was printed with blocks.
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Together with the Yuan dynasty record that is included in the ‘Treatise on 
Agriculture’ (Nongshu) by Wang Zhen (1290-1333), these are the only known 
technical descriptions of printing with wooden movable types. Even so, the 
written evidence for technical details of the movable type technology is 
better than that for block printing. This may be attributed to the fact that 
to gain f inancial support or to attract the reading public to special, more 
economic procedures for large printing projects, detailed justif ications for 
the breach with established methods were necessary.
In his description of the methods of wood type printing, Jin Jian, while 
deploring the fact that the copper types of the Gujin tushu jicheng were no 
longer stored at the Wuying dian,32 explains the shaping of all wooden 
parts of the printing process: the types, the sorting trays, the outlines and 
columns of the f inished sheets that were not printed together with the 
movable type, the cases where the types were kept and the order in which 
they were stored, and the benches on which the typesetters stood in order 
to reach the higher drawers of the type cases. He also describes in detail the 
ten-day cycle of searching out the types from the type cases, setting them 
on forms, proofing the forms, printing, and re-distributing them into the 
cases (see Figures 20-22).33
Jin Jian also gave an estimate of the material costs of the project and 
pointed out that, by comparison, printing a copy of the 130-chapter Shiji 
(Memories of the Grand Historian) with the block printing method would 
entail the carving of 2,675 blocks for 1,450 tael. In a f irst estimate, he assumed 
that carving about 150,000 types of the most common six-thousand and 
several hundred characters including type blanks, type cases, setting forms, 
and other equipment would cost 1,400 tael.34 In his f inal account, he quotes 
a much higher f igure of 235,000 types for a total material cost of 2,339.75 tael 
together with the wage quota of 0.69 tael for cutting one-hundred types.35 
This would result in 22,425 tael for the entire set. Starting out with a staff 
of twelve, the number of workers and employees was eventually increased 
to one-hundred.36
32 Jin Jian, Wuying dian juzhenban chengshi, fol. 1b/2a.
33 Ibid., fol. 31a-33b, transl. in Rudolph, A Chinese Printing Manual, p. 14.
34 Rudolph, A Chinese Printing Manual, p. xix, fol. 1b-2a
35 Ibid., p. xxi, fourth memorial dated from 1774. These f igures, including the wage quotations 
for cutting type blanks (0.22 tael per hundred), carving characters (0.45 tael), handwriting the 
characters to be carved (0.02 tael) are also specif ied in Huidian, chap. 1199, fol. 4b-5b.
36 Rudolph, A Chinese Printing Manual, p. xxii. Jin Jian, Wuying dian juzhenban chengshi, 
‘Zouyi’ (Memorials), fol. 10b/11a.
Printing in the ServiCe of the State 225
Figure 20  Sawing the wooden types
Source: Jin Jian, Wuying dian juzhenban chengshi, fol. 16a.
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Figure 21  Carving the types
Source: Jin Jian, Wuying dian juzhenban chengshi, fol. 18a.
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Figure 22  Type setting. This process includes selection of the types from the type 
cases, placing them on trays, arranging them in the right sequence, and 
proofing the set forms.
Source: Jin Jian, Wuying dian juzhenban chengshi, fol. 28b.
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According to the memorials in the preface of the Wuying dian juzhenban 
chengshi, the collectanea were printed in twenty sets upon white fourfold 
paper liansizhi for court display and preservation, and several more37 on 
yellow bamboo paper zhuzhi to be sold at a f ixed price.38 Provincial and 
private printeries were expressly authorized to reprint selected items of these 
exemplars or of the entire set, which they did in Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, 
Fujian, and Guangdong. The Jiangxi and Fujian reprints were especially 
complete and true to the originals.39 The reprints, as far as can be judged 
from the extant copies, were done with block prints rather than movable 
type.40 According to Schierlitz, in 1792 the types were copied in Korea in a 
set of 320,000. Here, they were referred to as ‘continuously renewed types’ 
(shengsheng zi).41
37 According to Lu Shaw, Imperial Printing, p. 57, ‘three hundred sets were printed on bamboo 
paper for public consumption.’
38 Jin Jian, Wuying dian juzhenban chengshi, ‘Zouyi’ (Memorials), fol. 6a.
39 Lu Shaw, Imperial Printing, p. 58; Schierlitz, ‘Zur Technik’, p. 36.
40 It is not easy to discern the difference between imprints with movable type and block prints.
41 Schierlitz, ‘Zur Technik’, pp. 36/37.
Figure 23  Individual wooden movable types in different sizes at the Gutenberg 
Museum, Mainz, dating about 1860
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Shiow-jyu Lu Shaw lists six further individual titles that were printed 
with this set but states that later the entire set was destroyed by custodians 
and burned as f irewood.42 In fact, they were probably not destroyed in the 
f ires at the Wuying dian in 1869 and 1901 because they were kept in an 
external storehouse. The entire workshop for typesetting and printing was 
situated not in the Wuying dian but at a branch off ice in the Bei changjie 
Street near the Xihua men palace gate.43 Schierlitz reports that a Chinese 
eyewitness saw wooden types on sale in Peking after the revolution of 1911. 
These may have been remnants of the ‘assembled gems’, but since at least 
one other private printery in Peking also used wooden movable type, the 
whereabouts of Jin Jian’s types remains uncertain (see Figures 23-25 for a 
set of wooden movable types).
Nevertheless, it becomes clear from these two large projects that 
although the palace printery was innovative in developing alternative 
printing technologies and even published a kind of ‘user manual’, the use 
of printing with either metal or wooden movable type actually remained 
quite limited.
Provincial Printeries
After the mid-nineteenth century, the provinces and provincial elites gained 
greater independence from the central government than was the case in 
the eighteenth century. In the course of these political shifts, the printing 
facilities of the provincial printeries increased in size.
In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, an off icial printery 
was established at Yangzhou, the so-called Yangzhou shiju (Yangzhou Poetry 
Office), which was supervised by the eminent and affluent Cao Yin (1658-1712), 
a bondservant of the Manchus who had also been in charge of the Imperial 
Silk Weaveries in Nanjing (1693-1712) and concurrently acted as salt censor of 
the Liang-Huai circuit in 1704, 1706, 1708, and 1710.44 Since Cao Yin’s connection 
to the Imperial Household was particularly close, many printing projects 
were entrusted to him, such as the 900-chapter Complete poetry of the Tang 
dynasty or several smaller-sized encyclopedias. As such, this institution 
stood between the central government and the purely provincial institu-
tions. The output of the Yangzhou Poetry Off ice amounted to about 3,000 
42 Lu Shaw, Imperial Printing, p. 59.
43 Schierlitz, ‘Zur Technik’, p. 37, 18, fn 1.
44 Lu Shaw, Imperial Printing, p. 34.
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Figures 24 and 25  Types on the tray, Gutenberg Museum
Source: author’s photographs, august 2008. Courtesy of the gutenberg-museum.
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chapters. They were executed as block printings of very high quality in the 
cherished and expensive ‘soft style’ of printing. This is a generic designation 
for the ‘handwriting’ or ‘calligrapher’s’ style. Since the width of vertical 
and horizontal lines is more evenly distributed, this resembles calligraphy 
more than the ‘hard style’ or ‘Song type’, also referred to as the ‘artisan style’ 
( jiangti). Carving the soft style takes longer and requires greater skill. The 
‘artisan style’ ( jiangti 匠体) with strong vertical and light horizontal lines 
became widespread during the late Ming, as the printing industry expanded.45
Provincial governments already possessed printing facilities in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For instance, the 1769 ‘Regulations 
and precedents on the prices of materials’ (Wuliao jiazhi zeli) were printed 
separately for each province, presumably at the provincial government 
office. Confucian schools that were maintained by local and regional admin-
istrations often organized printing activities, as many regional gazetteers 
suggest.46 After the Opium War and the Taiping rebellion, most provinces 
established provincial printeries more formally and prominently with funds 
of their own. They clearly had the order to reprint works that had gotten 
lost in the turmoil. The lack of texts of the Confucian state orthodoxy was 
especially felt in the Jiangnan area, where of the three libraries that had been 
specif ically built for housing the apex of knowledge contained in the Siku 
quanshu, two (at Yangzhou and Zhenjiang) were completely destroyed, and 
one (in Hangzhou) was damaged. Book historians are not quite clear as to 
whether the main impulse came from the central government or from the 
provinces. While Zhang Xiumin vaguely refers to ‘the ruling classes’ who 
established provincial publishing houses with printeries (guan shuju) ‘in order 
to restore the old order’,47 more recent publications specifically stress the role 
of the provincial governments and provincial elites, most of all Zeng Guofan, 
one of the central f igures of the self-strengthening reforms.48 Likewise, while 
Zhang Shudong presents the Yangzhou shiju as one of the f irst provincial 
45 ‘Plurality of Printing Techniques’ Website of the Palace Museum, Taibei, Taiwan.
46 See [Qianlong] Hangzhou fuzhi j. 10, fol. 17a, referring to the carving and printing of the 
Kangxi emperor’s Sacred Edict; or [Qianlong] Dushan zhouzhi, ‘Baoming xiuji zhishu shenwen’ 
報明修輯志書申文 (Declaration on the compilation and editing of [this] gazetteer), fol. 1b/2a. 
The literature on gazetteer compilation amply discusses the issue, see for instance Li Jingwen, 
‘Qingdai Henan shuyuan keshu qianlun’, p. 102, and Zhang Andong ‘Qingdai xiuzhi jigou de 
renyuan shezhi he ziliao laiyuan’, p. 50.
47 Zhang Xiumin, Zhongguo yinshua shi, pp. 559/560.
48 Zhang Shudong, Zhongguo yinshua, chap. 7, Sect. 6-5, (5), 1. (3) 地方官書局刻書; Qingdai 
yinshua, ‘Qingdai de difang zhengfu yinshua’ 清代的地方政府印刷. Qingdai yinshua is obviously 
an abbreviated form of Zhang Shudong’s account.
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printeries, Zhang Xiumin does not discuss continuity but rather stresses 
the difference between the Kangxi era and the mid-nineteenth century.49
The evaluation of the achievements of these provincial off ices varies as 
well. Tsien Tsuen-hsuin states in a general sense that ‘all were renowned 
for careful execution and mutual co-operation’,50 but Zhang Xiumin and 
especially Zhang Shudong discuss in more detail the achievements and 
failures of the print products of these institutions. The scholars agree, 
however, that among the twenty off ices listed (see Table 31), the Zhejiang 
and the Guangdong printeries had the greatest output. Thus, an account 
of 1935 gives the number of printing blocks that were still extant from the 
Qing as 122,000 carved at the Zhejiang off ice and an additional 39,000 that 
had been presented or deposed there by private collectors and printers, 
such as Ding Bing (1832-1899) from Hangzhou and Hu Fengdan from Jinhua. 
The number of printing blocks in the Guangya shuju and two Guangdong 
academies amounted to a total of 150,000 to 160,000.51 However, not all 
imprints were carved in blocks. The Jinling and the Jiangxi official printeries 
also used wooden movable type, and the Yunnan and Zhejiang off ice had a 
lead letterpress. Since luxury and ornamental editions were not usually in the 
product range of the official printeries, few multicoloured prints (taoyin) were 
produced; merely a few specimens are reported from Hubei and Zhejiang.52
On the basis of bibliographies of the provincial printeries, Zhang Xiumin 
estimates that their aggregate book production was about 1,000 titles. All four 
categories of Chinese bibliography were included, but most of their books 
belonged to the f ields of classics and history, especially the dynastic histo-
ries.53 In addition to this, books dealing with ‘modern’ topics like telegraphy 
or documented recent treaties with foreign countries were also printed.54
The main government printing activities thus spread from the central 
government to the provinces, as is clear from the approximate data of 36 
‘palace editions’ (dianben) against about one-thousand ‘[provincial printing] 
office editions’ ( juben) between 1862 and the end of the dynasty. The reason 
49 In his book length study on Cao Yin, Jonathan Spence discusses Cao’s efforts and achievements in 
the printing of the ‘Complete Poems of the Tang’, but although he elaborates on the other institutions 
which Cao directed, the Nanjing Imperial Silk Weavery and the Liang Huai Salt Commissioner’s 
off ice, he mentions the printery not as an institution but rather as an ad hoc commission for one 
specif ic project – albeit one that earned Cao Yin great honours. Spence, Ts’ao Yin, pp. 164-165.
50 Tsien Tsuen-hsuin, Paper and Printing, p. 188.
51 Zhang Xiumin, Zhongguo yinshua shi, p. 564.
52 Ibid., p. 564.
53 Zhang Xiumin, Zhongguo yinshua shi, p. 563
54 Ibid., p. 563. These titles are all from the Zhejiang off ice.
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for this situation was most probably the central government’s lack of funds. 
It is no wonder, then, that the regions with the most collectors who showed 
interest in supporting the official printing offices with either printing blocks 
or exemplars, such as Ding Bing, or with active fund-raising officials, such as 
Zhang Zhidong in Guangdong, had the largest facilities and the greatest output.
Nevertheless, the central government did not completely avoid moderniza-
tion in the printing sector in terms of contents, technology, and equipment. 
Modern government schools such as the Peking Tongwen guan (basically a 
school for translators and interpreters that had branches in Shanghai and 
Canton) and the research departments of the Jiangnan Arsenal and the 
Fujian Navy Yard all had their own printeries. Both the Peking Tongwen 
guan and the Jiangnan Arsenal publishing departments printed about 
200 translated works respectively. The Jiangnan Arsenal print shop at f irst 
(in 1868) only carved woodblocks, but in about 1875 installed its f irst lead 
type letterpress machine. It was later taken over by the Shanghai Off icial 
Printing Off ice.55 The Tongwen guan press, which was established in 1876 
(or 1873),56 also printed internal documents, edicts, and announcements 
and had seven hand letterpresses and four sets of Chinese types. In 1884, 
government publications were also printed in the newly founded Xiehua 
shuju that possessed modern printing machinery. In 1905, it was taken 
over by the commercial publisher Shangwu yinshuguan and had its name 
changed to Jinghua yinshuju. At f irst, it had about twenty to thirty employees 
and only letterpress machines, but later colour presses and lithographic 
machines were added. Another modern printing facility in Peking was the 
‘Zhili off icial printing bureau’ (Zhili guan shuju), which was also named 
the ‘Metropolitan off icial publishing bureau’ ( Jingshi guan shuju) .57 Its 
foundation is attributed to General Yuan Shikai (1859-1916), who was a 
provincial judge in Zhili province between 1897 and 1899. Its exact date 
of establishment cannot be ascertained, but the thirteen extant editions 
in the National Library of China, all lithographs or typeset, date from the 
Guangxu reign, with the last from 1907. In terms of content, these were 
administrative documents of a more general interest, such as the ‘Collected 
Statutes’ in one-hundred chapters but without the voluminous ‘Factual 
Precedents’ (in 1,220 chapters). Since the Collected Statutes had previously 
55 Zhang Shudong, Zhongguo yinshua, chap. 14, sect. 1.
56 Bai Shouyi, Zhongguo tongshi, vol. 11, chap. 18, sect. 2, ‘Zhongguo jindai chuban shiye de 
zhubu fazhan’ 中国近代出版事业的逐步发展 (The gradual development of the modern Chinese 
publishing sector).
57 Bai Shouyi, Zhongguo tongshi, vol. 11, chap. 18, sect. 2, ‘Chuantong keshuye de fazhan’ 传统
刻书业的发展 (The development of traditional character carving).
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been published in Shanghai, and in view of its other publications which are 
all much shorter, this printery apparently was not a very large institution.
After the administrative reforms of 1905, both the Ministry of Education 
(1906) and the Ministry of Finance (1907) established their own printing 
off ices. The Ministry of Education printed textbooks at its Xuebu tushuju, 
while the Ministry of Finance, which had invested large sums and acquired 
the newest Western technology, produced paper money and other f inancial 
documents at the Duzhi bu yinshua ju.
In sum, the modern printeries of the capital that had been founded and 
f inanced in part or entirely by the central government until the last decade 
of the Qing rule remained smaller in scope and more specialized than the 
Wuying dian had been, and neither the printery of the Jiangnan Arsenal 
nor the Zhili provincial printing off ice were entirely under the control of 
the court and central government.
These developments illustrate the general shift of political power from 
the Peking central government to the aff luent Jiangnan and Guangdong 
centres as well as the North Chinese military faction around Yuan Shikai 
and Li Hongzhang. Within Peking, they also show the diversif ication of 
printing institutions, which no longer came under the direct and personal 
control of the emperors or the regents.
Periodical Government Publications of the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries: Court Gazettes and Provincial Newspapers
One of the government printing products, although published in the capital 
and pertaining to the Qing court, was not at all a luxury or exemplary item 
but aimed to inform a broader reading public beyond the directly concerned 
officials in the affairs of the court and the central government. Government 
news had been spread in short bulletins since the Song dynasty. The earliest 
extant examples date from the Ming. In the Qing, the so-called dichao (liaison 
off icials’ transcripts), jingchao (capital transcripts), gongmen chao (palace 
gate transcripts), and jingbao (capital reports) were copied, printed, and 
distributed to the provinces by the ‘newspaper workshops’ (baofang) of the 
postal relay stations (titang) in the Peking publishing and bookselling centre 
Liuli chang. These gazettes contained edicts, memorials, and reports that 
had been released by the Grand Secretariat.58 Sixteen of the relay stations 
existed in Peking, assigned for delivery to and from Zhili, Shandong, Shanxi, 
58 Vittinghoff, Anfänge, p. 57.
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Henan, Jiangnan, Jiangxi, Fujian, Zhejiang, Hubei, Hunan, Shaanxi and Gansu, 
Sichuan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, and Guizhou. A foreign observer in 
the late Qing assumed that the printing was done in only one of the relay 
stations,59 while another source hints that the gazette was issued by twelve 
publishing houses and distributed at a rate of ten-thousand copies per day.60 
The official copies were printed with wooden movable type; unofficial, faster 
copies were either handcopied or printed with wax plates.61 Zhang Shudong 
also refers to yet another method of fast duplication, the so-called ‘dried 
doufu plates’ (dougan’er ban), and a kind of fast hardening plaster which 
was burned after the characters were carved. In both cases, the non-printing 
parts of the plate were carved out as in wood block carving. Their quality was 
very low, but these methods were cheaper than the handcopied versions and 
faster than the wooden type versions.62 In the provinces, the court gazettes 
were once again reprinted and distributed. Circulars that contained only 
information from provincial authorities were referred to as yuanmen chao 
or yuanmen bao (transcripts or reports from the provincial government 
gates). The printing, most often with wax plates, and distribution of these 
provincial gazettes was handled entirely by the private sector.63
The court gazette was published until 1911 but declined in the last years 
of the dynasty. This may have been due to the competition from the private 
press that had emerged in the treaty ports, most of all in Shanghai. However, 
as Vittinghoff argues, the decline was perhaps more linked to the challenge 
from so-called ‘off icial newspapers’ (guanbao  or gongbao), which regional 
administrators published after private newspapers had been forbidden in 
1898.64 Like the provincial printeries, and sometimes together with them, 
such official newspapers were founded in most provinces.65 The most famous 
59 Ibid., referring to Mayers, ‘The Peking Gazette’, p. 15.
60 Ibid., p. 57.
61 For a detailed description of the various unoff icial formats and versions of the court gazettes, 
see Barbara Mittler, A Newspaper for China, pp. 179-187.
62 Mayers, ‘The Peking Gazette’, p. 16. Mayers quotes the following subscription prices for the 
copies of the Peking Gazette: 25 cents per month for natives, somewhat more for Europeans; 
about the same sum or slightly more for the off icial (post relay) version, but f ive taels per month 
for the handcopied version. The Gazette was also reprinted in the modern treaty port journals, 
such as Shenbao (1872-1949) and Shanghai Xinbao (1861-1872); see Janku, Nur leere Reden, p. 65, 
171. Moreover, it was translated into English in the Shanghai based journal North China Herald.
63 Zhang Shudong, Zhongguo yinshua, chap. 7, sect. 3; Vittinghoff, Anfänge, p. 58.
64 Vittinghoff, Anfänge, p. 58.
65 For a list of off icial printing institutions of the late Qing, including the off icial newspapers, 
see Zhang Shudong, Zhongguo yinshua, chap. 14, sect. 1, table 14-2 ‘Guanyin, guanbao deng qita 
guanban yinshua jigou yilan biao’ 官印、官报等其它官办印刷机构一览表 (Overview of off icial 
printeries, off icial journals and other off icial printing institutions).
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among these were Shandong Governor-General Yuan Shikai’s Beiyang guan-
bao (North China Off icial Newspaper, established in 1902) and Hu-Guang 
Governor-General Zhang Zhidong’s Hubei guanbao (established in 1898).66
Nevertheless, government institutions continued to supply daily court 
information until the end of the dynasty. The very last of the ‘modern’ 
printing institutions founded under the Qing dynasty were the facilities 
of the Imperial Household Department which were installed to print the 
long-established court gazette gongmen chao with lead type letterpress.67
Paper Money in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
Although the use of paper money and off icial bills of exchange was f irst 
recorded in the Song dynasty and the system was continued for longer or 
shorter periods during the Yuan and Ming, the Qing only adopted it as 
a method of last recourse in situations of extreme scarcity of monetary 
metal. This occurred during one decade in the early years of the dynasty 
(1651-1661), but thereafter, for a lapse of almost two hundred years, no paper 
money was printed by the government.68 It was only in 1853, during the 
Taiping rebellion, that the Qing issued bank notes denominated in cash, 
the so-called Great Qing treasure notes (Da Qing baochao), and in silver, the 
Ministry of Revenue off icial notes (Hubu guanpiao). The cash notes were 
denominated from between 500 and 1 million cash, and the silver notes from 
between one and 50 taels.69 We can only estimate how many single notes 
were issued. Frank King quotes a f igure of over 15 million (ching-)ch’uan 
(cash strings) in Peking alone, not considering the provinces;70 Zhang and 
Tan assume that the total f igure may have been 9.78 million of silver tael 
and 27.11 million cash string notes; in 1868, only 3.28 million silver tael notes 
were reportedly retrieved. The rest may have been destroyed in the Taiping 
rebellion or hoarded, as in a case described by Zhang and Tan.71
In Peking, the silver notes were issued directly by the Ministry of Revenue 
and the cash notes through off icial banks.72 As in the Song dynasty, the 
ministry or its agents printed the notes either with wooden or copper blocks. 
66 Vittinghoff, Anfänge, p. 58.
67 Zhang Shudong, Zhongguo yinshua, chap. 14, sect. 1, table 14-2.
68 Peng Xinwei, Monetary History, p. 707.
69 King, Money, p. 150.
70 Ibid.
71 Zhang and Tan, ‘Xin faxian’, section 4.
72 King, Money, p. 150.
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The ornamental, relatively simple two or three colour prints resembled 
those of the Ming dynasty notes. Counterfeiting was not diff icult. In order 
to prevent it, the issuing institutions stamped the notes with off icial seals. 
Apparently, the Ministry also delivered blank notes to the provincial govern-
ments which would later print out the denomination.73
The experiment was not considered a success, and the notes were with-
drawn by 1872. Privately issued drafts, silver bills by pawnbrokers, cash 
bills, and foreign notes nevertheless continued to be used, and the central 
government did not (and could not) restrict their circulation. After the 
Sino-Japanese War, the provincial governments started to issue their own 
bills, such as the North China Railroad Official Track General Office (Beiyang 
tiegui guanlu zongju ) in 1895, or the Hubei and Guangdong provincial 
administrations in 1899. The Beiyang Railroad bills were printed in London 
and the Hu-Guang bills by the Japanese Treasury Department.74 The Railroad 
bill was produced in the ‘modern’, horizontal format, but the Hu-Guang bill 
retained the traditional vertical format. Taiwanese banknotes were issued 
by the Tainan Off icial Silver and Cash Bill General Off ice after the island 
had become a Japanese colony in 1895.75
After the reorganization of the central government and its ministries 
in 1904, the new Ministry of Finance (duzhi bu) considered printing paper 
money again. At f irst, the Ministry investigated the options for outsourcing. 
The Beiyang Off icial Newspaper Off ice, the Japanese Treasury Depart-
ment, and the Commercial Press in Shanghai all had the skilled labour and 
know-how in machinery and technical processes and could have fulf illed 
the commission, but in the end the Ministry established a printery of its 
own for paper money, stamps, tax seals, and other f inancial documents 
and entrusted the acquisition of machinery and technology transfer to the 
American Banknote Company. The printing off ice was founded in 1907, and 
two specialists from the American Banknote Company were invited to teach 
Western methods of steel-plate intaglio printing to the Chinese printers and 
engravers.76 The central government invested a total of 1.1 million tael to set 
up a modern factory in Peking outside the city gate Xuanwu men on an area 
73 Zhang and Tan, ‘Xin faxian’, from a sample of 267 notes in eleven denominations have made 
out eight different block (or stamp) types for the characters on same denomination silver notes, 
and the cash notes also showed differences. In some cases, the f igures were handwritten, as on a 
1859 f ive tael note auctioned in November 2013. See the website of the auction house Chengxuan, 
‘2013 qiuji paimai hui. Zhibi’ Lot 2342. 
74 Peng Xinwei, Monetary History, pp. 711-712.
75 Ibid., p. 712.
76 Reed, Gutenberg, p. 65; Zhongguo yinshua tongshi, chap. 17, sect. 3.
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of 240,000 square metres (see Figure 26). Architectural f irms from Japan 
and the United States (Milburn, Heister & Company) were entrusted with 
the construction, which was f inished only in 1914, after the demise of the 
Qing dynasty.77 The newest machines for steel-plate gravure, lithographic, 
and letterpress printing as well as photographic devices and power engines 
were imported from the United States in order to guarantee the production 
of high-quality bank notes.
One of the f irst model banknotes of the ‘Great Qing Bank’, a one-
hundred silver dollar (yinyuan) bill showing a large portrait of the regent 
Zaifeng (1883-1851), the father of the last emperor, was designed by the 
American illustrator Lorenzo J. Hatch (d. 1913) of the American Banknote 
Company. It was f inished in 1910, and on the f irst day of the third month 
of the year 1911, regular printing production was started.78 The investment 
of the Qing government in modern printing machinery, technology, 
and knowledge transfer lasted longer than the dynasty. After the fall 
of the Qing, the American experts stayed on and continued to train 
Chinese printers and designers. In 1915, the products of the printery of the 
Ministry of Finance won an award at the Panama Pacif ic International 
Exposition.79
Conclusion
In considering the three f ields of government printing discussed above 
‒ the reproduction and augmentation of traditional learning with books, 
the printing of information on actual court events and decisions, and the 
77 Chen Zhen, Zhongguo jindai, ‘Beijing duzhibu yinshuaju’ 北京度支部印刷局 (The Printing 
Off ice of the Peking Ministry of Finance), pp. 319-320. Milburn, Heister and Company, Selections 
from the Latest Works of Milburn, Heister & Co., p. [28]; Specifications for a Bureau of Engraving 
and Printing for the Chinese Government to be erected in Peking. According to ‘Commerce: The 
Chinese Bureau of Engraving and Printing’, at present the main building houses one part of the 
China Banknote Printing and Minting Corporation.
78 According to Zhang Shudong, chap. 17, sect. 3, this day was declared the ‘banknote printing 
memorial day’ (chaopiao yinshua jinianri 钞票印刷纪念日). Peng Xinwei, while aff irming the 
high quality of the paper money printed with modern machines, is sceptical whether much of 
it was actually used, since most of the banknotes he had seen were model notes (p. 713). More 
specif ically, an anonymous article published on the website Gu qianbi shoucang wang 古钱币收
藏网 (‘Old money collector’s web’, dated 2004-10-16, accessed Sept. 2007) declares that although 
Hatch’s design was superb, the banknote could not be circulated because the dynasty fell soon 
after it was f inished. See ‘Zhibi de jianding he bianwei’ 纸币的鉴定和辨伪 (Assessing paper 
money and forgeries).
79 Zhang Shudong, Zhongguo yinshua, chap. 17, sect. 3.
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production of f inancial documents ‒ the Qing central government placed 
the highest importance on the f irst for much of its reign, experiencing an 
apex in the eighteenth century. The Qing continued to supply information on 
court events and decisions but only hesitantly engaged in the production of 
f inancial documents, and only in the last moment. Provincial governments 
took the lead after the mid-nineteenth century, replacing or complementing 
the printing activities of the centre. In the case of the currency, however, the 
Qing government tried to reassume its leading role and unify the multiple 
notes and bills in circulation at the time in an attempt to stimulate technol-
ogy transfer from the West and, to some extent, Japan. It was not a technical 
problem that stood in the way here.
Appendix
Table 32  Estimate of the mass of cash coins to be retrieved from 250,000 copper 
types used in the printing project for the imperial encyclopedia Gujin 
tushu jicheng (1726-1728)
Size of Gujin tushu jicheng types on 
the imprints
ca. 1 cm x 1 cm for regular characters, 0.5 cm x 1 cm 
for half width commentary size characters1
Standard weight of one copper cash 2.98 to 4.48 g2
estimated weight of one copper type Ca. three times that of a copper cash, that is 8.94 
to 13.44 g3
estimated weight of 250,000 types 2,235 to 3,360 kg
weight of one string of 1,000 cash 2.98 to 4.48 kg
estimated yield of 250,000 types in 
strings
750 strings if one type yields three copper cash
alloy of types unknown
alloy of cash ca. 50% copper, 41.5% zinc, 6.5% lead, and 2% tin
alloys of korean metal types Bok type in korean national museum: 50.9% 
copper, 0.7% zinc, 28.5% tin, 10.2% lead, 2.2% iron4
‘general value’: copper, tin, and zinc in the ratio 
of 7:2:1 (‘ancient times’), general proportion of 
bronze: 70%~95% copper, 5%~30% tin.5
Conclusion for the conversion of type 
into cash
the copper content shouldn’t be a problem, if the 
content of tin can be adjusted accordingly.
for comparison in 1781, 655 strings and 200 cash were cast from 
salvaged copper in the Peking mints.6
wear and tear of the types during the 64 print runs
number of characters of one set of 
Gujin tushu jicheng
ca. 100,000,000
number of types ca. 250,000
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if all types were used, each of them 
would occur:
400 times
in a print run of 64 copies, each 
would be used:
25,600 times
1 lu Shaw, Imperial Printing, p. 47, however, mentions 0.5 x 0.5 cm for the commentary size. this 
can hardly be the case, since commentary characters had the same height as regular ones. 
2 Burger, ‘minting’, p. 378, 383. 
3 the regular (not commentary) size korean bronze types in the gutenberg-museum mainz weigh 
between 10 and 15 grams. my thanks to Director Dr. eva-maria hanebutt-Benz for the information. 
4 Cheongju early Printing museum, ‘metal types in korea [i.e. koryŏ] dynasty’, ‘Bok types and Jun 
types of korea Dynasty’. 
5 Cheongju early Printing museum, ‘the process of making metal types’. 
6 Burger, ‘minting’, p. 383.
Table 33  Provincial printing offices established in the second half of the 
nineteenth century





局, renamed Jiangnan 
guan shuju 江南官書






1864 Zeng guofan 曾
國藩
Jiang Chu shuju 江
楚書局




局, alternative name 
Jiangsu shuju 江蘇
書局




yangzhou 1869 Salt Commissioner 
fang Junyi 方濬頤
Zhejiang guan shuju 
浙江官書局









over 100 and 
several dozen titles. in 
20 years, 200 titles.
Printed 浙江通
志 (1899). merged 
in 1909 with the 
Zhejiang library.
Qushui shuju 曲水書
局 (anhui shuju 安徽
書局 or anhui fuwen 
shuju 安徽敷文書局) 
Changzhou 1863 the fuwen shuju used 
wooden movable 
types. 
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fujian fuzhou shuju 
福建福州書局
fuzhou 1866 gov.-general Zuo 
Zongtang




wuchang 1867 gov.-general of 
huguang and 
gov. of hubei, li 
hanzhang 李瀚章
hubei shuju and 
Chongwen shuju 
were originally sepa-
rate and later merged. 
output 250 titles, 
140,000 printing 
blocks. Printed hubei 
tongzhi. received 
financial subsidies 
by li hanzhang and 
Zhang Zhidong. in 
peak times employed 
60 to 70 letter-





shuju 湘南書局, hubei 
sixian shuju 湖北思
賢書局
Changsha 1865 focus on the works of 
contemporary writers











funds raised by 
Zhang Zhidong. 
output ca. 300 
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宣, director Sun 
Jianai 孫家鼐
initially planned to 
focus on ‘modern’ 
topics. But since 
it didn’t receive a 
budget for printing, 
it did not produce its 
own imprints. instead, 
since 1896 they were 
transported by the 
CmSnC from southern 
official printeries and 




局 (Sichuan Printing 
office for Conserving 
antiquity), Chengdu 
shuju 成都書局
Chengdu 1863 wu tang 吳棠
yunnan shuju 雲南
書局





guiyang 1896 Songkun 嵩昆 Zhang Xiumin: 
‘relatively small 
output’









Qinghai unclear long Xiqing 龍
錫慶
only in Zhang 
Shudong, sect. 14-1
Dihua shuju 迪化書局 urumchi 1880 Zuo Zongtang左
宗棠
only in Zhang 
Shudong, sect. 14-1
guiyuan shuju 桂垣
書局, in 1907 guangxi 
shuju 廣西書局
guilin 1890 ma Piyao 馬丕瑤 only in Zhang 
Shudong, sect. 14-1
Sources: Zhang Shudong, Zhongguo yinshua, chap. 7, sect. 6-5, (5), 1. (3); chap. 14, sect. 1 各地官书
局 (www.cgan.net/book/books/print/g-history/big5_12/14_1.htm#1411); Qingdai yinshua; Zhang 
Xiumin, Zhongguo yinshua shi, p. 559 ff.

8. Private Printing, Private and 
Government Cooperation , and the 
Printing Workforce
The Private Printing Sector
In the f ield of printing that was not f inanced or controlled by the gov-
ernment, production for commercial purposes provided textbooks and 
learning aids of all types to prepare for off icial examinations. Moreover, 
information was provided in f ields of knowledge beyond those that were 
directly controlled by the state ‒ for instance, merchantry, navigation (maps), 
medicine, and agriculture ‒ but less for the craft trades, where skills were for 
the most part transmitted orally. Commercial publishers also supplied the 
entertainment sector, especially the theatre, with scenarios and f ictional 
writings. Multicolour block printing was used for book illustration, calendars, 
and for room decoration such as New Year’s pictures. And from the mid-
nineteenth century, information on contemporary political, economic, and 
cultural affairs and events was also printed in newspapers and journals, 
using lithographic and letterpress equipment imported from overseas.
Printing for non-commercial purposes served to enhance scholarly 
and social prestige. The boundaries of non-commercial and commercial 
publishing were sometimes blurred. If collectors reprinted their valuable 
editions of medical texts, for instance, for the use of other scholars or a wider 
public and sold these books, they preferred to understand their income by 
sales as only a means to purchase more rare editions that they could reprint 
and redistribute rather than gaining mere prof it.1 Religious beliefs were 
1 A typical case of a gentleman-merchant who printed to enhance his prestige rather than to 
make prof its was Pan Shicheng (c. 1804-1873), a Guangdong comprador and book collector, who 
between 1845 and 1851 published the collectanea Haishan xian guan congshu 海山仙館叢書 and 
other works. See Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period, p. 606; Wang and Lin, ‘Nan Yue xianxian’. A 
famous early non-prof it printer was the father of the philosophers Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao, see 
Tsien Tsuen-hsuin, Paper and Printing, p. 381, f ig. 1234; see also Ellen Widmer ‘The Huanduzhai’, 
p. 97 with a description of a philanthropist who was prompted by supernatural forces to print 
the medical texts in his possession. One of the most productive printer-publishers was Mao Jin 
(1599-1659), who is said to have published more than 600 works on over 100,000 woodblocks in 
thirty years, which were sold all over the country at f ixed prices. But rather than accumulating 
prof it, Mao invested the family fortune in his bookselling enterprise. See Fang Xing et al., ‘Paper 
Making, Printing and Publishing’, p. 235. 
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another important stimulus for non-commercial printing. Thus, the f irst 
known examples of printed scrolls and books in East Asia contain Buddhist 
writings.2 Buddhists were especially eager to duplicate texts because they 
believed that this was a way of acquiring merit and improving their karma, 
and that the quantity of texts produced had a direct influence on the amount 
of personal merit.3 Christian missionaries had made efforts to spread their 
creed in China from the sixteenth century, and in the nineteenth century, the 
letterpresses they had imported and the fonts they had developed helped to 
launch mechanized printing. Christian competition in turn may have been 
one of the triggers for the lay Buddhist movement of the late nineteenth 
century, which adopted the reproduction and distribution of Buddhist texts 
as its foremost method of promoting its religious mission.
State of the Field and Locations of Printing Workshops
Since the 1980s and 1990s, the study of Chinese book and publishing history 
has been expanding in academic circles in China and abroad.4 In the 
People’s Republic of China, important outline histories have been written 
by Zhang Xiumin and Zhang Shudong. The technical aspects have been 
most thoroughly treated in English by Tsien Tsuen-hsuin and in Chinese 
by Pan Jixing. In addition to these overviews, detailed studies of printing 
in the provinces and smaller centres are also abundant.
Japanese scholarship has traditionally been strong on the study of dating 
and editions, since Chinese books were acquired in Japan from an early 
period and in considerable quantity. A fair number of books no longer 
extant in China have been preserved in Japan. One of the classical studies 
in this respect is Nagasawa Kikuya’s Wa Kan sho no insatsu to sono rekishi 
(The printing of Japanese and Chinese books and its history). More recently, 
the eminent expert of Chinese bibliography, Yoneyama Toratarō, published 
2 Ledderose, Ten Thousand Things, pp. 150-152, refers to dharani rolls, several centimetres 
high and some metres long, that contain parts of the ‘Great Dharani Sūtra of Stainless Pure 
Light’, discovered in the monastery Pulguksa in Korea, dating before A.D. 751, and of the same 
text, which in A.D. 764, a Japanese empress vowed to have printed in one million copies. The 
oldest dated printed scroll (23.7 cm, more than f ive metres long) from China is the Diamond 
Sūtra discovered in Dunhuang. Its colophon records the year A.D. 868. Cf. Tsien Tsuen-hsuin, 
Paper and Printing, p. 8.
3 Ledderose, Ten Thousand Things, p. 152.
4 For overviews of the recent state of the f ield, see McDermott, Social History of the Chinese 
Book, ‘Bibliographical Notes’, pp. 263-278, and Meyer-Fong, ‘The Printed World’.
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Zusetsu Chūgoku insatsu shi (An illustrated history of Chinese printing). 
Younger generations of Japanese scholars have concentrated on the cultural 
meaning transported in Chinese books. An outstanding study in this respect 
has been presented by Inoue Susumu in his work Chūgoku shuppan bunkashi 
(2002) on scholars, the state, and book distribution from the beginnings 
of handwritten books in the f irst millennium B.C. to the Ming; a further 
important contribution to the book history of the High Qing is Okamoto 
Sae’s 1996 study on censorship (‘book prohibition’ kinsho/jinshu ) in the Qing.
The f ield is also increasingly f lourishing and gaining momentum in 
European languages. Recently, there has been extensive study of the 
previously fairly unknown activities of private printing and publishing 
workshops and enterprises. For the Ming and Ming-Qing transition, out-
standing research has been carried out by Lucille Chia about publishing 
in the Fujian province centre at Jianyang (2002), by Ellen Widmer on the 
publishing house Huanduzhai in Hangzhou and Suzhou (1996), and by 
Chow Kai-wing on Late Ming commercial publishing and the way in which 
political control was exerted on the contents of books privately printed, 
especially in comparison to censorship in European countries (2006). Joseph 
McDermott’s study on the social history of the Chinese book (2006) develops 
the thesis of the importance of the manuscript versus the imprint in late 
imperial China, which at several points draws on Inoue Susumu’s previous 
studies.5 Imprints and manuscripts remained complementary throughout 
the Qing and even Republican periods, even though printing as a means of 
duplicating texts gained ascendance in the late Ming.6 The situation of 
government and private printing from the Song era up until the early Ming 
has been presented and analysed in a collected volume edited by Hilde de 
Weerdt and Lucille Chia,7 and Cynthia Brokaw and Christopher Reed 
brought together articles on both traditional and present-day publishing 
in their 2010 collection From Woodblocks to the Internet.
Important work on printing in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries focuses on the rise of newspapers and the emergence of a public 
sphere, especially in Shanghai. Major achievements here have been reached 
by the Heidelberg project group, which has focused on the beginnings of a 
public sphere in China, with particular focus on the Shenbao (1872-1949), 
5 McDermott, ‘The Ascendance of the Imprint’, p. 57.
6 Ibid., p. 92. Cf., for instance, the fact that the Court Gazette was also sold in a handcopied 
edition throughout the longest part of the Qing period.
7 De Weerdt and Chia, Knowledge and Text Production in an Age of Print: China, 900-1400. 
Leiden: Brill 2011.
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one of the f irst commercial daily newspapers in China, founded in 1872 by 
the British entrepreneur Ernest Major (1841-1908).
Barbara Mittler, Natascha Vittinghoff, and Andrea Janku have studied 
the rise of the public sphere and the role and self-evaluation of the intel-
lectuals in the political upheavals of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century in monographs and, together with other authors, in contributions 
to a volume edited by Rudolf G. Wagner.8 Other important research on 
publishing in Shanghai includes the early study by Jean-Pierre Drège on the 
Commercial Press between 1897 and 1949 and, more recently, Christopher 
Reed’s inquiry into the rise of Chinese ‘print capitalism’ in the late Qing 
and early Republic of China.
Research on popular multicolour ornamental printing has been presented 
by John Lust in an overview in Chinese popular prints and in a monograph on 
ornamental printing in Shandong by James A. Flath. Gabriele Goldfuss has 
inquired into the religious printing activities of the lay Buddhist movement 
around Yang Wenhui (1837-1911) in the late nineteenth century.
In this impressive range of scholarship that looks at book production 
from economic, technical, political, and cultural perspectives, the most 
recent highlight is Cynthia Brokaw’s exploration of printing and publishing 
in Western Fujian, a region even more remote than Jianyang in the same 
province, which was researched by Lucille Chia. Brokaw directs our attention 
to the Sibao publishers, who were hardly ever acknowledged in the standard 
Chinese elite-oriented printing histories. Their products of average or low 
quality were what most people could afford, such as primers for reading and 
writing, f iction, and medical handbooks. This research shows that block 
printing, which Shanghai book and press historians were to dismiss as 
marginal in the twentieth century, was carried out on the periphery until the 
1940s. In fact, as Goldfuss has shown, if printing blocks were not recycled for 
purposes such as heating or for paving ways and roads, and if they survived 
political upheavals, they could be used for printing in the late 1980s.9 In 
2006, unesco declared the Chinese engraved block printing technique to 
be an Intangible Cultural Heritage that deserves to be safeguarded.10
8 Rudolf G. Wagner (ed.), Joining the Global Public.
9 Goldfuss, Vers un bouddhisme, p. 51 ff, and f ig. 2, 5-6 with photographs of the ‘Sutra carving 
site’ (Kejing chu 刻經處) in Nanjing taken in the early 1980s, which show printers inking the 
woodblocks and binding the sutra texts.
10 The list ‘Guowuyuan guanyu gongbu […] Fei wuzhi wenhua yichan minglu’, dated May 2006, 
mentions the techniques of block printing sites in Yangzhou, the Jinling Sutra Printing Site, and 
the Dege Sutra Printing House in Sichuan Province (as numbers 429/VIII/78 to 80 respectively) 
as protected intangible cultural heritage. See also ‘Jinling kejing yinshua jishu’.
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Like the other branches of handicraft manufacture, the printing sector 
during the Qing era followed the pattern of rising commercialization and 
expansion of manufacturing of the late Ming. After a short lull during the 
Ming-Qing transition, the production of printing also spread out to rural 
and peripheral areas.11 Some important commercial publishing sites in the 
late Ming (sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) were Nanjing, Suzhou, and 
Huzhou in Jiangnan; Yangzhou in Northern Jiangsu; Hangzhou in Zhejiang; 
Huizhou in Anhui; and the Jianyang centres of Masha and Shufang in Fujian. 
In the Ming-Qing transition, Jianyang as a centre of printing suffered and did 
not recover. Nanjing and Hangzhou lost their leading positions, and Peking 
with its Liuli chang district rose to primacy.12 Zhang Xiumin lists only thirteen 
commercial publishing houses in Peking in the late Ming period, while 38 
commercial printers in Nanjing are known. This ratio was turned around 
during the Qing era, when 112 publishing houses and bookstores existed in 
Peking, and only thirteen in Nanjing. In the provinces, starting from the 
Kangxi era, Sichuan had ten large commercial houses in Chengdu and several 
establishments in Chongqing. Nevertheless, these f igures may be just the tip 
of the iceberg. The Jiangnan printing industry ‒ including all publishers not 
only in Nanjing but also Suzhou, Yangzhou, and Hangzhou ‒ was still prolific 
even in the eighteenth century. In the nineteenth century, the Jiangnan 
metropolis Shanghai again overtook Peking and, together with Canton, 
became the first place where mechanized printing machinery was operated.
Canton became a centre of printing in the mid-Qing. It was a place where 
much information on overseas powers and countries arrived. Reformers 
and statecraft thinkers from before and after the Opium Wars published 
their writings in the jingshi wenbian collections and monographs such as 
the Haiguo tuzhi (Illustrated treatise on the maritime kingdoms). At least 
23 printing shops existed from the 1850s until the f irst decade of twentieth 
century. Two more towns in the vicinity of Canton had print shops of more 
than local importance: the market town Foshan and the more rural Magang 
in Shunde district. Foshan, a busy market town which was also a centre for 
ceramics and the iron industry, had at least twelve publisher-printers, more 
than any other city in Guangdong with the exception only of Magang, where 
female block cutters practiced their low-wage trade.13 For the market town of 
Xuwan, a printing centre in Jiangxi, there are f igures of about 47 individual 
11 Brokaw, Commerce in Culture, p. 8. The following overview follows Brokaw p. 8 ff. and Zhang 
Xiumin, Zhongguo yinshua shi, pp. 551-559.
12 Brokaw, Commerce in Culture, p. 8.
13 Brokaw, Commerce in Culture, p. 11.
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printing and publishing shops. According to Brokaw, Xuwan and Magang 
had the single greatest output of block printings. In north China, Ji’nan and 
Liaocheng were important locations for printing, as both were strategically 
located near the north-south traffic artery of the Grand Canal. Yuechi  county 
in eastern Sichuan was a rural region where farmers practiced block cutting as 
a subsidiary craft in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. They supplied the 
urban book market in Chengdu and Chongqing but also had their own direct 
distribution channels.14 The rural centres of printing in South China were most 
often located in areas that also had a prolific paper manufacturing industry.15
The art of multicoloured woodblock printing used for house decora-
tion, especially during New Year (nianhua), in the early and mid-Qing era 
was concentrated in the three largest artistic centres of Suzhou (in the 
Taohuawu  district); Yangliuqing in Hebei, f ifteen kilometres west of Tianjin; 
and Mianzhu in Sichuan, about one-hundred kilometres northeast of the 
provincial capital Chengdu.16 On a smaller scale, ornamental block prints 
were produced in many locations throughout the Qing empire.17
Output of the Printing Industry
In the private printing sector, it is diff icult to make a clear division between 
the concepts of ‘publishing house’, ‘print shop’, and ‘bookstore’. As a rule, 
the publishing house (shufang, literally book-workshop) both produced 
and distributed books.
So far, much doubt remains about the aggregate output of these rural and 
urban centres of printing and publishing. One estimate that is frequently 
quoted in the literature was made by Yang Jialuo: among the 253,000 titles 
registered in off icial historiography and bibliography from the Han to the 
Qing era, about half of the output‒ over 126,000 titles, probably also including 
manuscripts ‒ are attributed to the Qing,18 yielding a yearly average of 471 
14 Ibid., p. 12.
15 For an excellent, comprehensive study on papermaking in Sichuan, see Eyferth, Eating Rice 
From Bamboo Roots.
16 John Lust, Chinese Popular Prints, p. 47, 66, 80.
17 Lust, Chinese Popular Prints, p. 86, mentions one to three minor centres in every province, 
and James Flath in The Cult of Happiness, p. 12-13, gives details on six further locations in the 
North China ‘aesthetic region’.
18 Tsien Tsuen-hsuin, Paper and Printing, p. 190, fn. f, citing Yang Jialuo楊家駱, ‘Zhongguo 
gujin zhuzuo mingshu zhi tongji’ 中國古今著作名數之統計 (Statistics of old and new Chinese 
book titles), in Xin Zhonghua 新中華 (The New China Fortnightly), 1946, vol. 4, p. 7.
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titles per year for the 267 years of the Qing dynasty. Not all Chinese book 
historians agree with this f igure. At present, the estimates for the Qing 
dynasty range between 70,000/80,00019 and 200,00020 titles. This result does 
not impress European bibliometricians, who point to annual averages of 
book production between 1751 and 1800 on a scale of, for instance, 2,300 in 
the regions now known as Germany and 3,100 in France, or 12,500 for entire 
Europe including Russia.21 The low-end estimates for China are based on 
information in various Qing bibliographies, which tend to understate or 
ignore books beyond the scope of state orthodoxy. Thus, Buddhist writings 
and local compilations, especially the great number of genealogies, were 
often disregarded. As we see from Brokaw’s study on Sibao, the sales volume 
of one of the largest Sibao publishing houses in the early twentieth century, 
when mechanized printing started to replace the handicraft trade, amounted 
to 8,000 sold copies of 250 titles per year. These are most certainly not 
considered in any of the above estimates. In the heyday of Sibao publishing 
in the Qianlong and Jiaqing eras, 46 such publishing houses were founded.22
The total number of copies of existing ‘ancient books’ (printed and 
handwritten before 1912) has been assessed at between 35 and 50 million.23 
The number of titles produced between 1912 and 1949 has been estimated 
at 68,000 titles, which amounts to about 1,800 per year.24
Looking at the issue from the consumer side is diff icult because no 
systematic surveys of literacy rates were conducted before the twentieth 
century, and observations by Chinese and Western observers between the 
seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries diverge sharply. The most generous 
estimate of Qing dynasty literacy rates has been made by Evelyn Rawski. 
From scattered evidence, she has concluded that during the Qing era about 
30 to 45 percent of the men and two to ten percent of the women could read 
and write.25 For nineteenth-century rural Guangdong, she estimated a male 
19 Wu Feng 吴枫, ‘Zhongguo guji shuliang shulue’ 中国古籍数量述略 (A brief account on the 
quantity of Chinese old books), in Wu Feng xueshu wencun 吴枫学术文存 (Collected works of 
Wu Feng), Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 2002. The author is grateful to Professor Gao Xuan 高瑄, 
Vice Director of Tsinghua University Library, Peking, who provided this information and the 
following data on Chinese estimates.
20 Wang Shuwei 王树伟, ‘Woguo guji zhi duoshao’ 我国古籍知多少 (How many old Chinese 
books exist?), in Baike zhishi 百科知识 (Encyclopedic knowledge), 1981, no. 12.
21 Buringh and van Zanden, ‘Charting the ‘rise of the West’’, p. 44; van Zanden, ‘De timmerman’, 
p. 117/118.
22 Brokaw, Commerce in Culture, p. 3, 8.
23 Ancient Collection Division, ‘Current situation’ and information by Gao Xuan.
24 Reed, Gutenberg, p. 298, note 8.
25 Rawski, Education and Popular Literacy in Ch’ing China, pp. 22-23.
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literacy rate of 40 to 50 percent, and in Canton city even 89 to 90 percent. 
Li Bozhong , who discusses Rawski’s data, estimated a maximum literacy 
rate in the region of the Yangzi Delta of 30 percent for both genders.26 Other 
scholars are more sceptical and have estimated male literacy in the range of 
20 to 25 percent. Opinions on what ‘literacy’ actually means are also divided. 
According to Li Bozhong, ‘being literate’ implies knowledge of at least one-
thousand characters and ‘half-literate’ about 500 to 600 characters,27 but 
scholars such as Wilt Idema have def ined ‘moderate literacy’ as starting 
with a knowledge of about 2,000 characters.28
Literacy does not necessarily mean that a person will buy books. However, 
in view of the estimated 51 to 102 million literate people in 1800 or 60 to 120 
million in 1900,29 even the highest estimate of 50 million extant books (as 
of 1912) seems a low rate that may imply that much book production was 
not recorded by Chinese bibliographers.
Price trends for books were decreasing throughout the Qing era and 
varied broadly according to the quality of collating and proofing, character-
carving, and materials used for printing and binding. The sales prices that 
Liu Qiang states for the Wuying dian books ranged from 12.46 tael for the 
rhyme dictionary Peiwen yunfu (106 chapters), printed in 1711; 5.148 tael for 
the ‘Regulations and precedents of the Ministry of Personnel’ Libu zeli (52 
chapters) printed around 1800; and 6.721287 tael for the Peking city gazetteer 
Rixia jiuwen kao (160 chapters), printed in 1778. The last quoted price at that 
time bought 268 jin (ca. 160 kg) of white wheat flour.30
Cynthia Brokaw quotes book prices for the low end of the production 
scale and at a time when prices had fallen, mainly due to the decline of 
woodblock prices since the Jiaqing era. The cheapest items on the Sibao 
merchants’ account books in the last decades of the Qing and in the early 
years of the Republic were primers like the ‘Three character canon’ Sanzi 
jing for 0.005 tael, an edition of the six-chapter ‘Three-hundred collected 
Tang poems’, or a simple annotated ‘Book of Changes’ or ‘Classic of History’ 
for 0.03 tael. The most expensive item was a sixteen-chapter collection of 
ghost stories, Liaozhai zhiyi, with a wholesale price of 1.1 tael and a retail 
26 Li Bozhong, ‘Bagu zhi wai’, p. 8.
27 Ibid., p. 7.
28 Brokaw, Commerce in Culture, pp. 562-565.
29 Assuming an optimistic literacy rate of 30 percent and a pessimistic rate of 15 percent 
respectively for a population of 341.6 million in 1800 and 400 million in 1900. For population 
f igures, see Angus Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run, p. 169, ‘Table D.1. 
Chinese Population, 50 AD-1996’.
30 Liu Qiang, ‘Qing Wuying dian’, p. 276.
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price of 1.32 to 1.76 tael.31 About half of the titles cost 0.1 tael or below. In 
view of wages in the late Qing period, the low-priced books should have 
been affordable for families whose income was at least partly in monetary 
wages, while the palace editions remained luxury editions for the very 
wealthy or for state institutions.
If the output of the government printeries is seen in relation to the 
overall output, even in Yang Jialuo’s f igures, at 600 for the central govern-
ment and 1,000 for the printeries of the provincial governments, this 
accounts for but one percent of the titles. However, the comparison is 
skewed because the voluminous encyclopedia Gujin tushu jicheng is only 
counted as one title. The percentage would increase signif icantly if we took 
court and provincial gazettes into account, but in this case we would also 
have to include the output of the commercial newspapers and journals 
published especially in the treaty ports. Leaving newspapers and court 
gazettes aside, it is still evident that the output of government printeries 
comes to but a fraction of the total production of the printing industry 
in the Qing period.
Mechanization in the Printing Industry in the Late Qing and 
Early Republic
From the beginning of the nineteenth century, as political crises of unprec-
edented scale shook the empire and competing value systems appeared in 
the form of Christianity and – for two decades – the Taiping ideology, the 
printing industry boomed and diversif ied. Already before the Opium War, 
the London Missionary Society had started to develop Chinese letterpress 
printing and letter-casting machines (relief media) as well as planographic 
media (lithography) in Southeast Asia and in the city of Canton. The post-
Opium War treaties of Wangxia (1844) and Tianjin (1858) guaranteed overseas 
powers the freedom of Christian missionary activity in China. Consequently 
the printing activities of both Protestant (the London Missionary Society, 
the American Presbyterian Mission Press) and Catholic (Jesuit) groups 
intensified. The Protestant missions preferred letterpress relief media, while 
the Catholics favoured planographic printing (lithography and collotype).32
Copperplate engraving (intaglio) had f irst been introduced in the Kangxi 
era and from 1712 had been applied by Jesuit missionaries at court for map 
31 Brokaw, Commerce in Culture, p. 514.
32 Reed, Gutenberg, p.29.
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making.33 The Qianlong emperor was particularly interested in the artistic 
and graphic qualities of this medium. In 1765, he ordered from the French 
royal academy for painting and sculpture in Paris a series of sixteen cop-
perplate engravings of the military expeditions to Turkestan to be executed 
on the basis of the paintings of his court painters Giovanni Castiglione, Denis 
Attiret, Ignatius Sichelbarth, and Jean-Damascène Sallusti. The offprints 
and copperplates were delivered in 1774. Thereafter, the series of military 
expeditions and suppressions of uprisings were all glorif ied with large-size 
copperplate engravings, and this time executed by Chinese designers and 
engravers.34 Around 1787, the buildings in European style of the imperial 
gardens Yuanming yuan were also, upon imperial order, depicted with this 
foreign technique by Chinese artists who had been trained by Castiglione.35 
The last series of copperplates showing battle scenes depicts the subjugation 
of the rebellion by Jehangir in Eastern Turkestan between 1825 and 1828 
and was designed in 1828.36 After a lapse of a few decades, mechanized 
copperplate engraving was reintroduced in the Jianghai Customs Printing 
Off ice in Shanghai but more importantly in the printery of the Ministry of 
Finance for banknotes, stamps, and government seals.37
Private, secular printing f irms like Ernest Major’s enterprises used let-
terpress for newspaper production and lithography for illustrated magazines 
and reprints of classical Chinese literature.
Yet before the turn of the twentieth century, most book printing outside 
the treaty ports was still done in woodblock carving.
The rise of the modern printing industry has been described in detail 
by Christopher Reed, who has shown that in the last thirty years of the 
Qing dynasty, lithography dominated over the letterpress in output and 
popularity.38 However, after the 1890s, letterpress typography began to 
replace lithography; by the early twentieth century, both types of mechanized 
33 The technique was introduced by the Jesuit Matteo Ripa. The f irst maps were engraved in 
1712 and 1719, and later under the Qianlong emperor in 1775. Helen Wallis, ‘Die Kartographie 
der Jesuiten am Hof in Peking’, p. 121.
34 See the catalogue of the exhibition ‘Europa und die Kaiser von China’ with the introduction by 
Müller-Hofstede and Walravens, ‘Paris-Peking’, pp. 163-172, for the illustrations of the expeditions 
to Jinchuan in Sichuan (1775/76), Taiwan (1786/87); Annam (1789/90), against the Gurkhas in Tibet 
(1793-1799) and the ethnic uprisings of the Miao in Guizhou, Hunan, and Sichuan (1798-1803) 
and Wädow, ‘Die ‘Schlachtenkupfer’ aus der Regierungsdevise Qianlong’.
35 Jean Paul Desroches, ‘Yuanming yuan: Die Welt als Garten’, p. 124.
36 Walter Fuchs, ‘Schlachtenkupfer der Kienlung- und Taokuang-Zeit’, p. 119.
37 Reed, Gutenberg, pp. 28/29, table 1.1 ‘Western print media in China, 1700-1913’, p. 65.
38 Reed, Gutenberg, p. 121 and p. 327, note 124. On p. 126, however, he gives the f igure of 94 
lithographers.
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printing largely replaced woodblock printing – at least in Shanghai. Fur-
thermore, not only were Western printing machines imported to China 
starting from the 1870s, the machinery was also f irst repaired and later built 
domestically. Between 1914 and 1932, Shanghai was the most important 
Chinese centre of printing machinery production that also exported to 
Southeast Asia and even to Japan.39 Domestic printing machinery makers 
only emerged in the period after the fall of the Qing, but it shows the vitality 
and adaptability of the Chinese manufacturing sector.40
As Brokaw has shown, in the periphery beyond Shanghai, block printing 
was still practised, if with decreasing profits, until the 1940s.41 Yet even in 
a former treaty port, Qingdao ‒ with a population of over 400,00042 and 
several newspaper publishers, universities, and institutes of secondary 
education ‒ printing and character carving was exercised as a handicraft 
trade in the 1930s. Only every one in a thousand persons was engaged in 
this sector, but within the handicrafts in Qingdao, printing ranked f ifth in 
respect to households and persons employed (see Table 34 and Table 35). 
We have no indicators as to the relation of handicraft (block) printing and 
mechanized printing in Qingdao. According to a nationwide estimate of the 
net production value of handicrafts within the entire manufacturing sector, 
the share of handicrafts in the total production value of manufacturing in 
1933 was still 72 percent. However, in the printing sector, mechanization 
had advanced faster, with the percentage of the net production value of 
handicrafts at only 45.3.43
In less industrialized inland cities, mechanized printing was probably 
less advanced, but demand for products of the ‘information industries’ 
may also have been comparatively lower than in Qingdao, for instance, 
where several universities and institutes of secondary learning were based. 
At any rate, even in early 1930s Qingdao, handicraft printing and letter 
39 Ibid., p. 136.
40 Ibid., p. 135.
41 However, even in Shanghai in the 1890s, ‘printing from blocks is still done with advantage 
whenever a larger work meets with continuous demand, though only a small number is needed, 
perhaps some hundred copies, per year.’ See Reed, Gutenberg, p. 320, note 32.
42 For the population f igures of Qingdao, see Cui Yuting, ‘Kangzhan yiqian Qingdao’, p. 145.
43 ‘Yijiusansan nian Zhongguo shougongye chanzhi zhan gongye chanzhi de bizhong guji’ 
一九三三年中国手工业产值占工业总产值的比重估计 (Estimates of the relation of the net 
value of Chinese handicraft production to the total net industrial production value), in Peng 
Zeyi, Zhongguo jindai shougongye, vol. 3, pp. 814-815. Peng quotes here the f igures given in Wu 
Baosan et al. (eds.), Zhongguo guomin suode (China’s national income), 1933, vol. 1, p. 64, 65, and 
66, with (a very slight) modif ication in Wu’s Zhongguo guomin suode 1933 xiuzheng, pp. 135, 140, 
and 142.
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carving still could feed the artisans and was moderately popular as a 
career choice for young people considering learning a craft, probably also 
for the reason that little capital was necessary to start up a shop of one’s 
own (see Table 35).
In Peking, according to the city gazetteer of 1939, about 30 lead letterpress 
printers and 500 smaller and larger lithographers operated their business 
with a workforce of about 10,000. About 2,000 of them worked at the printery 
of the Ministry of Finance. The section on printing states that character 
carving was no longer practised in commercial enterprises but was still 
done in schools, churches, and newspapers.44 However, the section on 
book and rubbings informs us that ‘formerly there were several dozen of 
character carvers in Peking. They f irst all came from Nanjing, only later did 
they take on North Chinese apprentices. At present almost all the old shops 
have been closed down. Among those who persisted, the Wenkai studio is 
best known. […] It often employs more than one hundred people. The other 
shops engage between seven and eight or one to two carvers.’ Bookbinders, 
character copyists, and specialists for taking ink rubbings from metal or 
stone are also mentioned. But the print-related handicraft trade that still 
employed the most workers was the paper mounting of calligraphic or 
painting scrolls. 1,500 paper mounters are reported for Peking. The trade, 
like character carving, was f irst practised in Peking by Jiangnan artisans 
from Suzhou but was later mastered by Northern workers.45
To conclude, although mechanization started in the 1870s and took off 
in the second decade of the twentieth century, it did not immediately push 
the handicraft sector from the market. Due to the huge increase in demand 
for information, education, and entertainment encoded in print media, the 
craft sector survived for several decades thereafter.
The Relationship of Government and Private Printing
The censorship of books was carried out most severely and systematically in 
the Qianlong era in connection with the compilation of the collectanea Siku 
quanshu. Recent scholarship has pointed to the emphasis by the Qianlong 
emperor and his central government upon censorship of anti-Manchu 
writings, the eagerness of off icials to f ind suspicious books in order to 
gain rank and prestige, and the compliance of the scholarly elites with this 
44 Beijing shizhi gao, vol. 3, p. 493.
45 Ibid., p. 509-511.
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policy.46 The monitoring activities had consequences for publishers. Zhang 
Xiumin refers to ‘over 120 cases’ of censorship in the Kangxi, Yongzheng, 
and Qianlong eras and states that, in the larger initiatives of censorship, 
not only authors but also artisans could be implicated.47 One particularly 
drastic case is reported from the Kangxi era, when in the year 1663, the 
author of an indicted ‘History of the Ming Dynasty’, Zhuang Tinglong, was 
posthumously punished by having his corpse dug up and burned. Those who 
had edited, distributed, sold, and bought the work ‒ as well as Tang Dafu, 
who had carved the blocks during a period of f ive years, Li Xiangfu, who 
had printed forty copies of it, the bookbinder, and the porter of the blocks, 
altogether seventy (and in another version, 120) persons were sentenced to 
death and executed in Hangzhou.48
Other scholars have assessed the direct impact of the ‘literary inquisition’ 
of the 1770s as less severe. For one, the suspect books were more often issued 
by private, not commercial publishers, and thus the range of persons involved 
was more conf ined.49 Moreover, if character carvers, printers, or sales 
agents were illiterate, which occurred now and then, their sentences were 
mitigated.50 The blocks of the incriminated books would often be destroyed, 
but sometimes the emendation or deletion of the passages offensive to the 
emperor and his dynasty was an acceptable alternative.51 According to 
a report to the throne from the year 1781, 52,480 woodblocks of seditious 
books had been broken up and recycled as f irewood. Since two pages of a 
book are carved on one block, the forms for at least one hundred, but more 
likely several hundred books, were destroyed in this process. Books were 
burned, too, but absolute control could not be achieved; indeed, some of the 
works on the 1782 index could still be found in the twentieth century.52 The 
censorship focused mostly on scholarly works in the f ield of history, and 
to some extent lexicography; examples of works of entertainment are not 
recorded, so it appears that commercial publishing was not greatly affected 
by the prohibitions. Following the model of the preceding dynasties, cultural 
politics during the Qing era promoted an education that was focused on 
46 Guy, Four Treasuries, pp. 198-200.
47 Zhang Xiumin, Zhongguo yinshua shi, p. 544.
48 Ibid., pp. 757-758.
49 Brook, ‘Censorship’, p. 181.
50 Ibid., p. 183, refers to a reduction of the sentence of f logging from one hundred to eighty 
blows, as well as exemption from three years of banishment for the illiterates engaged in book 
production.
51 Brook, ‘Censorship’, p. 191.
52 Guy, Four Treasuries, pp. 171, 194.
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the students’ participation in off icial examinations on various levels, from 
district and provincial to the level of the capital. Scholarly status greatly 
enhanced one’s social prestige. Whoever could afford the tuition fees and 
the books (and was not dependent upon family male labour power for more 
basic economic pursuits) could allow their sons to study in preparation for 
a degree in one of the levels of the examination hierarchy.
The road was theoretically open for all males except those with ‘debased’ 
status, but artisans, for instance, could rarely take it due to f inancial reasons. 
Until the mid-eighteenth century, the canon of books to be mastered for 
analysis and exegesis in official examinations covered the Confucian classics, 
historical works, political administration and decision-making, and jurispru-
dence. After 1756, the composition of a poem was demanded in addition to 
essays and exegetical answers to questions on moral philosophy, while the 
legal question was eliminated from the examination questionnaires.53 Only 
a limited percentage of the population participated in official examinations: 
it has been estimated that in the late Qing period 1.6 to 1.9 percent of the 
total population took part in the examinations. By 1800, a quota of over 
two million examination candidates together with about 750,000 degree 
holders who had already attained scholarly status were channelled into this 
specif ic type of elite learning by the decisions of the central government.54
Knowledge of science, medicine, and technology was required only at the 
general level that was necessary for administrative decisions. Expertise in 
these f ields was not tested in the highest examinations that were held at the 
capital. Nevertheless, Qing emperors and scholar-off icial elites, especially 
in Jiangnan, were aware of the importance of knowledge of precise studies, 
especially mathematics. The early Qing emperors Shunzhi and Kangxi em-
ployed Jesuit missionaries at court who brought recent European knowledge 
of astronomy, mathematics, geography, cartography, and, to a certain extent, 
mechanics, to the personal attention of the rulers and the Chinese scholars. 
In the eighteenth century, proto-scientif ic research was exercised outside 
the court in Jiangnan scholarly communities. It was linked to ‘evidential 
research’ (kaozhengxue), which had previously for the main part involved 
philological scholarship. As long as these endeavours remained apolitical, 
the Qing state did not interfere with the evidential researchers.55
53 See Elman, ‘The Social Roles of Literati’, p. 367, ‘The Format of Provincial and Metropolitan 
Civil Examinations, 1646-1756’, p. 374 for the content of boyhood education, p. 409 for the 
‘Reformed Format of Provincial and Metropolitan Civil Service Examinations, 1757-1787’, p. 413 
for the ‘Reformed Format of Provincial and Metropolitan Civil Service Examinations, 1793-1898’.
54 Elman, ‘The Social Roles of Literati’, p. 370.
55 Ibid., p. 425.
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Since only the smallest part of these prospective and already successful 
candidates could actually attain a post in administration, one of the ways 
of putting one’s knowledge to good use was by teaching in state or private 
schools and academies or by opening a bookstore-publishing house. As 
literacy spread from the early nineteenth century on, basic writing and 
calculating skills were taught on a wider scale than before,56 and teaching 
materials were also printed and distributed by lowbrow publishing houses 
such as those based in Sibao or Xuwan at affordable prices.57
The state did not obstruct the publishing and printing activities of the 
private sector if it kept clear of criticism of the dynasty, such as downright 
condemnation of the Manchus as ‘barbarians’ or, more subtly, referring to 
the Qing emperors and empresses by their personal names rather than using 
the obligatory substitute characters. Two examples, one large and one small, 
illustrate the relation of the central government and the private sector after 
the decline of printing activities at the Wuying dian in the mid-nineteenth 
century. In the f irst case, the central government and the court privatized 
the reproduction of what had once been the essence of Qing dominance 
over the canon of knowledge in the empire. In the second case, printing the 
internal rules and regulations of court life was also outsourced.
On imperial order, the encyclopedia Gujin tushu jicheng was reprinted 
twice in the late Qing, once by letterpress and once in lithography. The 
court had 1,500 copies printed of the letterpress lead type edition by a 
company established specif ically for this purpose that went by the name of 
‘Tushujicheng Lead Type Publishing Company’ (Tushujicheng qianyin shuju). 
It is preserved in many libraries worldwide, which, somewhat confusingly, 
date it to 1884,58 but the printing dates 1885 to 1888 seem more plausible.59 
The publishing company was a subsidiary of Dianshizhai, which belonged 
56 Elman, ‘The Social Roles of Literati’, p. 370.
57 The publishers  of Xuwan, according to Brokaw, Commerce in Culture, p. 538, were mostly 
‘failed’ scholars or low degree holders. Brokaw, op. cit., p. 516, has calculated that during the 
late Qing, a modest selection of twenty elementary schoolbooks by the Sibao publishers for the 
examination curriculum would cost between 0.1728 and 0.2580 tael.
58 According to the digital library catalogues of the Academia Sinica, Taiwan, the Japanese 
Union Catalogue Nacsis, the Taiwan National Library, and the Beijing tushuguan (the Chinese 
National Library), ‘1884’ is presumably the year when the project was started. According to the 
Beijing tushuguan, the imprint expressly says: ‘in the summer of the year Guangxu jiashen (1884), 
the Shanghai Tushu jicheng lead type edition publishers assembled stocks for the reprint’ 光绪甲
申年夏上海图书集成铅版印书局集股重印. The National Library lists another lead-type edition 
by the Shanghai Tushu jicheng letterpress publishers of Guangxu 30 (1904). No information was 
available on this reprint.
59 Giles, Alphabetical Index, p. xix; Reed, Gutenberg, p. 116.
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to the Shenbao group that the American entrepreneur Ernest Major had 
founded and at that time still owned.60
Whether lithographic rather than letterpress printing is more aesthetically 
pleasing to the Chinese remains unresolved,61 but obviously the govern-
ment wanted to commission an additional, more presentable lithographic 
reprint and eventually gave out another order to Tongwen press, the largest 
Chinese-owned lithographic enterprise at the time.62 The initiators from 
the Council of Foreign Affairs (Zongli yamen) intended to use it also as a 
gift in international diplomacy, presumably to show the scope of Chinese 
learning. The court covered the entire sum of about 350,000 tael for one 
hundred copies, which were printed and published as a revised edition with 
emendations, totalling 1,672 volumes (ce).63 The production process lasted 
from 1892 to 1894.64 Part of the edition was to be sold for 3,500 tael per set, 
but after several years, a considerable number of copies remained on stock, 
taking up much space. After 1901, the government presented copies to the 
provinces65 and also to foreign heads of states and institutions.66
From the perspective of the government and court, the contrast to the 
Kangxi/Yongzheng project must have been striking. Back then, applying a 
comparatively rare but sophisticated technology and collecting the latest 
information on the widest imaginable scope of topics including knowledge 
of Western mathematics, astronomy, geography, and armament provided 
by missionaries, the court produced this sum of learning on its own in a 
60 Reed, Gutenberg, p. 104.
61 See Rudolf Wagner’s critique of Reed’s thesis that early lead-type printing before ca. 1900 
could not satisfy Chinese aesthetic demands. Wagner, ‘Gutenberg’ (Chapter 1); Reed, Gutenberg, 
p. 27.
62 Reed, Gutenberg, pp. 115-117.
63 The memorial with the cost estimate for the project states that the original Kangxi edition 
to be used as an exemplar for the reprint cost 13,000 tael. ‘Zhupi Guangxu Shiliu nian shi yue 
shisi ri junjichu zoupian’ 硃批光緒十六年十月十四日軍機處奏片 (Memorial note of the State 
Council, Guangxu 16/10/14, with vermilion rescript), in Zi Ye, ‘Qing ting shiyin’, p. 62.
64 Zhang Xiumin, Zhongguo yinshua shi, p. 592.
65 ‘Zhupi Jiangxi xunfu xie’en shangci Gujin tushu jicheng pian’ 硃批江西巡撫謝恩賞賜《
古今圖書集成》片 (Note by the Jiangxi governor on the grateful receipt of the Gujin tushu 
jicheng, with vermilion rescript, [Guangxu 27, 1901]), in Zi Ye, ‘Qing ting shiyin’, pp. 62-63. Zi Ye 
mentions that this is the earliest of twelve notes by provincial governors on the receipt of the 
encyclopedia.
66 One set was donated to the China Society of London and given on loan to the Library of 
the University of Cambridge, see ‘Introduction to the Chinese Collections’. Another one was 
presented to the American president Theodore Roosevelt, who had it stored in the Library of 
Congress, see Zi Ye, ‘Qing ting shiyin’, p. 63. In 1902, Columbia University in New York also 
received one set. See Reed, Gutenberg, p. 325, fn. 103.
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veritable ‘palace edition’. Now, in an effort to conserve Chinese learning 
that must be understood as part of the self-strengthening movement, the 
project had to be outsourced to ‘merchants’67 and earlier had even been 
reproduced by a foreign-owned printing company.
A printing project much smaller in scope concerning subject matter 
particularly important for everyday life at the Qing court was the revision 
of the ‘Imperially endorsed interior court regulations’ (Qinding gongzhong 
zeli). The accounts book of the project are preserved in the First Historical Ar-
chives. They are not dated, but from all the information available about court 
regulations, we can assume that the book contained the 1884 regulations. In 
the bibliography of the works of the Imperial Household Department, this 
edition as well as its predecessor of the Tongzhi years (1862-1874) is attributed 
to the Wuying dian.68 However, from extant documents we see that these 
regulations ‒ which concern, for instance, the conduct of all courtiers and 
eunuchs, and the treatment of palace women ‒ were commissioned to 
printers and character carvers from a commercial printshop, Zhuanyun 
zhai (Carved cloud studio)69 at the book and antique centre Liuli chang. 
This printing and character carving workshop printed all Peking pawn 
certif icates (dangpiao). Apparently it held this monopoly by customary 
agreement among the pawnshops.70 Five printers with their materials, 
including the blank printing blocks, were sent to execute the job in the 
palace.71 They f inished after 115 days, and two of them stayed on for another 
eleven days for corrections and emendations. Seventy more workday units 
(gong) were necessary for printing and binding.72
It remains a puzzle as to why of all texts, the court regulations that are most 
intimately related to the personal life of emperors, eunuchs, and court women 
were entrusted to outside printers at a time when, judging from the other extant 
accounts, the Wuying dian was not yet quite defunct. The archival records 
67 This designation is preserved in the memorial of the State Council, which states, ‘We, the 
ministers, have found out that the Shanghai merchants are the most familiar with lithography’ 
‘Zhupi Guangxu Shiliu nian‘, in Zi Ye, ‘Qing ting shiyin’, p. 61.
68 Qingdai neifu, pp. 236/7.
69 Archival record at the First Historical Archives, Neiwufu zeliguan 内務府則例館 (Regulation 
and precedent off ice of the Imperial Household Department) 23, Fuwen 附文 1 to 3, undated.
70 Wang Yongbin, ‘Dong hengzhao dangpu’; ‘Beijing de qianshi jinsheng.’ Besides pawn 
certif icates, Zhuanyun zhai also printed works of entertainment like the scenario book Guwu 
lu 顧誤錄, an edition of 1851.
71 The document Neiwufu zeliguan 内務府則例館23, Fuwen 附文 (Appended note) 1 mentions 
‘additional food money for printers that are sent to the Palace’ and ‘wages for those who transport 
the blocks into the palace.’
72 Neiwufu zeliguan 内務府則例館 23, Fuwen 附文 3, p. 1.
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show that the entire text was carved, printed, and bound by the Zhuanyun zhai 
personnel. This suggests that the Wuying dian at this time did not have enough 
qualified manpower at its command for even for this relatively minor project.
Both printing projects outlined above ‒ the huge imperial encyclopedia 
and the short handbook of court behaviour ‒ show that not only the central 
government but also the court administration had already relinquished the 
idea that only – or at least mainly – imperial craftsmen upon palace precincts 
should execute the printing of the texts that ensured the emperor’s control 
and sponsorship of learning in the whole Qing realm and the conduct of 
his thousands of personal servants in the Forbidden City.
The Workforce Employed by the State and Private Workshops
The locations where printing blocks were prepared, characters carved, and 
books were printed and bound ranged from the centre of imperial power to 
rural surroundings at a distance of thousands of kilometres from Peking, 
where characters might be carved under the open sky. The workforce was 
as varied as these settings. However, also within the craft ‒ or art ‒ of block 
printing, the required knowledge and skills differed widely. This involved 
writing out the model transcript in beautiful calligraphy onto sheets that 
were pasted in reverse on the printing blocks, carved out in relief, brushed 
with ink, covered with the pages, pressed, taken off, dried, controlled, and 
thread-bound into f lexible volumes. Accordingly, the qualif ications and 
payment of the craftspeople varied as well.
Artisans in the Palace Printery Wuying dian
In the imperial printery, students of the imperial academy would write 
out texts that were subsequently processed by artisans in decreasing order 
of qualif ication. During the longest period of its activities, highly skilled 
artisans were employed at the imperial printery, but here, too, a strict 
hierarchy applied to the various stages of the printing process.73 As one 
73 For information on the staff of the Wuying dian, both Lu Shaw, Imperial Printing, pp. 9-11 
and Liu Qiang, ‘Qing Wuying dian’, pp. 267-269, refer to the Guangxu edition of the Collected 
Statutes (Huidian, chap. 89, 98; Huidian shili, chap. 1045, 1173), but vary slightly. Liu Qiang 
concentrates on the fuller staff after 1778 and mentions more subordinate sections and off icials 
of intermediate position than Lu Shaw.
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of the agencies of the Imperial Household Department, it came under the 
general supervision of a high-ranking member of the imperial clan. Its two 
main sections were those of the Overseer of Works ( jianzao chu) and of 
Proofreading ( jiaodui shuji chu). The section of the Overseer of Works was 
responsible for printing books and tracing the emperor’s handwriting for 
engraving. It had several subordinate sections that respectively functioned 
for the entire time span of this institution or only for certain periods. These 
were the copper type storehouse (tongzi ku) for the copper type used in the 
Gujin tushu jicheng project; a bindery (shuzuo) within the Wuying dian, in the 
south-eastern aisle;74 a printery (shuayin zuo), where the transcripts for block 
printing were copied and the blocks were prepared and cut ‒ initially the 
blocks were cut only within the Wuying dian, but after 1860, two additional 
exterior sites were used;75 the paper-folding section (zhepei zuo); the house 
for wooden types (‘assembled gems’ juzhen guan) for Jin Jian’s wooden 
movable type project at a location outside the palace gate Xihua men, not 
far from the Wuying dian; a section for tracing the imperial handwriting 
(yushu chu);76 and several storage, f inancial, and other administrative 
subsections. In its fullest expansion, it had regular positions for about 
twenty leading staff, thirty subordinate clerical jobs, and eighty to ninety 
artisans. The Section of Proofreading was headed by one Manchu and one 
Han Chinese high-ranking off icial, an administrative and supervising staff 
of 26, and 32 unranked scribes, secretaries, and assistants. No artisans 
worked here. The proofreaders were chosen from the members of the Hanlin 
Academy and were responsible for drafting and editing the more ceremonial 
government pronouncements or historiographical projects, or from students 
(gongsheng) of the Imperial University (Guozi jian)77. Although working at 
the Wuying dian was prestigious, the ranks of its off icers were not high. 
Most of the intermediate and subordinate positions were not ranked but 
f illed with clerks (baitang’a) or banner people without permanent off icial 
posts (sula).78 The ‘Current regulations and precedents of the Imperial 
74 Liu Qiang, ‘Qing Wuying dian’, p. 268.
75 Ibid., loc. cit.
76 Due to a lack of funds, it was incorporated into the Wuying dian printery xiushu chu in 1843. 
Qinding Zongguan Neiwufu xianxing zeli, p. 318.
77 Huidian, chap. 1199, fol. 6a/b. Academy students were employed for writing out the transcripts 
between 1738 and 1769 and again after 1780. A regulation of 1820 provides that writing one hundred 
chapters should not last longer than a half year, and correcting one thousand characters should 
be achieved within twenty days.
78 According to Evelyn Rawski, The Last Emperors, pp. 167-168, the Manchu term baitang’a 
means ‘applicable, useful’ and refers to ‘errand boys, handymen, underlings’, a ‘catch-all term 
for unranked clerks in government off ices, artisans, and doctors.’ Sula were labourers, from the 
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Household Department’ contain detailed prescriptions of how Wuying 
dian positions at all higher levels should be f illed by promoting personnel 
of lower positions into the vacancies.79
As a rule, artisan posts were assigned to banner people and referred to 
as ‘inner-clan work service [positions]’ ( jianei jiangyi) or ‘banner artisans’ 
(qijiang). These artisans were unfree bondservants (booi) of the upper 
three of the Eight Banners (bordered yellow, plain yellow, plain white) that 
formed the emperor’s household servants.80 Bond service was arranged 
hierarchically. At the top, it could include powerful personalities like Cao 
Yin, the director of the Imperial Silk Weaveries in Nanjing. Emancipation 
was possible in special cases. Thus, as mentioned above, Jin Jian and his 
family were freed from the status of bondservants.81 The lowest stratum 
of bond service was that of the ‘state slaves’ (sinjeku), who were prisoners 
of war (or their descendants) and ranked far below the booi.82 Sinjeku were 
employed for physical, often agricultural, tasks on the imperial lands but 
also within the palace. Sinjeku women also worked in the palace and at the 
imperial mausoleums and palaces in the secondary capital Shengjing.83 It 
is not recorded whether women worked in the palace printery.
In view of the superior quality of the Wuying dian editions, it is usually 
assumed that only the most skilled and experienced artisans were employed 
in the Imperial Printery. However, the ‘Current regulations and precedents of 
the Imperial Household Department’ mention that artisans from the Office of 
Palace Construction (yingzao si) were also employed at times when specialists 
were missing. These may have been skilled in other crafts (in the case in ques-
tion, the palace printery ‘borrowed’ ten paper mounting artisans [biaojiang], 
two painters [huajiang], and sixteen carpenters [mujiang] from the Office of 
Palace Construction) but were not professional printers or character carvers. 
The merit of this arrangement for the Wuying dian was doubtless that these 
original Manchu meaning ‘idle, unemployed’. The term was applied for banner people without 
regular off icial positions. These were menial and low-paid but nevertheless sought-after posts.
79 Qinding Zongguan neiwufu xianxing zeli, pp. 308-309, ‘Jianshe yuanyi’ 建設員役 (Assigning 
jobs to administrators).
80 Rawski, The Last Emperors, p. 167. Banners were the basic Manchu military and social 
organization, but not all banner people were Manchus. Mongols, Koreans, and Han Chinese 
who had surrendered in the early seventeenth century before the Manchus took over imperial 
rule were also represented.
81 Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period, p. 159.
82 Rawski, The Last Emperors, p. 171.
83 Ibid., p. 172, mentions more than f ive thousand sinjeku women in the palace in addition to 
more than four thousand at the imperial mausoleums in the late seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.
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artisans remained on the payrolls of the Off ice of Palace Construction.84 
On the whole, although exterior artisans could be hired, it was obviously 
preferred to f irst provide whatever workforce was needed from within the 
palace personnel. At one point in 1811, Wuying dian artisans numbered 104 
banner artisans and only eight [exterior] ‘hired artisans’ (zhaomu jiang).85
The ‘hired artisans’ normally came from the capital, the adjacent districts, 
or the provinces of Shanxi and Jiangnan.86 We do not know whether the six 
colleagues from the Liuli chang printery Zhuanyun zhai• remained in the 
palace overnight, but at least the artisans from outside Peking probably lived 
in dormitories on the precincts. The respective regulations of the Imperial 
Household Department foresaw:
In case of large work projects within the palace, when exterior civilian 
artisans must be employed, the ministers shall plan to let the overseers 
of works employ trustworthy foremen, and for this special task, these 
foremen shall search for calm and law-abiding workers among the artisans 
with whom they usually come into contact. In addition to overseers of 
works or of renovations, off icials shall be assigned to wait for the artisans 
at the palaces gates and distribute belt marks87 with their names written 
on them. First the respective overseers of works or overseers of renovations 
shall examine them outside; then the special delegates shall count and 
control them on the palace precincts. Every group of ten artisans shall 
be escorted by one delegate.88
When working within the palace, we know that an excellent level of per-
formance was expected from the character carvers, the type setters for the 
movable type projects, the printers, and the binders. If artisans made too 
many mistakes, especially with carving or type setting, they could be f ined 
part of or even all of their wages.89 For all printing editions and projects, but 
84 Qinding Zongguan neiwufu xianxing zeli, p. 309, ‘Tiaoqu jiangyi’ 挑取匠役 (Selecting artisans’ 
work obligations).
85 Qinding Zongguan neiwufu xianxing zeli, p. 309.
86 Liu Qiang, ‘Qing Wuying dian’, p. 271.
87 The documents of the Wuying dian in the First Historical Archives contains a ‘List of all 
belt marks given out at the Wuying dian’ Wuying dian fa fang gejian yaopai zhang 武英殿發
放個件腰牌賬. Neiwufu … boce, no. 432-5-41, booklet 02, dated 1905. The belt marks evidently 
were given out for identif ication and control of external personnel.
88 Qinding Zongguanv neiwufu xianxing zeli, Guangchusi, chap. 3, p. 57-58, quoted in Peng 
Zeyi, Zhongguo jindai shougongye, vol. 1, p. 156.
89 Liu Qiang, ‘Qing Wuying dian’, p. 269, quoting from Huidian, chap. 1050, Hanlin yuan – 
zhizhang – zuanxiu shushi 翰林院, 職掌, 纂修書史.
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especially for the emperor’s personal writings, utmost care was required for 
all parts of the procedures, not least for the proofreading. As a rule, imperial 
manuscripts had to be proofread three times by off icers of increasingly 
higher status before the transcript for carving could be written out.90
Few new printing projects were launched in the nineteenth century, 
and funds for the imperial printeries decreased. Liu Qiang argues that the 
Wuying dian started to save on expenses for external artisans from Jiangnan 
and hired Shanxi character carvers instead, who produced lower-quality 
blocks. Moreover, the qualif ied banner artisans in permanent positions had 
become old and frail and were not replaced by equally skilled successors, so 
that the number of those who actually worked at the Wuying dian decreased 
to twenty to thirty people.91 Among the Wuying dian archival documents 
in the First Historical Archives, one undated f ile records the names of the 
artisans in permanent positions and assistants (sula) of the printing and 
bookbinding section. In a total of 59 names, there were fourteen artisans in 
leading positions, 28 ‘artisans on work obligation’ ( jiangyi), one carpenter, 
f ive ‘civilians of Wanping district’ (Wanping xian min )92, and eleven sula. 
The banner aff iliation (plain yellow, plain white, and bordered yellow) is 
recorded for all leading positions and all sula. Only four people are expressly 
named as ‘civilians’. Apparently not all of the artisans always showed up 
for work; for those who did not, the list reports ‘did not arrive’ (wei dao).93
The trend towards outsourcing is obvious also from the fact that even 
the small group of f ive character carvers, together with an unknown but 
probably equally limited number of printers, binders, and bookcase makers 
for the 1884 Gongzhong xianxing zeli project were hired entirely from outside.
Wages in the Palace Printery
Comparatively comprehensive information is available for the wage rate of 
the imperial printery Wuying dian (see Tables 36 to 39, 42, 43). The Collected 
Statutes and the regulations and precedents of the Imperial Household 
Department show that since wages began to be recorded (1705), they were 
differentiated into wages for the ‘internal’ banner artisans and the ‘external, 
90 Liu Qiang, ‘Qing Wuying dian’, p. 269.
91 Liu Qiang, ‘Qing Wuying dian’, p. 271.
92 The Wanping and Daxing districts together made up the territory of urban Peking).
93 Neiwufu … boce, no. 432-5-41, booklet 03, Wuying dian xiushuchu, shuayin zuo 武英殿修書
處,刷印作 (Wuying dian printery, printing and bookbinding section).
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hired’ artisans (see Table 36). However, direct comparison is possible only in 
one case. The regulations of 1705 state that banner artisans who printed 1,000 
sheets of paper received 0.1 tael ‘food provision money’, but the hired artisans, 
depending on the quality of the paper printed, were paid monetary wages 
between 0.12 and 0.16 tael.94 While it is not strange from an equitable point 
of view that external, highly qualif ied artisans should receive higher wages 
than the palace employees in permanent positions, who enjoyed other, more 
long-term benefits, it does show that from the beginning of the eighteenth 
century at the latest, the palace paid civilian, hired artisans well and did 
not discriminate against the Han Chinese who served the state temporarily. 
On the contrary, in 1705 the system of offering the banner artisans in the 
Wuying dian printery ‘off icial food’ (guanfan) had already been abolished. 
The banner artisans from 1705 onward were paid according to predefined 
workloads in a wage system equal to that of the hired artisans.95 Thus, the 
pre-1705 stage was a system of time wage payment, and in the later phase, 
eff iciency wages were paid to both banner artisans and the external, Han 
Chinese artisans.
From the wage lists and the jobs for which external artisans’ wages were 
provided, it seems that the external artisans were engaged in carving and 
writing out transcripts, while the banner artisans were mainly employed for 
the binding and ornamentation of the book covers. The section for imperial 
writings (yushu chu), which was responsible for carving and printing texts 
authored or personally calligraphed by the emperors, paid higher wages than 
the printery for the other (non-imperial) texts (xiushu chu). Unlike their 
colleagues from the xiushu chu, the printers, ink makers, paper mounters, 
and ink carvers from the section for personal writings of the emperors 
also retained the right to food provisions. These consisted of daily rations 
of 2 liang mutton (74.6 g), 9 ge old rice (0.93 l), 1 liang sauce (37.3 g), 5 qian 
light sauce (18.65 g), 4 liang bean curd (149,2 g), 2 liang bean sprouts (74.6 
g), 1 jin brushwood (596.8 g), and 1 liang charcoal (37.3 g).96 After about 
sixty years, the bean curd and bean sprouts were no longer provided but 
instead converted to monetary payments given as exactly 0.0032924 tael 
per daily ration.97 For the ranked and unranked off icials, these rations were 
higher, and the provisions in kind were continuously given out in addition to 
94 Huidian, chap. 1199, fol. 2b.
95 Ibid., fol. 2a. 
96 Ibid., fol. 9a/10a. ‘Old rice’ refers to grain that had been stored at the granaries for several 
years.
97 Ibid., fol. 11b. It was a custom of the Qianlong era to give accounting data in extremely f ine 
units.
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their salaries.98 However, in the section for imperial writings, the multiple 
controlling and proofreading procedures have to be taken into account, so 
that it took much longer to f inish a block with imperial script and receive 
the according wages than for other texts.
Comparing the standard workloads to be achieved within one workday 
(gong), like copying one-hundred characters for a transcript to be pasted 
in mirror image on the block and subsequently embossed, carving one-
hundred characters, or printing one-thousand sheets, the nominal wage 
level expressed in silver tael seems to have remained more or less equal 
over long time spans. However, if one realizes that these formal wages 
were converted to copper cash, this has radically different implications. 
In the mid-eighteenth century, when copper cash was scarce and became 
expensive, the low exchange rate must have caused discontent, while wage 
notation in silver was very much to be preferred during the early nineteenth 
century and especially after the mid-nineteenth century, when copper 
inflation raised the exchange rate to more than ten times that of the ideal 
rate of 1:1,000.
The accounts book of the Zhuanyun zhai are in both silver and copper 
cash for different types of expenses (Table 44). The fees of 0.24 tael for every 
100 characters carved, a very considerable rate compared to the earlier 
wage rates of a maximum of 0.16 tael, are accounted for in silver (Table 46). 
It is doubtful whether this rate meant that the wages were actually paid 
out in silver. Presumably the print shop deducted part of the money as a 
transaction fee and paid it out in copper. However, the food and drink money 
was accounted in copper cash and probably flowed more directly into the 
hands of the artisans. Wages for printing and binding were not accounted 
for but occur only as expenses for the daily food and drink allowances, 400 
cash, for seventy workdays.99 If one compares the palace wages to those 
of the provincial printery of Zhili (Table 40), the wages for carving 100 
characters ‒ 0.044 tael for carving new blocks and 0.065 for adding text 
to existing blocks ‒ were only one-half of those of the palace. Comparison 
with the few wage rates that are known for commercial printing (Table 48) 
indicate that the wages paid by the government were higher than those 
in commercial printing. Nevertheless, some direct and indirect evidence 
shows that the inflexibility of the wages paid by the government raised 
98 See Liu Qiang, ‘Qing Wuying dian’, p. 272, for details about the various food rations in the 
hierarchy of Wuying dian off icials. As Liu Qiang points out, after 1845, the meat ration was 
reduced for leading off icials and def initely abolished for the artisans.
99 Neiwufu zeliguan 内務府則例館23, Fuwen 附文 (Additional note) 1, and 3, p. 1-2.
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problems when the cost of living increased. The wage raise of 0.01 tael 
per hundred characters for the externally hired artisans who wrote out 
the transcript for the yearly calendar Zhongxing genglu between 1751 and 
1795 can be understood in this way (Table 41).100 In 1810, the Wuying dian 
printers pleaded for augmentation of their wages because they could no 
longer make ends meet. Consequently, they received a wage raise of 0.02 
tael for every 100 characters carved, and 0.01 tael for every 100 characters 
of the transcripts copied out. Moreover, if blocks had to be corrected and 
if these corrections made it necessary to recarve subsequent blocks, the 
foremen could now account for the costs of the corrections and did not 
have to deduct these from wages.101 Thus, although the artisans employed 
in the imperial printery may have experienced diff iculties in securing their 
livelihood, some indications show that at least until the mid-nineteenth 
century, the authorities tried to comply with their requests. One example 
may show that these artisans were comparatively well taken care of. In 
the winter and summer months, temperatures in the palace workshops 
were always a problem. For instance, the palace studio of the Jesuit painter 
Denis Attiret (1702-1768), who worked for the Qianlong emperor between 
1739 and 1768, was heated only by a small furnace in winter for keeping the 
paint from freezing, and in summer became stif lingly hot because it was 
unsheltered from the torrid sunshine.102 Apparently, the working conditions 
in the Wuying dian were somewhat better. Not only were stoves and fuel 
provided in the winter months but in the summer matting was provided to 
shade the workplaces and ice blocks were applied to lower the temperature. 
While heating in winter was used commonly in Peking, cooling in summer 
was rather exceptional, at least for commercial printers.103
Working and Living Conditions of Commercial Printers
Book historians have pointed out that more names of late Ming printers 
are known from imprints in books than of their successors in the early 
and mid-Qing, probably due to the fear of the consequences of the literary 
100 Huidian, chap. 1199, fol. 11b/12a. Actually, the wages had been reduced by 0.01 tael in 1751 
and were raised again to the pre-1751 level in 1795.
101 Zhang Xiumin, Zhongguo yinshua shi, p. 756, quoting from the accounts of the imperial 
printery at the Wuying dian, Wuying dian xiushuchu baoxiao dang’an 武英殿修書處報銷檔
案.
102 Veit, ‘Jean-Denis Attiret’, p. 144.
103 Zhang Xiumin, Zhongguo yinshua shi, p. 756.
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inquisition.104 This fear receded gradually in the nineteenth century, and 
thus more is known about character carvers, printers, and book bind-
ers from this era. Amazingly enough, the character carvers were often 
illiterate.105 Little capital was available and necessary for commercial 
printing, and in order to remain competitive, one option for publishers 
was to outsource the most cost-intensive job of character carving to rural 
regions, even if the carved blocks had to be transported over long distances. 
Suzhou publishers, for instance, had their blocks carved in Magang in 
Guangdong province, which lies at a distance of more than one thousand 
kilometres from Suzhou.
Character carving was a craft branch in which many women and girls 
were engaged. This is well attested for Magang in Guangdong and Xuwan in 
Jiangxi. Magang and Xuwan brides often received their self-carved blocks as 
their dowries.106 In the block-printing region Yongzhou in Hunan province, 
girls and boys of young age would ‘carve the blocks while leaning on a tree 
and tending the oxen’.107 The employment of young and female labour 
explains the low wages paid and thus the competitiveness of these rural 
locations (see Table 48). However, the quality of their work is generally 
assessed as low. It was executed swiftly and contained many errors. The 
adult women would usually work in their own houses; ‘in exceptional cases’, 
the elderly women would also manage the household subsidiary business, 
especially when men were sojourning elsewhere.108
Cynthia Brokaw, to whom we owe so much f irsthand information on the 
practice of traditional printing, has illustrated several business forms and 
patterns of labour recruitment.109 Yuechi in Sichuan province was a rural 
setting where carving was predominant and only very little publishing 
was practised. For the most part, it supplied the publishing houses in the 
metropolises of Chongqing and Chengdu, which were at distances of over 
100 and 200 kilometres respectively. Work was either sent out or the carvers, 
who were all male, sojourned and were permanently engaged at the Chengdu 
or Chongqing publisher/booksellers’ enterprises.
104 Ibid., p. 754.
105 Brokaw, Commerce in Culture, p. 14, McDermott, Social History of the Chinese Book, p. 35. 
McDermott also specif ies on pp. 29-30 that the carving process was divided in a way that all 
similar strokes (horizontal, vertical, slanting) of all characters on a block were carved separately, 
which made division of labour and consecutive work of several people possible.
106 Zhang Xiumin, Zhongguo yinshua shi, p. 754; Brokaw, Commerce in Culture, p. 540.
107 Zhang Xiumin, Zhongguo yinshua shi, p. 754. 
108 Brokaw, Commerce in Culture, p. 133.
109 Ibid., pp. 537-546.
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Xuwan in Jiangxi was much better connected by water and land to the 
greater cities on the middle and lower Yangzi. It was a publishing and print-
ing centre where the male and female labour force was recruited from the 
surrounding villages. The carvers, printers, and binders either worked at 
the publishers’ shops, or the blocks were delivered to them for carving.
Mainly women were engaged in Magang in Guangdong. They supplied 
the publishers in nearby Foshan and Canton. A few of the women were 
specialists, but for most, carving was subsidiary business that was outsourced 
to them by the shop managers of the printing shops. No female sojourners 
came from Magang, since women as a rule did not work outside of their 
own families before the twentieth century. However, male sojourning was 
common in Shunde prefecture, where the district Magang is situated. Shunde 
is well known to sociologists for the habit of female ‘marriage resistance’, 
which means that parents were willing to let their daughters stay at home 
after marriage or live together with other women.110 The women who did 
not join their husband’s household were most often engaged in silk reeling 
and worked outside their homes in silk f ilatures; no cases of character 
carvers are reported. Nevertheless, it may not be pure chance that the 
trade was practised here, where greater female independence caused by 
wage earning outside family abodes created the rare equivalent of the 
non-religious sorority.111
In the rural Sibao region in Western Fujian, some of the f ifty and more 
publishing houses also bought the printing blocks from elsewhere, for 
instance from the Magang women carvers.112 Actually, the Sibao publishers 
used various forms of labour supply to produce the books they distributed 
in the entire southern part of China. In interviews with the members of 
publisher lineages, informants said that writing the transcript and carving 
characters was highly skilled labour that was done by the elders of the 
households. Other character carvers travelled to their customers and were 
offered free board and accommodation in the publisher’s family or at a 
local temple while working on a particular project.113 Since the equipment 
needed by the itinerant carvers and printers ‒ knives and brushes ‒ was light 
and unsophisticated, this was a logical option for low-capital publishing. 
110 See Hill Gates, China’s Motor, pp. 189-191, who refers to the relevant studies by Marjorie 
Topley (1975), Janice Stockard (1989), and Andrea Sankar (1978).
111 Professional sororities like ‘self-combing women’ were not confined to Shunde but occurred 
in all of Guangdong and Guangxi. Their members worked mainly in the silk industry. Jinsheng, 
‘Yue Gui de ‘zishu nü’’, p. 89.
112 Brokaw, Commerce in Culture, p. 101.
113 Ibid., pp. 96-98, 99.
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This was even more so if the books to be produced were not required in 
large print runs. A typical job for itinerant printers was the production of 
genealogies, which they could conveniently carve and print at the ancestor 
shrines of rural well-to-do lineages.114 The migrants often exercised their 
trade as a subsidiary business in the agricultural slack season and as a 
rule had not received any formal training. In contrast, an apprenticeship 
system existed for professional character carvers that lasted from three to 
f ive years, starting at age nine or ten.115 In Yuechi and Magang, the children 
were also f irst taught the skills of carving at age nine or ten for one to three 
years before they were given paid work.116
Printing and binding could be done as unpaid family work by women 
or children. One of the two big publisher families in Sibao, the Zous, had a 
‘book printing school’ (yinshu xuetang) in one of their ancestral halls by the 
mid-eighteenth century, which might have been a place to train character 
carvers, printers, and binders in the family business.117 In Sibao, the printing 
and binding of books were usually done by women, sometimes with the help 
of children, in their own homes.118 In less rural settings ‒ for example, the 
market town of Xuwan in Jiangxi ‒ printing was usually done in the back 
rooms of the publishing and bookselling houses.119
Since the largest proportion of Sibao’s production was school books, 
most of the production had to be ready by the beginning of the school year 
after the Chinese New Year in January or February. In the 1920s and 1930s, 
a smaller shop specializing in schoolbooks would at New Year’s day need 
a stock of 2,000 to 3,000 copies of the reading and writing textbook Sanzi 
jing 120 and 800 to 1,000 other primers and textbooks. With a labour force 
of household members and two hired female labourers, a publishing house 
could print and bind 100 copies of the Sanzi jing in one day. For a sum of 4,000 
primers, at least 40 workdays would be necessary to f inish this target.121
1930s wages in Sibao ranged from 0.2 and 0.4 to 0.5 yuan for every 1,000 
sheets printed, and thus about 0.6 yuan to 1.2-1.5 yuan per day with an 
114 Zhang Xiumin, Zhongguo yinshua shi, p. 757.
115 Brokaw, Commerce in Culture, p. 14, for professional character carvers from Yuechi in Sichuan.
116 Ibid., p. 540, 545.
117 Brokaw, Commerce in Culture, p. 105, referring to a 1947 lineage genealogy of the Zou family, 
Fanyang Zoushi zupu.
118 See ibid., p. 106, f ig. 3.3 for a photograph of such printing rooms, and her detailed description 
of the printing process, pp. 107-111.
119 Ibid., pp. 105-106, fn. 64.
120 This is a short text with 1,128 characters. In its original form, it would f it on three printing 
blocks of four hundred characters each, but can be extended by commentaries of various lengths.
121 Brokaw, Commerce in Culture, pp. 122-123.
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average daily print run of about 3,000.122 In comparison, the wages reported 
for the Qingdao handicraft printers were anywhere between eight and 15 
yuan per month, with an average of ten yuan (see Table 34). If the Qingdao 
printers worked for 25 days, their daily wages would vary between 0.6 and 
0.32 yuan, with an average of 0.4 yuan. Thus, in the high season, Sibao wages 
would surpass those of Qingdao, but daily production was not always as 
high as 3,000 pages throughout the year and may have been more evenly 
spread in the city of Qingdao.
In China’s centre of modernity and capitalist production, Shanghai, the 
mechanized printing industry emerged in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century. Lithography thrived from the 1870s and was surpassed by the 
letterpress only in the early twentieth century. But block printing had not 
yet completely disappeared in Shanghai. By the 1890s, it was still used in 
a missionary textbook edition started in 1879, although the missionary 
publishers had f irst introduced printing machinery to China.123
While the scope of block printing compared to letterpress and lithography 
has yet to be explored, the relation of the letterpress and lithography is better 
researched. Christopher Reed estimates that the number of workers in all 
Chinese lithographic printeries may have been as high as 8,050 by 1894 as 
against only 870 letterpress workers. He also mentions that between 1876 
and 1911, 149 lithographic printers started business in Shanghai, relative to 
only 21 lead type shops between 1842 and 1911.124 In Reed’s view, the decline 
of lithography and the rise of the letterpress can be attributed to the fact 
that although lithographic printing could produce less expensive books 
than block printing, in relation to the letterpress the necessary workforce 
was still too large. The use of kerosene and steam power could reduce the 
number of workers per machine from eight to three, but the lithographic 
workshops still employed 100 to 200 workers each because preparing the 
stone plates, copying the text, and reducing its size by photography required 
a much larger workforce than letterpress printing. By the 1920s, although the 
wages reported for lithographic copyists were astonishingly low (0.3 yuan 
to 0.1 yuan per thousand written characters),125 contemporary Chinese and 
foreign observers found that, in view of the cost performance, the alternative 
technology of letterpress printing was preferable.
122 Ibid., p. 131.
123 Reed, Gutenberg, p. 320, fn. 32, quoting John Fryer, Records of the General Conference of the 
Protestant Missionaries of China, p. 715.
124 Ibid., p. 97, 121.
125 Ibid., p. 322, fn. 54, quoting from Chen Cunren, Yinyuan shidai shenghuo shi (Everyday life 
history of a dark age), p. 232.
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The Social Status of Publishers and Printers
Carvers, printers, and binders produced indispensable receptacles of scholarly 
knowledge, but their crafts were not considered to be highly qualified occupa-
tions. This may have to do with the simplicity of the production process. Neither 
complicated devices (like weaving looms) nor risky installations (such as a 
furnace or kiln) were necessary. Printing with movable type was not unknown 
but still relatively uncommon. Therefore, we do not know whether the image 
of the typesetters was any higher than that of the character carvers. Compared 
to building or shipbuilding, printing did not require much capital: a relatively 
small, often female or young household-based labour force could accomplish 
its projects. In rural settings, writing out the transcript was therefore done 
by family elders and managers with some knowledge of characters and was 
considered the highest qualified part of printing. In the palace printery, where 
we can assume a higher literacy rate, the carving of characters earned twice 
the wages of copying, as it took much longer to carve a character than to write 
it with a brush (see Table 36). However, the best paid tasks were proofreading 
and control of work processes rather than copying the transcript or carving 
characters. The printers and binders earned the lowest wages.
In the family publishing business, where printing was often a subsidiary 
occupation during the agricultural slack season, a gender and age division 
prevailed in which women and children produced the books and men 
decided which books to print. It was also the men who distributed and sold 
the books after they were produced.126
There is ample proof in the f ield of printing of one of the assumptions 
of this study, namely that the status of artisans and commoners within 
the ‘four occupational groups’ was actually reversed in the sense that not 
merchants but artisans ranged last. Among the merchants, the publisher-
booksellers were held in comparatively high esteem, especially when they 
managed to create the image of printing not for prof it but to generously 
spread information to all those who needed it.
Once again, Cynthia Brokaw provides insights into how the Sibao book 
traders were perceived by the local elite of society. Even if they were com-
mended for earning their living by ‘plowing the Classics and sowing the 
historiographies’ (geng jing jia shi)’ or for their competence in character 
carving,127, praise of such a condescending nature demonstrates the low 
status of book merchants, even if they were trading in Confucian items.
126 Brokaw, Commerce in Culture, pp. 132-133.
127 Ibid., p. 286.
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Attitudes did change when the artisans and the elite scholar-off icials 
came into direct contact. For one, if asked to write stele texts for guild 
houses, the scholar-off icials would certainly do so. Thus, the author and 
the calligrapher of the 1898 stele inscription and the character designer of 
the inscription board of the character carvers’ guild temple Wenchang miao 
in Peking were both Hanlin academicians and compilers of the Collected 
Statutes; the author, Yang Shixiang (1860-1909), served as Governor-General 
of Zhili province between 1907 and 1909. On behalf of the character carvers 
who feared a crisis in traditional learning and off icial examinations, he 
expressed the hope that Confucian writing and character carving would 
persist and secure the living of those in the association.128
More precise are the few examples of acknowledgement to the book carv-
ers’ efforts documented in Zhang Xiumin’s book history. In the light of the 
f iles of the Wuying dian in the First Historical Archives, Zhang’s complaint 
that virtually no printers’ names from the Qing are transmitted (as against 
seventy to eighty from the Ming) seems no longer tenable, but much more 
research in local archives will be necessary to explore the characteristics 
of all Chinese printing centres. Even then, it will be diff icult to f ind more 
names of female printers. According to Zhang Xiumin, precisely one female 
character carver, who lived in Songjiang in Jiangnan province during the 
Qianlong reign, is known by her family name Ma because the customer whose 
poetry collection she carved thanked her in a poem.129 Among the few known 
male carvers is Liu Yongri, a master from Suzhou who in 1671 was honoured 
by a literatus whose poems he carved in extraordinarily elegant characters, 
with a ‘Preface for the character carver Liu Yongri’s sixtieth birthday’. The 
text praises Liu’s reliability, stating that although he was sixty, he walked 
every day, rain or shine, to his customer’s house to fulf il his task.130
Another master who rose above anonymity was Zhu Gui from Suzhou. 
Coming from an impoverished scholar family, Zhu in the Kangxi reign 
‘changed his trade’ and started to carve texts and illustrations. His most 
famous works are ‘Charts of plowing and weaving’ (Gengzhi tu) that had been 
commissioned by the Kangxi emperor and the pageant on the ‘Emperor’s 
birthday celebrations’ (Wanshou shengdian). Having ingratiated himself to 
128 Li Hua, Ming Qing yilai, pp. 162-163, ‘Chongjian Wenchang ci ji’ 重建文昌祠記 (Record of 
the renovation of the Wenchang shrine).
129 Zhang Xiumin, Zhongguo yinshua shi, p. 755, who quotes the verse from this poem ‘with 
profuse efforts, a female worker carved my worthless writings in pear wood’ 漫勞紅女為灾梨
which is explicit about the gender of the carver.
130 Zhang Xiumin, Zhongguo yinshua shi, p. 758, ‘Jijue shi Liu Yongri liushi shou xu’ 剞劂氏劉
永日六十壽序 (Preface for character carver Liu Yongri’s sixtieth birthday).
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the court, he managed to secure a low-echelon official position in the Court of 
State Ceremonials (Honglu si) of the Imperial Household Department.131 He had 
risen to officialdom not exclusively due to his artisan skills but also because 
of his family’s scholarly status. What certainly helped him to promotion was 
that he also carved illustrations and that his work was thus associated with 
art. This was also the case with the block printer’s family of Huang Lizhong 
(1652-1738) from Qiu village in the She district in Huizhou prefecture, who 
was already in the trade during the Ming dynasty and rose to local fame 
because of the family’s charitable activities.132 In the Ming period, the Huang 
family did not try to disguise their origins as artisans and merchants but 
actively sought ‒ like other artisans, especially potters, gardeners, bamboo 
carvers, and lacquerers who produced art and craft items ‒ to acquire a literati 
image. They practised and refined their skills in calligraphy, painting, music, 
and poetry and also participated in civil examinations but never ascended 
above the local level. Their gains from commercial activities enabled this 
family of ‘literati carvers’ to attain prominence.133 A further case is that of Mu 
Jinwen (1721-1812) from Suzhou, a ‘plain-clothed’ (buyi) scholar without office 
and famous character carver who combined the scholarly, art connoisseur, 
merchant, and philanthropic levels of the trade or art and thus remained at 
the social level of the literati, with famous friends such as the men of letters 
Yuan Mei (1716-1797) and Qian Daxin (1728-1804).
Intermediary stages between the artisan and the artist existed as well and 
have been aptly described by James Flath. New Year’s posters usually come 
with colophons. As a rule, the master artisan designers of the popular block 
prints in rural North China had not received systematic Confucian schooling 
and therefore were not completely proficient in the literary style but neverthe-
less tried to avoid the vernacular for their illustrations, thereby creating in 
their prints a half-popular and half-literary style. Only in a few cases did 
accomplished artisans design New Year’s posters, such as the painter Qian 
Hui’an (1833-1911) from Shanghai or the designer Gao Tongxuan (1835-1906), 
both of whom worked at Yangliuqing. From Gao Tongxuan’s workshop, we also 
know how the hierarchy of master and subordinate artisans who processed 
his drafts translated into remuneration. One draft by Gao Tongxuan earned 
about five to six yuan, and with an average of 170 designs per year, his income 
was about ten times that of the artisans in his print shop.134
131 Zhang Xiumin, Zhongguo yinshua shi, p. 758.
132 Ibid.
133 McDermott, Social History of the Chinese Book, pp. 35-36.
134 Flath, Cult of Happiness, p. 16.
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Conclusion
To assess the role of the Qing state in the private printing sector, book historians 
point out that previous dynasties preferred to reserve the books of the palace 
printeries for court and government use, so that private printers had no chance 
to obtain and use them as exemplars for reprints.135 Yet in the Qing dynasty, 
most of the printed products of the Wuying dian were sold to those who could 
afford the prices, which were already high in the eighteenth century. This 
change may be attributed to the greater anxiety of the f irst Manchu rulers 
to present themselves as active guardians and promoters of the Han Chinese 
civilization, moral philosophy, and book learning. However, the outsourcing of 
the re-edition of the imperial encyclopedia Gujin tushu jicheng stands in strong 
contrast to the imperial vigour and activism of the early eighteenth century. It 
also shows the degree to which the enhanced productivity of lithography and 
letterpress enabled the Shanghai and Canton elites to promote the cultural 
aspect of the self-strengthening project ‒ who were still in the service of the 
dynasty and the court, notwithstanding their latent anti-Qing feelings.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the court and central 
government controlled the contents of the printed matter issued by private 
publishers to the extent that actual and supposed anti-dynastic writings 
were not tolerated at all. Since the waves of inquisition came sporadically 
but unexpectedly, publishers and printers were generally careful not to 
criticize the government. However, no restrictions for politically neutral 
contents applied. Investments for lithography or letterpress and typecasting 
devices were neither hindered nor encouraged by the state. The organization 
of Chinese handicraft printing and the transition to mechanized printing 
was left to the printers, especially in the treaty ports which were within 
the jurisdiction of foreign powers.
Journals were forbidden time and again, for instance when the con-
stitutional Hundred Day Reforms were crushed in 1898.136 However, the 
Shanghai-based journals remained out of the reach of the central government 
due to the extraterritorial status of that city. In 1906, the f irst press and 
publication law (Da Qing yinshuawu zhuanlü)  was promulgated, and the 
newly established Ministries of Commerce, Education, and Surveillance 
jointly supervised a ‘General Printing Bureau’ (Yinshua zongju) where all 
printeries and newspapers had to register.137
135 Liu Qiang, ‘Qing Wuying dian’, p. 271.
136 Janku, ‘Ironie, Spott und Kritik’, p. 211.
137 ‘Jiefang qian de Beijing yinshuaye’.
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Previous Chinese craft historians have claimed that the state exploited the 
artisans recruited from the private sector.138 However, looking at the palace 
printery Wuying dian, we f ind that as far as wage payment is concerned, 
this was certainly not the case. Wages in the palace tended to be higher 
than in the Peking private sector, and the treatment of the artisans that 
were engaged in all parts of the printing process was considerate in terms 
of food provisions, heating, and cooling, as far as we can tell from various 
sources. Work in the palace was highly hierarchic, and the banner aff iliation 
played a great role. If the banner craftspeople were not free to leave their 
permanent positions at will, this can be understood as exploitative. However, 
this did not concern the hired civilian artisans.
In the non-government sector, the position of artisans was to a large extent 
subordinated to the merchant publishers in the trade, so that, as in other 
craft occupations, the path to social success and prestige went predominantly 
through commerce. There were hardly any character carvers and no printers 
or binders who could achieve fame only by their craft skills. In this branch 
of cultural production, the advancement in status from artisan to artist was 
possible, but this held more for those who designed illustrations than for 
those who only carved characters. As for the women in the trade, who are 
more visible here than in other crafts, the chance to manage a print shop 
may have arisen when the men in the family were missing or sojourning 
elsewhere. However, most of them practised the craft as unpaid family work 
or as a subsidiary business to their agricultural labour.
At the end of the dynasty, printing activities were to be found in extremely 
different locations. In the modernizing cities, an increasing number of book 
and newspaper publishers operated mechanized presses, although even here, 
block printing persisted for some time. Particularly in the rural regions, 
where raw materials were easily available, wood blocks for elementary 
schoolbooks were still carved by hand. In the hinterland, as education was 
spread through government reforms and private initiative, the commercial 
and the subsistence sectors came into much closer contact than when the 
Manchus conquered the Ming empire.
138 Zhu Cishou, Zhongguo gudai gongye shi, ‘The ebb and rise of the off icial and private crafts’, 
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Table 35  Position of handicraft printing and character carving among all craft 
trades in Qingdao, 1931-32
Entire handicraft sector
households employed in the handicraft 
sector
 1,327
Persons employed in the handicraft sector 10,939
male 4,782
female 6,157
apprentices, all male 2,600
trades included 59
Printing and character carving
Percentage of total craft households 3.99%
Percentage of total employed persons 2.35%
Percentage of apprentices relative to all 
apprentices in handicrafts 
8.47%, rank 6
rank within total number of craft 
households 
5 of 59
rank within total number of persons 
employed in crafts
5 of 59
Percentage of apprentices relative to the 
households in the trade
4.2 apprentices per household, rank eight
Percentage of apprentices relative to 
persons engaged in the trade
0.9 apprentices per person in the trade, rank 
12
rank within highest wage levels 46
rank within lowest wage levels lowest minimum wage recorded (together 
with wine distillers/beer brewers, iron 
goods makers, white iron smiths, doufu 
makers, and launderers)
rank within number of handicraft workers 
who can support themselves with their 
wages in Qingdao
two
rate of those persons engaged in the trade 
who can make a living 
93%; the others don’t earn enough.
rank within trades that can support the 
wage-earners’ daily lives or ensure a surplus
15, after tailors for western-style ladies’ 
wear, stationery makers, cotton flickers, 
soap and western candle makers, cosmetics 
makers, brush makers, milk condensers, 
honey makers/beekeepers, peanut sorters, 
and machine mechanics, whose rates are all 
100%, the pastry makers (98%), cap makers 
(95%), and tailors for Chinese garments 
(94%).
Source: See table 34.
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Table 36  Government wage rates for block printing and binding, 1705
Status group Work procedure Work procedure 
in Chinese




Printing 刷書 1,000 
sheets
















making small book 
covers












Carving letters for 
inscription boards 
or the throne



























































Cutting pages 裁書 1,000 
sheet
0.02 
Source: Huidian, chap. 1199, fol. 2a-3a.
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Table 37  Government wage rates for the production and setting of copper 
characters for the Imperial Encyclopedia Gujin tushu jicheng, 1726 and 
1728
Work procedure Work unit Wage
Copper type setting 3.5 tael per month food provision money
Carving movable copper types each type 0.025 tael money wage
Source: Huidian, chap. 1199, fol. 1a.
Table 38  Government wage rates for block printing, binding, and ornamentation 
of books and covers at the printeries for the emperor’s personal 
writings, yushu chu, 1768 


























black or red 










black or red 










black or red 
鉤墨頂硃 24 0.24 
Sutra binder folding sutra 
texts










Source: Huidian, chap. 1199, fol. 10b.
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Table 39  Government wage rates for printing with wooden movable type for 
reprinting rare books of the ‘Four Treasuries’ project in the collectanea 
Wuying dian juzhenban [cong]shu, 1774
Work procedure Work unit Wage
Carving the types 100 types 0.45 tael
Copying the characters (for carving Song-style types) 100 types 0.02 tael
Source: Huidian, chap. 1199, fol. 6b.
Table 40  Wage rates for block printing in the provincial printery of Zhili, 1807




Carving characters for judicial 
protocols: new cases, in Chinese 
characters
刷印招冊，刊刻新事漢字 100 characters 
(new)
0.044
Carving characters for judicial 
protocols: Previous cases, added at the 






Correcting and emending old facts on 
the blocks
修補舊事漢字 100 characters 
(repairing)
0.12
Planing the surface of old and new 
printing blocks
新舊板片刨面 one printing 
block
0.08
Sawing the edges of old and new 
printing blocks
新舊板片鋸邊 one printing 
block
0.08
Carving manchu letters for new 
mongolian legal cases
刻出蒙古案件新事清字 100 characters 
(old)
0.08
Copying the red lines for the Chinese 
characters in old and new legal cases
繕寫新舊漢字紅格 100 characters 
(old and new)
0.01
Copying the red lines for the manchu 
letters in mongolian legal cases




Printing the judicial protocols in 
Chinese characters and the volumes 




Binding the judicial protocols in 





tracing margins for the yellow 
volumes
黃冊描邊 100 pages 0.055
Source: Peng Zeyi, Zhongguo jindai shougongye, vol. 1, pp. 407-408.
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Table 41  Government wage rates for copyists at the yushu chu, 1751 and 1795 
Year Status 
group









Copying printing (‘Song’) 
style characters for the 
transcript of the yearly 






Copying printing (‘Song’) 
style characters for the 





Source: Huidian, chap. 1199, fol. 11b. the increase of 0.01 tael is expressly mentioned.
Table 42  External, hired artisans’ wages for block printing in the Wuying dian, 
1861







Carving/printing (‘Song’) style characters 書刻宋字 100 characters 0.08 
Carving standard handwriting (‘soft’) style 
characters 
刻輭字 100 characters 0.08 
Carving ou-type handwriting style 
characters
刻歐字 100 characters 0.14 
Carving ou-type handwriting style 
characters: above wage doubled if carved in 
jujube wood
刻歐字 100 characters 0.28 
Carving out the white spaces in the printing 




Carving illustrations 刻畫圖 one square inch 
per gong
0.154 
Copying/printing (‘Song’) style characters 書寫宋字 100 characters 0.02 
Copying standard handwriting (‘soft’) style 
characters
寫輭字 100 characters 0.03 
Copying ou-type handwriting style 
characters
寫歐字 100 characters 0.04 
Copying illustrations 畫圖 two square 
inch equals one 
workload gong
0.154 
folding and fixing the sheets 摺配齊訂書籍 1,000 sheets 0.13 
Printing on fourfold lianzhou paper 印刷連四紙書 1,000 sheets 0.16 
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Printing on bamboo paper 印刷竹紙書 1,000 sheets 0.12 
Cutting pages 裁書 1,000 sheets 0.02 
Source: Qinding zongguan Neiwufu xianxing zeli 欽定總管內務府現行則例 (imperially endorsed 
current regulations and precedents of the imperial household Department). 1851-1861. reprint 
Gugong zhenben congkan, vol. 309, p. 313.
Table 43  Wage rates for Wuying dian block printing projects of the 1870s/1880s 







style characters for the 
transcript of the astronomical 




100 characters 0.02 plus food 
allowance 0.01
Carving/printing (‘Song’) 
style characters for the 




100 characters 0.08 plus food 
allowance 0.02
Source: liu Qiang, ‘Qing wuying dian’, pp. 273-274, from the account books of the wuying dian, 
Wuying dian xiushuchu zouxiao qingce 武英殿修書處奏銷清冊.
Table 44  Carving fees paid to the external printery Zhuanyun zhai in Peking, 1884
Work procedure Work proce-
dure in Chinese
Norm wages for carving 100 
characters
Carving [soft-style] characters for 




0.24 silver tael plus 400 copper 
cash food and drink allowance 
per day
Source: first historical archives document neiwufu zeliguan 内務府則例館 23, fuwen 附文 
(additional note) 1, and 3, p. 1-2.
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Table 45  Synopsis: Wages for copying 100 characters at the Wuying dian
Year Status group Norm wages in 
silver tael
Exchange 




1705 external, hired artisan 0.04 1,400 Soft style
1705 external, hired artisan 0.02 to 0.04 1,400 Song style
1751 external, hired artisan 0.02 780 for the calendar Zhongxing 
genglu
1768 0.03 950 Song style
1774 0.02 955 for carving wooden movable 
types, no running text
1795 external, hired artisan 0.03 1,150 wage increase expressly 
mentioned (Zhongxing 
genglu)
1860s external, hired artisan 0.02 Song style
1860s external, hired artisan 0.03 Soft style
1860s external, hired artisan 0.04 ou style
1870s 0.02 plus 0.01 
food allowance
for Xukan sanyuan jiazi 
biannian wannian shu
Source: tables 36, 38, 39, 41 to 43.
Table 46  Synopsis: Wages for carving 100 characters (government wage rates)







0.08 1,400 w Song
1705 external, 
hired artisan






























0.08 1,400-1,500 w Soft style
1861 external, 
hired artisan
0.14 1,400-1,500 w ou style
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0.24 tael plus 







working in the 
palace
for Xianxing 
gongzhong zeli. Soft 
style.
400 cash food 
allowance = 0.02 tael
for comparison
1726-28 0.025 900 w Carving one copper 
movable type
1774 0.45 955 w Carving 100 wooden 
movable types
w = wuying dian 
Source: tables 36, 37, 39, 42 to 44.
Table 47  Synopsis: Wages for printing 1,000 sheets (government wage rates)










1705 external, hired 
artisan
0.16 1,400 w Printing on fourfold 
lianzhou paper
1705 external, hired 
artisan
0.12 1,400 w Printing on bamboo 
paper





wage given for 100 
pages (0.012 tael)
1861 0.16 1,400-1,500 
(1855)
w
1861 0.12 1,400-1,500 w
w = wuying dian 
Source: tables 36, 40, 42. 
Source for exchange rates: ‘exchange rates Database’ of the project group ‘monies, markets, and 
finance in China and east asia 1600-1900’, tübingen university, institute for Chinese and korean 
Studies.
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Table 48  Wage rates in commercial printing for carving 100 characters








1644 Peking, printer hired 
by missionary tang 
ruowang (adam 
Schall von Bell)
0.06 5,882 tang ruowang 湯若
望, Xiyang xinfa lishu 
zoushu 《西洋新法
歷书奏疏》
1662-1722 Peking 0.08 1,428-780 no source given
1773 Peking, wuying dian 0.1 955 Carving on pear 
wood blocks
1790s 56-63 coins 
zhi-qian 制錢
(official cash)
1,060-1,150 no source given 
around 
1800
Suzhou 110 + 1,450 
(1799)
wang huizu 汪辉祖, 
Bingta menghen lu 病
榻夢痕錄
late 1870s hunan, yongzhou 50-60 Shulin qinghua
mid 1880s hunan, yongzhou 80-90 Shulin qinghua




mid 1880s hunan, yongzhou, 
yuan-style script, big
200 Shulin qinghua
mid 1880s hunan, yongzhou, 
seal script per 
character
5 Shulin qinghua
Ca. 1910 hunan, yongzhou 
(male wages)
130 1,600 Shulin qinghua
Ca. 1910 hunan, yongzhou 
(female wages), but 
also in guangdong 
and Jiangxi
20-30 1,600 Shulin qinghua
Sources: Zhang Xiumin, Zhongguo yinshua shi, p. 755; ye Dehui, Shulin qinghua, pp. 154-155.

9. The Artisan’s Place: The ‘Four 
Occupational Groups’ and the Social 
Position of Craftspeople
In imperial and pre-imperial periods, Chinese governments made practical 
provisions to allocate and supervise skilled labour in the service of the state. 
A particular perspective of social hierarchy came with this system which 
expressly included artisans.
The concept of the ‘four occupational groups’ originates from the intention 
of rulers and administrators to divide and settle the population according 
to occupations and to monitor their numbers and activities. Together with 
the assessment that scholars and farmers were ‘fundamental’ but artisans 
and merchants were ‘secondary’ or derived groups, this notion confirmed 
the dominance of agriculture and Confucian learning and administration.
Origins and Early Applications of the Concept
Chinese philosophy has brought forth several concepts of hierarchy in 
human society. The f irst textual evidence for the basic Confucian view 
can be traced back to the philosopher Mencius (f l. fourth century B.C.), 
who considered the most fundamental relationships in human life to be 
those between father and son, ruler and minister, husband and wife, elder 
and younger brother, and between friends. These pairs, which set up a 
hierarchy of age, descent, and gender, were captured in the formula of 
the ‘f ive human relationships’, which was sometimes also reduced to the 
f irst three matching pairs. They were shaped into the principal outlook 
on humanity by Confucian commentators in the f irst century B.C. This is 
still ‒ at least partly ‒ culturally relevant to East Asian societies.
A further concept that also goes back to Mencius is the distinction be-
tween rulers and administrators, who work mentally, and the ruled, who 
labour physically. It is the quintessence of an explanation for the necessity 
of the division of labour:
Great men have their proper business, and little men have their proper 
business. Moreover, in the case of any single individual, whatever articles 
he can require are ready to his hand, being produced by the various 
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handicraftsmen: if he must f irst make them for his own use, this way of 
doing would keep all the people running about upon the roads. Hence, 
there is the saying, ‘Some labour with their minds, and some labour with 
their strength. Those who labour with their minds govern others; those 
who labour with their strength are governed by others. Those who are 
governed by others support them; those who govern others are supported 
by them.’ This is a principle universally recognised.1
Several other rankings and views, e.g. on the hierarchy of nobility, were 
formulated in the pre-imperial period. The idea that is most relevant for the 
crafts originates from sometime between the f ifth to third centuries B.C. It 
defines four occupational groups of commoners (literally ‘four people’ simin 
四民): 1. off icials/off icers, both civilian and military (shi 士); 2. farmers 
(nong 農); 3. artisans (gong 工); and 4. merchants (shang 商). We f ind this 
concept in works such as the Guanzi (Master Guan) in the following passage:
Guanzi replied [to the question of Duke Huan of Qi as to how he should 
organize the people]: ‘They [the gentry, peasants, artisans, and merchants] 
should not be allowed to dwell together in confusion. If they do so, their 
speech will become distorted and their work disorganized. For this reason, 
the sage kings, in situating the gentry, were certain to send them to places 
of leisure. In situating the farmers, they were certain to send them to 
the f ields. In situating the artisans they were certain to send them to 
the bureaus responsible for them. In situating the merchants they were 
certain to send them to the marketplaces.’2
This also occurs in the Shujing (Book of History)3 and Gongyang zhuan 
(Gongyang’s commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals),4 always with 
1 Mengzi, ‘Teng Wengong shang’ 滕文公上 3a.4, transl. in The Chinese Classics, Vol. 2, The 
Works of Mencius, p. 249 f.
2 Guanzi chap. 20, p. 135 ‘Xiao kuang’ 小匡 (Little basket), in Allyn Rickett’s translation, 
Guanzi, p. 185. The ‘Sayings of the States’ (Guoyu), ‘Qiyu’ 齊語 (Sayings of Qi), chap. 6, p. 226, 
have a close paraphrase of the passage in Guanzi.
3 Shujing, ‘Zhou guan’ 周官 (Off ices of the Zhou): ‘The Minister of Works manages the earth 
[works] of the country, f ixes the living quarters of the four people, and sets the seasonal schedule 
for working the earth.’ The comment says: ‘The ‘Winter Minister’ [i.e. Minister of Works] is in 
charge of the empty portions of the territory, where the ‘four people’ settle, namely off icers, 
farmers, artisans, and merchants’; transl. by Séraphin Couvreur, Chou King, p. 335, (12).
4 Gongyang zhuan 公羊傳, Cheng gong yuan nian 成公元年 (First year of the reign of Duke 
Cheng, third month), jiegu 解詁 (commentary): ‘The four people of antiquity were, f irst, those who 
were virtuous and able and held off icial positions: the off icers; second, those who cultivated the 
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an emphasis upon the distinction between the four occupational groups and 
the importance that rulers should not allow them to mix with each other.
Derk Bodde has pointed out that the term was f irst introduced by the 
legalist school of thought that ‘wanted to build up the state’s wealth and power 
through a planned economy that would involve the total population and utilize 
quantitative techniques’. As applied by the legalists, the distinction between 
the four groups hinges precisely on occupation and not income or hierarchical 
status . Thus, the ‘officers’ from around the eighth to third centuries B.C. were 
low-level, learned aristocrats who lived by their professional skills either 
as civilian or military off icials, while others were engaged in agriculture 
together with tenants or serfs. In the imperial era, they became the landholding 
‘scholar-gentry’ from which the official class was recruited. ‘Farmers’ loosely 
designated all those working on the land, whether as owners, tenants, or hired 
labourers. The ‘artisans’ included skilled and unskilled craftsmen, and the 
‘merchants’ encompassed the whole range from very large-scale traders and 
proto-industrialists ‒ for instance the owners of iron foundries ‒ to peddlers.5
The sequence of these four groups, with the officer/officials f irst and the 
merchants last, was not yet fixed in pre-imperial times but commenced from 
the Han and thereafter remained in this order.6 The designations benye (‘root’ 
or fundamental occupations) for the officers and farmers and moye (‘branch’ or 
secondary/derived occupations) were coined in the era of the Warring States (c. 
third century B.C.). Throughout the period of imperial China, in the precepts 
of the ruling and educated elites, this dichotomy between ‘fundamental’ and 
‘derived’ implied a ranking of useful and less useful activities that should be 
promoted or restricted by the rulers. This tendency is captured in the phrase 
‘emphasizing the roots and disregarding the branches’ (zhongben yimo) or, more 
specifically, ‘emphasizing agriculture and disregarding commerce’ (zhongnong 
yishang). Sometimes the artisans, gong, were included with the merchants.
Recent research has f ine-tuned the argument to the effect that already in 
the pre-imperial era, during the period between 353 and 334 B.C., the legalists 
advised rulers to restrict as much as possible the ‘secondary occupations’, 
land and produced grains: the farmers; third, those who had ingenuous minds and experienced 
hands and produced utensils: the artisans (三曰巧心勞手以成器物曰工); fourth, those who 
circulated wealth and sold commodities: the merchants. Since the four people did not mix among 
each other, there was enough wealth for all.’ See the variant in Hanshu (Dynastic history of the 
Han), chap. 24a, pp. 1117/8, which formulates more tersely, ‘those who created ingenuously and 
produced utensils were called artisans’ 作巧成器曰工, or in Nancy Lee Swann’s translation in Food 
and Money, p. 115, ‘those who devised and made utensils [and instruments] were the craftsmen’.
5 Bodde, Chinese Thought, pp. 204-205.
6 Ibid., p. 371 ff. has a detailed analysis of all Zhou and Han occurrences of the term.
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which produced for and traded on the commercial market, or to forbid them 
altogether ( jinmo, ‘prohibiting the secondary occupations’).7 The legalist 
philosopher Han Feizi (d. 233 B.C.) claimed that merchants and artisans made 
up two of the ‘f ive vermin of the state’ that only brought forth or distributed 
useless objects.8 In the later Han dynasty, Wang Fu (ca. 78-163 A.D.) criticized 
the extravagance and ‘cunning’ decoration in the craft objects and the profit 
orientation of the merchants.9 Apart from the fact that some artisans produced 
art and crafts objects of high value, their extraordinary skill, qiao ‒ a character 
that also bears the connotation of ‘cunning’ that resembles the English term 
‘crafty’ or ‘crafted’ ‒ made them suspicious in the eyes of the scholar-elite.
The concept of the ‘four people’ was used throughout imperial China 
as a set designation for commoners, implying virtually ‘everybody’.10 It is 
occasionally mentioned in the dynastic histories, but the priorities among 
the four occupations are neither discussed nor redefined. In the Tang dynasty 
it was once prominently used by the scholar-official Han Yu (768-824) in an 
essay where he criticizes the impact of Buddhism and Daoism in general and 
specifically the prerogatives of tax freedom and suspension of labour services 
accorded to monasteries, monks, and nuns. In the text, he claims that the ‘four 
people’ had to feed two unproductive groups, the Buddhists and the Daoists.11
Conversely, not everybody who worked as an artisan was a free commoner 
and belonged to the group of the gong. In some periods, especially between 
the third and eighth centuries A.D., craft labour was also considered a 
lowly occupation and executed by slaves and bondservants. In the Tang 
dynasty, artisan households were legally classif ied as ‘lowly people’ together 
with other groups like the musicians of the Court of Imperial Sacrif ices, 
bondspeople, musician’s households, and male and female government 
slaves. However, from the Ming dynasty onward, only the category of slaves 
remained in a legally debased status.12
7 Zhou Shengchun et al., ‘Zhongguo lishi shang’, pp. 15-16.
8 Han Feizi 韓非子, chap. 49, Wu chong 五蠹 (Five vermin), in Hanzi qianjie, p. 489, transl. W. K 
Liao, The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu, p. 296. The other groups are scholars, the sword-carriers, 
and the courtiers.
9 Wang Fu, Qianfu lun, chap. 12, transl. Rainer Holzer, Ch’ien-fu lun, p. 70; see also Craig Clunas, 
Superfluous Things, p. 142.
10 Bodde, Chinese Thought, p. 203, with reference to a book title like the agricultural almanach 
Simin  yueling 四民月令 (Monthly ordinances for the four people) by Cui Shi 崔寔 (d. ca. 170 
A.D.). For the Simin yueling, see also Monique Nagel-Angermann, ‘Nongjia’, p. 82.
11 Han Yu, ‘Yuan dao’ 原道 (What is the true way?), transl. Charles Hartman in Sources of 
Chinese Tradition, p. 377/379.
12 Hansson, Chinese Outcasts, pp. 28/29. However, some artisan occupations, such as tanners 
and butchers, retained a low image. But generally speaking, the outcast status was more 
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In the second millennium, only a few thinkers and officials reconsidered the 
ranking of scholars and farmers as fundamental and of merchants and artisans 
as secondary, or the concept of the four occupational groups as a whole. Those 
who did so were the Song philosophers Chen Xiqing (1180-1256) and Zheng 
Zhidao (fl. 1079); the Ming scholars He Xinyin (1517-1579), Zhao Nanxing 
(1550-1627), Wang Daokun (1525-1593), and Feng Yingjing (1555-1606); and the 
Qing philosopher Huang Zongxi (1610-1695).13 They postulated that farmers, 
artisans, and merchants all belonged to the ‘fundamental occupations’, or even 
that merchants and artisans surpassed the farmers in importance. However, 
such reasoning remained the exception to the rule. The dominant view was 
the ‘physiocratic’ conviction that agriculture in combination with subsidiary 
production, mainly in textiles, was of the greatest importance to the state 
and that specialization in manufacturing and commerce was undesirable and 
suspect. This was formulated by the Yongzheng emperor in 1727 as follows:
Among the four classes of people, next to the scholars, farmers are the most 
valuable. All artisans and merchants rely on their food for farming, which is 
why farming is the basic pursuit (ben) throughout our realm while crafts and 
trade are merely secondary (mo). With the rising demand today for the ever 
more elaborate and finely crafted implements, clothing, and amusements, we 
are surely going to be needing more artisans. One more artisan in the market 
place, however, means one less farmer in the fields. Moreover, when the simple 
people see how much more artisans make than farmers do, they are sure to 
stampede to learn a trade. A sudden increase in the number of artisans will 
mean a glut of manufactured goods on the market, which will make it harder 
to sell things, as blockages develop, and prices fall. Thus, not only will an 
increase in people who pursue secondary occupations harm agriculture…, 
it will also have a harmful effect on the artisans themselves.14 […]
Hastily correcting this by legislation is not what the situation demands and 
would be hard to achieve. The only solution is patiently to instruct people day 
by day so that they understand that the basic occupation is an honourable one.15
associated with sexual pollution and less with blood and death than, for instance, in Korea 
and Japan (p. 18).
13 Zhou Shengchun et al., ‘Zhongguo lishi shang’, pp. 17-18. 
14 This is the translation by Susan Mann, ‘Household Handicrafts and State Policy in Qing 
Times’, p. 78.
15 Fang Xing, ‘The Retarded Development of Capitalism’, pp. 392-393, gives a longer excerpt of the 
relevant edict, which is included in the ‘Veritable Records of the Qing’, Da Qing Shizong Xian (Yongz-
heng) huangdi shilu, chap. 57 (Yongzheng 5/5/4), fol. 3b, p. 884. This shows the insight of the emperor 
that the government hardly had the option to reverse the general trend of commercialization.
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Make them respect honesty, not indulge in crafty skills, and if this is done 
day by day and month by month, it will eventually become a habit, and 
although not all artisans have to return to farming, it can at least prevent 
the farmers from hastening to become artisans. […]16
Why did the imperial state and especially the f irst Qing rulers insist on 
extolling agricultural pursuits rather than emphasizing manufacturing and 
commerce? In view of the population increase and the labour intensiveness 
of rice cultivation, it seems plausible that the central government feared 
that the food supply would be jeopardized if too many farmers left their 
occupation. The central government may also have been worried that the 
tax-in-kind on the rice-producing provinces and regions, the so-called ‘grain 
tribute’, would decrease. Moreover, many believed that political stability 
would be endangered if the ideal situation of a village-based agricultural 
state were to crumble.17
This opinion remained dominant until before the Opium War, and even 
important advocates for political and social reforms such as Gong Zizhen 
(1792-1841)18 and Wei Yuan (1794-1857)19 initially remained true to the traditional 
pattern, although Wei Yuan later changed his view. The transitional phase 
between the First Opium War (1842) and the Sino-Japanese War (1895) led 
contemporary intellectuals to the conviction that commerce and industries were 
of the utmost importance for the ‘self-strengthening’ and ‘enriching’ of China.
Historians’ Assessments
Chinese and Western historians of China have reflected upon the concept of 
the ‘four people’ in various ways. Those who discuss phases of pre-imperial 
16 This is the end of the excerpt as given in Peng Zeyi, Zhongguo jindai shougongye, vol. 1, 
p. 419. The target of the Yongzheng emperor’s policy is expressed even more clearly here.
17 For a detailed discussion of the insistence on the ‘four occupations’ and its extension, which 
prescribes the gender relation of men who till and women who weave, but stay in the house, see 
Francesca Bray, ‘Towards a Critical History’, p. 201 ff.
18 Gong Zizhen, a forerunner of late nineteenth-century reformers, was less successful as 
mid-level off icial in Peking, but later became famous for his early call to abolish the civil service 
examinations, footbinding, opium smoking, and exaggerated deference to the emperor in court. 
Hucker, Eminent Chinese, p. 431-434.
19 Wei Yuan was especially concerned about China’s foreign relations and in 1843 published 
Haiguo tuzhi 海國圖志 (An illustrated treatise on the maritime kingdoms), the f irst geography 
of overseas Western countries. Before this, Wei Yuan, who was acquainted with Gong Zizhen, 
had edited the f irst Qing dynasty edition of statecraft writings.
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and early imperial social history do not refrain from using it, even if they 
qualify this critically, to describe the constituents of these societies. For 
instance, Derk Bodde conceives of these four as ‘four major categories or 
social classes’20 but notes the omission in this concept of at least four groups 
that were signif icant in the West: the clergy, the nobility, the military, and 
slaves. On the relationship of the Confucian scholar to the artisans, he states 
that this concept, together with Mencius’ division between brain workers 
and manual workers, resulted in
a polarization of mental and manual work which barred the literatus 
from any sort of manual activity other than painting and calligraphy, kept 
the hand worker in unlettered silence, and induced the former either to 
disregard the latter entirely in his writings or to describe his way of life 
in casual, patronizing, or idealized language.21
In his research on social mobility, Wolfram Eberhard also refers to the 
‘four classes of free burghers’ and emphasizes that craftspeople made up 
the group that generally had ‘the smallest chances of upward mobility’.22
Philip A. Kuhn discusses the concept of the ‘four large occupational status 
groups’, which he defines as ‘scholars, agriculturalists, artisans, merchants’ as 
an element in his analysis of the four axes of social differentiation formulated 
in pre-modern sources: (1) occupational status; (2) rulers and ruled; (3) free 
and unfree; (4) rich and poor.23 According to Kuhn, political status ranked 
supreme in social importance, but occupational status was not unimportant 
and closely related to the political hierarchy.24 The f irst two of his axes were 
considered universal and built into the natural order. However, this was not 
the case with the latter two ‒ the free and the unfree, and the rich and the 
poor ‒ which were seen as ‘man-made’ rather than naturally occurring.25
Other historians more sharply refute the value of the concept. Ho Ping-ti, 
for instance, f inds the classif ication into ‘four major functional orders’ 
too broad and too narrow at the same time.26 In the f irst place, it does not 
take into account ‘debased people’. And within the particular groups of the 
fourfold division, a broad range of stratif ications prevailed, which makes it 
20 Bodde, Chinese Thought, p. 203.
21 Bodde, Chinese Thought, p. 222.
22 Eberhard, Social Mobility, pp. 237-238.
23 Kuhn, ‘Chinese Views of Social Classif ication’, pp. 18-26.
24 Ibid., p. 27.
25 Ibid., pp. 22-25.
26 Ho Ping-ti, The Ladder to Success, p. 18.
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obvious ‘that the traditional Chinese society was always a multiple-class 
society’.27 Marie-Claire Bergère f inds the ‘quadripartite division of society’ 
especially unsatisfying for the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
when class relations changed and new groups formed, as exemplif ied in 
the increasing number of brokers in commerce and politics as well as 
rebel members of secret societies that belonged to none of the traditional 
categories. Merchant communities assumed new roles as they mediated 
between these newly emerged middle strata and the public authorities.28
A representation of the four groups from the early twentieth century was 
designed in the Qijianlong workshop of the printing centre Yangliuqing 
near Tianjin.29 The artists obviously felt the need to comment on the lack 
of one distinct professional group, the soldiers. Nevertheless, in the printing 
they presented an idealized image of the four groups in harmony. Among 
the four, the artisans are not easily identif iable. Since they are not shown 
at work, it would be diff icult to recognize them as artisans and not simply 
as merchants, were it not for the title ‘Scholar, farmer, artisan, merchant’. 
The inscription, in the spirit of the self-strengthening movement and the 
increasing militarization of the late Qing society, reads:
Study battle, strengthen daily,
Scholars form a single faction,
Compete to become stronger,
Coordinate merchants, exhort workers,
In China, farming always comes f irst,





While there can be no doubt about the dynamism of the late Qing society and 
the emergence of new economic players, or about the economic variance in 
each of the four groups, in the late Qing era, the concept of the four groups was 
27 Ibid., p. 20.
28 Bergère, The Golden Age of the Chinese Bourgeoisie, pp. 19-20.
29 See James Flath, The Cult of Happiness, illustration after p. 20, ‘Scholar, farmer, artisan, 
merchant’. 
30 Flath, The Cult of Happiness, translation of the inscription by Flath, p. 61.
the artiSan’S PlaCe: the ‘four oCCuPational grouPS’ 301
far from withering away.31 On the contrary, it was applied to the contemporary 
situation and the perceived need for industrialization, commercial relations 
with foreign countries, and military service, as expressed in the poem: tong 
shang ‘to take up trade relations’, quan gong ‘to promote [industrial] work’, 
and chong bing ‘serving as a soldier’. For the first time, the functions of the 
gong ‒ the craftsmen of old and present-day workers in manufacturing sites and 
industry, technicians, and engineers ‒ were discussed and favourably assessed 
in comparison to the tasks and achievements of the other three groups.
Late Qing Views on the Position of Artisans
In the historical narratives of the dynastic histories that were compiled 
between the second century B.C. and the eighteenth century A.D., the four 
occupational groups  (simin) or the synonymous term, ‘scholars, farmers, 
artisans, and merchants’ (shi nong gong shang) only occur occasionally, and 
always in the meaning of ‘all commoners’. The concept is not discussed or 
qualif ied.32
The situation changed in the nineteenth century, and this change can 
be identif ied from within the so-called ‘statecraft writings’. From then 
onwards, these writings reflect an increasing concern for the composition 
of the group of commoners and, at the very end of the dynastic rule, also 
for a reassessment of their relative importance.
The concept of statecraft ‒ literally, ‘to order/manage the world’ ( jin-
gshi) ‒ originates from the Song dynasty. Statecraft authors, most often 
committed off icials and scholars, aimed to solve immediate political and 
socio-economical problems with a long-term view to creating a ‘universal 
moral order.’33 As has been shown by Jane Kate Leonard, statecraft writings 
tended to become more practical and pragmatic from the Southern Song 
to the Qing periods, but up to the late Qing, ostensibly moral ends always 
justif ied the proposed practical solutions.34
31 For the application of the fourfold division since the sixteenth century in Japan, where it 
was combined with ‘status’ (mibun 身分) and legally more binding than in contemporaneous 
China, see Douglas R. Howland, ‘Samurai Status’, pp. 355-362.
32 A text analysis of the twenty-f ive dynastic histories installed at the Academia Sinica full 
text database yields a result of 50 hits for simin and 7 for the synonymous shi nong gong shang, 
Hanji quanwen ziliaoku 漢籍全文資料庫/ Scripta Sinica, http://hanchi.ihp.sinica.edu.tw/ihp/
hanji.htm.
33 Leonard, Wei Yuan, p. 20.
34 Ibid., pp. 20-22.
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Statecraft writings deal with all matters and aspects of administrative 
concern. They were compiled from existing texts that were not initially 
written with the purpose of being included in these collections. Some of 
them were imperial edicts or government orders, while others were the 
communication of off icials to the central government, mostly in the form of 
memorials. The latest editions also contain texts that are suggestions from 
intellectuals outside the government, or descriptions of foreign political 
and administrative matters that stand in no immediate relation to China 
but were thought to be useful as possible models.
In the Qing dynasty, the f irst of these collections was edited in 1826 by 
He Changling (1785-1848), a provincial administrator in Jiangsu, and Wei 
Yuan, who served as a mid-level district administrator in the same province. 
The editors proposed a change of the bureaucratic framework in order 
to prevent corruption and to stabilize social and economic conditions. 
However, the collection also contains texts from the early and high Qing 
that were considered relevant for contemporaneous problems. With the f irst 
of these editions, Wei Yuan created a model for political expression that 
was taken up by later intellectuals who edited sequels and complements 
to the original edition. The editors, including Wei Yuan, belonged to the 
scholarly elite but did not rank high in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Some of 
them were related to more prominent personalities, such as Mai Zhonghua 
(1876-1956), a student and the son-in-law of Kang Youwei,35 or Sheng Kang, 
father of the industrialist Sheng Xuanhuai (1844-1916).36
In her study on the relationship of statecraft writings and the press, 
Andrea Janku explains that from the 1890s on, such compilations increased 
and reached their apex around 1898. After Kang Youwei’s Hundred Day 
Reform was crushed in the summer of 1898, the original group of statecraft 
compilers kept silent or resumed their work in other forms from exile. 
In 1902, statecraft writings were once again used in order to justify the 
government’s reform efforts. Meanwhile, many of the previous editions were 
reprinted, but compilation and reprint activities petered out after the fall 
of the dynasty. As a public sector began to take shape and political opinion 
could be expressed in newspapers and journals, statecraft writings and 
journalism approached each other in content, and with this assimilation, 
the genre of statecraft writings gradually faded away. The last of the editions 
is from 1914.37
35 Janku, Nur leere Reden, p. 79.
36 Janku, ‘Preparing the Ground’, p. 75, fn. 27.
37 Ibid., pp. 74-76.
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The ten most important collections, dating from the years 1826 to 1902, 
are listed in the following table.38 They formed the text corpus for this 
study. Recent research has identif ied about nineteen late Qing and early 
Republican statecraft collections.39
Table 49  Collections of statecraft writings, 1826-1902







1 he Changling 賀長齡and wei yuan 魏源, 
Huangchao jingshi wenbian皇朝經世文編 
(Statecraft writings of our august Dynasty)
1826 120 19 7
2 rao yucheng 饒玉成, Huangchao jingshi 
wenbian xuji 皇朝經世文編續集 (Continued 
collection of statecraft writings of our august 
Dynasty)
1882 120 12 2
3 ge Shijun 葛士濬, Huangchao jingshi wen 
xubian 皇朝經世文續編 (Sequel to the 
statecraft writings of our august Dynasty)
1888 120 13 6
4 Sheng kang盛康, Huangchao jingshi wen 
xubian 皇朝經世文續編 (Sequel to the 
statecraft writings of our august Dynasty)
1897 120 35 5
5 Chen Zhongyi 陳忠倚, Huangchao jingshi wen 
sanbian 皇朝經世文三編 (third edition of 
statecraft writings of our august Dynasty)
1898 80 13 12
6 mai Zhonghua 麥仲華, Huangchao jingshi 
wen xinbian皇朝經世文新編 (new edition of 
statecraft writings of our august Dynasty)
1898 21 16 11
7 Shao Zhitang 邵之棠, Huangchao jingshi wen 
tongbian 皇朝經世文統編 (Comprehensive 
edition of statecraft writings of our august 
Dynasty)
1901 107 65 38
8 he liangdong 何良棟, Huangchao jingshi 
wen sibian 皇朝經世文四編 (fourth edition of 
statecraft writings of our august Dynasty)
1902 52 19 7
38 These were installed at the Academia Sinica Taiwan ‘Electronic Editions of Chinese Writings 
Full-text Database’ 中央研究院漢籍電子文獻瀚典全文檢索系統, http://www.sinica.edu.
tw/~tdbproj/handy1/ and have later migrated to other sites. Photomechanic reproductions were 
published in several editions, for instance by the Guofeng chubanshe and in the Collectanea 
Jindai Zhongguo shiliao congkan.
39 Shen Yan, ‘Wan Qing jingshi wenbian’, p. 58, counts nineteen; Andrea Janku, p. 74, table 2, 
has seventeen sequels to the 1826 edition.
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9 Qiushi zhai (pseud.) 求是齋, Huangchao 
jingshi wenbian wuji 皇朝經世文編五集 (fifth 
collection of statecraft writings of our august 
Dynasty)
1902 32 11 2
10 gan han 甘韓, Huangchao jingshi wen xinbian 
xuji 皇朝經世文新編續集 (Sequel to the new 
edition of statecraft writings of our august 
Dynasty)
1902 21 18 8
total 793 221 98
A closer investigation of the context of the terms ‘the four groups’ (simin) or 
‘scholars-farmers-artisans-merchants’ (shi nong gong shang) in the earliest 
of these collections shows that in the texts of the f irst collection (1826), both 
terms refer to commoners in general. Some texts outline the characteristics 
and complementary functions of each of the four groups and any other 
groups that are perceived as necessary or at least as existent. For example:
The scholars understand the way of the former kings and support the ruler 
of men in governing the realm. The farmers till the f ields with physical 
labour and harvest the grain to feed the realm. The artisans produce the 
necessary vessels and objects for the use of the realm. The merchants 
bring scarceness and abundance into contact and assemble goods for 
the prof it of the realm. Besides, those ordinary people who are close to 
the off icials, such as present-day off ice assistants, are indispensable for 
administration, and therefore must also be appended to the four people.40
Other texts designate the scholars as ‘those who excel’; soldiers as ‘those 
who are strong’; and farmers, artisans, and merchants as ‘those who are 
weak’.41 Single groups are also discussed. The statement one comes across 
40 Jin Fu 靳輔 (1633-1692), ‘On creating wealth and augmenting provisions, memorial one’ 
(‘Sheng cai yu xiang diyi shu’ 生財裕餉第一疏), Collection 1, chap. 26, fol. 20a/b. Jin Fu, a ban-
nerman, was a specialist in river conservancy and served as the Director-General of the Yellow 
River Conservancy for eleven years. He successfully organized dike and canal construction on 
the lower reaches of the Yellow River. See Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 161 ff.
41 Shen Qiyuan 沈起元 (1685-1763), ‘Reflecting on strategies for current tasks’ (‘Ni shiwu ce’ 
擬時務策), Collection 1, chap. 35, fol. 41b. Shen Qiyuan directed the Confucian academy at 
Luoyang; see Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 175.
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most frequently is that the scholars rank f irst among the four groups,42 
while it is mentioned only once that the farmers face the greatest hardships 
of all four.43 Merchants are also mentioned once,44 but there is no separate 
characterization or discussion of artisans.
It was also a matter of debate what the right apportionment of the four 
categories of people was. Generally, the best ratio was considered to be 
70 percent farmers and 10 percent each of artisans, scholars, and merchants.45 
The most extensive discussion of the four groups was formulated by Yun Jing 
惲敬 (1757-1817),46 the founder of the ‘Yanghu school’ of practical learning. He 
pointed out the fact that at the time not only four but as many as fourteen 
groups existed but that those who fed and provided the essential services 
were still the same four as in ancient times.47 To some extent, the additional 
ten groups is a rhetorical inflation stemming from a preference for pairs. It 
includes, in an allusion to Han Yu, Buddhist and Daoist clergy; the nobility 
(gui) and the rich ( fu); military leaders (cao bing zhe) and their followers 
( jianyi zhe), their offspring (zidi), wives, and in-laws (yinya); commercial 
agents and brokers (ya, hui); servants (pu and tai); courtesans; and actors 
42 Zhou Kai 周凱, ‘An explanation of the poem on cultivating mulberry trees’ (‘Zhong sang 
shishuo’ 種桑詩說), Collection 1, chap. 37, fol. 23a claims that ‘scholars are the f irst among the 
four groups, and often farm as well as study. When the scholars lead [in introducing agricultural 
methods], the people [i.e. farmers] will certainly follow.’ Zhou Kai (ca. 1779-1837) acted as a 
mid-level civil and military off icial in various provincial governments and was a specialist in 
navigation and shipbuilding. For further references on the position of the scholars within the 
four groups, see Xu Chengxuan 許承宣 (f l. 1676, Supervising Censor in the Off ice of Scrutiny 
for Public Works, see Zhongguo lidai renming da cidian, p. 750), ‘Comment to a document on 
‘Four problems of corvée and taxation’ [of 1645]’ (‘Fuchai guanshui sibi shu’ 賦差關稅四弊疏), 
dated 1680, Collection 1, chap. 28, fol. 28a; Chen Qingmen 陳慶門, ‘About being a honest off icial’ 
(‘Shixue yiguan lu’ 仕學一貫錄), Collection 1, chap. 22, fol. 28a.
43 Wang Peixun 王沛恂, ‘Record on wild silkworms’ (‘Ji shan can’ 紀山蠶), Collection 1, chap. 37, 
fol. 23b.
44 Zhang Jian 章謙, ‘On preparations for years of drought’ (‘Bei huang tonglun, xia’ 備荒通論
下), Collection 1, chap. 39, fol. 12b/13a.
45 Jin Fu, ‘On creating wealth and augmenting provisions, memorial one’, in Collection 1, 
chap. 26, p. 7-1. Xu Chengxuan, ‘Comment to a document on four problems of taxation [of 1645]’, 
Collection 1, chap. 28, fol. 28a says that scholars constitute ten percent of the entire four groups.
46 For biographical information, see Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 959-960 and Zhongguo 
lidai renming da cidian, p. 1783. Yun had passed the second-degree off icial examinations in 
1783 and successfully worked as regional administrator in various districts. He was known as 
an upright off icial, but in 1814 was relegated and stripped of his off ices after being accused of 
overlooking that his subordinates had accepted bribes. He was an expert in classical, pre-Han 
dynasty writing (guwen, a style revived by Han Yu) and close to legalist thinking. Since he came 
from Yanghu in Jiangsu, his school of thought was entitled ‘Yanghu school’ (Yanghu pai 陽湖派).
47 Yun Jing, ‘Subsequent changes from the Three Emperors onwards’ (‘Sandai yin’ge lun’ 三代
因革論), Collection 1, chap. 11, fol. 11a-12b.
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( furen, nanzi). According to Yun Jing, on top of the burden of feeding these ten 
superfluous groups, other tendencies lead to the impoverishment of farmers, 
artisans, and merchants. He states that contrary to the ideal in ‘antiquity’, 
when the rulers owned all land and made the people till it, the rich now buy 
land and delegate agricultural labour to landless, destitute workers (yong). 
The artisans of olden times had specif ic patterns of production and were 
supervised by the off icials, but later they allegedly did not conform to any 
rules and ‘made everything on their own’. Yun Jing claims that unskilled 
artisans cannot support themselves, and the skilled hands produce items 
of such exaggerated ref inement that it takes them several years to f inish a 
single one, with the result that they, too, cannot make a living. Tradition-
ally, merchants were not allowed to wear sumptuous dress and use luxury 
carts, but in Yun Jing’s era, they indulged in exaggerated luxury which did 
not match with their positions, and tried to imitate the scholar-off icials. 
Consequently, their wealth also decreased. Yun Jing ends his argument with 
the urgent advice that the members of the unproductive groups be reduced.
Another conservative thinker, Wang Boxin (1799-1873),48 a friend of 
commissioner Lin Zexu (1785-1850), who had ordered the destruction of 
imported opium in Canton in 1839 and the punishment of those Cantonese 
compradors who had handled the opium trade, called for an outright ‘pro-
hibition of the secondary occupations’ (‘Jin mo’).49 Deploring the situation 
where craftspeople were no longer supervised and controlled by off icials, 
he made a distinction between those artisans who followed their inherited 
trade and were impoverished and those who produced ‘clever devices’ for 
the market and flourished. He called for the punishment and discrimination 
of the latter and the merchants who traded in their products.
Such anti-commercial invectives, which do not touch on the position or 
value of the scholarly class, gradually diminished in the statecraft collections 
in the course of the late nineteenth century. They showed the anxiety of a 
part of the scholarly elite that society was changing for the worse and that the 
economically active groups that produced and traded goods were to blame for it.
Re-evaluations: Turning to Antiquity and Facing the West
From the f ifth of the statecraft collections (1898) onwards, the change to 
more assertive views of craft production and commerce becomes manifest. 
48 For biographical data, see Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 511.
49 Collection 4, chap. 55, fol. 3a-4a.
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This re-evaluation sometimes went hand in hand with a more critical view 
of the role of the scholars. Among the lines of thought developed, some still 
referred to antiquity, while others brought up for discussion the position of 
crafts and commerce in overseas countries. Both antiquity and the situation 
abroad served as positive models that stood in contrast to the circumstances 
in China at that time.
In these argumentations, the ancient times were superior not only 
because able administrators closely supervised the crafts but because 
the saint kings and their highest ranking councilors were engineers and 
inventors. The examples cited are almost identical: the mythical f igures 
of Fuxi (the inventor of hexagrams for divination, hunting, f ishing, and 
animal sacrif ice), Shennong (‘Celestial Farmer’, patron of Chinese medicine, 
agriculture), Huangdi (‘Yellow Emperor’, inventor of Chinese characters, 
ships and carts, medicine, music, sericulture), the saint kings Yao and 
Shun (inventors of the game weiqi and the calendar) and Yu (hydraulic 
engineering), and f inally the historical personages of Duke of Zhou (regent 
for the second Zhou king Cheng, f l. 1030 B.C., consolidator of the Zhou 
dynasty, the purported inventor of a compass-like ‘south pointing needle’50), 
Zhang Heng (78-139), a court astronomer in the Later Han who invented 
a seismoscope and a rotating celestial globe, and Zhuge Liang (181-234), 
military strategist and councilor to Liu Bei, ruler of the state of Shu-Han 
in the Three Kingdoms, to whom the invention of the ‘wooden ox’,51 a war 
engine, is ascribed.52 According to this reasoning, after the Song dynasty, 
the spirit of inventiveness and interest for technical matters declined 
because the scholars were too concerned with book learning and passing 
off icial examinations. Craftspeople were hence considered vulgar, and it 
was believed that only the simple-minded became artisans.53 Another text 
50 Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, vol. 4 part 3, Physics and Physical Technology: 
Civil Engineering and Nautics, p. 582.
51 The muniu 木牛 or muniu liuma 木牛流馬 (wooden ox and f lowing horse), is most often 
identif ied as wheelbarrow.
52 Xue Fucheng 薛福成 (1838-1894), ‘A theory on promoting crafts and industries’, written 
in 1893 (Zhen baigong shuo guisi 振百工說癸巳), Collection 5, chap. 63, fol. 3a. Xue served 
as secretary to Zeng Guofan and was a diplomat in London and Paris from 1890 to 1894; see 
Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 331-332. For the same sequence of inventions by sage kings 
and court off icials, see also ‘Written after the inauguration of an industrial school’ (‘Shu 
chuangxing yixue hou’ 書創興藝學後), by an anonymous author, Collection 7 (1901), chap. 87, 
fol. 8b.
53 ‘A theory on promoting crafts and industries’, Collection 5, chap. 63, fol. 3a. As to the low 
esteem for craftspeople, even after the merchants had risen in prestige by buying off icial titles, 
see also ‘Suggestion to all provinces to enlarge their off icial manufactories’ (‘Gesheng tuiguang 
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draws on a citation from the ‘Book of Changes’ (Yijing) that criticizes the 
neglect of technical matters: ‘[In later times] it was ignored what the Book 
of Changes says: ‘In preparing things for practical use, and inventing and 
making instruments for the benef it of all under the sky, there are none 
greater than the sages.’’54
Over time, the voices that called for an equitable appraisal within the four 
occupational groups became more and more articulate. They claimed that 
in antiquity the artisans and merchants stood on an equal footing with the 
scholars. A skilled artisan could allegedly even criticize the government. 
In later times, the Ministries of Revenues and Work controlled commerce 
and crafts, but the off icials did not understand the actual problems of 
commerce and crafts or industries. Consequently, they demanded that the 
ways of antiquity be applied.55
However, the greatest difference with the f irst collections of statecraft lit-
erature lies in the fact that comparisons to industrializing and industrialized 
countries ‒ the ‘West’ and Japan ‒ were beginning to be incorporated into 
discussions on the four occupational groups. The main contrast was seen in 
the status of the counterpart of the Chinese artisans (gong) abroad, namely 
craftspeople, technicians, engineers, and industrialists (of all scales). Three 
crucial factors seemed different: foreign rulers appreciated the efforts of 
craftspeople and industrialists, protected their property rights by legislation, 
and made sure that technical knowledge was transmitted and enhanced in 
official vocational schools. As we have seen before, authors began to question 
the normative dominance of the scholars, but the discourse diversif ied 
into positions that perceived the Western counterparts of the artisans as 
dominant and decisive in Western societies and economies, and those that 
insisted on the dominance of the merchants. Xue Fucheng formulated both 
gongju yi’ 各省推廣工局議), Collection 7, chap. 87, fol. 9a. Criticism of pure book learning 
is expressed in ‘Suggestion that China should open additional training centers for crafts and 
industries’ (‘Lun Zhongguo yi ling she yishu’ 論中國宜另設藝塾), Collection 8 (1902), chap. 42, 
sect. 18 (http://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapter=464464).
54 ‘Written after the inauguration of an industrial school’, Collection 7, chap. 87, fol. 8b: ‘Yi 
yue, beiwu zhiyong, li chengqi, yiwei tianxia li, mo da hu shengren’ 易曰備物致用,立成器，以
為天下利，莫大乎聖人. Translation James Legge, I ching, p. 373; Yijing, chap. ‘Xici A’ 繫辭上, 
7, p. 107.
55 ‘A theory on Chinese and foreign wealth and poverty, similarities and differences’ (‘Zhong 
wai pin fu yi tong lun’ 中外貧富異同論), Collection 7, chap. 106, fol. 32a. See also Ying Zuxi 應祖
錫 (1855-1927), ‘Promoting the industries and opening commerce’ (‘Xing gong tong shang’ 興工通
商), Collection 9 (1902), chap.12, part 5, sect. 8 (http://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapter=874265). 
Ying Zuxi served f irst as a diplomat in Spain, later as a regional administrator under the Qing 
and in the Republic of China.
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opinions in separate texts. In ‘Theory on promoting crafts and industries’, 
he explained that:
In Western usage, states are built on commerce and industry. The artisans 
generally form the substance and the merchants the application, which 
means that the artisans actually rank higher than the merchants.56 The 
scholars research the natural sciences and techniques, which means 
that as far as merit is concerned, the artisans combine their own and 
the scholars’ affairs.57
In his conclusion, he compared the Western situation to China’s antiquity. 
If China wanted to strengthen itself and promote the crafts, it f irst had to 
overcome its prejudices against artisans and its exaggerated appreciation 
for scholars and off icial examinations.58
The critique of the interrelation of classical text learning as the main road 
to off ice, power, and reputation is also formulated by contrasting this with 
the West. One text claims that in the West, merchants, artisans, soldiers, 
and farmers all learned their trades in specialized schools and therefore 
stood on the same level as Chinese scholars:
The appreciation of commerce in the West goes so far as to establish 
commercial schools. One f irst has to learn [emphasis added] a trade in 
order to be a merchant. That means that the merchants of the West are 
similar to the scholars in China. Actually, not only the merchants are 
similar to the scholars, but all technical branches, military matters, 
and agriculture are taught in schools in order to train the talents. That 
means that artisans (technicians) as well as soldiers (military off icers) 
and farmers (agronomists) all are like scholars.59
Taking this kind of vocational training as a model, reformers demanded 
that such schools also be established in China60 and that the most eff icient 
56 Identical to ‘Written after the inauguration of an industrial school’, Collection 7 (1901), 
chap. 87, fol. 8b.
57 Xue Fucheng, ‘A theory on promoting crafts and industries’, Collection 5, chap. 63, fol. 3a.
58 Xue Fucheng, ‘A theory on promoting crafts and industries’, loc. cit.
59 ‘A theory on public prof it’ (‘Gong li shuo’ 公利說), anonymous author, Collection 7, chap. 107, 
p. 13b. 
60 ‘Suggestion that China should open additional training centers for the industries’, Collec-
tion 8, chap. 42, sect. 18 (http://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapter=464464); ‘Written after the 
inauguration of an industrial school’, Collection 7 (1901), chap. 87, fol. 8a/b.
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merchants and engineers should be conferred off icial posts as incentives,61 
or that industrialists should be elevated to the nobility.62
Several authors considered the Western system of ensuring property 
rights for inventors as key to the success of the West and should therefore 
be emulated in China.63 They argued that without patent legislation in 
China, the West would continuously lead in technical innovation, and China 
would never catch up.64 In one instance, the importance of patent rights 
was spelled out in detail. In an account that here and there runs counter 
to the understanding of historical facts, Chen Chi (1855-1900)65 narrates 
the story of the ‘simple copper smith’ (tonggong 銅工) Krupp, who learned 
advanced gun-making technology in France with the consent of Napoleon 
Bonaparte. France was the f irst country where the inventor’s patent rights 
were protected by law, which for a while made it the leading power in Europe. 
When Krupp presented his breech-loading gun (sic) to the German ruler, he 
was richly rewarded and given nobility status. In the German-French war 
[1870], Krupp’s guns defeated the French. Thus, it was the invention of ‘a small 
copper manufacturer’ rather than military prowess and diplomatic skill that 
decided the victory.66 Chen Chi concludes that the only way for China to 
rise out of its backwardness was to promote industry, and the f irst step in 
promoting industry was patent legislation. In this account, which contains 
several counterfactual points,67 the author directly addressed the emperor 
61 Ying Zuxi, ‘Promoting the industries and opening commerce’, Collection 9, chap. 12, part 5, 
sect. 8 (http://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapter=874265), demands the option to confer off icial 
positions to merchants and artisans. ‘A theory on Chinese and foreign wealth and poverty, 
similarities and differences’, Collection 7, chap. 106, fol. 32a more specif ically calls for off icial 
status for the most skilled technicians.
62 Xue Fucheng, ‘A theory on promoting crafts and industries’, Collection 5 (1898), chap. 63, fol. 3b.
63 ‘On attaching importance to crafts and industries’ (‘Zhong gong lun’ 重工論), anonymous 
author, Collection 8, chap. 42, sect. 18 (http://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapter=464464), parallel 
in Xue Fucheng, ‘A theory on promoting crafts and industries’, Collection 5 (1898), chap. 63, fol. 3b.
64 ‘Suggestion to all provinces to enlarge their official manufactories’, Collection 7, chap. 87, p. 8b.
65 As a middle echelon off icial in the Ministries of Revenue and Justice and Secretary in 
the State Council, Chen Chi studied Western affairs and recorded his ideas on economic and 
administrative reform in Yongshu 庸書 (A commonplace book, 1893) and Xu fuguo ce 續富國策 
(Sequel to ‘Strategies for enriching the country’, 1896). Together with Kang Youwei he organized 
the ‘Study association for (national) strengthening’ (Qiang xue hui 強學會). Wang Yantao, ‘Chen 
Chi de jingji sixiang’, p. 183.
66 Chen Chi 陳熾, ‘A theory on fostering industries and strengthening the country’ (‘Quan 
gong qiang guo shuo’ 勸工強國說) , Collection 6, chap. 9, fol. 2b.
67 For instance, the technology that the Krupp family developed was steel casting rather 
than copper manufacture, and cannon rather than gun fabrication. Although not impossible, it 
seems improbable that (Friedrich) Krupp (1787-1826) saw Napoleon in person, as in Chen Chi’s 
narrative. It was not Friedrich but his son Alfred Krupp (1812-1887) who successfully presented 
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and the central government. Therefore he stressed the acknowledgement 
that Western artisans who had become manufacturers and industrialists 
received from their rulers and underlined the risk that all rulers run if they 
do not give their utmost attention to such industries.
Finally, many of the statecraft writings express the hope of retrieving 
profits lost to Western countries trading in China. For this reason, they point 
to Western models of industrial promotion and the protection of property 
rights. In this sense, Xue Fucheng points out:
If we disregard what the Western people esteem highly, then the extreme 
wealth produced in China will gradually flow overseas, China will become 
poorer and weaker every day, and the West will become richer and stronger 
every day – and this is what the Westerners keenly desire.68
To conclude this review of perceptions of the concept of the four occupational 
groups, we should add that even the late collections of statecraft writings 
contain articles that insist that there were far too few farmers, and that the 
other three groups as well as the additional ten described by Yun Jing had 
increased disproportionately. One writer, who uses a pseudonym, advocated 
that several ten thousands of ineff icient scholars and several millions of 
artisans ‘who merely seek excessive ref inement but are unproductive’ and 
‘merchants who are not active in business’ should return to working on the 
land. In his view, the government should concentrate on developing new 
agricultural land rather than on fostering trade and commerce.69 However, 
this remains an exception embedded in a majority of accounts that call for 
a revision of rigid agrarianism, in the spirit of Confucius, ‘the sage whose 
actions were timely.’70
breech-loading cast steel cannons to the Prussian king Wilhelm I. Furthermore, while Friedrich 
in his f inal years had all but driven the family business into ruins, the Krupps, having been 
members of the Essen notables since the seventeenth century, and in particular Alfred Krupp, 
were hardly ‘small copper smiths’. See William Manchester, Krupp, p. 37 ff.
68 Xue Fucheng, ‘Explanation on the English use of merchants to open new lands’ (‘Yingjili 
yong shangwu pi huangdi shuo’ 英吉利用商務闢荒地說), Collection 5, chap. 74, fol. 4b. See 
also ‘Written after the inauguration of an industrial school’, Collection 7 (1901), chap. 87, fol. 
8b; ‘Suggestion to all provinces to enlarge their off icial manufactories’, Collection 7, chap. 87, 
p. 8b.
69 Gu’an zi 古庵子 ‘On the four occupational groups’ (‘Simin lun’ 四民論), Collection 7, chap. 106, 
fol. 16a.
70 ‘Extension of the theory on the four occupational groups’ (‘Guang simin lun’ 廣四民論), 
Collection 7, chap. 106, 16b to 17a. For the quote from Mengzi 孟子, ‘Wanzhang‘ B, see the transla-
tion by D.C. Lau, Mencius, p. 150.
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The concept of the four occupational groups was applied even at a time when 
it may have seemed outdated and even by the reformers of the day who invoked 
it to call for industrialization and the promotion of commerce: ‘The wealth of 
the country is stored in four big chambers. The first are the scholar-officials, 
the second the farmers, the third the artisans, the fourth the merchants.’71
Concept and Reality
How close is such reasoning to the realities of society, and what, in particular, 
does it tell us about the actual social position of the craftspeople?
The observed texts variously touch on the relationships between the four 
occupational groups. Until the late nineteenth century, the dominant posi-
tion of the scholars remained undisputed. Thereafter, the f irst critical voices 
were raised.72 Farmers were rarely mentioned in the texts after the f ifth 
collection, and the focus shifted to the two other groups, which previously 
were conceived of as secondary or derived and now required ‘promotion’. 
This comes as no surprise as far as the merchants are concerned. Several 
indicators show that the actual position of the merchants had risen in the 
course of commercialization since the Late Ming era.73 The most important of 
such indicators was the possibility of participation in civil service examina-
tions. In the Song period, merchants and artisans had been excluded from 
the examinations and consequently from taking off ice. But since the Ming 
dynasty, these discriminatory restrictions were lifted.74 In order to attain 
greater acceptance by the political elite, the merchants adapted to the 
norms of the scholar-off icial class by acquiring knowledge of the Confucian 
scriptures that formed the canon for off icial examinations, and in addition 
to that emulated the lifestyle and fashions of the ‘high-cultural’ circles.75 
71 Ying Zuxi 應祖錫, ‘Promoting the industries and opening commerce’, Collection 9 (1902), 
chap. 12, part 5, sect. 8 (http://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapter=874265).
72 Xue Fucheng, ‘A theory on promoting crafts and industries’, Collection 5, chap. 63, fol. 3a/b; 
‘A suggestion that China should open additional training centers for the industries’, Collection 
8, chap. 42, sect. 18 (http://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapter=464464).
73 Lufrano, Honorable Merchants, p. 37.
74 Ho Ping-ti, The Ladder to Success, p. 42; Miyazaki Ichisada, China’s Examination Hell, p. 19, 
mentions only restrictions as to ‘base occupations’ such as running brothels, and that the 
candidate needed a guarantor for his personal respectability, but not – if he was a commoner – a 
certif icate of his ancestors’ occupation. See also Lufrano, Honorable Merchants, p. 38.
75 See, for instance, Brook, Confusions, p. 128, for the mid-Ming Huizhou merchants based at 
Yangzhou. Compare also Antonia Finnane’s more sceptical approach to the question whether 
Huizhou merchants in Yangzhou actually were an exemplary and representative case of ‘blurred 
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The merchants did not create a dominant culture of their own that would 
have superseded that of the learned classes with privileged access to state 
office. Antonia Finnane perceptively remarks that the wealthy merchants of 
Yangzhou had their portraits made in their gardens, showing them pursuing 
elegant pastimes rather than doing business in their counting houses.76
As we have seen, orthodox representatives of the state and the scholar 
class wished to limit the influence of this group and hence invoked the ideal 
of an agrarian society. However, after the Opium Wars and the Taiping Rebel-
lion, with the enlarged export and import markets, business opportunities 
broadly increased, commercialization intensif ied, and buying off icial titles 
and examination degrees became a frequent practice among merchants.77 
Moreover, Western values spread in post-Opium-War China, especially 
Protestant utilitarianism, and this contributed to more appreciative views 
of prof itable commercial business.
When reformers called for a wider recognition of the positive contribution 
of merchants to society, an innovative form of business organization ‒ the so-
called ‘official-supervised, merchant-managed’ enterprises ‒ emerged, where 
merchant know-how and capital was invested under off icial patronage. 
Together with the arsenals and dockyards, these were the greatest modern 
companies established in the second half of the nineteenth century.78 Some 
of the statecraft writers such as Zheng Guanying (1842-1922)79 were actively 
involved in such companies.
The position of artisans, if seen from their legal chances of receiving a 
higher education, was formally equal to that of the merchants.80 However, 
the examples of artisans who rose to fame and high social status only on 
basis of their skills are few and far between. There have always been the 
boundaries’ between social groups, that is, between scholar-literati and merchants in her 
Speaking of Yangzhou, pp. 253-264.
76 Finnane, Speaking of Yangzhou, p. 264.
77 Naquin and Rawski, Chinese Society, p. 221.
78 Feuerwerker, China’s Early Industrialization, p. 9, lists as examples and models for late 
Qing industrial and commercial enterprises the China Merchants’ Steam Navigation Company 
(1872), the Kaiping Coal Mines (1877), the Shanghai Cotton Cloth Mill (f irst planned 1878, later 
the Huasheng Cotton Mill), the Imperial Telegraph Administration (1881), the Moho Gold Mines 
(1887), the Hanyang Ironworks (from 1896), the Daye Iron Mines (1896), the Imperial Bank of 
China (1896), and the Pingxiang Coal Mines (1898).
79 Zheng had pursued classical studies in his youth but did not pass off icial exams. He learned 
English at an Anglo-Chinese school in Shanghai, and in 1860 entered an English trade company 
at age seventeen, where he worked as a ‘comprador’ before setting up his own business. Like 
many other merchants, he acquired off icial rank by purchase. See Feuerwerker, China’s Early 
Industrialization, p. 116, and especially Johannes Kehnen, Cheng Kuan-ying, p. 18 ff.
80 Lufrano, Honorable Merchants, p. 37.
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big names, especially in palace architecture. In the Ming era, some of these 
builders rose to off icial status, like Xu Gao, who became Minister of Public 
Works in 1562.81 However, as Clunas remarks, throughout the Ming period 
it was noted with disapproval when persons of artisan backgrounds were 
elevated to high government positions, as these were reserved as the domain 
of the learned classes.82 During the Qing era, palace architects were never to 
rise as high as that. Lei Jinyu (1659-1729), the patriarch of the most renowned 
family of palace builders in the Qing, acquired a rank and official salary of the 
seventh grade of nine,83 which was much lower than a minister, who ranked 
grade 2a in the Ming. The ‘Record of outstanding artisans’ (Zhejiang lu), 
which portrays the efforts of the Lei family in the chapter on Qing architects, 
includes short biographies of 42 builders. Most of them were mid or high 
level off icials, and except for the Leis, only two other persons are explicitly 
described as artisans. All the others ‘supervised’ rather than engaged in 
manual efforts and arrived at their leading positions in the traditional way 
of off icial examinations rather than by professional craft training.84
Other cases known from the late Ming or Ming-Qing transition when 
artisans rubbed shoulders ‒ or, as the Chinese expression goes, ‘sat together 
and exchanged greetings’ ‒ with the high-cultured circles was when they 
produced luxury items like carved bamboo, lacquers, bronzes, and ceramics. 
Elite customers treasured those wares as proofs of their connoisseurship, 
but this did not mean that the status of artisans rose to equality with the 
scholars or even with the merchants who could afford such art objects.85
Until the very late Qing period, the most feasible path of upward mobility 
for artisans must have been to acquire enough wealth to enter commerce, 
with the option of studying the prescribed curriculum for the state examina-
tions or to purchase off ice. Clues that artisans tried to enter commerce can 
be found. For instance, a French Jesuit missionary who visited the Jingdezhen 
porcelain production centre wrote in 1710: ‘Although for one artisan who 
gets rich, a hundred ruin themselves, they will always try their fortune in 
the hope to accumulate enough money for opening a shop of their own one 
day.’86 More examples of this trend are given in the chapters on shipbuilding 
81 Klaas Ruitenbeek, ‘The Rebuilding of the Three Rear Palaces in 1596-1598’ and ‘Building 
Regulations (Zeli) and their Context’, p. 189.
82 Clunas, Superfluous Things, p. 147.
83 Zhu and Liang, Zhejiang lu, in Zhongguo yingzao xueshe huikan IV/1 (1933), p. 84.
84 Ibid., pp. 83-115.
85 Clunas, Superfluous Things, pp. 61-62. See also Angela Hsi, Social and Economic Status of 
the Merchant Class, p. 143.
86 Père d’Entrecolles, ‘Lettre’, p. 202.
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and printing. From the numerical evidence, merchants’ guilds as bodies of 
self-organization seem to outnumber craftspeople’s guilds, and authorities 
also seem to have taken more authoritarian measures against artisan guilds 
than against merchant guilds.87 In Hankow, the ‘Upper Eight Guilds’ (shang 
ba hang) were those of ‘the most lucrative commercial trades of the city: 
copper and lead dealers, piece-goods dealers, medicinal herb dealers, paper 
dealers, Shanxi bankers, pawnbrokers, vegetable oil dealers, dealers in 
miscellaneous commodities’, while the ‘Lower Eight Guilds’ (xia ba hang) 
referred to the handicraft workshops (zuofang).88
The opinion that commerce relied upon manufacturing and that therefore 
craftspeople should rank above the merchants was formulated for the f irst 
time in the late statecraft writings.89 It stands to reason that such ideas were 
articulated most decidedly in texts that deal with institutions of vocational 
training that were founded as a key part of the Qing government’s efforts 
to promote industry, i.e., the schools and off icial model factories that were 
opened between 1902 and 1909 in Beijing and the provinces.90 The last of 
the statecraft collections contains the statutes for the Peking Reconstruction 
Craft Centre,91 which offer more concrete insights into the labour force 
than the more exhortative and abstract texts. This centre formed the core 
of a government employment programme for reconstruction after the 
devastations of the Boxer Rebellion (1900/1901). The statutes explain that: 
‘The four groups lost their occupations after the Western powers invaded 
Peking to f ight the Boxer Rebellion.’ The centre therefore was intended not 
only for people originally from Peking but also for those who had fled the 
turmoil in their home regions and caused the population in the capital to 
swell from around 700,000 to two million.
Except for merchants, off icials, and soldiers, there are basically two ways 
of earning one’s living: ‘eating from one’s strength’, which the Westerners 
call ‘workers’, and ‘eating from one’s skill’, which the Westerners call 
‘technicians’. Most of the physical labourers are domestics, rickshaw 
pullers, water carriers, and mason’s helpers. Most of the skilled labourers 
87 Timothy Bradstock, Craft Guilds in Ch’ing Dynasty China, pp. 63-64.
88 William T. Rowe, Hankow, p. 332.
89 ‘Written after the inauguration of an industrial school’; ‘Suggestion to all provinces to 
enlarge their off icial manufactories’, Collection 7, chap. 87, fol. 8b; ‘On the importance of the 
industries’, Collection 8, chap. 42, sect. 14 (http://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapter=464464).
90 Peng Nansheng, ‘Wan Qing shougongye jingji zhong de zhengfu xingwei’, pp. 51-52.
91 Huang Zhonghui , ‘Statutes for the Peking Reconstruction Craft Center’ (‘Chuangban Beijing 
shanhou gongyi ju shuo tie’ 創辦北京善後工藝局說帖), Collection 10, chap. 9, p. 6b to 7b.
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are carpenters and masons. Moreover, there are people from various craft 
branches in town, certainly not below several hundred thousands, but they 
are all migrants, not local people. They originally led a secure life, but came 
to our city because of the foreign attacks and have lost all their belongings. 
Some of them have become criminals. In order to prevent further illegal 
actions, it was suggested to establish several reconstruction off ices. […]
Three groups of people can be allowed into the center: 1) Those who 
originally have learned a craft. These are the foremen who teach the 
others. 2) Young and clever persons will be taught by the foremen such 
crafts as: cotton weaving, belt weaving, embroidery, ivory or wood carving, 
cloisonné making. 3) The unskilled, old and young and crippled can weave 
mats, make ropes, brooms and brushes and do all simple and rough jobs.
The plans for the centre foresaw that the objects produced should be typical 
Peking arts and craft products that were in demand by foreign customers, 
but crafts that were so far unknown in China could also be introduced.
It would be unfair to end this account with an institution devoted to 
poverty reduction and crime prevention rather than with the modernization 
and mechanization of craft production. For the statecraft writings also 
contain texts on technical schools with higher ambitions of teaching the 
theory of mechanics in order to enable, in the second phase of instruction, 
practical and ingenious constructions.92 The most famous among these are 
the schools of the Fujian Navy Yard and the Jiangnan Arsenal discussed in 
the previous chapters. China’s economy was on the road to industrialization 
by the early twentieth century, and the reformist intellectuals perceived the 
necessities of the times. The government in its last years tried to develop 
new administrative structures that were intended to accommodate and 
foster commerce and industries in ‘modern’ ways.
The Place of the Female Artisan
The concept of the ‘four groups’ is not gender specif ic. Since it aimed to 
classify the ruler’s subjects in a general sense, it sets out from the perspective 
92 ‘Written after the inauguration of an industrial school’, Collection 7, chap. 87, p. 8b; ‘Sug-
gestion to all provinces to enlarge their off icial manufactories’, Collection 7, chap. 87, fol. 9a/b; 
‘On the importance of the industries’, Collection 8, chap. 42, sect. 14 (http://ctext.org/wiki.
pl?if=gb&chapter=464464); ‘Suggestion that China should open additional training centers for 
the industries’, Collection 8, chap. 42, sect. 18 (http://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapter=464464).
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of households rather than individuals. While in the Qing dynasty, male 
sojourning was a frequent practice, the female artisan’s place was in her 
family.93 Within an extended family, a married woman’s chances of rising 
to a managing position depended on the relative position of her husband 
within the birth hierarchy and the number of sons she bore, her relation 
to the mother-in-law but also, and not least, on her personal skill in the 
craft production. As Susan Mann has convincingly argued, the custom 
that girls and women ‘begged for skill’ qiqiao on the seventh day of the 
seventh lunar month stems from the hope for continuous work eff iciency 
and, consequently, for a good income to support oneself and the family.94
The trades in which women engaged lay mainly in the textile sector, such 
as spinning, weaving, and embroidery, or were related to processing any cash 
crops the family might produce or raw materials that were locally available, 
such as cotton, silkworms, bamboo, and wood for paper production and 
carving printing blocks, sugar production, or tea curing.
Both Mann and Bray have discussed how the Qing state also tried to con-
trol male and female occupational patterns.95 According to state orthodoxy, 
which drew on ancient models, the right type of complementary work for 
peasant couples was silk and hemp spinning and weaving for women, and 
grain production for men.96 Since the late Ming era, this basic pattern was 
discontinued in many regions because weaving cotton proved so profitable 
that entire families would engage in it, with the husband at the loom and 
the wife spinning, or in the case of silk production, reeling the silk. In other 
regions, women worked in the f ields. This seemed disquieting to the Confu-
cian elites, because it was the beginning of a specialization that implied 
that farmers could become artisans or merchants.97 In the perception of 
the elites and the government, in an agricultural family the occupation 
of the male head of the household was in agriculture, even if women and 
children earned incomes from craft production for the commercial sector. 
The transition from a farmer to an artisan took place when the men in the 
93 Francesca Bray, ‘Towards a Critical History’, pp. 187-188, citing from Shenshi nongshu 沈氏農
書, reports that rural landlord households hired women by the year to weave cotton. The extent 
to which this was practised and organized is not discussed, but since food for these women was 
accounted for one year, they probably lived with the family of their employer. Urban weaving 
households, according to Bray, p. 189, hired only men and paid daily wages.
94 Mann, ‘Women, Families and Gender Relations’, pp. 464-465, who coined the phrase ‘managed 
daughter-in-law’ and ‘managerial mother-in-law’ for the power relations within families of male 
sojourners.
95 Mann, ‘Household Handicrafts and State Policy in Qing Times’.
96 Bray, ‘Towards a Critical History’, p. 193.
97 Ibid., pp. 190-203; Bray, ‘The Meaning of Work’.
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family gave up farming. It is from this perspective that the gender issue 
also plays a role in the stability of society, which was believed to rely on an 
ideal numerical relation of the ‘four groups’.
Conclusion
The concept of the ‘four groups of the people’ appears to have remained 
immutable throughout the imperial period, despite the fact that more 
occupational groups than those four existed at all times. By itself, the concept 
was not devised as an instrument for a comprehensive social analysis of all 
the ruler’s subjects but for monitoring the balance between the agricultural 
part of the population ‒ which was the most important for the revenue of 
the state ‒ and the rest, who were also deemed potentially more dangerous 
to social stability. Assuming that governments had the power to restrain 
or control occupational structures, political counselors from the fourth 
century B.C. included the additional idea that the non-agrarian and non-
administrative occupations were ‘derived’ and ‘secondary’. This ranking was 
disputed and re-evaluated in certain periods, and it was f inally rejected by 
the reformers of the late nineteenth century. Nevertheless, reformist circles 
invoked the concept of the four occupational groups in order to demand a 
greater appreciation for the manufacturing and commercial occupations 
as well as a thoroughgoing revision of the educational system. This, they 
claimed, was the only way to ensure wealth and self-assertion against 
Western and Japanese encroachments on the Qing empire.
Some indicators ‒ such as the opportunity to attend Confucian schools 
and to participate in state examinations since the Ming period, and the 
fact that since the mid-Ming era artisans were no longer registered as 
subjects obliged to render corvée service ‒ show that artisans’ legal status 
was improving. Nevertheless, artisans who did not produce luxury items or 
work as court architects found it nearly impossible to rise to prominence, 
and their work was considered ‘menial’ by the more articulate elite. Their 
opportunities for upward mobility, if they existed at all, lay in commerce 
and from there, if their f inances allowed it, to learning. Thus, although they 
ranked third in the hierarchy, they were in fact worse off than the merchants.
Philip Kuhn has observed that the ‘four occupational groups’ is the closest 
of all Chinese concepts to the medieval and early modern European model of 
the three classes or three estates.98 Both notions do indeed group the ruler’s 
98 Kuhn, ‘Chinese Views of Social Classif ication’, p. 20.
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subjects according to their occupations, but the differences in substance 
outweigh the similarities in structure. The European medieval concept 
of oratores, defensores, laboratores ‒ or clergy, nobility, commoners ‒ as 
in early modern France, does not differentiate between those engaged in 
gainful work for subsistence or profit, as does the Chinese model of farmers, 
artisans, merchants. In the simin concept, the military element is completely 
missing, and the religious function of the clergy is not quite parallel to the 
more moral and political obligations of the Chinese scholars. The French 
estates had explicit political and economic functions and rights in the state. 
This was not the case in Ming and Qing China, where it would have been 
unthinkable for elected representatives of the four occupational groups to 
assemble before the emperor and deliberate on f iscal matters and other 
grievances. The question posed by the Abbé Sieyès (1748-1836) ‘Qu’est-ce 
que le Tiers état?’99 would have been meaningless in the Chinese context, 
since at least the ‘last’ three of the occupational groups constituted the 
commoners that were combined in the European third estate. Although 
the French Revolution of 1789 and the ousting of the Qing dynasty in 1911 
were both the result of the struggle of majority groups for greater political 
participation and coincided with the beginning of industrialization, the 
preconditions of social formation were obviously not equal.
The reformists from the 1880s on appealed to the government for a 
greater appreciation of craftsmen and technical producers within the four 
occupational groups. However, in the political arena, this concept was 
invoked by one of the harshest opponents of the imperial system, Liang 
Qichao (1873-1929), to drive home another message. In 1902, while in exile 
in Japan, he noted that there was no problem with equality among the four 
occupational groups because a class system with special prerogatives had 
not existed in China since the period of the Warring States. While labour 
issues might arise in future days, he did not see this occurring anytime soon 
because the industrial production sector had not yet been developed. In 
his analysis, China’s most pressing problems were a lack of general political 
participation and the building of a nation-state.100 As a result, appeals that 
would have pitted occupational groups against each other were not taken to 
battle when the Chinese monarchy was brought to fall in the 1911 revolution.
99 Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, Qu’est-ce que le Tiers état?
100 Liang Qichao 梁啟超, Xinmin shuo 新民說 (‘On the new people’), chap. ‘Lun ziyou’ 論自由 
(‘Discussion of liberty’), pp. 40-42. For other references by Liang Qichao and related authors to 
the four occupational groups as representatives of the entire ‘people’, see Janku, ‘Preparing the 
ground’, p. 103, 105, 107, 111.

10. Merchant and Craft Guilds1
While the previous chapters addressed the relationship between the state 
and artisans from the perspective of the concerned state institutions and 
specif ic branches, we now turn our attention to the modes of organiza-
tion of representatives of the crafts and their interaction (or avoidance of 
interaction) with state authorities at the local level. Chinese associations of 
merchants and artisans that are commonly referred to as ‘Chinese guilds’ 
originate from the late sixteenth century. Initially, they were alliances of 
travelling merchants who, due to the intensif ied interregional trade and 
geographic mobility, had settled down in the regions of their sales markets. 
Guilds exclusively for craftspeople existed, but in many cases the division 
between both can barely be made.
Unlike their counterparts in most European countries which were dis-
banded in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Chinese guilds 
proliferated from the mid-eighteenth century onward, and their numbers 
soared after the intercession of the Taiping rebellion and the Opium Wars in 
the mid-nineteenth century. They began to decline during the last decade of 
the Qing dynasty, superseded by chambers of commerce that were promoted 
in the state’s economic and political reforms. Subsequent governments of 
the Republic of China, both at Peking (1912-1927) and Nanjing (1927-1937), 
f irst launched branch-specif ic commercial and industrial associations and 
eventually ordered the re-organization of the traditional guilds. Although 
this command was formally implemented, various transitional modes and 
arrangements lingered on until the foundation of the People’s Republic in 1949.
This chapter gives an outline of the rise and spread of the guilds, their 
typologies and functions and their relationship to the government, power 
relations within the guilds, and f inally their transition in the twentieth 
century within the framework of the increasingly active involvement of the 
state in the economic sphere in the course of the late Qing and early Republic.
Origins and Typology of Chinese Guilds
Early types of urban business associations (hang ‘[business] street/line’, zuo 
‘manufacturers’ or ‘workshops’, tuan ‘associations’) had been established 
1 This chapter is partly based on the author’s article ‘Chinese Guilds, Seventeenth through 
Twentieth Centuries: An Overview’.
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by government order since the eighth century.2 These organizations 
served to recruit artisans for public works and to coordinate the delivery 
of taxes-in-kind by the merchants, and also to maintain urban security. As 
the cities expanded, the concept of one trade line per street could no longer 
be maintained. This may have led to the formation of voluntary merchant 
associations beyond the government-ordered restrictions.3 However, 
while the guilds from the mid and late Ming period onwards published 
and perpetuated their regulations in stele inscriptions, no comparable 
epigraphy exists for the earlier periods. Scattered evidence suggests that 
the meeting places of the early trade associations were temples, such as the 
temple of the silk-loom god established between 1078 and 1085 in Suzhou. 
The earliest reference to a gongsuo (public hall), that of the silk weavers of 
Wu Prefecture (Suzhou), dates from 1295.4
The link between these early guilds and those founded after the mid-Ming 
is tenuous. In their epigraphic writings, the Ming and Qing guilds do not 
claim origins earlier than the late Ming.5 Although the new type of guilds 
from the sixteenth century still coordinated the merchants’ and artisans’ 
obligations to the government, their main purpose was to regulate access 
to markets and homogenize business opportunities for their membership.
One early instance of such a new guild may be found in the f ifteenth 
century,6 but more solid evidence is available from the Wanli era (1573-
1619). The names of twelve Ming dynasty guild houses ‒ nine of which 
were located in Peking and one each in Hunan, Suzhou, and Foshan (near 
Canton) ‒ are known.7 Nine were expressly entitled huiguan  (houses of 
assembly), and with the exception of the potters’ guild in Foshan, they were 
all merchant guilds.
The huiguan were based on the membership criterion of common geo-
graphic origin. Another important form of trade association was based on 
the principle of common occupation and most often designated as gongsuo 
2 Peter Golas, ‘Early Ch’ing Guilds’, pp. 555-557.
3 Katō Shigeshi, ‘On the Hang or Associations of Merchants in China’, pp. 45-83. Compare 
also Shiba Yoshinobu, Commerce and Society in Sung China, p. 2, who characterized the change 
from the Tang to the Song guilds as a transformation ‘into something more nearly approaching 
an autonomous trade association.’
4 Guo Rongdong, ‘The Silk-Weaving Craftsmen in Suzhou’, p. 10.
5 Golas, ‘Early Ch’ing Guilds’, p. 555.
6 Michel Marmé, Suzhou, p. 137, for a reference to a 1466 foundation of a guild of cotton cloth 
merchants from the Jiangsu districts Jiading 嘉定, Kunshan 崐山, and Suzhou, at Linqing 臨
清, an important entrepôt city on the Grand Canal in Shandong.
7 Peng Zeyi, Zhongguo gongshang hanghui, ‘Short table of the Chinese craft and commercial 
guilds, 1655-1911’, pp. 997-1048; hereafter ‘Short table’.
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(public hall). For the gongsuo, common geographic origin could play a role 
but was not a necessary requirement. Other designations for guilds were bang 
(literally, mutual help associations) or shuyuan (Confucian academy), named 
after their places of assembly, or houses of Daoist and popular religious 
worship.
Generally speaking, the earlier guilds were more of the huiguan type, 
while in later periods the gongsuo prevailed. Some huiguan guild houses in 
Suzhou were renamed gongsuo, with the specif ication of their particular 
trade. The guild historian Liu Yongcheng believes that this occurred because 
the common origin set too narrow limitations on the activities of merchants 
and craftsmen in one trade.8 However, the opposite trend that several 
gongsuo combined into a huiguan was also possible.9 Wang Rigen defines 
the difference between huiguan and gongsuo as one of scope: huiguan 
were larger, and within huiguan, several gongsuo could exist. Huiguan 
were more formal organizations, and their demands on their members 
regarding representation and contribution were higher than those of the 
more informal gongsuo.10 The huiguan served not only economic purposes. 
On the contrary, they were f irst established as meeting places and hostels 
for off icials on duty away from their home places, and for students preparing 
for off icial examinations on different levels – local, regional, provincial, or 
imperial in Peking. Peking was the city with the most huiguan ‒ more than 
400 ‒ but only a fraction thereof were used predominantly as assembly 
houses for merchants and craftspeople.11 From Peking we also f ind a case 
where scholar-off icials and merchants preferred to keep to themselves, as 
was the case with the Guangdong merchants who in 1712 built a huiguan of 
their own, the Xiancheng huiguan, and moved out of the Canton huiguan.12 
However, since merchants and scholar-off icials relied on each other for 
power and f inances, huiguan were also the places where both parties could 
easily get together it they wished.13
8 Liu Yung-ch’eng, ‘The Handicraft Guilds in Soochow’, pp. 124-125.
9 For instance, the Timber merchant guild in Shanghai, Mushang huiguan 木商會館, estab-
lished in 1858, that was f irst a gongsuo and in 1897 changed its name to huiguan (‘Short table’, 
p. 1019).
10 Wang Rigen, Ming Qing minjian shehui de zhixu, pp. 186-187.
11 Li Hua, Ming Qing yilai Beijing gongshang huiguan beike xuanji, p. 20, estimates that 86 percent 
of the Peking huiguan houses were established as hostels and meeting places for scholar-off icials. 
See also Belsky, Localities, pp. 59-60.
12 Li Hua, Ming Qing yilai Beijing gongshang huiguan beike xuanji, p. 1; Wang Rigen, Ming Qing 
minjian shehui de zhixu, p. 183; Belsky, Localities, pp. 91-92.
13 Wang Rigen, Ming Qing minjian shehui de zhixu, pp. 186-187.
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A marked difference between Chinese and European guilds is the fact that 
it was not necessary to be a formally registered citizen of a particular city or 
place in order to become a guild member. Instead, the Chinese guilds ‒ at 
least for the huiguan type ‒ required that members belonged to a particular 
place of origin.
Not all guilds or proto-guilds disposed of guild houses, written regulations, 
and off icial recognition.14 The guilds that featured all three criteria were 
mostly founded or re-organized in the late nineteenth century and showed 
a certain degree of organizational sophistication.
Distribution in Space
An essential statistical overview of Chinese guilds is the ‘Short table of the 
Chinese craft and commercial guilds, 1655-1911’,15 which contains a list of 
ca. 600 dated and 130 undated guild houses and associations. Since few stele 
inscriptions were considered for its compilation, it is certainly not complete 
and requires enlargement,16 but we can assume that it gives a f irst impres-
sion that is not too far off the mark for features such as distribution over time 
and space as well as the regions of origin of the guild members. According to 
this list, guild concentration was the highest in the Lower, Middle, and Upper 
Yangzi (the provinces of Jiangsu, Hubei, Hunan, and Sichuan which include 
the cities Suzhou, Shanghai, Changsha, Hankou, and Chongqing respectively) 
and along the coastline in Guangdong, Guangxi, Fujian, Zhejiang, Zhili, 
and Fengtian. These were the economically most advanced areas with the 
most treaty ports in the second half of the nineteenth century. The inland 
regions such as Sichuan, Jiangxi, and Yunnan but also the northwestern and 
northeastern frontiers such as Inner Mongolia17 and Manchuria appear to 
have been quite underrepresented. It is probable that the existence of many 
more huiguan with economic functions will come to light as research in 
Chinese local archives and f ield research intensif ies.18 Further research 
and statistical compilations have so far reached a total of more than 2,800 
14 Peng Nansheng observed that ‘trades without associations and associations without regula-
tions’ were a common phenomenon. Peng Nansheng, Hanghui zhidu, p. 22.
15 Peng Zeyi, Zhongguo gongshang hanghui, pp. 997-1048.
16 Vincent Goossaert, ‘Matériaux et recherches ’, p. 210.
17 See the epigraphic materials contained in Imahori Seiji’s survey on the social groups of 
Hohhot, Chūgoku hōken shakai no kikō (The structure of feudal Chinese society).
18 Lan Yong, who studied the huiguan in Sichuan province, based on written evidence and 
f ield research has arrived at a number of 1,400 houses (Lan Yong, ‘Qingdai Sichuan tuzhu yimin 
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guilds of all types, including both the more economy-orientated merchant 
and craft guilds and guilds with social and administrative functions.19
Typical outsending regions, which can best be observed by the names of 
guild houses of the huiguan type, were the coastal provinces of Guangdong, 
Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangsu, Shandong, and Zhili as well as the home provinces 
of the famous local bankers, the Shanxi merchants, and the wealthy salt 
traders, the Huizhou merchants from Anhui.
Merchant Guilds and Craft Guilds
As we have seen, the earliest guilds were merchant associations. The f irst 
Shanghai guild, for instance, was the shipping merchant guild house, Shang-
chuan huiguan, which was established in 1715.20 This was one of the richest and 
most influential guilds in Shanghai, which was involved in the sea transport of 
grain tribute after the Grand Canal was no longer navigable. It was profession-
ally organized, employing directors and monthly managers from 1844. All of 
the managers owned large fleets of merchant ships,21 mostly of the Shachuan 
type for coastal navigation. According to one stele, the costs of its renovation 
in 1891 ‒ including big hall, drum and bell tower, southern and northern 
aisle, tower, gate, and posterior wall ‒ amounted to 2,304 British pounds, 106 
Shanghai tael, and 118,000 cash.22 Between 1863 and 1868, its facilities were used 
as the Jiangnan Arsenal’s office buildings.23 While sixteen further shipping 
guilds are included in the ‘Short table’,24 only two guild houses that expressly 
represented the Ningbo and the Zhejiang shipwrights are recorded.25
fenbu de dili tezheng yanjiu’, and personal conversation with the author, October 2007), while 
Richard Belsky, Localities at the Center, p. 37, records only 586 huiguan for Sichuan.
19 ‘Chinese Guilds Database’ and ‘Datasets ‒ Guilds ‒ China ‒ Craft guilds: Report on the data 
collection’, compiled by the author et al., Website Institutions for Collective Action, installed 2012.
20 ‘Short table’, p. 1002.
21 Chen Zhongping, ‘The Origins of Chinese Chambers of Commerce’, p. 170. 
22 Shanghai beike ziliao xuanbian ji, p. 196. For comparison, in the Shanghai embroiderers’ and 
tailors’ guild, a total of 154 members donated a sum of 406 Dollar (yangyuan), thus about ca. 
304 tael (Shanghai beike ziliao xuanbian, p. 301-304). The exchange rate of the British pound to 
one tael in 1891 was about 0.22 (Peng Xingwei, A Monetary History of China, p. 763). 2,304 pound 
would thus amount to over 10,000 tael. This is more than thirty times of what the embroiderers 
and tailors could afford.
23 ‘Shanghai zui zao de huiguan’.
24 ‘Short table’, p. 1003-1046.
25 The 1853 Zhejiang red network of ship carpenters, Zhejiang hongbang muye gongsuo 浙
江紅幫木業公所, ‘Short table’, p. 1018, and the Siming muye changxing hui 四明木業長興會, 
‘Short table’, p. 1018.
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Regarding the division between commercial and craft guilds, a clear 
categorization is often more diff icult for craft guilds than for unequivocal 
merchant guilds like those of the shippers or bankers. With roughly 250 
commercial guild houses and 250 craft or both craft and commercial guild 
houses, by far not all entries in Peng Zeyi’s ‘Short table’ allow for a clear-cut 
attribution to one or the other. However, Peng’s tabulation is not the last word 
on the quantity and distribution of Chinese guilds. Therefore, the result of an 
almost equal number of exclusively merchant and craft guilds can only be 
tentative. Burgess’ study on the Peking guilds in the 1920s, for which he and 
his team conducted f ield research in the guild houses, has about the same 
half-half ratio with 40 craft, 60 commercial, and 11 ‘professional’ guilds of the 
service trade.26 Yet Li Hua, in whose opinion the specialization of Chinese 
craft and commercial guilds occurred extremely late, claims that among 
the 36 (sic) pre-Opium-War craft and commercial guilds in Peking, 25 were 
exclusively commercial guilds, 13 were both commercial and craft guilds, one 
was both agricultural and commercial (the vegetable traders’ guild), and only 
one was an exclusively artisan guild.27 This may be a problem of conflicting 
definitions. Nevertheless, Li Hua’s observation for Peking corroborates our 
view on the importance of the merchant image for craftspeople.
Niida Noboru, a Japanese specialist on Chinese law and society, also 
pointed out the diff iculty of differentiating between merchant and craft 
guilds in his monograph on the Chinese guilds. He discussed the differ-
ent types of crafts in Peking that produced on demand only and therefore 
can be considered ‘pure’ handicraft guilds, such as the building trades, 
hairdressers, and some shoemakers, while others maintained a stock that 
they sold throughout the year, such as the sheep hide tanners.28 For Niida, 
who throughout his book took a comparative perspective, the difference 
between the merchant and craft guilds was not as marked in China as in 
Europe.29 He maintained that in Europe, especially in Germany and Holland, 
the merchants gradually forced the craftsmen out of the guilds due to their 
contempt for the latter’s ‘dirty hands’ and ‘blue f ingernails’. The craftspeople 
thereafter established their own guilds and fought with the merchants for 
political participation in the municipal governments in what was known 
as the ‘Zunftkampf’ (battle of the guilds). Niida thought that the Chinese 
guilds could ‘not even dream’ of having the same prerogatives in municipal 
26 John S. Burgess, The Guilds of Peking, p. 119-120.
27 Li Hua, ‘Lun Zhongguo fengjian shehui de hanghui zhidu’, p. 107. 
28 Niida Noboru, Chūgoku no shakai to girudo, pp. 46-48.
29 Ibid., pp. 45-46.
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administration as their European counterparts.30 This view requires some 
qualif ication. The Dutch guild historian Maarten Prak posits that conflicts 
among the guilds of the Low Countries occurred not so much between craft 
and merchant guilds but between the rich guild members and the poor within 
the same guild, or between the non-aff iliated urban elites and the guilds.31 
Guilds and elites were united in their aim to preserve ‘political autonomy 
[from princes and ministers] for their local community’ and ensured that 
working classes were kept excluded from local governments.32 Moreover, 
in more recent German historiography, the opponents in the struggle for 
political participation are not simply reduced to ‘guilds’ and ‘patricians’, 
and the term ‘urban conflict’ (Stadtkonflikt) is preferred to ‘guild conflict’.33 
For the Chinese context, William Rowe’s research on Hankou identif ies the 
guilds of that city from the late nineteenth century as the unoff icial city 
government that wielded great power. After the revolution broke out in 
October 1911, the city was actually administered by the ‘All-Hankou Guild 
Alliance’ (Ge huiguan gongsuo lianhe hui), an association that had evolved 
from earlier, pre-Taiping networks ‒ the ‘Upper Eight Guilds’ (shang ba 
hang), to be precise, of the merchants, not the artisans.34 Earlier, in the city 
of Chongqing in Sichuan on the Upper Yangzi, an eight-province guild house 
network had formed that also had largely taken over administrative functions 
from the municipal government. Niida was aware of these tendencies and 
also referred to the Chongqing case, but he stressed that the functions of the 
guilds were ‒ like those of twelfth and thirteenth-century England ‒ ‘sup-
plementary’ to those of the urban administrations and not legally defined.35 
Thus, while Niida looks at the legal foundation of the guilds ‒ inspired by Max 
Weber, Karl August Wittfogel, and Charles Gross36 ‒ Rowe considers their 
actual influence. It is no wonder that both arrive at different conclusions.
Concerning the late emergence of craft guilds relative to merchant 
guilds,37 Timothy Bradstock has offered a plausible explanation in his study 
30 Ibid., p. 46.
31 Maarten Prak, ‘Corporate politics in the Low Countries’, p. 105.
32 Ibid., p. 106.
33 Mathias Puhle, Magdeburg im Mittelalter, p. 85, with reference to Karl Czok, ‘Zunftkämpfe, 
Zunftrevolutionen oder Bürgerkämpfe?’, Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Karl-Marx-Universität 
Leipzig 7, 1956/57, pp. 129-142.
34 Rowe, Hankow, p. 334.
35 Niida, Chūgoku no shakai to girudo, p. 51.
36 Charles Gross, The Gild Merchant: A Contribution to British Municipal History, Oxford 1890.
37 For the situation in the Low Countries, compare Bert De Munck, Piet Lourens, and Jan 
Lucassen, ‘The Establishment and Distribution of Craft Guilds in the Low Countries’, pp. 42-43, 
which gives 1400 as the date of the full maturity of the guild system and points out that ‘at 
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on Chinese craft guilds. Incidents from the early eighteenth century show 
that the Suzhou city administration denied unskilled workers the right 
to form a guild.38 The rising number of the craft guilds in the eighteenth 
century may be attributed to the fact that guild managers and business 
owners became more prosperous and, unlike unskilled workers and jour-
neymen, were able to establish better ties with off icials, for instance by 
purchasing titles. From the perspective of the authorities, a knowledgeable 
and educated guild leadership was a reliable agent of self-control and the 
maintenance of propriety, including such functions as tax collection and 
the organization of public works.39 The local authorities therefore allowed 
trusted craftspeople to form guilds under the leadership of the employers 
and shopowners in each trade, but they formally reserved the right to 
endorse guild regulations and in extreme cases also to dissolve the guilds. 
The craft guilds ‒ like the merchant guilds ‒ thus ‘f illed a vacuum created by 
urban growth and the rise of commerce, one which the central government 
had neither the means nor the inclination to take responsibility for until 
the twentieth century’.40
Functions and Internal Organization
The constitutive elements of Qing guilds are a common-interest group of 
merchants or artisans, a commonly owned or rented place of assembly, writ-
ten regulations, and recognition by the local administration. The last three 
characteristics indicate the transition of a guild from informal to formal 
organizational status.41 Qiu Pengsheng outlines the process of formalization 
of the Suzhou guilds as follows: individual artisans or merchants mobilized 
colleagues to form a group on grounds of common homeplace, religious 
beliefs, and the necessity of mutual help. They raised funds for a meeting 
place and sought recognition from the local administration. In a second 
f irst only merchants and woollen workers had guilds, within a few centuries a whole range of 
occupations had become organized, particularly in industry’.
38 The Suzhou calenderer’s strikes between 1670 and 1734 are well-explored labour incidents of 
the Qing dynasty and have been discussed by a great number of researchers. The stele materials 
that record the incidents are contained in Ming Qing Suzhou gongshangye beike ji, pp. 53-82. For 
relevant studies, see Terada Takanobu, ‘Soshū no tambogyō no kei’ei keitai’; idem, ‘Tambogyō 
ni kansuru hikoku’; Tsing Yuan, ‘Urban Riots and Disturbances’, pp. 279-320; Paolo Santangelo, 
‘Urban Society in Late Imperial Suzhou’ pp. 81-116; idem, ‘Alcuni aspetti di vita urbana’, pp. 1-45.
39 Bradstock, Craft Guilds, p. 5.
40 Ibid., p. 6.
41 Rowe, Hankow, p. 257.
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step, the group negotiated and formalized measures for the protection and 
use of its common property.42
Like most craft and commercial associations worldwide, the Chinese 
guilds combined economic, social, and religious functions. In the economic 
f ield, guilds regulated prices and wages and tried to obtain monopolies 
within their territories by including all actors in the trade. As a rule, guild 
regulations stipulated that rather than keeping newcomers out, everybody 
in the trade should be forced into the guilds.43 Another important task 
was to securee access to raw materials and training the labour force. Guild 
regulations most often f ixed the duration of apprenticeship ‒ three years 
as a rule ‒ but did not specify the contents of professional training. The 
number of apprentices a workshop could take on was restricted and often 
limited to only one. The duration of the three-year apprenticeship actually 
regulated wage costs and work quality at least as much as the amount of 
skill that could be learned within that period.44 Chinese guilds did not 
formally test the master’s qualif ications. Whoever had the funds to open a 
shop and to pay the entrance fees for the guild could do so.
One specif ic function for the huiguan more than the gongsuo was labour 
recruitment. In the case of the Shanghai ship transport and shipbuilding 
f irms, including the Jiangnan Arsenal, many of the shippers, dock workers, 
and shipbuilders, were recruited from exterior provinces. The labourers 
typically came from Ningbo and Canton but also Shaoxing in Zhejiang, 
Zhangzhou in Fujian, and Chaozhou in Guangdong. Labour contractors 
(baotou) from the particular regions introduced newcomers to specif ic 
shipping and shipbuilding companies or to the Arsenal. Since local dialects, 
religious veneration, and eating habits differed widely, the guild houses 
provided shelter, food, and entertainment to their fellow countrymen. For 
instance, at the Ningbo guild house, which was known as both Ningbo 
huiguan or Siming gongsuo,45 labour contractors recruited shipwrights 
from Ningbo for Ningbo employers.46 The Ningbo ship carpenters also had 
their own association, the Siming muye changxing hui, from 1879.47 At the 
Arsenal, the forgers belonged to the Wuxi network (Wuxi bang), and the 
42 Qiu Pengsheng, Shiba, shijiu, p. 190.
43 Rowe, ‘Ming-Qing Guilds’, Ming Qing yanjiu, Sept. 1992, p. 60.
44 A representative of the Peking barbers’ guild informed Niida Noboru that big and reputable 
shops employed few apprentices and many journeymen, and only small places had many 
apprentices. Niida, Pekin kōshō girudo shiryōshū, II, p. 298.
45 ‘Short table’, p. 1012, established 1797.
46 Johnson, ‘Dock Labour at Shanghai’, p. 273.
47 ‘Short table’, p. 1028.
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painters and metal workers were organized in the North Jiangsu network 
(Subei bang).48 The division of labour could be quite precise: for instance, 
a ‘red group’ of Zhejiang carpenters (Zhejiang hongbang muye gongsuo) 
registered in 1869,49 constructed only steamboats, while a ‘white group’ 
specialized in house construction and was not supposed to encroach on 
the work of others. The forgers (duangong), who venerated Laozi as their 
patron saint, assembled at the Laozi temple (Laojun miao). In the shipping 
industry, both the huiguan and the gongsuo were vertically organized and 
stood under the control of the employers.50 However, as the samples given 
in the 1975 Arsenal history show, this did not mean that the workforce did 
not organize on their own. The networks remained informal and could be 
def ined as religious rather than occupational groups.
The social functions of the guilds included the provision of welfare facili-
ties like communal cemeteries, elementary schools, and poverty relief to 
members as well as municipal tasks in f iref ighting, policing, maintaining 
infrastructure (especially streets, bridges, and piers), and last but not least, 
entertaining in the form of theatrical plays and processions for the guild 
patrons.51 Certainly not all guilds could fulf il all of these tasks for everybody, 
but at least in Hankou, where commerce thrived in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, charity and community service was not restricted to 
guild members.52
William Rowe has discussed the specif ic devotional piety which serves 
as a form of self-assertion and which creates a feeling of responsibility and 
accountability towards the patron saint(s) of the guild. In nineteenth-century 
Hankou, virtually every guild was a religious fraternity.53 Burgess and Niida, 
who studied the Peking guilds, were less convinced of the importance of 
religion in the twentieth-century capital; but Timothy Bradstock, reading 
the same sources, comes to the conclusion that if religious service was not 
practiced, this was the result of a lack of funds rather than disenchantment 
and religious scepticism.54
As a rule, Qing guilds were organized in management boards with directors 
that were recruited among its members. Cases of rotational leadership are 
48 Jiangnan 1975, p. 26.
49 ‘Short table’, p. 1018.
50 Johnson, ‘Dock Labour at Shanghai’, p. 273.
51 Rowe, ‘Ming-Qing Guilds’, p. 49
52 Rowe, Hankow, pp. 265-6.
53 Ibid., p. 290.
54 Burgess, The Guilds of Peking, p. 214; Niida, “Industrial and Commercial Guilds”, p. 181; 
Bradstock, Craft, pp. 248-249.
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known, as well as those where the guild offices were hereditary.55 In a recent 
monograph on Chinese guilds, Peng Nansheng also reflects on this organiza-
tional system, which combined ‘rudimentary democracy, authoritarianism, 
and customary law’.56 He sees democratic elements in the system of yearly 
rotating directorship of some guilds, in the elections held by other guilds, in the 
fact that a quorum was necessary for important decisions, and in the practice 
followed by some guilds to put controversial decisions to a secret vote.57
The tasks of the board comprised arbitration among the members and 
active support in cases of off icial encroachments or unfounded customer 
claims. Moreover, in the course of the late nineteenth century, some of the 
common-origin guilds started to include several smaller guilds or networks 
(bang).58 As their membership swelled to several thousands of people and 
they gained considerable corporate property in the form of large guild 
houses and other real estate, the tasks became more complex. In such guilds, 
directors and managers had to handle the f inancial dealings and allocation 
of expenses for building and maintaining guild houses and other social 
facilities like cemeteries and schools, or make arrangements for sacrif ices, 
theatrical performances, plenary meetings, and banquets.
Relationship to the Government
As in the case of guild functions, opinions are divided about the relations 
between the government and the guilds. Some studies stress the importance 
of the guilds being recognized by local authorities. Bradstock assumes that 
the known craft guilds all were sanctioned by the local authorities, and that 
in fact the main rationale of these guilds was to assist the government in the 
administration of commerce and crafts, and especially to control unruly 
elements. He argues that the increasing number of guilds in the latter half 
of the eighteenth century coincides with the dilemma of population growth 
55 Morse, Gilds of China, p. 12, cites as examples the Tea Guild at Shanghai, with ‘an annually 
elected committee of twelve, each committee man acting in rotation for one month as chairman, 
or manager’; the Bankers’ Guild at Ningbo with an elected treasurer and a committee of twelve; 
the Carpenters’ Guild at Wenzhou with f ive elected headmen; the Millers’ Guild of Wenzhou, 
composed of sixteen mill proprietors who elect four representatives annually. Niida, Pekin kōshō 
girudo, III, p. 529, heard from a representative of the hatmakers’ guild that leadership positions 
were now rotational but had been hereditary before 1928.
56 Peng Nansheng, Hanghui zhidu, p. 32.
57 Ibid., pp. 32-33, 40.
58 This process has been described by Rowe, Hankow, p. 264, as the formation of ‘multiplex 
guilds’.
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without a concomitant increase of administrative personnel.59 To prevent 
worker’ strikes and riots from breaking out, local administrations preferred 
to depend on employers’ guilds rather than allow journeymen or unskilled 
labourers to form their own associations. The strike incidents of the Suzhou 
calenderers, which occurred time and again from 1670 until 1729, are a case 
in point. Calenderers worked woven and dyed cotton cloth by pressing it with 
heavy foot rollers, holding onto a kind of railing.60 This was low-wage, unskilled, 
physical labour exerted by migrants who came to the industrial city of Suzhou 
in great numbers: 7,000 to 8,000 in the early Qing era, and about 10,000 by 1730.61 
The conflicts that flared up in early Qing Suzhou between these workers and 
their employers, the owners of the calendering workshops, who processed the 
textiles as contractors for cloth merchants, concerned mostly wage issues. In 
order to drive home their demands, the calenderers also resorted to violence 
against their employers’ property. In addition to demanding wage raises and 
threatening strikes, in 1715 some calenderers also requested the prefectural 
government grant them the right to build a guild house, an orphanage, and 
a hospital. The government sided with the employers and refused to allow 
the calenderers to build a guild house, chastising their representatives with 
corporal punishment on the grounds that ‘Once a hui-kuan is completed, all 
those vagabonds without any proper registration will be quartering there with 
their factions and crowds, and the harm will be incalculable.’62 The unrest 
was suppressed for a while but broke out again in 1723 and in 1729, when it 
became part of a greater anti-Qing conspiracy that involved wider circles of 
the Suzhou society.63 It was discovered and crushed, and no separate guild 
foundation of the calendering workers is reported in Suzhou thereafter.
One less long-lasting case that did not pose the same potential threat 
to the authorities as that of the calenderers is that of the Suzhou printers. 
The issue here was not the establishment of a guild house, as the Suzhou 
bookstore owner–publisher–printer (shufang ) guild house, Chongde 
gongsuo, was an early establishment founded in 1671.
59 Bradstock, Craft Guilds, pp. 63-66.
60 Santangelo, ‘Urban Society in Late Imperial Suzhou’, p. 109. Fang Xing et al., ‘Cloth Processing 
in Suzhou and Songjiang’, Xu Dixin et al., Chinese capitalism, p. 225, complements this description: 
‘After dyeing, most cloth shrinks and requires pressing or calendering, especially cloth dyed in 
light colours. Calendering was done by rolling the cloth with a wooden roller, applying weight 
and movement by means of a vaguely rhombus-shaped stone, rocked backward and forwards. 
This work was done by strong and agile men, mostly at night, and was a specialised occupation.’
61 Tsing Yuan, ‘Urban Riots and Disturbances’, p. 307.
62 Ibid., p. 305. Ming Qing Suzhou gongshangye beike ji, p. 66.
63 Tsing Yuan, ‘Urban Riots and Disturbances’, pp. 305-306.
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For comparison, Peng Zeyi’s ‘Short table’ includes relatively few booksell-
ers’ guilds and, as we might expect, even fewer character carvers’ guilds:
The bookstore guilds are:
– Chongde gongsuo 崇德公所, established in 1671 in Suzhou (‘Short table’, 
p. 1001);
– Wenchang huiguan 文昌會館, established in 1864 in Peking; actually 
two sites, one of the Southern and one of the Northern booksellers 
(‘Short table’, p. 1021);
– Book trade association in Wugang 武岡, Hunan, which negotiated guild 
regulations in 1904 (‘Short table’, p. 1037);
– Shuye shanghui 書業商會, the Shanghai bookseller’s association, 
established in 1905 in Shanghai (‘Short table’, p. 1039);
– Wenlin gonghui 文林公會, the ‘Forest of Learning Association’, estab-
lished in 1908 in Changsha, Hunan (‘Short table’, p. 1041);
– Zhibao tang至寶堂, established between 1875 and 1908 in Wuzhou 梧
州, Guangxi, a guild for the trade of paper, books, and f ireworks (‘Short 
table’, p. 1044);
– Wenchang association 文昌會, established in 1910 in Taoyuan 桃源, 
Hunan (‘Short table’, p. 1046).
The character carvers’ guilds include:
– Jike gongsuo 剞劂公所, established in 1739, in Suzhou (‘Short table’, 
p. 1005);
– The guild of the character carvers of Hunan, Changsha, established 
between 1736 and 1795, (‘Short table’, p. 1005);
– Kezi hang gongsuo 刻字行公所, Character carvers’ guild house, Peking, 
established in 1897 (‘Short table’, p. 1035);
– Character carvers of six classes Liumen diaobang 六門雕幫, established 
in 1909 in Changde 常德, Hunan (‘Short table’, p. 1035).
The Chongde gongsuo in 1845 reported to the magistrate of Wuxian (Suzhou) 
that the printers (yinshou) ‒ thus the employees, not the owners of the 
printshops ‒ had unilaterally set up regulations for this guild, which previ-
ously had not had any written binding rules. These regulations had provided 
for training apprentices, hiring additional labour, and an increase of the 
festival bonus ( jieli). Moreover, the printers had ‘cheated newcomers into 
paying guild fees’. A f irst attempt to make the bookshops accept the new 
regulations had failed, and after the printers had tried a second time, the 
bookstore owners appealed to the authorities for support. The verdict was 
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that a festival bonus had to be paid but that the bookshops did not need to 
accept any other rules.64 Those printers who had set up the regulations were 
forbidden to return to Suzhou and stir up trouble again, and the booksellers 
were ordered to set up a stele at their guild house with the off icial record 
of the matter.
The incident did not remain an isolated occurrence in Suzhou. At least 
four more examples are known in which the Suzhou authorities inter-
vened against ‘private’ (in the sense of ‘secret’, unregistered) guilds.65 A 
secretly founded guild of tobacco processors was banned in 1867 for ‘trying 
to monopolize the market’. In the same year, in reaction to a complaint by 
eighteen candlemakers’ shops to the effect that twelve individuals had 
tried to organize a guild and ‘instigate the masses [i.e. the workers against 
their employers]’, this association was declared illegal, too. In 1870, brocade 
weavers were not allowed to ‘try to establish a guild house (gongsuo), set 
up a guild leader and guild regulations, and molest their colleagues by 
enforcing donations’. It was also forbidden for the guild to re-open under 
another name or def ine itself as a religious community. In the fourth case, 
a magistrate prohibited the establishment of a second guild for cloth dyers 
on the grounds that the previous guild was well-functioning and active 
in charitable work, so there was no need for a second guild. Control over 
existing guilds was, moreover, intensif ied by local governments after the 
mid-nineteenth century: they were required, or forced, to collect the transit 
tariff lijin and perform community tasks like f iref ighting, policing, and 
building and maintaining municipal infrastructure.66
But while the local authorities enforced their power to sanction, the guilds 
also could gain more autonomy by cooperating with officials.67 Hosea Morse, 
Statistical Secretary of the Inspectorate General of Customs in China, an insti-
tution founded by foreign traders that collected maritime trade taxes between 
1854 and the late 1940s on behalf of the Chinese state, took a completely differ-
ent perspective on the power relation between the guilds and the authorities. 
In one of the earliest studies on Chinese guilds, Morse presented China as a 
caretaker state that only collected taxes and provided security services by 
installing police forces, and stressed the independence of the guilds from 
the government: ‘The trade gilds […] have moulded their own organization, 
64 Ming Qing Suzhou gongshangye beike ji, pp. 95-96; Fang Xing et al., ‘Paper Making, Printing 
and Publishing’, p. 247.
65 Peng Nansheng, Hanghui zhidu, pp. 58-59.
66 Peng Zeyi, ‘Shijiu shiji houqi’, p. 91.
67 Peng Nansheng, Hanghui zhidu, p. 62.
merChant anD Craft guilDS 335
sought their own objects, devised their own regulations, and enforced them 
in their own way and by their own methods.’68 In an assessment that was 
frequently cited later, Morse formulated that ‘The gilds were never within the 
law: they grew up outside the law; and as associations they neither recognized 
the law nor claimed its protection.’69 Actually, Qing legislation issued by the 
central government does not include any provisions on guilds. Legal texts 
did call for vigilance against the ‘monopolistic formation of cartels’,70 but 
the manner of converting this warning into action was entrusted to the 
judgment of the local authorities. Thus, it was not the central government 
but the local authorities that interacted with the guilds. This explains why 
the handicraft regulations ( jiangzuo zeli) issued by the central government 
for officials who managed building and production for the state contain no 
references to the guilds, although the artisans hired from private workshops 
were certainly organized in guilds. In the guild stele writings, only a few 
clues show that central government institutions were aware of the guilds,71 
although off icials ‒ at least on the Peking stele inscriptions ‒ frequently 
appear as authors, editors, or calligraphers of these inscriptions ‒ off duty, 
but conveying authority and probity to the respective institution.72
In Hankou, guilds were not coerced by the local government into register-
ing; rather, it was the advantages of registering a guild that prompted guilds 
to seek off icial recognition. A registered guild could appeal to the local 
authorities if they saw their rights infringed or their collective property 
violated. Some of the smaller guilds, however, preferred to stay anonymous, 
but also bigger groups such as the Huizhou huiguan in Hankou applied for 
off icial recognition only 27 years after its foundation.73 Informal existence 
was possible if the guild could make do without administrative protection.
68 Morse, Gilds of China, pp. 20-1.
69 Morse, Gilds of China, p. 27. He qualif ies as ‘rare’ the case of the Wenzhou carpenters’ guild 
that was recognized by the city off icials in return for corvée duties (p. 12).
70 Rowe, Hankow, p. 257, quoting from the legal code with commentary Da Qing lüli huiji 
bianlan 15.2-3.
71 Niida, Pekin kōshō girudo shiryō shū, IV, p. 682 (1899) and p. 723 (1792) among the names 
of donors for the embellishment of two guild temples includes the names of the Bureau of 
Construction of the Ministry of Public Works, yingshan (qingli) si 營繕(清吏)司 and the Off ice 
of Palace Construction of the Imperial Household Department yingzao si 營造司. 
72 In Li Hua’s stele text collection for 38 trades, at least 25 steles have inscriptions by mid-level 
off icials. Off icials of the highest ranks are few – only one Minister calligraphed the characters 
for the guild house of the actors, Liyuan gongsuo 梨園公所. See Li Hua, Ming Qing yilai, p.105. 
Off icials of the Imperial Household Department or the Ministry of Public Works have left no 
traces as authors or calligraphers of stele texts for the Peking guild houses.
73 Rowe, Hankow, p. 258.
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How can these contradictory views of tightening control versus laissez-
faire approach on the part of local governments be reconciled? To a certain 
extent, they may reflect regional variance. From early on, Suzhou was one 
of the most important manufacturing centres, especially for silk and cotton 
textiles. Conflicts between employers and workers are recorded in the 
Suzhou guild epigraphy since the early eighteenth century. It is conceivable 
that the authorities in Suzhou were more likely to try to obtain closer control 
especially of the workers’ guilds than local governments in other regions. For 
Hankou, however, at least one case has been quoted where a guild ‒ that of 
the itinerant f ish peddlers ‒ was not prohibited, but whose exclusive sales 
right were not acknowledged by the local authorities.74 On the whole, the 
Hankou case shows yet another instance of government support for the 
guilds as well as the attempts of the guilds to actively court Hankou and 
provincial off icials by, for instance, conferring honourary titles on them.75 
It is quite feasible that Hankou off icials were more accommodating towards 
guilds than their colleagues in Suzhou. The balance of power also depended 
on the distribution of commercial and craft guilds in the respective localities. 
We may safely assume that merchant guilds provided better resources and 
possibilities to make the authorities act on their behalf. In sum, cooperation 
between local off icials and guilds and their interconnection certainly were 
much more complex than Morse believed (which Max Weber took over from 
him), with signif icant variation from place to place.
Power Relations within the Guilds: ‘The Master and the Man’
The relationship of guilds and would-be guilds to the government in the cases 
cited for Suzhou at the same time also reflect the vertical relationship be-
tween the guild members. As a rule, journeymen could belong to the guilds, 
which were, however, dominated by the shopowners. Observers of guild 
relations in early twentieth-century Peking have found relative harmony 
between ‘master and man’. John Burgess defined as one of the characteristics 
of Peking guilds that they aimed at the welfare of all members of the guilds, 
which were mostly face-to-face groups with close personal relationships 
between master, journeymen, and apprentices.76 There can be no doubt 
that this was a paternalistic and hierarchical bond, especially between 
74 Rowe, Hankow, pp. 297-8.
75 Ibid., pp. 334-7.
76 Burgess, The Guilds of Peking, p. 211.
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masters and the journeymen they had personally trained as apprentices. 
As one retired carpenter told the Niida team, previous apprentices were 
considered family members and had the duty to participate in the master’s 
family celebrations, and when the master passed away, they were expected 
to wear the same mourning clothes as his family members. However, the 
care was mutual, so that a master was also obliged to support his previous 
disciples after they had f inished their apprenticeship.77 A representa-
tive at the tailors’ guild specif ied that journeymen who had not served as 
apprentices in the workshop where they worked did not wear mourning 
clothes, were not expected to assist in the master’s family rituals, and were 
not taken care of by the master after they had left his shop.78 This implies 
that conflicts were possible and did occur, even if as a rule the relationships 
of employer and employee were close or at least respectful from the side 
of the hired workers.
Yet this was not always the case. Generally speaking, the central and 
southern Chinese workers and hired artisans staged more strikes than their 
colleagues in Peking, but even in the capital, work stoppages occurred after 
the mid-nineteenth-century. In the Peking shoemakers’ guild, for instance, 
the journeymen went on strike and obtained wage raises in the 1850s and 
subsequent years until 1882.79 Although both journeymen and shopowners 
belonged to the same guild ‒ the shoe and boot guild Xuexie hang ‒ the 
degree of organization of the journeymen was obviously better than that of 
the employers. The journeymen’s Hemei hui (Assembly of United Beauty) was 
able to enforce wage raises until in 1882 the shopowners took the initiative to 
unite and establish their own association, the Caishen hui (Assembly of the 
God of Wealth) within the shoe and boot guild. In the end, 120 shopowners 
were involved and took the continuing wage conflict to court for arbitration. 
The workers’ demands were rejected, and the victorious shopowners set up 
a stele in commemoration of their achievements.80
77 Niida, Pekin kōshō girudo shiryōshū, IV, pp. 654-655. The legal historian Niida Noboru 
(1904-1966) collected information on the Peking guilds in two f ieldwork periods in 1943 and 
1944, with the assistance of colleagues, among which Imahori Seiji 今堀誠二 (1914-1992) and 
Okuno Shintarō 奥野信太郎 (1899-1968). They recorded stele inscriptions, took photographs of 
the guild houses, and interviewed the representatives of the guilds. His study mentioned above 
was based on the insights gained during these research periods. The materials were edited and 
published between 1975 and 1983.
78 Niida, Pekin kōshō girudo shiryōshū, II, p. 235.
79 Documentation is included in Niida Noboru, Pekin kōshō girudo shiryōshū, III, p. 489 ff. 
and in Li Hua, Ming Qing yilai, p. 164 ff., and analysed in Niida, Chūgoku no shakai to girudo, 
pp. 207-209.
80 For a translation, see Moll-Murata, ‘Social Harmony and Social Unrest’, pp. 269-271.
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This was a rare case in which the journeymen were organized earlier than 
the employers. Contrary examples are known for central and south China. If 
the skilled, hired craftspeople felt the need to combine, they did so in informal 
groups known as hang (trade line), bang (mutual help group or ‘gang’), dang 
(‘faction’), tuan (‘association’), and the like. The Canton silk weavers, for 
instance, split into the Xijia hang (Employees’ trade) and the Dongjia hang 
(Employers’ trade).81 The Changsha tailors had seven associations in the last 
decades of the nineteenth century, of which two were for the masters and five 
for the journeymen, but these were all reunited after which they revised their 
old regulations. The separate masters’ and journeymen’s associations of the 
Changsha brushmaking shops also reunited during the same time period but 
kept their respective separate regulations.82 For other guilds, it was expressly 
stated that they were open to masters and journeymen, or that masters or 
shopowners and journeymen negotiated the guild regulations together.83
Cases in which employers and employees associated in separate guilds are 
also known, apart from those mentioned, for three other Hankou guilds.84
Burgess and Gamble, whose writings are based on their observations in 
1918 and 1919, predicted that even in Peking the harmonious relationships 
within the guilds would dissipate in the process of industrialization and 
that this would bring an end to the craft guilds.85 However, in small-scale 
handicraft production, guilds or informal proto-guilds survived longer. 
Thus the craft guilds that had phased in later than the merchant guilds 
during the commercialization of the sixteenth to eighteenth century were 
also later in phasing out.
Outlook to the Twentieth Century
In recent years, the transition of the guilds from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ 
has been intensely researched by Chinese scholars. The establishment of 
81 Liu Yung-ch’eng, ‘The Handicraft Guilds in Soochow’, p. 145.
82 Peng Zeyi, ‘Short table’, pp. 1042-1043.
83 Examples in the ‘Short table’ are the Changsha incense makers in the Jiaqing reign (1796-
1820, p. 1014), the Hankou biscuit roasters in 1860 (p. 1019), the Hankou gold leaf makers in 1870 
(p. 1024), the Changsha lacquerers in 1887 and 1906 (p. 1030), the Changsha restaurant trade, 
which included journeymen since 1898 (p. 1042), or the Sichuan embroiderers in 1842 (p. 1017). 
The cases from Hunan and Hubei seem overrepresented in Peng Zeyi’s table.
84 The coal and charcoal maker journeymen’s guild, established in 1871 (‘Short table’, p. 1025), the 
plasterer journeymen’s guild, built in 1867 (p. 1022), and the Hankou f irework trade journeymen’s 
association of 1890 (p. 1032).
85 Burgess, The Guilds of Peking, p. 236.
merChant anD Craft guilDS 339
chambers of commerce in the late Qing era is a focal point for this transition 
and for the further fate of the guilds. In an important case study, Chen 
Zhongping has described the beginnings of the Shanghai Chamber of 
Commerce. Unlike in Hankou, alliances of several guilds are not found in 
the cities and market towns of the Yangzi Delta. In a complex process of 
cooperation and competition of elite merchants with the local, provincial, 
and central governments, the Qing state in 1904 f inally prioritized the 
promotion of commerce in its ‘New Policies’ through the chambers of 
commerce. The central government approved that these chambers had 
their leadership recruited from and elected by elite merchants. The role of 
the guilds therein was not specif ied in the 1904 decree. In practice, not all 
guild members could join the chambers of commerce but only the leaders 
of the most influential guilds.86
After the fall of the Qing, the subsequent Republican governments at 
Peking and Nanjing tried to strengthen state control of commerce and 
industries, and in their legislation they gradually eliminated the tradi-
tional forms of association. The National People’s Party (Guomindang) had 
consolidated its government in Nanjing in 1927, and economic development 
ranked high on its agenda. The ‘Regulations on the craft associations’87 
that were promulgated in late 1927 stipulated that the pre-existing guilds 
should all reorganize and report to the authorities in charge.88 This was to 
be applied to all production enterprises, regardless of whether these were 
mechanical or handicraft manufacturers. In any administrative region, 
the associations were the sole representatives of their respective trade 
branch. The associations were obliged to set up regulations according to a 
given pattern. Moreover, they were expected to cooperate with government 
authorities by answering questionnaires on the situation of their trade.89 
Together with the 1929 ‘Law on Industrial and Commercial Associations’ 
(Gong shang tongye gonghui fa) and the 1930 ‘Detailed Regulations for the 
Execution of the Law on Industrial and Commercial Associations’ (Gong 
shang tongye gonghui fa shixing xice), this body of commercial legislation 
now emphasized compulsory membership and cooperation with government 
authorities and secured the inclusion of all f irms within a certain branch.90 
The old-style guilds were to be reorganized within one year and had to report 
86 Chen Zhongping, ‘The Origins of Chinese Chambers of Commerce’, p. 191.
87 Peng Zeyi, Zhongguo gongshang hanghui, pp. 990-995, ‘Gongyi tongye gonghui guize’, 
promulgated by the Ministry of Agriculture and Industry (Nonggong bu 農工部) on 1927/11/21.
88 Ibid., ‘Regulations on craft associations’, p. 995, par. 36.
89 Ibid., p. 990, par. 2, 3, 12.
90 Peng Nansheng, Hanghui zhidu, p. 76.
340 State anD CraftS in the Qing DynaSt y (1644-1911) 
to a supervisory committee (Shangren tuanti zhengli weiyuanhui). The 
names of the associations were unified, and almost all of them were renamed.
In the Republic of China, the actions of the commercial associations were 
closely monitored and presented in municipal statistics. By 1934, Wuhan (the 
conglomeration of what was previously Hankou and the adjacent districts of 
Hanyang and Wuchang) had 159 new associations; Shanghai had 236 (of which 
40 were industrial, 1936 figures), and Chengdu in Sichuan had 111 by 1939. By 1933, 
there were a total of 4,185 new associations in 21 provinces.91 This is certainly 
more than even the closest reading of Qing texts and steles will ever reveal. 
The process of transformation seems to have been concluded by the 1930s.
Guilds in Transition
When Niida Noboru and his colleagues and students conducted another 
extensive investigation on traditional guilds and their successors, they 
visited about f ifty previous guild sites, recorded the existing stele texts, 
and interviewed guild representatives.
These interviews show that little enthusiasm was felt for the new trade 
associations, while nostalgia for the guilds remained. The main reason 
for this was that the new associations had less autonomy than the guilds. 
One informant from the barbers’ association said that the statutes of their 
association had been imposed on them in 1942 but that these were not 
considered the ‘real’ rules of the trade.92 To a representative of the hatmakers’ 
guild, the inheritance of leadership positions seemed preferable to rotational 
directorship.93 Several interview partners confirmed that belonging to an 
association brought little or no benefit.94 This led to a situation in which 
the ‘old’ huiguan and the ‘modern’ associations coexisted ‒ sometimes in 
competition with each other but at other times complementing each other. 
The rule of sole representation of one trade branch was sometimes avoided 
91 Ibid., p. 78.
92 Niida, Pekin kōshō girudo shiryōshū, II, p. 294.
93 Ibid., III, p. 529.
94 Ibid., interview at the furriers’ association, III, p. 561 (‘there was no advantage in establishing 
commercial or trade associations’); carpenters’ guild, IV, p. 652: (‘the only advantage of guild 
membership is being able to see the theater performances’); jade carvers’ association, I, p. 38 (‘it 
is no advantage to be a member of the [new] association (gonghui)’); gold and silver smelters’ 
association, I, p. 127 (‘Nobody wants to become a director of the association (tongye gonghui 
huizhang). It [is a rotational task that brings no advantages] and only costs money.’) See also 
Bradstock, Craft Guilds, p. 247.
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by declaring the reason for association as one of common geographic descent 
rather than of common occupation. A Shanghai guidebook published in 
1930 lists nine guilds in the tobacco trade, nine dyers’ guilds, and three 
lacquerware guilds, many of which in their names suggest common-origin 
associations.95 In general, the guild members were more disposed towards 
the huiguan, which retained some of their social, religious, and cultural 
functions. They rejected the new associations also because they considered 
them as instruments of the authorities, which in Japanese-occupied Peking 
restricted and f ixed prices and their access to raw materials.
The transition from the guilds to the trade associations may not have 
roused as much antipathy in other cities with bigger industrial sectors where 
the guilds, and especially the huiguan, were not as omnipresent as in the 
ex-capital. Clearly, the representatives of small-scale handicraft business 
‒ who had known the traditional system with values such as solidarity, 
relative economic autonomy, and guild morals ‒resented the top-down 
reforms that restricted their degree of self-determination and called into 
question the pre-existing hierarchy and didactic methods. Nonetheless, after 
the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the last remaining 
traditional guilds were closed down.
Guilds in Jingdezhen
What can we know about the guilds that were located beyond the great and 
well-documented centres of Peking, Suzhou, Shanghai, and Hankou? In spite 
of the lack of documentation, a look at the producer city of Jingdezhen can 
illustrate the existence of guilds, the characteristics of proto-guilds, and 
their survival until the twentieth century.
In Peng Zeyi’s ‘Short table’, Jiangxi province in general does not rank high 
among the host regions. Likewise, for Jingdezhen, the largest porcelain produc-
tion centre in China in the Qing period (and, until the late eighteenth century, 
in the world), the ‘Short table’ mentions only two associations ‒ ‘Perfect 
Porcelain’ (Taocheng) and ‘Celebrated Porcelain’ (Taoqing) ‒ even though in 
its eighteenth-century heyday, hundreds of thousands of workers are said to 
have been engaged in the porcelain trade in and around this market town.96
95 Bradstock, Craft Guilds, p. 242.
96 The f igures are disputed. Tang Ying, the Superintendent of the Imperial Kilns, mentioned one 
hundred thousand workers in 1743 (Kerr, Ceramic Technology, p. 200). In the Decennial Reports, 
p. 204, several estimates are discussed, the highest of them referring to a workforce of one million.
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How is it that so little about Jingdezhen guild activity is known? Artisan 
and commercial activities of ‘trade lines’ (hang) and ‘networks’ (bang) are 
referred to here and there in Qing contemporary writings on Jingdezhen as 
well as surveys and histories of the Republican era, but stele inscriptions or 
other contemporary guild documents have not survived. However, custom-
ary rules of the trades were recorded in local gazetteers and monographs on 
porcelain production in Jingdezhen. They report that the division of labour 
was very detailed, with at least eight production lines: kiln firing; the forming 
of the blanks (on the wheel or in moulds); the painting of ornaments; the 
production of saggars, the protective clay containers used for f iring porcelain 
objects; the packing and transporting; the forming and attaching of the 
standing rim of the vessels; the production of tools for porcelain making 
(especially knifes for cutting and carving the clay); and the service trades 
(especially cart builders and the horse guild). These were again split up into 
36 subdivisions, which explains the saying that each finished porcelain vessel 
had passed 72 hands. There were no easily identif iable formal ‘guilds’ but 
rather proto-guilds that roughly tally with the subdivisions, so that basically 
as many trade networks (hangbang) as trades (hang) existed. The diff iculty 
is to assign these networks to localities and to the guild houses, which in 
Jingdezhen are of the huiguan (common-origin) and shuyuan (Confucian 
academy) type rather than the gongsuo (common-occupation) type.
About half of the huiguan that have survived to this day carry alternative 
names of Confucian academies. They were places of assembly for members 
from the following outsending regions: ten for people from different pre-
fectures in Jiangxi, two for people from Guangdong, two Anhui huiguan, 
one each for people from Zhejiang, Hubei, Hunan, Fujian, three for people 
from Jiangsu, and one for people from the remote northwestern province 
Shanxi. The dates of origin of the houses are not recorded, but the names 
of a few of them occur in eighteenth-century texts.
The home regions of the ceramic workers within Jiangxi province are also 
known. Duchang97 people were engaged in almost all trades of the high, medium, 
and low-skill varieties. They were kiln workers, formers of ‘round forms’,98 kiln 
fillers, kiln builders, painters, and saggar makers. Potters who produced ‘open 
forms’99 came from Fuzhou, which was at a distance of 200 km by river; only 
97 On the northern shore of lake Poyang, ca. 100 km waterway from Jingdezhen.
98 ‘Round forms’, yuanqi 圓器, refers to items that were formed either on the potters’ wheel 
or in a mould.
99 ‘Open forms’, zhuoqi 琢器, are pieces such as vases and ceremonial vessels that are orna-
mented by cutting, embossing, or carving out patterns on the clay, or that are polygonal.
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the top-quality kiln builders of the Wei family hailed directly from Jingdezhen 
but were later superseded by the Yus from Duchang. Those who performed the 
high-skill trade of forming and carving vases were from Fengcheng, about 250 
km waterway. Workers in low-skill trades such as saggar makers first came from 
the relatively nearby districts of Leping and Poyang (25-40 km away) but later 
also hailed from Duchang, Fuzhou, and Raozhou. People from all five northern 
and central prefectures in Jiangxi province worked as packers of small items.100
Concerning the networks of artisans, information is relatively scarce.101 
An ‘old’ and a ‘new’ network were comprised of people from Duchang and 
Poyang; the ‘Perfect Porcelain’ and ‘Celebrated Porcelain’ network convened 
at the Jingyang Academy (Jingyang shuyuan). These were kiln workers 
specializing in pine faggot kilns (‘Perfect Porcelain’) and in brushwood kilns 
(‘Celebrated Porcelain’) respectively. The Jiangzhen guild house (Jiangzhen 
gongguan)102 was built with donations from the Duchang potters. It was 
not reserved for potters but was also frequented by Duchang people who 
came to Jingdezhen for academic formation, hence its alternative name 
‘Old Southern Academy’ (Gu nan shuyuan).
Although guild regulations did not exist or were not transmitted, custom-
ary rules offer some insights into the activities of the networks. Most of them 
concern the riskier part of the production and distribution processes, namely 
f iring, unloading of the kilns, and packing. Rules are further recorded for the 
critical periods in the twelfth lunar month (when work was stopped), the 
beginning of work in the third lunar month, and the renewal of contracts 
or dismissal of labourers and foremen in the seventh lunar month. When 
work was interrupted during the winter period, workers could return to 
their home regions, but some of them stayed on.103
Merchant networks, also called bang, are well documented for the 
twentieth century. For 1936, 26 such networks were reported.104 As business 
was thriving after the Second World War, these networks increased to as 
many as 76. According to a twentieth-century observer, owners of ceramic 
100 Liang Miaotai, Ming Qing Jingdezhen chengshi jingji yanjiu, p. 216.
101 ‘Jingdezhen de fengqing’; Zhongguo cidu, vol. 2, pp. 775-781, ‘Ciye hanggui’ (Rules of trade 
of the porcelain makers).
102 Peng Zeyi, Zhongguo jindai shougongye I, p. 184, quoting from a gazetteer of Duchang county 
compiled in the 1870s, Tongzhi Duchang xianzhi.
103 ‘Jingdezhen de fengqing’, sect. 10: ‘After production is stopped in the XIIth month, the workers 
have nothing to do. For making a living, they sell loads of vegetables, other regional products 
and eel, small f ish, and fresh-water snails in the streets.’
104 See Jiangxi sheng qinggongye ting (ed.), Jingdezhen taoci shigao, p. 322: seven from Hubei, six 
from Jiangxi, two from Manchuria, two from Zhejiang, two from Anhui, one each from Tianjin, 
Guangdong, Henan, Sichuan, Peking, Jiangsu, Hunan.
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businesses had to be members of one of the guilds or form a partnership 
in which one of the members belonged. The sanction of the guilds was 
required before a newcomer could begin manufacturing, and the guild had 
to approve beforehand what type of ware could be made.105
An industrial history of Jingdezhen from the 1930s, which gives a relatively 
clear overview, classif ies ‘trade associations’ according to the criterion of 
common occupation. 21 branches are listed under their traditional names, 
among them the venerable ‘Perfect Porcelain’ and ‘Celebrated Porcelain’ 
associations. They are all designated as she, which implies a sacrif icial 
community. The author was obviously not favourably inclined towards 
these associations. He informs us that they existed of old but that they no 
longer had much to do. They merely congregated several times a year and 
offered sacrif ices.106 After the foundation of the People’s Republic, such 
associations were deemed even more dubious in retrospect and seemed to 
be the breeding ground for the underground activities of secret societies. 
Such insinuations are formulated in the most generalizing way,107 so that 
the illegal potential of these old Jingdezhen guilds can hardly be assessed. 
The respective groups existed until the 1950s and are said to have offered 
considerable resistance to the collectivization of the porcelain trade.108
In an interview with the vice president of the Jingdezhen Ceramics 
Museum, Hans Wilm Schütte was told that in the 1930s, brawls between 
the different local-origin groups that at the same time represented different 
trades burst out in the city as a consequence of diminishing opportunities 
to earn a living in the traditional handicraft sector.109
Thus the range of guild and proto-guild activities, especially of the infor-
mal bang networks that were not off icially registered, could also include 
clandestine and violent action and thus constitute the ‘reverse’ side of their 
relationship with the government.
Conclusion
The investigation of the guild system shows that the argument that craft-
speople were subordinate to merchants is also valid in view of the potential 
105 Rose Kerr, Ceramic Technology, p. 771, fn 230, quoting Stanley Wright, Kiangsi Native Trade and 
Taxation (Shanghai, 1920), pp. 191-192. Fees were pre-determined, and conditions were very restrictive.
106 Wang Siqing, Jingdezhen ciye shi, pp. 183-185.
107 Jingdezhen taoci shigao, p. 299.
108 Hans Wilm Schütte, ‘Perfektion als Hemmschuh?’, p. 72.
109 Ibid. The interview was conducted in 1986.
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impact of their associations. For one, craft guilds were established later than 
merchant guilds because artisans as a rule had fewer possibilities to attract 
the attention of local authorities than merchants. If they wanted their guild 
regulations endorsed, artisans had to enhance their respectability like the 
merchants by purchasing titles and convincing the off icials of their probity. 
Conversely, the guilds with the most influence in municipal governments 
in the later nineteenth century were merchant guilds that could afford to 
f inance the ‘liturgical service’ of charity, maintaining infrastructure, and 
installing local militia, rather than the craft guilds.
Relationships within the guilds were hierarchical, and shopowners domi-
nated the decisions of the associations. Evidence of separate journeymen’s 
guilds is from the late nineteenth century. Before that, local authorities 
would rarely allow journeymen or unskilled labour to set up their own 
guilds or to formulate unilateral guild regulations in existing guilds where 
employers and employees were both represented.
Craft guilds survived until the twentieth century, even if central govern-
ments tried to eliminate and transform them into bodies that could be 
more easily controlled than the traditional associations. However, the Qing 
government did not touch the craft guilds. By the 1920s and 1930s, the formally 
acknowledged guilds slowly disappeared, but groups that had always existed 
as proto-guilds remained. Religious associations and the veneration of a 
common patron saint played an important role from early on and could also 
serve as a rationale of occupational assembly until the mid-twentieth century.
In the Republican era, industrial workers in the cities probably preferred 
to organize themselves in workers’ unions rather than to join the tradi-
tional guilds. Power and decision-making structures in unions were more 
democratic, while in the pre-existing guilds, the masters frequently decided 
questions of price f ixing, wages, and hours of work among themselves.110 
Moreover, membership in trade unions had to remain voluntary, unlike in 
the traditional system in which persuasion and pressure could be applied 
informally in order to make everybody in the trade or from a particular 
home region join the guild. Instances of fusion of guilds with labour unions 
were also reported. In fact, the basic policies of the Guomindang included 
the building up of labour unions, the legalization of strikes, the promotion 
of arbitration by government commissions and the principle of voluntary 
membership, all of which it enforced at its power base in Canton.111 A 1927 
110 Burgess, The Guilds of Peking, p. 224.
111 Burgess, The Guilds of Peking, p. 230. Canton was the capital of an alternative military 
government established in 1917 under Sun Yatsen.
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survey of the Canton city government shows that, out of 180 labour unions, 
74 were reorganized guilds.112 Apprenticeship was evolving into a system in 
which the rights and duties of the apprentices were regulated more clearly, 
and which entailed more theoretical training in schools that were often 
operated or supervised by the government.
Among the organizations surveyed, the huiguan proved to be the most 
persistent, even if they are no longer occupational representations. Some of 
the old buildings are being renovated and serve as museums or theatres for 
traditional opera performances. The principle of regional representation in 
the capital or in provincial cities in hostels with restaurants and entertain-
ment sector has never been given up. Although most of the old huiguan 
have not been preserved in their original buildings, the institution per se is 
perpetuated in capital liaison off ices for provinces, special economic zones, 
and lower-level administrative areas, of which many hundreds are present 
in Peking.113 The flair of the huiguan, however, as stages where important 
people meet in a representative setting, has been imaginatively adopted 
by the hotel and restaurant caterers who also know how the designation 
of this venerable institution translates into English.
112 Ibid., p. 225, quoting Ta Chen and S.K. Sheldon Tzo, ‘The Unionization of Labour in China’, 
Monthly Labour Review, Washington.
113 Belsky, Localities, p. 25.
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Figure 27  Toothpick cover, collected at the ‘All-Shanxi huiguan’ (Quan Jin 




Efficiency of State Institutions in the Direct and Indirect Control 
of the Crafts
Setting out from the observation that in the early economic historiography of 
the People’s Republic of China, the Qing state as a rule was depicted as weak 
and ineff icient, but that more recent research on craft history has come to 
a more appreciative view of the performance of the last dynasty, this study 
has reviewed the role of state institutions controlling craft production as 
well as the historical precedents for their activities.
As a result, it has become clear that the manner in which the Chinese 
dynastic states of the second millennium procured their requirements all 
varied from each other. During the Song era, either artisans were hired by 
the government in permanent positions or the guilds were delegated the 
task to ensure that the government was provided with suff icient temporary 
labour forces at government manufactories and palace workshops. The Yuan 
dynasty registered the artisans in an elaborate system, and the artisan status 
became legally hereditary. Specif ic obligations were linked to this artisan 
status. These were more rigid in the initial phase of the dynasty in the 
thirteenth century, when bound labour or slavery existed, and were slightly 
relaxed towards the dynasty’s end. This change over time has been plausibly 
attributed to the greater demand of the Mongolian rulers and elites for the 
skills and the objects produced not only by Chinese but also by Central 
Asian artisans. For the supply of artisan skills was scarce in this nomadic 
society when the Mongols started their conquests. The Ming dynasty took 
over the principle of artisan registration but with a less complex system 
of periodic work shifts. Corvée obligations were more frequent for those 
living in or close to the capitals and less demanding for those coming from 
greater distances. This service system was changed and streamlined several 
times, and although the registration of artisans remained a requirement 
throughout the dynasty, the service obligations were by and large commuted 
to a system of monetary payment. Thus, both in the Yuan and the Ming 
era, state coercion relaxed towards the middle and late phases. Artisans 
required to provide corvée services and those in permanent service of the 
state in the Northern Song (ca. 1000 A.D.) comprised at the most 0.6 percent 
of the entire population; in the Yuan dynasty (1290), seven percent of all 
households were registered for actual or potential service for the state; 
in the Ming, depending on the population estimates assumed, registered 
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artisans represented between 0.26 and 0.15 percent of the population. The 
percentage of registered artisans in the entire population was thus at its 
height in the Yuan period and sharply decreased from then on.
This was the situation when the Manchu Qing dynasty commenced. 
The historiographic record states that, instead of tightening control over 
the artisan workforce as had been the case in the preceding dynasties, the 
registration of artisans was abolished permanently as early as the second 
year of the dynasty (1645) and that artisans thereafter were recruited of 
their own volition and remunerated. However, scattered evidence shows 
that government demand initially could not be adequately satisf ied by 
hired artisans alone. Moreover, the artisan registers were still on record, 
and until about 1700, a special artisan tax was collected.
In order to gain an overview of the artisan workforce under the Qing, this 
study surveyed the institutions of the central government that were directly 
responsible for craft production, i.e., those organizations that operated craft 
manufactories and employed construction workers on a permanent basis. The 
Ministry of Public Works, which organized building, weapons, ammunition 
and armour, shipbuilding, the Imperial mints, and the production of arts and 
crafts, reduced in the course of time its construction workforce. Where it was 
feasible, for instance for building materials like bricks and tiles, production was 
outsourced to private or semi-private producers, but the sectors involved in 
military and monetary production remained under the exclusive control of the 
state. The other imperial institution that employed a large artisan workforce 
was the Imperial Household Department. Here the trend to outsourcing 
was less marked, but it was also evident in the state manufactories for silk 
weaving in Jiangnan and for porcelain in Jingdezhen. An estimate of all known 
permanent artisan positions in the service of the state yields a figure of at least 
40,000 persons around 1800. This is about 0.01 percent of the population and 
thus a significant reduction as compared to the Ming, even though we must 
bear in mind that soldiers who were engaged as skilled or unskilled workers 
in arms production were not always designated as ‘artisans’.
As far as the written normative sources reflect reality, the wage rates 
of the workers in permanent positions at the Ministry of Public Works or 
the Imperial Household Department were rather high, especially for work 
within the palace. Given that few wage quotations for comparable private 
sectors exist, we can only conclude that their income was apparently at 
least at market level or above. The artisans in permanent positions were 
referred to as shiliang jiang (food provision artisans), which implies that they 
received part of their wages in grains and other foodstuffs. In periods of price 
inflation, this could alleviate their living circumstances. The workers at the 
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Jiangnan weaving manufactories were reported to be entitled to their food 
rations even in periods when there were no work assignments and they could 
not obtain any monetary wages. For temporary work in construction, wages 
differed widely between the provinces. The available wage quotations from 
the Wuliao jiazhi zeli (Regulations and precedents on the prices of materials, 
1769) on the whole also reflect market prices ‒ with considerable variance 
across regions. This was not the case for the shipbuilding and armament 
manufacturing crafts. Here, uniform soldiers’ wages were applied.
The private sector began to unfold at the same time that the workforce di-
rectly employed by the state shrank. The estimates in this study have yielded 
the result that the ships owned and constructed by the state represented only 
one-tenth of the entire existing ships in the second half of the eighteenth 
century; the overall output of book publications by the government in the 
Qing amounted to about one percent of total publications. For food, shelter, 
and luxury production, the private sector was increasingly able to supply 
the court and the state. Early on in the dynasty, this had already been 
the case for construction, silk weaving, and arts and crafts production. In 
other branches of craft production, transitional modes were realized. For 
instance, in order to maintain imperial designs and symbolism, porcelain for 
court use was formed and decorated at the Imperial Porcelain Manufactory 
in Jingdezhen but f ired in private kilns. The ‘weaving households’ of the 
Jiangnan Imperial Silk Weaveries were allowed to f ind substitute workers 
who wove in their stead on the looms of the Imperial Manufactories. A 
further option was for the private sector to provide transport vessels needed 
by the state, like ships for grain or copper transport.
In some sectors the central government asserted its monopoly more vigor-
ously, such as arms production, battleships, and coinage. Other economic 
branches such as luxury beverage processing ‒ tea and alcohol ‒ were entirely 
outsourced. In the case of printing, the Qing adopted a policy of propagation 
of the Confucian canon and the historically legitimatory texts by allowing 
part of the books from the palace printery to be sold to the public and to be 
used as exemplars for reprinting. Thus, it broke with the custom of preceding 
dynasties, which kept the books from palace printeries for the sole use of the 
court and administration. The Qing dynasty reserved and at certain periods 
aggressively defended their supreme power over the production of texts that 
formulated cultural and ethical values, as in the literary inquisition, but 
duplication of the orthodox texts was favoured. Finally, certain symbols of 
imperial power and presence remained the exclusive privilege of the ruling 
house, such as yellow glazed tiles for buildings belonging to the court or 
the state cult but also specif ic porcelain designs.
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Did the central government exploit the artisans in order to achieve these 
goals? Various prohibitions ‒ the seafaring prohibition between 1662 and 
1683, the literary inquisition or book prohibition in the 1770s and 1780s, and 
the copper prohibition in the 1730s and 1740s ‒ were enforced in concrete 
situations for political (at least in the case of the f irst two) rather than 
socioeconomic reasons. It is also possible that even the copper types of 
the encyclopedia Gujin tushu jicheng, a costly imperial prestige project, 
fell victim to the copper prohibition. In the phases when these bans were 
most rigorously enforced, they affected the artisans negatively. Examples 
include the shipbuilders, who were forbidden to construct overseas and 
coastal vessels; the character carvers, printers, and binders who were called 
to account for producing real or presumed anti-Manchu publications; and 
the coppersmiths who were expected to work under off icial supervision 
in order to prevent coin manipulation. Although the most acute periods of 
government pressure did not last long, such embargoes and preventions had 
long-term consequences and illustrate the basic approaches of Qing dynasty 
economic policies that curbed rather than stimulated certain economic 
activities. In the case of the sea prohibition, the ban was lifted after 1684, 
yet the size of the ships remained restricted, at least off icially. Only four 
ports were open to foreign trade, and after 1757, all but Canton were officially 
closed. Foreign trade and overseas expansion were thus limited, which clearly 
had consequences for craft production. Basically, until the Opium Wars, the 
Qing state did not actively promote craft production and commerce but 
concentrated instead on agriculture. Even so, it did not ‒ and was aware it 
could not ‒ stop the transition from self-suff icient agricultural production 
for self-suff iciency to full-time craft production for the market. More direct 
encroachments occurred when artisans suffered illegal deductions from 
their negotiated or norm wages by off icials or lower-level administrative 
personnel or were obliged to deliver taxes-in-kind at prices below market 
rates. However, these restrictions and limitations hardly had a long-lasting 
negative impact on most craft activities. The state did not foster large-scale 
enterprises and manufactories, but they did exist in small numbers.
The situation changed radically after the shock of the Taiping rebellion 
and the Opium Wars. Armament production and shipbuilding, which had 
reached a kind of impasse by the time the Opium Wars broke out, were now 
mechanized in ambitious ‘self-strengthening’ programmes, and technology 
transfer was actively sought. However, the first stage of the self-strengthening 
movement did not have the desired result.
In printing, the spread of orthodox, state-supporting texts that were 
deemed to represent the Chinese cultural ‘essence’ was enhanced in 
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importance due to reprinting projects in the provinces. The palace printery 
rapidly lost its importance, although it was not completely closed down. 
Mechanical text reproduction using foreign machinery was started in the 
provinces and from the 1880s also commenced in the capital.
As for the vessels built in Chinese shipyards, they were second rate at 
best, and the navigational skills of the new navy captains and crews could 
not ward off French or Japanese attacks in 1884 and 1895. The develop-
ment of steam technology made little economic sense if all raw materials 
had to be imported at high cost and if the f inished products from foreign 
manufacturers were not only cheaper but of better quality.
At the same time, if the ultimate aim was to preserve China’s independ-
ence from the European and American imperialist states, there was no option 
but to acquire the techniques of mechanized production and the scientif ic 
knowledge that they were based on. In defence of the modernization efforts 
in general and the development of steam navigation in particular, it has 
been pointed out that the Chinese learned and applied Western skills in a 
relatively short time. To a certain extent, they were even able to close the 
gap with some Western technologies. The experiments with shipbuilding 
production made clear that it was not suff icient to master the skills of 
assembling the new ships and how to navigate them; the necessary coal 
mining as well as iron and steel technologies also had to be acquired. In 
consequence, modern mining was developed in coal mines in Zhili, Taiwan, 
and Shandong, and steel ref ineries were set up at the Jiangnan and Tianjin 
Arsenals.
The educational structures also had to be modif ied in the process of 
modernization and industrialization. Schools and universities for technical 
learning were now established on a much wider scale, which in retrospect 
had the effect of enhancing the recognition of the pioneering role of the 
Fujian Navy Yard School in particular.
More fundamental change that no longer remained confined to technol-
ogy but also provided for new political structures was ushered in by the 
Hundred Day Reforms of Kang Youwei. These measures were f irst crushed 
by the forces of reaction under Empress Dowager Cixi. However, after China 
lost much of its autonomy in the aftermath of the Boxer Rebellion, the 
reforms were widely adopted. In the process of these administrative and 
constitutional reforms, the ministry that had previously been responsible 
for public works was completely reshuff led, some of its old competen-
cies given to other ministries, and its tasks redef ined. For instance, in 
the craft sector, training programmes for apprentices were launched. 
However, as in earlier centuries, the ruling ethnic group of the Manchus 
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was overrepresented in the leading positions of the new government 
departments.
Did foreign imports and the presence of foreign manufacturing crush 
the handicraft sector? For shipbuilding as well as printing, traditional 
techniques persisted well into the Republican era and complemented the 
mechanized industries. In the cases presented in this study, sailing ships 
and wooden barges were used in the large seaports for lighterage and on the 
more torrential streams, which were not accessible by steam navigation. Even 
during an age when the letterpress and lithography had made large inroads 
in the cities, character carving was still utilized in medium-sized provincial 
cities like Qingdao, not to mention the rural backwaters of Sibao, where 
mechanized printing did not gain much ground until the mid-twentieth 
century. In fact, neither shipbuilding nor character carving crafts have 
completely died out, even if junks and woodblock printing nowadays have 
little economic importance but rather belong to the f ields of historical 
reminiscence or religious activities.
Artisans Between Merchants and Hired Labourers
Until the late nineteenth century, the Qing state and its elites were for the 
most part suspicious of merchants and artisans, although they were aware 
that these groups fulf illed important functions and although some elite 
merchants had the means to provide themselves with all the necessary 
attributes of the scholarly, highly cultured circles. Despite the fact that 
artisans ranked above merchants in the traditional classif ication of the four 
occupational groups, the former had fewer chances for social ascent than 
merchants. The road to success for an artisan was through commerce and 
from there via off icial examinations (for his progeny) or via the purchase of 
an off icial title. In the latter case, this was a position where the government 
recognized the value of this group as ‘merchants’ (shangren) who could 
supply the requirements of the state. This tendency was clear in building 
and printing.
As for government recognition of merchant and artisan associations, 
the central government did not concern itself with guilds. The interface 
of merchants and craftspeople and the government were the district and 
prefectural administrations which could endorse guild regulations and 
provide enforcement and arbitration in cases of conflict. However, in return 
they also expected welfare and administrative services from the guilds. In 
this setting, merchants were again at an advantage against artisans. Craft 
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guilds were established later than merchant guilds. While the f irst records 
of merchant guilds are from the sixteenth century, the f irst records of craft 
guilds are from more than a hundred years later. However, both merchant 
and craft guilds started to flourish only in the nineteenth century, when they 
may have felt a greater necessity to assert and solidify their position in the 
market due to the enhanced competition by foreign goods and producers. It 
took craft guilds longer to convince the local authorities of their probity and 
respectability, not least because, besides the small masters and storeowners, 
unskilled, low skilled, or skilled hired labour were also represented in the 
guilds. These workers were perceived to be unruly elements in the urban 
landscapes, especially if the labourers were migrants, as in the case of the 
Suzhou calenderers. As a rule, local authorities would not grant them the 
right to establish their own journeymen’s guilds, siding with the employers 
in order to keep down demands for wage raises. The author is aware of only 
one contrary example from Peking, where it took the employers several 
decades to unite against a pre-existing journeymen’s association within 
the shoemakers’ guild. However, in most cases, as in Europe, the authorities 
and the guild leaders were allied against the workers. What seems different 
from the European case, as generalized by James Farr, is that the artisans 
did not lose their influence within the guilds and urban politics: they never 
had it to begin with. Thus, Ming and especially Qing guilds provide an 
important alternative model for the causes, forms, and percentages of 
associations of skilled and unskilled artisans in guilds and proto-guilds, 
with a chronological, structural, and social setting that differs in many 
respects from the European case.
At the very end of the Qing, a process of empowerment of the merchant 
elites began which led to the formation of chambers of commerce. These 
successors to the merchant guilds now came ‘within the law’, with all 
the consequential legal prerogatives and duties. It took a while until this 
process of legalization came to include the craftshop owners and masters 
as well, and it is doubtful whether they were content with the greater 
supervision of their activities and the internal regulations imposed by 
the Republican state.
For hired workers, the labour unions may have been more attractive than 
the guilds, where the masters made most of the decisions. Proto-guilds, 
often also associated with secret societies, persisted in their geographical 
locations of strength, as exemplif ied in the case of Jingdezhen, where some 
observers have regarded the hired labourers’ activities for keeping up with 
increasing competition as notorious and illegal. In the larger context of this 
study, the gradual increase in aff iliation with the guilds goes hand in hand 
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with the increase of waged or commodif ied labour for the market.1 In the 
period under observation, corvée labour was just starting to be abandoned 
legally and practically. However, this did not reflect the mindset of many 
off icials, who certainly did not consider the workforce to be free wage 
labourers in the f irst stage of modernization, when the arsenals were still 
led as bureaucratic institutions rather than as industrial enterprises.
Depreciation and Appreciation of Craft Production and 
Craftspeople during the Qing Dynasty
To sum up, until the mid-nineteenth century the Qing government ideology 
stressed agriculture and regarded the crafts and commerce from a distance. 
It did not obstruct or systematically exploit craftspeople, but there were 
systemic weaknesses like corruption or squeeze, due partly to the fact that 
local and regional administrators and their personnel were chronically 
underfinanced, which could cause discontent. However, the precise extent 
of such illegal practices is still largely unexplored.
Technical and institutional modernization followed in two phases, each 
after a major crisis that almost ended dynastic rule: the Taiping and the Boxer 
Rebellions. In the first phase, with the help of (well-paid) Western specialists, 
state-operated shipyards and arsenals started mechanized production and 
offered vocational education on different levels beyond mere training on the 
job. The ships they produced could not adequately defend China’s territory, 
but the new skills were transferred to a growing group of technicians who 
gradually, and with low capital, started their own mechanized enterprises. 
In the second phase, reforms were much more far-reaching. For the f irst 
time, widespread programmes for vocational training were instituted that 
showed a growing and genuine concern for crafts and industries beyond the 
f ield of military production. Formal commercial legislation, the beginnings 
of patent law, awards and prizes for achievements in craft and industrial 
production all came to rise in this period. To put things briefly, in the phase 
between 1902 and 1911, efforts were made and successful institutions created 
that outlived the dynasty. Chinese historiography has now rediscovered the 
achievements of this period of the ‘New Policies’. Together with a critical 
1 Marcel van der Linden and Jan Lucassen, Prolegomena for a Global Labour History, pp. 9-10. 
For def initions of labour relations as proposed by the Global Collaboratory on the History of 
Labour Relations, 1500-2000, see Hofmeester et al., ‘Conquerors, Employers, and Arbiters: States 
and Shifts in Labour Relations 1500-2000: Introduction’, pp. 23-26.
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appreciation of the policies before the mid-nineteenth century, this can 
enhance the process of a more balanced reappraisal of the achievements 
of the Qing central government which has already commenced in recent 
Chinese publications on the economic and social history of craft production.
At the outset, this study pointed to the recent growth and export successes 
of the Chinese economy. How are they linked to the centuries of Qing rule 
and most of all to the phase of early industrialization? From a technical point 
of view, connections seem hard to f ind, since present day manufacturing 
is predominantly executed with machines and powered by fossil energy. 
Institutionally, handicraft production in private enterprises was able to hold 
out and even increased throughout the era of the Republic of China, but 
suffered under nationalization in the f irst decade of the People’s Republic 
of China. It has expanded again since the economic reforms of the recent 
decades.2 If there is a connection between the beginnings of industrializa-
tion and the present, one can see it, on the basis of this study, in the diff iculty 
of states to f ind an adequate level of regulation for manufacturing. For 
much of the Qing dynasty, and in fact also for the Republican era, the crafts 
thrived perhaps due to the low degree of intervention from the side of the 
state. The strong interventionist course of economic policies from the 1950s 
to 1970s ‒ with the priority placed on building up heavy industries and the 
virtual abolishment of individual workshops and small-size enterprises ‒ 
inhibited rather than promoted craft production. The present economic 
policies of partial deregulation still constitute a much stronger presence of 
the state than the regulatory efforts of the early twentieth century. In the 
present globalized and interlinked world, laissez-faire policies in the manner 
of the Qing dynasty before the nineteenth century are no longer feasible. 
A legal framework for product quality, property rights, environmental 
protection, and labour issues is indispensable, but f inding the right degree 
of protection and promotion of craft enterprises and industries would be a 
challenge for any government. The enhancement of vocational training, one 
of the f irst steps taken by the Qing in their ‘New Policies’ , remains a task 
that the government of the People’s Republic of China is now readdressing 
after having concentrated excessively on higher tertiary education for 
decades.3 The long road travelled since the late nineteenth century is 
demonstrated in a quote that the American economic historian Albert 
Feuerwerker referred to in 1959 – with the intention of illustrating the 
2 Schütte, ‘Handwerk’, pp. 289-291.
3 Erling, ‘China kopiert die deutsche duale Ausbildung’.
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somewhat unrealistic expectations of late Qing economic reformers, in this 
case Chen Chi, regarding China’s economic development:
One writer was so optimistic about the future of Chinese goods, which he 
said would be as good as but cheaper than foreign manufactures, that he 
looked beyond recapturing the domestic market to ask, ‘We can’t prevent 
our people from using Western manufactured goods; can they prevent 
their people from using Chinese goods?’4
4 Feuerwerker, China’s Early Industrialization, p. 36.
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jingshi 經世  301
Jingyang shuyuan 景仰書院  343
Jinhua  232
Jinjiang 晉江  159
Jin Jian 金簡  223, 224, 229, 263, 264
jin mo 禁末  296, 306
jintie 津贴  36
Jinzhuan chang 金磚厰  113
jiqi zhizao ju 機器製造局  137
Jiujiang customs  118
Jiuqing yiding wuliao jiazhi 九卿議定物料價
值  86, 90
joiner 安裝匠  188
journeymen  337
juben 局本  232
Junhe’an machine manufacturers 均和安機
器厰  166
junqi jian 軍器監. See Directorate for 
Armaments
junxu ku 軍需庫  74
Ju Qingyuan 鞠清遠  28
juzhen guan 聚珍館  263
ju 巨  45
Kangxi  70, 82, 105, 218, 219, 249, 253, 257, 258, 
260, 275
Kang Youwei 康有爲  302, 310, 353
kaozhengxue 考證學  258
Kehnen, Johannes  313
Kejing chu 刻經處  248
Kennedy, Thomas  139
Kezi hang gongsuo 刻字行公所  333
kiln workers  343
kinsho/jinshu 禁書  247
Koreans  264
Krupp  310
Kuhn, Dieter  28
Kuhn, Philip  299, 318
Laboratory for Chemical Analysis of Ores 
huafen kuangzhi suo 化分礦質所  97
labour recruitment  329
Lake Tai 太湖  163, 193
Lang Tingji 郎廷极  117
Lao Ge 老格  118
Laojun miao 老君廟  330
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Laozi  330
law on patent rights  98
lead type  233, 236, 259, 273
leather and fur makers pizuo 皮作  77
Lei Jinyu 雷金玉  314
Leonard, Jane Kate  24, 89, 126, 301
Leping 樂平  343
lianchuan 練船  145
Liang Jiang 兩江  169, 172
Liang Miaotai 梁淼泰  118
Liang Qichao 梁啟超  319
liansizhi 連四紙  228
Liaocheng  250
Liaohe 遼河  163
Liaoning  158
Liaoyang 遼陽  164
Liaozhai zhiyi 聊齋志異  252
Li Bozhong 李伯重  62, 171, 189, 190, 252
Libu zeli 吏部則例  252
lifan yuan 理藩院  73
Li Hongzhang 李鴻章  70, 123, 130, 136, 137, 138, 
139, 140, 142, 170, 234
Li Hua  326
lijin 釐金  110, 334
limu 櫟木  173
Lin’an 臨安  51
lingjin yuan 綾錦院  51
lingzhi 領制  114
Lin Jing 林景  167
Linqing 臨清  113, 163, 322
Lin Zexu 林則徐  137, 306
lithographic printing  233, 238, 245, 260, 273
Liu Bei 劉備  307
liu ku 六庫  117
Liuli chang 琉璃廠  74, 112, 234, 249, 261, 265
Liumen diaobang 六門雕幫  333
Liuqiu 琉球  189
Liu Yongcheng  323
Liu Yongri 劉永日  275
Li Xiangfu 李祥甫  257
Liyuan gongsuo 梨園公所  335
Li Zhaoxiang 李昭祥  184, 185, 187
Li Zicheng 李自成  215
London Missionary Society  253
Longjiang chuanchang zhi 龍江船厰志  183, 184
Longjiang chuanchang 龍江船厰  147
Lu Jiaxi 卢嘉锡  27
lunban jiang 輪班匠  58
lunchuan chang 輪船厰  195
Lu Yongxiang 路甬祥  27
Lü Zhenyu 吕振羽  29
Magang 馬岡  249, 270, 271
Mai Zhonghua 麥仲華  302, 303
Major, Ernest  248, 254
Manchuria  91, 158, 163, 188, 324, 343
Manchus  213, 223, 229, 256, 259, 263, 264, 277, 278
Mann, Susan  26, 317
Manufacturing Storehouse zhizao ku 製造庫  
75, 106
Marx, Karl  29
Masha 麻沙  249
mast timber weimu 桅木  173
Mawei 馬尾  141
McDermott, Joseph  28, 247
Mencius  293
menlian ku 門簾庫  77
menshen ku 門神庫  77
merchant guilds and craft guilds  325
merchants  321, 322, 323, 326, 328, 332, 339, 344
Mianzhu 綿竹  250
military artisan households  56
Ming dynasty  58, 109, 114, 116, 322, 349
mining policies  95
Ministries of the Central Government, liubu 
六部  103
Ministry of Agriculture, Industry, and Com-
merce nong gong shang bu 農工商部  97
Ministry of Commerce shangbu 商部  96, 97, 98
Ministry of Finance duzhi bu 度支部  79, 234, 
237, 238, 254, 256
Ministry of Justice xingbu 刑部  103
Ministry of Personnel libu 吏部  103
Ministry of Public Works  89
Ministry of Public Works gongbu 工部  42, 72, 
77, 78, 79, 85, 86, 87, 96, 97, 106, 111, 132, 135, 
172, 183, 185, 188, 194, 350
Ministry of Public Works (Song)  51
Ministry of Revenue hubu 戶部  72, 79, 80, 103, 
107, 132
Ministry of Rites libu 禮部  103
Ministry of War bingbu 兵部  103, 132, 185, 199
minjiang 民匠  81, 104
missionaries  93, 314
miting 米艇  159
Mittler, Barbara  248
Mongolia  93
Mongols  54, 56, 264
Morse, Hosea  334, 336
moye 末業  295
muchang 木厰  78
muchang 木場  74
Mudanjiang 牡丹江  164
mujiang 募匠  50
mujiang 木匠  264
Mu Jinwen 穆近文  276
inDeX 397
muku 木庫  80, 104
Myers, Ramon  25
Nagasawa Kikuya  246
Nanchuan ji 南船紀  183
nan hao 南號  127
nanjiang 南匠  82
Nanjing  58, 80, 81, 84, 94, 113, 114, 115, 121, 136, 
138, 161, 163, 165, 186, 190, 192, 229, 232, 248, 
249, 256, 264, 321
nanjue 男爵  98
nanzi 男子  306
Napoleon Bonaparte  310
Naquin, Susan  109, 110
Needham, Joseph  26, 27, 45
neige 内閣. See Grand Secretariat
nei shisheng 内侍省  51
neiwufu 内務府. See Imperial Household 
Department
Neiwufu zeliguan 内務府則例館  261
New Amoy Dock Company  166
New Policies xinzheng 新政  339, 356, 357
New Year’s posters nianhua 年畫  250, 276
nianhua 年畫. See New Year’s posters
Nian Xiyao 年希堯  117
Nicholson & Boyd Co.  165
Niida Noboru  326, 330, 337, 340
Ningbo  96, 127, 163, 166, 170, 194, 196, 325, 329, 331
Ningbo huiguan 寧波會館  329
Ningguta 寧古塔  164
Niuzhuang 牛莊  164
Nonggong bu 農工部  339
Nong gong shang gongyi ju 農工商工藝局  99
Nongshu 農書  224
Northern ship traders  127
Nurhaci  76
Off ice of Estimates liaogu suo 料估所  75
Off ice of Palace Construction  82, 83
Off ice of Palace Construction yingzao si 營造
司  80, 104, 106, 264, 335
off icial artisan households  56
off icial examinations  258
Off icial Newspaper Off ice for Commercial 
Affairs shangwu guanbao ju 商務官報局  97
off icial supervision and merchant manage-
ment guandu shangban 官督商辦  130, 170
Okamoto Sae   247
opium  70
Opium War  96, 135, 163, 164, 170, 191
Oregon pine  174
packers  343
paibo派撥  188
painter, paint maker 油畫匠  188
painters huajiang 畫匠  91, 215, 254, 264
paint makers youjiang 油匠  91
palace women  98
Pan Jixing  246
Pan Shicheng 潘仕成  135, 170, 245
paoduiying 炮队营  195
paper mounters  256, 264, 267
Peiwen yunfu 佩文韻府  252
Peking  58, 72, 75, 76, 82, 84, 87, 91, 95, 99, 100, 
101, 102, 106, 108, 113, 117, 220, 229, 233, 234, 
236, 237, 249, 252, 256, 261, 262, 265, 266, 
269, 275, 278, 321, 322, 323, 326, 329, 330, 
333, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 341, 343, 346
Peking Reconstruction Craft Center  315
Peng Nansheng 彭南生  30, 100, 101, 331
Peng Zeyi 彭泽益  29, 39, 99, 326
Piontek-Ma, Elke  28, 91, 95
Pomeranz, Kenneth  24, 40
porcelain  115
porters 夫役  195, 197, 201
porters 挑力夫  128
potters’ guild  322
Poyang 鄱陽  343
Prak, Maarten   327
Prince Gong (Yixin) 奕訢  109, 123
printers  232, 237, 238, 248, 249, 254, 256, 257, 
261, 264, 265, 266, 267, 269, 271, 272, 273, 
274, 275, 277, 278
public and private reconstruction workshops 
gong si jianshe ge gongchang 公私建設各
工場  101
publishers  217, 245, 248, 249, 255, 257, 259, 270, 
271, 273, 274, 277, 278
Pudong 浦東  165
Puget Sound  174
Purvis and Company  165
Puting 溥頲  97
Puyi 溥儀  109
pu 僕  305
Qian Daxin 錢大昕  276
Qian Hui’an 錢慧安  276
Qianlong  70, 78, 88, 89, 92, 95, 114, 117, 118, 119, 
218, 219, 223, 251, 254, 256, 267, 269, 275
qianzi ku 鉛子庫  74
Qichang 旗昌  130
qijiang 旗匠  81, 264
Qijianlong 齊健隆 workshop  300
Qiji tiechang 旗記鐵廠  139
qimin ku 器皿庫  80
Qinding Fujian sheng waihai zhanchuan zeli 
欽定福建省外海戰船則例  87
Qinding gongzhong zeli 欽定宮中則例  261
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Qingdao 青島  166, 255, 273, 279, 283, 354
qiqiao 乞巧  317
Qiushi tang 求實堂  144
Qiu village 虬村  276
Qiuxin jiqi lunchuan zhizao chang 求新機器輪
船製造廠  167
quan gong 勸工  301
quan gong chang 勸工場  101
Quan gong qiang guo shuo 勸工強國說  310
Quan Hansheng 全漢昇  29
Quanzhou 泉州  58, 159, 174, 189
qugong 渠工  197
qukou 軀口  55
Raozhou 饒州  343
rattan worker 籐匠  188
Rawski, Evelyn  109, 110
Reed, Christopher  28, 221, 248, 254, 260, 273
Rehe  87, 88
religious communities  334
River Administration  88
Rixia jiuwen kao 日下舊聞考  252
rope maker 繩匠  128, 188
rotational leadership  330
Rowe, William  39, 327
Ruitenbeek, Klaas  28
Ruyi guan 如意館  93
sail makers 制蓬匠  128, 191, 194
sand ship Shachuan 沙船  128, 130, 163, 168, 
190, 325
Santangelo, Paolo  121
Sanzi jing 三字經  252, 272
satin duan 緞  114
sawyer 鋸匠  188, 194
scaffolders dacai jiang 搭材匠  91
Schäfer, Dagmar  28
Schütte, Hans Wilm  344
sea prohibition 海禁  95, 157, 167, 168
Searching for Novelty Machine and Steamship 
Construction Company  167
Section for Craft and Industrial Affairs 
(gongwu si 工務司)  97
Section for Overseeing the Works jianzao chu 
監造處  263
Section of Proofreading jiaodui shuji chu 校對
書藉處  263
self-strengthening ziqiang 自強  70, 76, 96, 121, 
123, 138, 143, 158, 170, 231, 261, 277, 298, 300, 352
Shaanxi  235
Shachuan 沙船. See sand ship
shamu 杉木  128, 159
Shandong  76, 79, 82, 93, 100, 101, 113, 124, 126, 
127, 132, 134, 136, 158, 163, 164, 165, 169, 171, 
173, 174, 234, 236, 248, 322
shang ba hang 上八行  315, 327
shangbu 商部. See Ministry of Commerce
Shangchuan huiguan 商船會館  325
Shang dynasty  47
Shanghai  102, 130, 131, 138, 139, 142, 145, 161, 163, 
165, 166, 169, 170, 174, 192, 194, 196, 197, 199, 
233, 235, 237, 247, 248, 249, 254, 255, 261, 273, 
276, 277, 323, 324, 325, 329, 331, 333, 339, 
340, 341, 344
Shanghai Maritime Customs  140
Shangren tuanti zhengli weiyuanhui 商人團體
整理委員會  340
shangren 商人  112, 354
shangse 上色  118
Shangwu yinshuguan 商務印書館. See 
also Commercial Press
Shantou 汕頭  165
Shanxi  234, 265, 266, 342
Shanxi merchants  325
shanzi jiang 山子匠  88, 91
shaofu jian 少府監  51
Shaoxing 紹興  329
sha 杉  173
She district 歙縣  276
Shen Baojing 沈保靜  199
Shen Baozhen 沈葆楨  140, 196, 199
Shenbao 申報  235, 247
Shengjing  76, 132, 188, 217, 264
Sheng Kang 盛康  302, 303
Sheng Xuanhuai 盛宣懷  302
Shennong 神農  307
Shen Qiyuan 沈起元  304
she 社  344
shiliang jiang 食糧匠  91, 350
shi nong gong shang 士農工商  300, 301, 303
shipbuilders  329
shipbuilding  72, 76, 85, 87, 90, 95, 108
ship carpenter 艦匠  188
shipwrights  128, 171, 187, 194, 325, 329
shixiang jiang 食餉匠  81
shoemakers’ guild  337
shougongye 手工業  43, 44
shougong 手工  44, 45
shouyi 手藝  44
shufang 書坊  250, 332
Shufang 書坊 (in Fujian)  249
shuimo wu 水磨務  51
shuishi 水師  132
shukōgyōsha 手工業者  44
shukōgyō 手工業  43
inDeX 399
Shunde 順德  249, 271
Shun 舜  307
Shuye shanghui 書業商會  333
shuyuan 書院  323, 342
shuzuo 書作  263
Sibao 四堡  248, 251, 252, 259, 271, 272, 274, 354
Sichuan  79, 87, 100, 101, 136, 158, 163, 193, 235, 
249, 250, 254, 270, 272, 324, 327, 338, 340
Siku quanshu 四庫全書  222, 223, 231, 256
Silk Brocade Off ice  51
silk-loom god  322
silk weavers  113, 322, 338
silk weaving  72, 81, 85, 91, 92, 120, 351
silversmiths yinzuo 銀作  77
simin 四民. See four occupational groups
Siming gongsuo 四明公所  329
Siming muye changxing hui 四明木業長興會  
325, 329
simin 四民  303
sinjeku  264
sinong si du quyuan司農寺都曲院  51
sishi 司事  195, 197
Six Ministries  73, 80
skilled workers 工匠  195
skill qiao 巧  296
slavery  60
slaves  82
socialism   29
soft style 軟体  231
Song dynasty  48, 50, 62, 63, 109, 115, 349
Song guilds  322
Songhua jiang 松花江  158, 163
Songjiang 松江  275
songmu 松木  128
Song Weichen 宋煒臣  167
Songyun 松筠  137
song 松  173
Southeast Asia  167
Southern ship traders  127
spinning  71, 98, 99
stage model of development   29
Stalin, Joseph  29
statecraft  298, 301, 302, 303, 306, 308, 311, 313, 
315, 316
State Farms Bureau tuntian qingli si 屯田清
吏司  75
state manufactories (Song)  51
stone masons shijiang 石匠  91
sturdy labourer 壯夫  188
sub-contractual system  196
Subei bang 蘇北幫  330
sula 蘇拉  263, 266
Suzhou  80, 81, 84, 94, 95, 100, 102, 108, 113, 114, 115, 
121, 135, 161, 163, 165, 247, 249, 250, 256, 270, 
275, 322, 323, 324, 328, 332, 333, 334, 336, 341
Suzhou Metal Tile Manufactory  113
Taicang 太倉  161
Taigu 太古  130
Taihe dian 太和殿  214
tailor caifeng jiang 裁縫匠  188
tailors’ guild  337
Tainan Off icial Silver and Cash Bill General 
Off ice  237
Taiping  127, 130, 138, 158, 165, 170
Taiping rebellion  96, 231, 236
Taiping troops  118
Taiwan  133, 140, 157, 168, 173, 189, 254
tai 臺  305
tanchang 炭厰  51
Tang Dafu 湯達甫  257
Tang guilds  322
Tang Ying 唐英  118, 341
tanku 炭庫  80, 104
Taocheng 陶成  341
Taohuawu 桃花塢  250
Taoqing 陶慶  341
taoyin 套印  232
third estate  319
Thomas Hunt and Company  139, 194, 196
Three Silk Weaveries  113, 114
Tiangong kaiwu 天工開物  116, 125
Tianjin  100, 101, 127, 130, 131, 136, 138, 163, 165, 
166, 169, 250, 253
Tianjin experimental manufactory Tianjin 
shixi gongchang 天津實習工廠  101
Tianlin muchang 天林木厰  112
Tianquan muchang 天泉木厰  112
tidiao 提調  197
tidu 提督  132
tieku 鐡庫  80, 104
tielimu 鉄力木  161, 168
tiezuo 鐡作  81
tilers wajiang 瓦匠  91
timber yard  112
titang 堤塘  234
tiyong 體用  121
tobacco processors  334
Tong’an sou 同安艘  159
Tong’an 同安  159
tonggong 童工  195
tonggong 童工 (child labour)  198
tonggong 銅工 (copper smith)  310
Tongmao 同茂  131
tong shang 通商  301
Tong Shuye 童书业  31
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Tongwen guan 同文館  233
Tongzhi  109, 112, 115, 119, 218, 261
Tongzhou 通州  127, 130, 131, 136
tongzi ku 銅字庫  263
touxia 投下  55
touyi 頭役  188
Trademark Bureau shangbiao ju 商標局  97
traditional craftsmanship chuantong 
shougongyi 传统手工艺  30
training centers for vagrants (youmin 遊民)  101
Tsien Tsuen-hsuin  232, 246
tuan 團  321, 338
tuntian 屯田  125
Tushujicheng qianyin shuju 圖書集成鉛印書
局  259
Tu Wei-ming  23
Uighur masters  93
unfree labour  47, 62
Unskilled workers 小工  195
Vittinghoff, Natascha  248
vocational schools  69, 98, 101, 103
vocational training  357
Vogel, Hans Ulrich  27, 28, 77, 220
Vries, Peer  40
wages  24, 36, 53, 61, 82, 86, 87, 90, 92, 94, 171, 
184, 191, 197, 219, 265, 267, 268, 273, 278, 329, 
345, 351
Arsenal wages  199, 201
Wagner, Rudolf G.  248
Wang Boxin 王柏心  306
Wang Daokun 汪道昆  297
Wang Peixun 王沛恂  305
Wang Shixiang 王世襄  85
Wangxia  253
Wang Yeh-chien  25
Wang Zhen 王禎  224
Wanping xian min 宛平縣民  266
Wanshou shan 萬壽山  83
Wanshou shengdian 萬壽盛典  275
Wan(yuan) xian 萬(源)縣  163, 193
weaving  71, 91, 92, 94, 98, 99
Weber, Max  23, 26, 327, 336
wei dao 未到  266
Wei family 魏氏  343
weighing masters 秤手  127
wei jiang de mian 維匠得免  54
Wei Mingkong 魏明孔  31, 40
weiyuan 委員  195, 197
Wei Yuan 魏源  137, 298, 302
Wenchang association 文昌會  333
Wenchang huiguan 文昌會館  333
Wenchang miao 文昌廟  275
Wenjin ge 文津閣  88
Wenlin gonghui 文林公會  333
wensi yuan 文思院  51
wenxiu yuan 文繡院  51
Wenzhou 溫州  163
Whampoa. See Huangpu
Widmer, Ellen  247
Wittfogel, Karl August  327
Wong, Roy Bin  23, 40, 110, 111
wooden ox  307
Worcester  192, 194
working day gong 工  185, 186, 188, 190
work promotion places quan gong chang 勸工
場  101
work shifts  47
workshops in Buddhist temples  52
wubei yuan 武備院. See Court of Imperial 
Armaments
Wu Chengming 吴承明  29, 40
Wujiang district 吳江縣  163
Wuliao jiazhi zeli 物料價值則例  87, 90, 91, 
231, 351
Wu Prefecture 吳郡  322
Wuxi bang 無錫幫  329
Wuxi 無錫  165
Wuying dian juzhenban chengshi 武英殿聚珍
版程式  223, 228
Wuying dian juzhenban shu 武英殿聚珍版書  
223, 286
Wuying dian Palace Workshop Wuying dian 
zaoban chu 武英殿造辦處  215
Wuying dian xiushu chu 武英殿修書處  215
Wuying dian 武英殿  81, 214, 217, 218, 219, 220, 
222, 223, 224, 229, 234, 252, 259, 261, 262, 
263, 264, 265, 266, 269, 275, 278
xia ba hang 下八行  315
Xiamen 廈門  159, 165, 168, 169, 170, 172, 189
Xianfeng  109, 112
Xianghe muchang 祥和木厰  112
Xiangsheng 祥生  165
xiao chaoting 小朝廷  84
xiaohuang ku 硝磺庫  74
Xiehua shuju 擷華書局  233
Xihua men 西華門  80, 214, 229, 263
Xijia hang 西家行  338
Xinjiang  74, 91, 93, 136, 138, 140
Xin Yuan’ou 新元欧  166
Xinzha 新閘  165
xiushu chu 修書處  263, 267
xixin chang 惜薪厰  74
Xixue guan 西學館  144
Xuanwu men 宣武門  237
inDeX 401
Xu Chengxuan 許承宣  305
Xu Dixin 徐涤新  29, 40
Xuebu tushuju 學部圖書公局  234
Xue Fucheng 薛福成  307, 308, 309, 310, 311
Xuexie hang 靴鞋行  337
Xu Gao 徐杲  314
Xu Jianqing 徐建靑  40, 112, 120
Xuwan 許灣  249, 259, 270, 271, 272
Yanghang maoyi zhangcheng 洋行貿易章程  170
yanghang 洋行  169
Yanghu pai 陽湖派  305
Yangliuqing 楊柳青  250, 276, 300
Yang Shixiang 楊士驤  275
Yang Wenhui 楊文會  248
Yangxin dian zaoban chu 養心殿造辦處  81, 82, 
83, 92, 106, 117, 217
yangyuan 洋元  197
Yangzhou  223, 229, 231, 249
Yangzhou shiju 揚州詩局  229, 231
Yangzhou 揚州  161, 163
Yangzi  126, 127, 158, 161, 163, 170, 171, 193
Yangzi Delta  126, 171
Yangzi jiqichang 揚子江機器厰  167
Yantai 煙臺  165
Yan Zhongping 嚴中平  29
yaohu 窯戶  113
Yao 堯  307
ya 牙  305
Yellow River  70, 76, 126, 127
Yesong 耶松  165
Yihe yuan 頤和園  83
yingbang 英鎊  197
Ying Baoshi 應寶時  130, 199
yingshan (qingli) si 營繕(清吏)司. See Bureau 
of Construction
Yingzao fashi 營造法式  86
yingzao si 營造司. See Off ice of Palace 
Construction
Ying Zuxi 應祖錫  308, 312
yinshou 印手  333
Yinshua zongju 印刷總局  277
yinshu xuetang 印書學堂  272
yinya 姻婭  305
yinyuan 銀圓  238
yipu 藝圃  145
yishu xuexiao 藝術學校  144
yitu 藝徒  145, 198
Yizheng 儀征  161
Yoneyama Toratarō  246
Yongle dadian  222, 223
Yongzheng  70, 82, 83, 85, 89, 95, 117, 218, 219, 
257, 260, 297, 298
yong 傭  306
youhua zuo 油畫作  80, 104
youtong 幼童  198
Yuan dynasty  54, 349
Yuan Mei 袁枚  276
yuanmen bao 轅門報  235
yuanmen chao 轅門抄  235
Yuanming yuan chaitan ku 圓明園柴炭庫  80
Yuanming yuan 圓明園  79, 91, 112, 254
yuanqi 圓器  342
Yuan Shikai 袁世凯  233, 234, 236
Yuechi 岳池  250, 270, 272
Yu family 余姓  343
yuheng qingli si 虞衡清吏司. See Bureau of 
Forestry and Weights
Yun Jing 惲敬  305, 311
Yunnan  87, 95, 99, 136, 137, 232, 235, 324
Yunnan copper mines  95
Yuntaishan  96
yushu chu 御書處  263, 267, 285, 287
Yü Ying-shih  23
Yu 禹  307
Zaifeng 載灃  109, 238
zai guan renyi 在官人役  200
Zaizhen 載振  97
zeli 則例  36, 39, 85
Zeng Guofan 曾國藩  70, 123, 138, 139, 140, 231, 307
Zhang Heng 張衡  307
Zhang Jian 章謙  305
Zhang Shudong  231, 232, 235, 246
Zhang Xiumin  231, 232, 246, 249, 257, 275
Zhang Yuanlong 張元隆  163, 169
Zhang Zhidong  233, 236
Zhangzhou 漳州  96, 159, 174, 189, 329
zhaomu jiang 招募匠  265
Zhao Nanxing 趙南星  297
Zhapu 乍浦  161
Zhejiang  79, 87, 95, 96, 100, 124, 126, 127, 128, 
130, 133, 138, 158, 161, 163, 171, 174, 183, 184, 
228, 232, 235, 249, 324, 325, 329, 342, 343
Zhejiang hongbang muye gongsuo 浙江紅幫木
業公所  325, 330
Zhejiang lu 哲匠錄  314
Zheng Chenggong 鄭成功  95, 133, 157, 168
Zheng Guanying 鄭觀應  313
Zheng Zhidao 鄭至道  297
Zhenjiang  223, 231
zhepei zuo 折配作  263
Zhibao tang 至寶堂  333
Zhili  79, 87, 91, 94, 100, 101, 126, 130, 132, 136, 
140, 158, 163, 165, 184, 233, 234, 268, 275, 286, 
324, 325
Zhili guan shuju 直隸官書局  233
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zhizao ju 製造局  137
zhizao xuetang製造學堂  145
zhizao xuexiao 製造學校  144
zhongben yimo 重本抑末  295
zhongnong yishang 重农抑商  295
Zhongxing genglu  269
Zhou Kai 周凱  305
Zhuang Tinglong 莊廷鑨  257
Zhuanyun zhai 篆雲齋  261, 262, 265, 268, 288
Zhu Cishou 祝慈寿  31, 36, 40, 112
Zhuge Liang 諸葛亮  307
Zhu Gui 朱圭  275
zhuoling chang 濯靈厰  78
zhuoqi 琢器  342
Zhu Puzhai 朱朴齋  163, 167
Zhu Zhiyao 朱志堯  167
zhuzhi 竹紙  228
zhuzuo jiang 住作匠  58
zibei  126
zidi 子弟  305
ziqiang 自強. See self-strengthening
Ziyi gongsuo 梓義公所 (Carpenters’ guild)  102
zongban 總辦  197
Zongli yamen 總理衙門  73, 123, 136, 219, 260
zuanfu 鑽夫  171
Zunftkampf  326
zuofang 作坊  315
zuofa 做法  86
Zuo Zongtang 左宗棠  70, 123, 138, 144
zuo 作  321
Zurndorfer, Harriet  23, 28, 37
